

## ASSESSING THE MATABELE WARS: AN EXERCISE IN UNDERSTANDING THE PERSPECTIVE OF "THE OTHER"

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*Instead of focusing on the victors' perspective, Scott T. Noth explores an unfamiliar viewpoint in this paper for an Imperialism and Colonialism Graduate seminar. Mr. Noth is working on his M.A. in history at Eastern and anticipates graduating during Summer 1995.*

The last two decades of the 19th century were characterized by frenzied European expansion and colonization. This was the period of the so-called "scramble for Africa," where European powers fought with each other over pieces of the great African cake. One of the most famous episodes in the scramble was that involving Cecil Rhodes and his British South Africa Company and their attempt to acquire the lands and mineral wealth of the Ndebele, a Nguni speaking society settled in modern day Zimbabwe.

The intrusion of the British South Africa Company into Matabeleland can be viewed as merely an episode of European expansion: simply another chapter in the advance of imperialism. However, few imperialist forces have received such widespread admiration or condemnation as the B.S.A.C. and few have had such an aggressive leader as Cecil Rhodes: a man whose devotion to the "advancement of 'Anglo-Saxondom'" was revealed in his professed desire to build a British empire "stretching uninterrupted from Cape to Cairo."<sup>1</sup> For Rhodes, the Matabele people were mere obstacles to his imperialistic ambitions.

Historically, imperialists like Rhodes have consistently failed to appreciate the perspective of their opponents; historians as well have consistently failed fully to understand the dilemmas which native people faced. The failure of

imperialists and historians to comprehend the view of the "Other" is discussed by J. D. Hargreaves: "Once historians can begin to see African states, not just as curious museum pieces whose affairs are only intelligible to anthropologists, but as politics sharing many basic aims with governments everywhere, his [sic] whole perspective may begin to change."<sup>2</sup>

This paper will study the Matabele War of 1893 from the perspective of the Ndebele, focusing on the internal political pressures posed by European expansion and the dilemmas these pressures posed for the Ndebele king. Representatives of the British South Africa Company did *not* view the Ndebele nation as a legitimate political entity. In their drive to settle and exploit Matabeleland, the B.S.A.C. deliberately deceived and manipulated Lobengula, the Ndebele king, for concessions until they could finally justify his removal by force. The first of two wars against the Ndebele--commonly called the Matabele Wars--commenced on October 5th, 1893 when High Commissioner of the B.S.A.C., Sir Henry Loch, gave Dr. Jameson permission to proceed with his plans to invade Matabeleland. Less than a month later, the King of the Ndebele was in full flight to the north and the troops of the British South Africa Company marched triumphantly into the capital, Bulawayo.

To understand the Ndebele perspective on these events, one must explore the political organization of the Ndebele, the specific goals of the B.S.A.C., the political motivations of major pre-war treaties and land concessions, and the general policies of Dr. L. S. Jameson, (the Company's chief agent). Also, a study of specific controversial events that "set the grounds" for conflict provides valuable insight to the true mind-sets and motivations of the main characters just before the war began.

### The Ndebele political organization--Lobengula's dilemma

The Ndebele were a closely knit people: organized in a highly stratified caste society with a king, (*rikosi*), holding absolute power. Following the Zulu pattern, the king was supported by several military units, each led by a separate chief, (*an induna*). Being a highly militarized society, the Ndebele preferred warfare to cultivation or mining. Iron tools and weapons as well as grain, cattle, and captives were provided by subservient tribute paying societies, such as the

2. J. D. Hargreaves, "Towards a History of the Partition of Africa," *Journal of African History*, Vol. I. (1960): 109.

1 Harold Nelson, *Zimbabwe: A Country Study* (Washington: U.S. Government, 1983), 17.

Shona, who lived East of Matabeleland.<sup>3</sup> According to historian Stafford Glass, "This practice had an economic basis in that it enabled cattle and grain to be secured for the nation; it had also a political and military objective in that youths may be secured to be trained as soldiers."<sup>4</sup> Lobengula's succession to the throne was hotly contested and the cleavage resulted in a brief civil war in 1870. An unstable succession, however, was only the beginning of Lobengula's troubles. The steady approach of Europeans posed a difficult dilemma for the new *ikosi*. Lobengula, like his father who rule before him, recognized that a war with Europeans would likely end in an Ndebele defeat, so he adopted a rather pacific policy.<sup>5</sup> This policy angered his young warriors, however, who to gain status in Ndebele society, won their honors in battle. Lobengula, according to John Galbraith, "seemed to be caught between the contradictions of white objectives and the basic nature of Ndebele society."<sup>6</sup>

Ultimately, it was the Ndebeles' relationship with the Shona that caused the most tension with the Europeans. Raids on the subservient Shona were necessary to maintain order and reproduce the state. These raids produced friction with white pioneers who had other plans for the Shona. According to Adrian Darton, the pioneers saw the Mashona as a potential labor source: "When the pioneers arrived, they looked upon the gloomy Shona faces on which the stamp of bondage clearly showed, and were sure that they had found a people who should be only too glad to receive their protection in return for labour services."<sup>7</sup> The B.S.A.C. never seemed to appreciate why Lobengula resisted the loss of Ndebele power over the Shona. J. A. Barnes emphasizes the significance of Ndebele raids, verifying Lobengula's fear: "Prohibition on raiding would strike at the very roots of the Matabele military state, socially as well as economically."<sup>8</sup> A complete understanding of this conflict is necessary in forming an appreciation of the Ndebele nation as a *political state* and to understand the king's dilemma. For it was with this dilemma in mind, that Lobengula shaped his policy *vis-à-vis* the British South Africa Company.

<sup>3</sup> Nelson, *Zimbabwe*, 13.

<sup>4</sup> Stafford Glass, *The Matabele War* (London: Longmans, 1968), 2.

<sup>5</sup> Nelson, *Zimbabwe*, 16.

<sup>6</sup> John S. Galbraith, *Crown and Charter: The Early Years of the British South Africa Company* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 30.

<sup>7</sup> Adrian Darton, *The Pioneers of Mashonaland* (London: Oxford Press, 1914), 97.

<sup>8</sup> J. A. Barnes, *Politics in a Changing Society* (Cape Town: University Press, 1954), 30.

### Cecil Rhodes' Ambitions: "From Cape to Cairo"

Cecil Rhodes was an aggressive imperialist administrator who coveted the land and rich mineral resources to the north of the Limpopo River including lands under Lobengula's hegemony. Throughout the mid-nineteenth century, several nations had been diligently working to solicit and acquire concessions from the Ndebele King: the Boers, Portuguese, Germans, and British were the strongest contenders. In the words of John Moffat, a key negotiator for the B.S.A.C., by the end of August 1888, "there was already quite a crowd of Europeans badgering the King at Bulawayo."<sup>9</sup> Cecil Rhodes, however, proved to be the most determined aggressor.

Rhodes established a company to exploit the supposed mineral wealth of Matabeleland, but his ambitions were not limited to economic profit. Biographer Patrick Keatley contends that Rhodes believed in British superiority and in his own destiny to help extend the British empire: "He believed that he had a special mission in life and this mission was to paint the map of Africa red—i.e., to acquire as much as possible of Africa for the British."<sup>10</sup>

The achievement of all these ambitions, however, was impossible in the face of a formidable Ndebele army and constant competition from rivals. For this reason, Rhodes initiated efforts to establish a legal British presence in Matabeleland that would thwart the ambitions of all competitors. The Lobengula-Moffat Treat and the Rudd Concession provided Rhodes with a legal basis for his imperialistic ambition.

### The Lobengula-Moffat Treaty of 1888: "Would I have given myself to any white nation in this way?"

In 1888, Rhodes contacted Sir Sidney Shippard, (the Administrator of Bechuanaland), and asserted that Great Britain should declare Matabeleland and Mashonaland to be under British protection.<sup>11</sup> The B.S.A.C. appointed the Reverend John Moffat to establish official relations with Lobengula. John Moffat was the son of Robert Moffat, the famous missionary who had befriended Lobengula's predecessor, Mzilikazi, and was acquainted with Ndebele customs. This was the first concrete effort by the B.S.A.C. to involve itself in Ndebele political affairs.

<sup>9</sup> Philip Mason, *The Birth of a Dilemma* (London: Oxford Press, 1958), 121.

<sup>10</sup> Patrick Keatley, *The Politics of Farmship* (Hammondsworth: Penguin Books, 1963), 77.

<sup>11</sup> Siunlake Samkange, *Origins of Rhodesia* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), 57.

Historian Arthur Keppel-Jones suggests that Moffat's mission was to ascertain the truth about the Grobler Treaty, a "friendship" treaty between the Ndebele and the Boers, and, if possible, to get Lobengula to sign a treaty giving Britain the sole right to influence affairs in Matabeleland.<sup>17</sup> Moffat attempted to nullify the Grobler Treaty by trying to persuade Lobengula completely to deny its validity. In January of 1888, Lobengula signed such a statement: "[Lobengula, Chief of the Amandebele, declare that the words of the treaty of 30 July 1887 [the Grobler Treaty] . . . are not true—they are not my words."<sup>18</sup> This statement, according to Keppel-Jones, "was enough to convince Moffat that the Grobler Treaty had been repudiated."<sup>14</sup>

Eleven days later, Moffat convinced Lobengula to enter into a formal treaty with Britain. This treaty stated concisely that:

Lobengula . . . will refrain from entering into any treaty with any Foreign State or Power to sell, alienate or cede . . . any part of Amandebele country . . . without the previous knowledge and sanction of Her Majesty's High Commissioner for South Africa.<sup>15</sup>

The B.S.A.C. naturally interpreted the treaty's terms as giving them nearly complete authority to decide the fate of Lobengula's land and its resources. Lobengula found to his regret that he had apparently signed away much of his independence.

After signing the treaty, the Ndebele King reemphasized to Moffat his determination to maintain complete political hegemony. When Moffat asked whether the Boers had secured political rights concerning land distribution, Lobengula replied "Would I have given myself to any white nation in this way?"<sup>16</sup> Obviously, Lobengula was becoming aware of the B.S.A.C.'s trickery with words, including Moffat's.

In effect, Moffat's treaty severely restricted Lobengula's ability to control his nation's foreign affairs. Moffat had so far expanded Britain's political control over Matabeleland that Lobengula would have to ask Britain's permission to make international policy decisions. Colin Leys asserts that Moffat claimed that Lobengula agreed "not to enter into correspondence on any subject with any foreign state or power, without the previous knowledge and permission of the

Governor at the Cape."<sup>17</sup> Considering Lobengula's absolute denial of this agreement, one must ask how such a misunderstanding could have occurred. Would Lobengula have signed a treaty that put him virtually under the control of the British Government? A more plausible possibility is suggested by J. G. Lockhart and C. M. Woodhouse, in their biography of Rhodes. They maintain that the missionary C. D. Helm, (the oral interpreter of the treaty), "was secretly in the employ of Rhodes."<sup>18</sup> This brings into serious question the legitimacy of Moffat's interpretive claims.

On the back of the Lobengula-Moffat Treaty, Helms has written "the document has been fully interpreted and explained by me to Chief Lobengula and his full council of Indunas . . . this thirtieth day of October, 1888."<sup>19</sup> Colin Leys raises an interesting suspicion concerning Helms' writing: Helms' statement was signed on 30 October, 1888, whereas the treaty itself was signed on 11 February, 1888, (eight months before). According to Leys, it seems improbable that Helms would have waited to explain the meaning of the treaty a full eight months after Lobengula had signed it.<sup>20</sup>

**The Rudd Concession: "... there is a great misunderstanding about this."**

The Rudd Concession of 1891, which granted exclusive mineral rights to the British South Africa Company in Matabeleland, was to become the most controversial agreement signed between the B.S.A.C. and the Ndebele. One scholar argues that: "If Moffat was less than forthcoming with Lobengula, Rudd deliberately deceived him."<sup>21</sup> The B.S.A.C. took extreme liberty in its interpretations of the contents, drawing opposition not only from Lobengula but from several European-based interests.<sup>22</sup> It is not surprising that Rhodes pursued it so determinedly, since, according to historians Robinson, Gallagher, and Denny, "the [Rudd] concession, to Rhodes, was of extreme importance: it was the basis of his entire project." Robinson continues, saying that, "on it [the concession] he could raise his company and exploit the option that it gave him in the dominions of Lobengula."<sup>23</sup>

17 Colin Leys, *European Politics in Southern Rhodesia* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), 7.  
18 J. G. Lockhart and C. M. Woodhouse, *Rhodes* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1963), 144.  
19 Gustav S. Preller, *Lobengula* (Johannesburg: Johannesburg Press, 1963), 76.  
20 Leys, *European Politics*, 8.  
21 Nelson, *Zimbabwe*, 18.  
22 Glass, *The Matabele War*, 8.

23 R. Robinson, J. Gallagher, and A. Denny, *Africa and the Victorians* (London: Oxford Press, 1961), 240.

12 *Ibid.*, 57.

13 *Ibid.*

14 Arthur Keppel-Jones, *Rhodes and Rhodesia: White Conquest of Zimbabwe, 1884-1902* (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1983), 156.

15 Samkange, *Origins*, 58.

16 *Ibid.*, 65.

The stipulations of the concession, albeit deceptive, were truly a work of diplomatic genius. The concession *seemingly* benefitted both Rhodes and Lobengula. Samkange maintains that Lobengula's interests partially coincided with those of Rhodes. He asserts that "Lobengula wanted no more white men in his country, while Rhodes did not want any more white competitors in Matabeleland."<sup>24</sup> Lobengula's reasons for wanting to preserve his hegemony were plain enough. Rhodes' true intentions were not as evident. From a close examination of the treaty and the events surrounding it, it is clear that Rhodes never intended to limit his expansion simply to Lobengula's domain. According to Lockhart and Woodhouse, "the arrangement, [the Rudd Concession] suited Rhodes admirably, for the occupation of Mashonaland would enable him to extend his tentacles into more distant lands and make treaties with the chiefs."<sup>25</sup>

From the outset, the Rudd party, (consisting of Charles Rudd, James Maguire, Sir Sidney Shippard, and Francis Thompson) deceived Lobengula as to their true intentions. Samkange recounts the party's first meeting with the Ndebele King. After presenting him with one hundred gold sovereigns, they told him that they were not like other concession seekers, since they did not want land, but only permission for about ten men to dig for gold. In return they promised Lobengula a thousand rifles, a hundred thousand rounds of ammunition, a gunboat on the Zambezi, and an allowance of 100 pounds sterling every year.<sup>26</sup>

Lobengula wanted to believe from these initial meetings that the B.S.A.C. would pose no significant threat to his security and sovereignty, that Rhodes' company was not like the other concession seekers. According to Per Hassing, Shippard stressed that "the English like to make money by trading and mining, but do not in general covet land."<sup>27</sup> The B.S.A.C. sought to define their role as a "protector" of Ndebele interests. Only by granting the concession, they claimed, could Lobengula and the B.S.A.C. end the constant harassment from other land-greedy interests. "We do not covet the land of the Amandabele for ourselves," Shippard told Lobengula, but "we do not wish to see the Boers gaining possession of it."<sup>28</sup>

By 1891, however, Lobengula was well aware of the Imperialists' tactics in twisting promises to suit their own purposes. In what seems a premonition, the

<sup>24</sup> Samkange, *Origins*, 84.

<sup>25</sup> Lockhart and Woodhouse, *Rhodes*, 175.

<sup>26</sup> Samkange, *Origins*, 73.

<sup>27</sup> Per Hassing, "Lobengula," *Leadership in Eastern Africa* (Boston: University Press, 1968), 242.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*

Ndebele King had reprimanded another prospective imperialist in 1871, saying "Yes, you may promise fairly now, but in the future time, when you are strongly established, you may forget your promise and exceed the liberty I have given."<sup>29</sup> Unfortunately, Lobengula's suspicions about the Rudd Concession were confirmed in the actual document itself. The signed concession differed significantly from the simplistic ideas first offered by Shippard to Lobengula, and the B.S.A.C. took advantage of the document's vague clauses to give themselves enhanced political control in Lobengula's domain. For example, in addition to exclusive charge over all metals and minerals in Matabeleland, the B.S.A.C. gained "full power to do all things that *they may deem necessary* to win and procure the same . . ." <sup>30</sup> (emphasis added). The concession also authorized the grantees "to take *all necessary* and lawful steps to exclude from [Matabeleland] all persons seeking land, metals, and mining rights therein . . ." <sup>31</sup> (emphasis added).

Rhodes' own broad interpretation of the Rudd Concession is revealed in a letter he wrote to Jameson: "Our concession is so gigantic, it is like giving a man the whole of Australia."<sup>32</sup> Clearly, Lobengula did not view the mining rights concession as "giving" away his entire country. After reading an article regarding the Rudd Concession in a Cape Town paper, Lobengula made known his disagreement with the B.S.A.C.'s interpretation. He immediately sent a Notice to be published in *The Bechuanaland News* and the *Malmari Chronicle*:

I hear it is published in the newspapers that I have granted a concession in all my country to Charles Rudd . . . As there is a great misunderstanding about this, all action about this, all action in respect of the said concession is hereby suspended, pending an investigation to be made by me in my country.<sup>33</sup>

The Colonial office in London paid little attention to Lobengula's complaints. Cecil Rhodes, however, was greatly troubled by the Ndebele King's rejection of the concession. According to Samkange, "Rhodes realized . . . that the Grant of a [Royal] Charter would depend upon his having a valid concession from Lobengula."<sup>34</sup>

<sup>29</sup> J. P. R. Wallis, *The Northern Goldfields Diaries of Thomas Baines* (London: Oxford Press, 1946), 236.

<sup>30</sup> C. W. Mackintosh, *Some Pioneer Missions of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland* (R. I. Museum, 1950), 398.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>32</sup> A. J. Willis, *An Introduction to the History of Central Africa*, 3rd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), 135.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 137.

<sup>34</sup> Samkange, *Origins*, 87.

How could such a misunderstanding have occurred? First, it is entirely possible that the final document was not the one read to him and to which he agreed. It was the Reverend C. D. Helm who not only had interpreted the treaty for the king, but had also advised him to grant the concession to Rhodes.<sup>35</sup> As mentioned before, Helm was employed by Rhodes and therefore probably not as impartial as Lobengula was thought to think. Second, the European's version of the concession is not consistent with the facts. Interesting questions regarding the validity of the concession are raised after studying the conclusions of the Inyati missionaries. These missionaries, who had no part in the negotiations, were asked by Lobengula to read the Rudd Concession in order to resolve the misunderstanding once and for all. Samkange describes the moment in which Lobengula asks arguably the most important question of his reign. Lobengula handed the missionaries a copy of the Rudd Concession, saying, "Read that piece of paper, and tell me faithfully whether I have given away any of the land of the Matabele." The missionaries replied, "Yes King, you have. How can the white men dig for gold without land?"<sup>36</sup>

This simple exchange raises fundamental questions concerning the validity of Rhodes' version. For example: if the concession was read to Lobengula, as Reverend Helm contends, then why was the king unable to ask such questions before the Inyati missionaries read it to him? If the concession had been completely explained by Helm to Lobengula and his full council of *indunas*, why is it that his *indunas* were found to be ignorant of its contents?<sup>37</sup>

Such questions may only be asked by one willing to consider the misunderstanding from the perspective of the "Other." If one does not consider this perspective, such fundamentally important questions will quite possibly be overlooked and an objective truth consequently missed. Clearly, the B.S.A.C. took full advantage of the communication barrier to advance its own hidden agenda, driven by the insatiable appetite of their leader, Rhodes. Considering the Ndebele's unfortunate plight following these events, one can understand why Lobengula, weary with frustration near the end of his life, declared, "The white man is, indeed, the father of lies."<sup>38</sup>

35 *Ibid.*36 *Ibid.*, 114.37 *Ibid.*, 116.38 *Ibid.*, 55.

### Jameson's Policy Towards Lobengula and the Robbery of Telegraph Wires—"What great wrong have I done?"

Dr. L. S. Jameson, Chief Agent and Administrator for the B.S.A.C. was responsible for the Company's general policy towards the Ndebele nation. By studying the key points in his evolving policy in the late 1880's and the early 1890's, one can understand the immediate causes of the Matabele Wars. Stafford contends that "the policy [Jameson] chose to follow could not function side by side with the needs of the military system of Lobengula and his Matabele nation."<sup>39</sup>

By December 1891, Lobengula still maintained that he had not in any way renounced his ownership of Mashonaland. Lobengula claimed complete hegemony over the subservient Mashona peoples even after the B.S.A.C. had, according to P. F. Hone, "strengthened its claim to the occupation, if not the possession, of Mashonaland through the Lippert Concession."<sup>40</sup> This concession, according to Hone, gave the British the added right to "lay out, grant or lease . . . farms, townships, [and] building plots . . ."<sup>41</sup>

Jameson's subsequent policies clearly indicate that he held absolutely no regard for Lobengula's long-kept tradition of extracting tribute from subservient societies throughout the region: a region which at that time was being systematically developed and settled by Europeans. An example of Jameson's disregard of Ndebele hegemony in Mashonaland is demonstrated in his policy of screening Ndebele who attempted to enter Mashonaland: he accepted Ndebele workers but turned back raiding parties. Historian A. G. Leonard briefly summarizes this policy, illustrating Jameson's personal assessment of an Ndebele's purpose and worth: "There were no other reasons why the Matabele should enter Mashonaland. Above all, those with warlike intentions must be kept out. Raiding parties, bent on extracting tribute from vassal Mashona chiefs, were the least welcome."<sup>42</sup>

Such demeaning policies as these contributed greatly to Lobengula's dilemma. The Ndebele King's firm resistance to the changes being introduced by the intruders, based on years of Ndebele tradition, was necessary to maintain order in his state.

39 Glass, *The Matabele War*, 13.40 P. F. Hone, *Southern Rhodesia* (London: Oxford University Press, 1909), 110.41 *Ibid.*42 A. G. Leonard, *How We Made Rhodesia* (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), 193.

The tension created by Jameson's policy was further intensified by the use of threats to maintain the integrity of a Company-imposed border. Biographer Felix Gross cites a series of telegrams that illustrate the nature of the border dispute: "On September 5, 1892, Lobengula was asked to keep his *impi* [raiding parties] out of the Victoria district . . . and on May 22, 1893, Jameson wrote, ". . . I have already explained to the king that bodies of this people crossing into Mashonaland might get into trouble."<sup>43</sup> Lobengula, too, found little in the actions of whites of which he could approve. Philip Mason cites Lobengula's warning to Jameson in February 1892: "I don't like the action you have taken with the Mashona. What does it matter if the Mashona fight among themselves? It is bad for you to mix yourself up in such matters."<sup>44</sup>

Despite Lobengula's attempts to maintain his traditional hegemony over the Mashona, Jameson's border policy persisted. A seemingly trivial event, the robbery of five-hundred yards of telegraph wire by Mashona peoples who desired to use it for bodily ornament, escalated the political dispute between the Europeans and the Ndebele into military conflict. The B.S.A.C.'s police responded to this robbery by seizing Mashona cattle. This action angered Lobengula, for he was the ultimate owner of the cattle and he wished to punish the Mashona himself. Glass contends that this situation revealed an enormous opportunity for Rhodes to justify the removal of the Ndebele by force: "The B.S.A.C. had stressed to both sides the need to observe the boundary. Both had made it clear that aggressive bands were not to enter Mashonaland."<sup>45</sup> When Lobengula naturally applied justice through a small raiding party, Jameson declared war, driving all Ndebele from the predominantly European Victoria district. Unable to compete with European firepower, Lobengula and his people were forced to withdraw.<sup>46</sup> Lobengula in a last, desperate appeal for reason, wrote, ". . . what has my *impi* [raiding party] done among the white people? . . . the *impi* had no concern with white men. I want to know from you . . . what great wrong have I done?"<sup>47</sup>

It is Lobengula's final plea for an explanation that best illustrates the B.S.A.C.'s failure to appreciate the dilemma of the "Other." Guided by Cecil Rhodes' continental ambitions, the Company viewed the Ndebele people

solely as irritating obstacles to European expansion. From the perspective of the "Other," it is clear that the B.S.A.C. did not fully respect the Ndebele nation as a political entity. Through deceptive treaties and concessions, Company representatives (as well as employee Reverend Helm), merely manipulated the sizeable communication barrier with the Ndebele King in order to gain as much political power within his domain as their consciences would allow. A study of the Lobengula-Moffat Treaty, the Rudd Concession, and Jameson's various policies brings one to a greater appreciation of the severity of "Lobengula's dilemma" and how the Company manipulated it. It is clear from the study of this specific case alone that employing the perspective of the "Other" can enrich one's understanding of the history of European imperialism.

43 Felix Gross, *Rhodes of Africa* (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), 207.

44 Mason, *The Birth of a Dilemma*, 154.

45 Glass, *The Matabele War*, 38.

46 *Ibid.*, 71-73.

47 *Ibid.*, 152.