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Letter from the Editor-in-Chief

It has been my honor to serve as editor-in-chief of the 28th edition of *Historia*, a journal associated with our Eastern Illinois University chapter of Phi Alpha Theta and dedicated to publishing the best of graduate and undergraduate historical research at our university. Choosing the final articles for the 2019 issue proved difficult as we had many worthy submissions. Collectively, our editors rallied together, and ultimately we believe that within this edition are articles encompassing the finest of what our university has to offer. We would like to thank the EIU History faculty for providing countless hours of mentoring to students who submitted articles for consideration. We also wish to thank our authors and all who took time to submit their work. Our research becomes our children and to expose ourselves and our work to criticism is never easy.

Our final editing occurred in the shadow of sad events in France. The devastating fire that nearly destroyed Notre Dame Cathedral on April 15, 2019 united our world in shock and in a commitment to rebuild and preserve what was left of this iconic piece of history. This tragedy provides this issue of *Historia* with its theme: the importance of preservation. Primary sources, archaeological evidence, and material culture are crucial tools for every historian. Without access to these precious resources, the articles within this journal could not have been written.

Along with our faculty mentors, we must thank our History Department chair, Dr. Sace Elder, and our graduate coordinator, Dr. Lee Patterson. We would be remiss not to mention our beloved Ms. Donna Nichols who has retired after many years of service to our department. Lastly, the *Historia* staff needs to thank our fearless leader, Dr. Edmund Wehrle, for the many hours he put towards the publishing of this journal, long after classes have ended. We also want to thank those who continued to work on the journal after the official semester ended, especially Kashonta Dixon.

Sincerely,
Sara English, editor-in-chief, *Historia* (vol. 28)

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Cyrus the Mythical: Perceptions and Memory of the Great King

Andrew M. Goldstein

Andrew Goldstein is a graduate student from Mechanicsburg, Illinois. He wrote this paper for Dr. Patterson's HIS-5440: Ancient Persia in Fall 2019.

In 1971, more than two millennia after the collapse of the Achaemenid Empire, dozens of world leaders once again flocked to its desert capital of Persepolis. They came at the behest of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, reigning monarch of Iran and self-professed successor to an extensive line of Persian kings. The visitors were treated to extravagant accommodations, including elaborate historical reenactments and a massive display of fireworks over the ancient city. It was all part of a celebration meant to commemorate the 2,500-year anniversary of the founding of the empire by Cyrus the Great, the legendary ruler who was known in his own time as “King of the Four Corners of the World.” In an emotional speech delivered in front of Cyrus’ tomb, Pahlavi praised his perceived predecessor as the “extraordinary emancipator of History” and “one of the most noble sons of Humanity.”¹

While the 1971 Persepolis Celebration was undoubtedly a political stunt meant to support a failing regime, it did succeed in reinvigorating the myth of Cyrus. This legend, cultivated over millennia, depicts the founder of the Achaemenid Dynasty as the perfect leader and a model for subsequent generations of rulers to follow. It is a construct formed by centuries of fictional narratives, propaganda, and a desire to invent the ideal king. These qualities can be seen in sources written throughout history, from those that were contemporaneous with Cyrus, to classical and biblical accounts. Over the course of thousands of years, the pictures painted by these sources gradually merged together to create a mythical and fictitious image of the king as a wise and benevolent ruler without flaws and unmatched in greatness. The truth of Cyrus is, unfortunately, lost to history—clouded beyond recognition by hundreds of generations seeking to mold the king to fit their own idyllic narratives. Today, however, it is clear that the ancient king remains remembered through the lens of the lasting “Cyrus myth.”

Cyrus in the Contemporary Sources

Accounts of Cyrus composed during his lifetime are a rarity; the passage of more than twenty-five hundred years has served to reduce many such records to dust. The few that survive today were carved into cuneiform tablets and exist largely in fragmentary portions that have been translated in recent centuries by historians and archaeologists. Two of the most complete sources available to us today, the Cyrus Cylinder and Nabonidus Chronicle, are immeasurably important in shaping our understanding and perception of the founder of the Achaemenid Empire. Each text offered a somewhat contrasting account of Cyrus’ arrival in Babylon in 539 BC, but their many similarities have allowed us to craft a working narrative of the conquest informed by both Persian and Mesopotamian voices.

¹ Talinn Grigor, “Preserving the Antique Modern: Persepolis ‘71.” *Future Anterior: Journal of Historic Preservation, History, Theory, and Criticism* 2, no. 1 (2005): 22-29.

The first of these two records, the Cyrus Cylinder, was a traditional Babylonian “building text,” placed into the foundations of a temple to the city’s patron god Marduk. It appears as a first-person perspective, ostensibly inscribed by the king himself, as a supposed firsthand account of Cyrus’ peaceful and divinely ordained conquest of Babylon. According to the cylinder, Marduk called on Cyrus to rescue the people of Mesopotamia from the cruel reign of the previous ruler Nabonidus. Cyrus, answering the call and accompanied by Marduk himself, led his “teeming army” across the Tigris River and into Babylon without a fight.² Nabonidus was deposed, and all the lesser sovereigns of the region came to do Cyrus homage. The new king graciously returned the images, statues, and peoples who had been captive in Babylon (including the followers of Judaism) to their places of origin, and set about restoring the many sanctuaries and shrines across the city—hence the placement of the cylinder in a temple that was presumably rebuilt during this period. At the end of the narrative, Cyrus referred to Ashurbanipal, the last king of Assyria, as “a king who came before me,” seemingly linking himself to the long line of Babylonian royalty.³

While the Cyrus Cylinder is a unique and fascinating account and one that has undoubtedly served to reinforce his image as a benevolent and humane ruler, it does not necessarily reflect the reality of the great king’s reign. The constant reverence and respect given to Marduk and its interment beneath his temple point to the cylinder as a piece of Persian propaganda, used to placate the people of Babylon. It also justified Cyrus’ claim to the city by depicting Nabonidus as having fallen out of favor with the gods, and thus being unfit to rule. His alignment with Ashurbanipal and supposed acceptance of Babylonian tradition was likewise a common tactic of conquerors seeking to legitimize their governance.⁴

The Cyrus Cylinder was furthermore refuted by the account given in the Nabonidus Chronicle, the second important contemporary source on the king. This chronicle covered much of the same time period as the cylinder, but detailed the arrival of Cyrus in a slightly less venerable manner. In this narrative, Cyrus’ conquests of Media in 550 BC and Lydia in 547 BC had brought him to the edge of Mesopotamia. His path to Babylon in 539 BC was far from the bloodless venture described in the cylinder; the chronicle told of a battle at Opis against the Babylonian army, and how the victorious Cyrus proceeded to send one of his military commanders ahead to seize the city (iii.12). This general entered without conflict, but the king himself did not arrive until three weeks later, long after any potential resistance had been subdued. While the chronicle did mention that Cyrus set about rebuilding the city’s monuments and participated in many of its traditional ceremonies, its final lines took particular care to reference a celebratory religious procession during which he donned Persian garb rather than the customary Babylonian; a gesture evidently meant to reaffirm to the people that they were now under the control of a foreign ruler.⁵

The primary reason that the Nabonidus Chronicle should be regarded as a superior source to the Cyrus Cylinder is its general reliability. It was part of a series of “Babylonian Chronicles,” infrequent records carved by astronomers and based on certain astrological cycles.⁶ This ensured that the chronicles were not created at the behest of any king or other power, and thus provided a largely detached and unbiased appraisal of events. While the chronicle’s depiction did not necessarily portray Cyrus in an overtly negative light, it was noticeably less accommodating of his actions; his “slaughter” of the people of Akkad en route to Babylon and his refusal to enter the city for three weeks until it was secured paint a much less benign and kingly image than that constructed by the

² Mark Chavalas, *The Ancient Near East: Historical Sources in Translation* (Malden: Blackwell, 2006), 428-429.

³ Chavalas, *The Ancient Near East*, 428-429.

⁴ Amélie Kuhrt, “The Cyrus Cylinder and Achaemenid Imperial Policy” *Journal for the Study of the Old Testament* 25 (1983): 88.

⁵ Amélie Kuhrt, “Cyrus the Great of Persia: Images and Realities” in *Representations of Political Power: Case Histories in Times of Change and Dissolving Order in the Ancient Near East*, ed. Marlies Heines and Marian Feldman (Warsaw, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2007), 178.

⁶ Kuhrt, *Images and Realities*, 176.

cylinder (iii.14). The explicit mention of the king's "Elamite dress" during a religious ceremony also seems to allude to the idea that he was not the universally accepted and celebrated liberator portrayed by his propagandists (iii.26).

Overall, the contemporary sources on Cyrus are of varied usefulness in constructing a realistic perception of the empire's founder. The Cyrus Cylinder offers plentiful information, but is based partially in fiction; conversely, the Nabonidus Chronicle remains a reliable record, but is frustratingly fragmented and vague. Still, there is much to be gained from these sources in the places that they overlap. For instance, one can infer that the king was an immensely resourceful and calculating leader, who understood the importance of appeasing conquered peoples by superficial acceptance of religious tradition and alignment with past dynasties. He was also capable of conveying his dominance through shows of force and assertion of cultural superiority. These qualities, among others, would inform the perceptions of later generations and continue to surface in narratives of Cyrus throughout history.

Cyrus in Classical Traditions

Fascination with Cyrus did not end with his death in 530 BC, or even when the empire he founded collapsed under the strain of Macedonian invasion two-hundred years later. Narratives of his exploits continued to be crafted by historians well into the period of classical antiquity, resulting in a much more abundant trove of evidence than what can be gathered from the few remaining contemporary sources. However, this vast expanse of knowledge is not without flaws. Many authors based their accounts from oral traditions that had been repeated over centuries, which led to some events being skewed beyond recognition. Others could be criticized for profound biases and blatantly fictitious plots, meant to construct a version of Cyrus that best fit their narrative and ideological goals. Still, much can be gained from these sources through cross-reference with one another, as well as with other extant records, such as the Cyrus Cylinder and Nabonidus Chronicle.

One of the two accounts most fundamentally responsible for our mythological perception of Cyrus is undoubtedly Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*. This epic series of eight books depicted Cyrus as the ideal king, raised as a vassal in the Median court to his grandfather Astyages and trained as a great general and cunning diplomat. Throughout the course of Media's lengthy war with the Babylonians, Cyrus traversed the near east and forged alliances between his kingdom and many others. In the end, Cyrus and his allies were able to defeat and capture Babylon in 539 (Xen. Cy. 7.5.20-42). Cyaxares, successor to Astyages and Cyrus' uncle, ultimately bestowed upon his nephew the Median kingdom (Xen. Cy. 8.5.19-20). Part of the final book of Xenophon's narrative was a lengthy discussion of how Persia quickly fell from glory following Cyrus' death, solidifying the idea that his rule had been uniquely successful due to the characteristics of leadership that he possessed.

Though widely considered by today's scholars to be one of the first great fictional novels, the *Cyropaedia*, according to Xenophon and many of his contemporaries, was a true work of history. Xenophon said as much in the opening pages of the first book, where he claimed to have crafted the work from his own inquiries while traversing the Persian Empire.⁷ However, the vast amount of dialogue between characters and the portrayal of numerous imagined events prove that Xenophon wrote not of the real Cyrus, but of his own ideal image of a perfect ruler and what that represented. For example, his portrayal of Cyrus as a faithful vassal to the Median King Cyaxares and the eventual inheritor of his great kingdom had no basis in historical fact; Cyaxares was a narrative invention; all other sources tell us that Cyrus overthrew the Medes to establish his own empire.⁸

⁷ Philip Stadter, "Fictional Narrative in the *Cyropaedia*," *The American Journal of Philology* 112, no. 4 (1991): 461.

⁸ Stadter, 463-464.

Depicting the future king as a patient ally who earned his success through loyalty, however, was more pertinent to Xenophon's narrative goal of crafting the ideal king.

While Xenophon's work was more akin to that of philosophers like Plato than it was to true histories, it still doubtlessly worked to enhance the strength of the Cyrus myth. A similar, yet more measured and immensely more important work was Herodotus' *Histories*. This vast chronicle, composed of nine books and written in the fifth century B.C, traced the saga of Greco-Persian relations from the time of Cyrus' founding of the empire to its loss against the Greeks at Marathon in 490. While Herodotus generally took a biased stance against the Persian kings, he told the story of Cyrus much differently. Like Xenophon, he posited that the eventual founder of the Achaemenid Empire was a grandson of the Median ruler Astyages, who foresaw in a dream his eventual overthrow at the hands of Cyrus (Hdt. 1.107). Astyages ordered the boy killed, but miraculous circumstances resulted in the future king's survival and adoption into a peasant family. Herodotus' narrative went on to detail Cyrus' prodigal leadership skills as a young boy and eventual discovery of his royal origins. He ultimately led a successful rebellion against Median authority, removing Astyages from power and becoming King of Persia (Hdt. 1.125-128). From this fairy-tale origin story, Herodotus' Cyrus went on to have immense success across Asia, including victories against Lydia and Babylon. Ultimately, though, the Great King fell in combat against the Massagetae tribe of northeastern Iran, marking the beginning of a long moral decline for the Persian Empire (Hdt. 1.214-216).

While Herodotus' managed to present a more restrained account of Cyrus' life than other historians such as Xenophon, he was still clearly taken with the idea of a "good" king and pursued a storytelling angle that portrayed him as such.⁹ One feature of Herodotus' narrative use of Cyrus was in his repeated reference to how the king "freed" the Persian people from Median oppression. One could argue that Herodotus sought to contrast the Persians of his own day to Cyrus by differentiating between their use of tyranny and oppression to subdue populations to the original king's desire to free his people. Such an objective would align well with Herodotus' primary narrative goal of disparaging the Persians of Darius and Xerxes.

One massive figure who was evidently influenced by the works of Herodotus and Xenophon was Alexander the Great. The account of his defeat of the Persian Empire by the Greco-Roman historian Arrian contained numerous references to the Macedonian king's fascination with his Persian precursors, including Cyrus. In one such occasion near the end of his decade-long campaign, Alexander supposedly led his fatigued forces across the inhospitable Gedrosian Desert. His justification for the crossing was to surpass Cyrus, whom legends claimed had once entered the desert with his entire army and escaped with only seven men (Arr. 6.24.2-3). While his true motivations for the Gedrosian expedition remain dubious, it seems clear that Alexander was deeply influenced by the ever-prominent Cyrus myth. In another instance conveyed by Arrian, Alexander visited the tomb of Cyrus at Pasargadae in Iran in 324 B.C. He was enraged to find it in a state of disarray, desecrated by thieves and left ruined. Cyrus' remains were strewn about the interior chamber, and his coffin was destroyed. Alexander demanded that the mausoleum be restored and resealed as a sign of respect to his perceived predecessor (Arr. 6.29).

While the reliability of Arrian may be questionable, one can assume that Alexander would have doubtlessly been influenced by the legend of Cyrus over the course of his foray into Persia. Having been educated by the great Aristotle, it is impossible to imagine that the young king would not have read Herodotus' *Histories*, and his exposure to Xenophon is similarly likely.¹⁰ These two authors' construction of Cyrus as an ideal king likely played a significant role in informing both

⁹ Harry C. Avery, "Herodotus' Picture of Cyrus," *The American Journal of Philology* 93, no. 4 (1972): 532-535.

¹⁰ Kieran McGroarty, "Did Alexander the Great Read Xenophon?" *Hermathena* 181 (2006): 105-107.

Alexander's reverence towards him and his desire to surpass his legacy. Consequently, his acceptance of the Cyrus myth and its inclusion in works such as Arrian's would only serve to further reinforce the image of the ancient king as the model ruler and one to be admired by future generations.

In the end, these classical sources do little to help us separate truth from fiction in the story of Cyrus. While they are beneficial in establishing the historical facts of his reign and necessary as some of the only extant records of his life, any description of Cyrus' character and exploits were generally clouded by the authors' own narrative goals. However, historians like Herodotus, Xenophon, and Arrian are not entirely to blame for their occasionally outlandish claims about the king—much of their information likely came from oral traditions and stories told over hundreds of years, which doubtlessly distorted the truth in various ways.¹¹ Despite whether their many fallacies were intentional or not, it does seem appropriate to place much of the blame for Cyrus' mythological perception on these authors, given that their accounts would go on to inspire the next two-thousand years of historical scholarship in the field of Achaemenid Persia.

Cyrus in the Biblical Tradition

Though only briefly mentioned, Cyrus' inclusion in the Bible and the subsequent reverence he received from later Hebrew scholars also served to boost his reputation as a benign humanitarian. This tradition was largely rooted in his freeing of the Jewish people from their seventy-year captivity in Babylon, which was cited in contemporary records such as the Cyrus Cylinder. Similar to other sources that have been discussed, however, the Bible and later accounts by historians like Josephus could be criticized for imagining what Cyrus represented rather than exploring who he truly was.

The biblical story of Cyrus was limited to the later chapters of the Book of Isaiah, which were purported to have been written by a prophet who lived during the early years of the Achaemenid Empire and has been referred to as Deutero-Isaiah (as the original Isaiah had lived roughly two centuries earlier).¹² Cyrus was discussed between the forty-first and forty-fifth chapters as having been the “shepherd” of God, called to release the Jews from Babylon (Isa. 44.28). While God acknowledged that Cyrus did not recognize his divine authority, he was still moved by the earthly king's righteousness and made him the anointed champion of the Hebrews. In the end, he commanded Cyrus to “rebuild my city (Jerusalem) and set my exiles free.” (Isa. 45.13).

While the Book of Isaiah would not generally be regarded as a scholarly text, it commands much importance in the historiography of Cyrus. While many historians have doubted that it was an immediately contemporary source, it was very likely written not long after Cyrus' reign.¹³ Thus, in a way comparable to the Nabonidus Chronicle, the Book of Isaiah represented an account of the king given from outside the Persian viewpoint. It also served as another testament to Cyrus' well-documented religious tolerance, a major factor in the development of his legendary status that had been attested to by both the contemporary and classical sources.

The biblical image of Cyrus also clearly influenced later historians and became even more widespread through their interpretations. One such example could be seen in the works of Josephus, a Jewish-Roman scholar writing in the first century A.D. The eleventh book of his *Antiquities of the Jews* depicted a similar situation to that laid out in the Bible, with Cyrus having been called by God to Babylon. After his liberation of the city, Cyrus read the prophecy given by the Book of Isaiah which claimed that he would one day free the Jews and return them to Israel (Jos. XI.1.2). Awed by this prediction, ostensibly written centuries earlier, Cyrus set about releasing the Jewish people back to

¹¹ Stadter, *Fictional Narrative in the Cyropaideia*, 463.

¹² Moshe Reiss, “Cyrus as Messiah,” *Jewish Bible Quarterly* 40, no. 3 (2012): 159.

¹³ Reiss, *Cyrus as Messiah*, 159.

their homeland, and ensured that they would be given all of the resources necessary to rebuild their temple and practice their religion. Josephus also transcribed a letter that the king had supposedly written to his satraps in Syria, describing the plight of the Jews and his intent to restore their city (Jos. XI.1.3).

Realistically, it seems unlikely that divine power inspired Cyrus to release the Jews from their captivity. More likely, he sought to reduce tension in the city and around the empire by engaging in religious tolerance and permitting the Jewish population to leave Babylon on their own accord. Josephus' assertion that Cyrus supported the rebuilding of the temple in Jerusalem after reading the prophecies in the Book of Isaiah is even more uncertain, given that modern religious historians do not believe that these chapters were authored until after Cyrus' death. Some scholars, however, have interpreted the reconstruction of Jerusalem as having been simply made possible by Cyrus' freeing of the Jews, and misunderstood by Josephus as the king endorsing the temple project.¹⁴

Regardless of its historical authenticity, the account of Cyrus in the Bible has unquestionably had an immeasurable bearing on history's perception of the king. As one of the most widely-read and circulated books of all time, its portrayal of Cyrus has arguably had more of an impact than any other source could and has contributed to his legend immensely. Likewise, Josephus' prominent Jewish history also served to propagate the myth of Cyrus to the masses, and would go on to influence many other biblical historians over the centuries to continue growing the legend of Cyrus.

Cyrus in Iranian Memory

The passage of time has made it difficult to tell how well Cyrus was remembered, if at all, throughout the pre-Islamic Arsacid and Sassanian periods. Unlike his immediate successors, who carved massive monuments into stone at places like Bisitun and Naqsh-e Rostam, the founder of the Achaemenid Dynasty left behind relatively few archaeological footprints beyond his modest tomb. Still, thanks largely in part to the mythological perception created by the sources discussed above, Cyrus is well-remembered in modern traditions. Even after the ouster of Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1979, the idealized image of Cyrus as the originator of the Iranian state has clearly continued to this day.

The most obvious and gaudy invocation of Cyrus was Reza Shah Pahlavi's use of his legend for his own personal gain at the 1971 Iranian 2,500th Anniversary celebrations at Persepolis. The aforementioned celebration, which brought together leaders from across the globe to superficially honor the legacy of Cyrus and his Achaemenid Empire, was widely criticized as a vehicle for the shah to increase his own personal prestige.¹⁵ While the shah was rightfully condemned both within Iran and around the world for his squandering of the nation's wealth on such insincere events as Persepolis '71, he could hardly be criticized as the first to use Cyrus' legacy to achieve personal objectives; as we have seen, parties ranging from Herodotus and Xenophon to the Bible have attempted to connect themselves to Cyrus in order to advance their goals.

Another event that served as a testament to the ancient king's lasting impact and legacy in Iran was the temporary return of the Cyrus Cylinder to its homeland in 2010. The cylinder, which had remained in the possession of the British Museum since its rediscovery in 1879, was released to the Iranian government on a three-month loan. However, the vast demand to see the cylinder, redubbed the "Cyrus Charter" by the Iranian Museum, resulted in a protracted visit of nearly a year.¹⁶ During this period, the cylinder served a dual purpose as a tool of both teaching and propaganda. While it was first and foremost an object used to educate Iranians on their pre-Islamic

¹⁴ Kuhrt, *Images and Realities*, 172-173.

¹⁵ Grigor, *Preserving the Antique Modern: Persepolis '71*, 22-29.

¹⁶ Manuchehr Sanadjian, "Islamic Rule and the Pre-Islamic Blessing, the "Homecoming" of the Cyrus Cylinder," *Dialectical Anthropology* 35, no. 4 (December 2011): 461-462.

history, it was simultaneously utilized by the ruling regime as a way to attach themselves to the Cyrus myth. Despite their general disregard for the nation's early history, the clerical elite saw an opportunity in the Cyrus Cylinder to further embed themselves in the traditional image of Iranian rule—promoting themselves much like Reza Shah four decades earlier, in a display clerics had bemoaned at the time. In a clear irony of history, the Cyrus Cylinder, originally issued as a work of Achaemenid propaganda, came to play this role again more than two and a half millennia later.¹⁷

Similarly, collective memory of Cyrus can also be seen in the way that Iranians gather yearly at his tomb in Pasargadae to pay their respects to the man that many still perceive as the founder of the nation. While these gatherings had initially begun as simple birthday celebrations that drew a crowd of a few hundred, they have more recently become politically-charged rallies aimed at critiquing the Islamic government. In one such instance, thousands of Iranians gathered at Pasargadae and chanted “Iran is our country, Cyrus is our father.”¹⁸ It is obvious that the image of Cyrus invoked by modern Iranians has been heavily informed by the numerous fictitious portrayals of him throughout history; this Cyrus is one meant to embody the cause of the Iranian people and their pursuit of freedom.

In the end, it seems clear that Cyrus the Great remains well-remembered in modern Iran. While this memory may not be an entirely accurate or justified one, given the vast disparities among the parties who invoke his memory, it is nonetheless the product of the “Cyrus myth.” The development of this legend over thousands of years is a testament to how easily ancient history can become construed and dramatized by the personal biases of our sources and their pursuit of narrative goals. Through antique carvings like the Cyrus Cylinder, which glorified Cyrus as the greatest king of his day, to classical and biblical sources who sought to mold the king into their idealized version of leadership, the truth of who the founder of the Achaemenid Empire really was has been lost to history. What remains is a heavily fictionalized perception of a great leader, and an example of how tradition and myth can combine to create a lasting and persistent image in our collective memory.

¹⁷ Sanadjian, *Islamic Rule and the Pre-Islamic Blessing*, 470-473.

¹⁸ Annelies Van de Ven, “De-Revolutionising the Monuments of Iran,” *Heritage, Sustainability, and Social Justice* 29, no. 3 (2017): 19-21.

Memories of the Great War: Africa in the Face of the First World War: An Historiography

Godwin Gyimah

Godwin Gyimah is a graduate student from Nkaw/kaw, Ghana majoring in Modern World History. He wrote this paper for Dr. Mark Voss-Hubbard's HIS 5000 Historiography seminar. Upon graduation, Mr. Gyimah will be pursuing his Ph.D.

The historiography of World War I in Africa has come a long way. The first general histories of the war were written when the war itself was but a few days old. However, the literature on the war in regard to Africa remained underdeveloped for decades. Slowly, the scholars began examining the war in Africa and the role of Africans in the war. Although the basic fact that Africans fought in the war is indisputable, interpretations of Africa's contributions to the war as well as the impact of the war on Africa differed greatly, depending on the time in which the interpretation was formulated. Until recently, works on Africa in World War I were few, probably because western historians did most of the writings about the Great War. The last two decades, however, have seen a wellspring of scholarship that promises finally to tell the full global story of the war—including the important role of Africa and Africans.

This paper provides a historiographical overview of World War I in Africa. This write-up seeks to assess the roles and impact of the war on Africa. Whereas most European scholars argue Africans contributed mainly as soldiers and that the war was fought in Europe, emerging literature, mostly works of African historians and some Europeans, emphasize that key battles were fought in Africa, and that the Africans contributed not only as soldiers, but in monetary and material ways. The war, in fact, had a major impact on the African continent. This historiography survey brings to light the transitions over time in the literature about World War I in Africa.

Virtually all the scholars surveyed in this paper agree that Africans were combatants and Africa was a theatre in World War I. However, most of the writings in the 1960s and 1970s focused military contributions of Africans, neglecting North Africa, British, and Portuguese East Africa as theatres. These works also ignored the role of women, changes in the political map, and the African movements for independence growing out of the experiences gained from the war. On the other hand, writings from the 1980s began to consider the role of women, and more recent studies take up other neglected issues like changes to the political map of Africa caused by the war, the role of North Africa, the experience of women, and the outbreak of pandemic influenza.

James Edmonds' book *A Short History of World War I* (1968) argues that World War I in Africa took place in four campaign sites: Togoland, South West Africa, Cameroons, and German East Africa (now Tanganyika).¹ He also notes Germany relied on the South African Dutch in fighting against the British. The Germans only depended on African tribes and added them to the Union Forces during the later period, when hostilities in the region increased. Initially, Germans believed they could fight and win the war depending solely on white forces. Nonetheless, the superiority of the Triple Entente forces compelled Germany to change its decision and start relying heavily on African troops. Edmonds confirms Africans fought in both Africa and Europe for their colonial masters. He affirms that recruited African troops were divided into two groups, with 50,000

¹ James Edmonds, *A Short History of World War I* (New York: Greenwood, 1968), 397.

focusing on German East Africa and 25,000 going to Europe.² Not only did Africans contribute militarily as soldiers, but Africans also supported the war with four airplanes which aided the Entente powers in its campaigns. These airplanes were sent to various war theaters. A country like the Gold Coast contributed towards the sponsorship of airplanes. The chiefs and other traditional authorities in the various towns made voluntary contributions which were used to purchase airplanes in support of the war.³

On the impact of the war on Africa, Edmonds notes 192 were killed, 557 were wounded, 84 died of diseases, and 434 were disabled. By 1916, the number of Africans fighting for Germany had fallen significantly as result of death from casualties or diseases.⁴ Also, of those who fell ill, 472 died, and 8,219 were left seriously ill. Edmonds also demonstrates how diseases, mainly malaria, dysentery, yellow fever, and pneumonia killed many Africans during and after the war. Uncooked rice, for instance, which most of the Africans depended on as a source of food caused dysentery.⁵ These casualties reduced the population in Africa as many suffered from death both on the battlefield and at home.

Edmonds' work contributes to the historiography on the First World War in diverse ways. Distinctively, he posits Africans provided four airplanes in support of the war. Nonetheless, he entirely neglected North Africa, a region which contributed significantly to the war. Additionally, the Gold Coast, a region on which Britain depended heavily for support was only briefly discussed. He indicated the Gold Coast authorities did not hesitate to defend its territories at any cost. Yet, Edmonds made no mention of the strategies they used in defending these territories. Moreover, his study on Africa only cursorily identified campaigns which took place in Portuguese East Africa. In East Africa, his primary focus was on Tanganyika. The roles of North Africa as a contributor in the war, the over £44,000 the Gold Coast paid to cater for the Togoland bill, and the various defensive strategies the Gold Coast adopted in defending Elmina and Komenda against the Central Powers' attacks all were missing from Edmonds' discussion.

On the impacts of the war, Edmonds speaks only about death, diseases, and casualties, neglecting other broad impacts on Africa. The price of cocoa, which fell in the last months of 1916 due to the British blockade of trade with the Central Powers and their colonies, the high prices of food and other basic needs that affected postwar Gold Coast from the 1920s, and the family structure in the Gold Coast that changed after the First World War which made women increasingly respected as breadwinners were not elaborated upon.

Unlike Edmonds, Byron Farwell's book *The Great War in Africa 1914-1918* focused on campaigns in various town levels, as compared to Edmonds who focused on campaigns in regional levels. He argued the First World War took place in West Africa, East Africa, Southern Africa, and the Cameroons. Lake Tanganyika, Tabora, Doula, Mora, Konigsberg, Longido, and Tanga were towns where the campaigns in Africa took place. According to Farwell, Corporal Ernest Thomas of "C" Squadron fired the first shot in Africa on August 22, 1914.⁶ Farwell describes how the Gold Coast Regiment marched against Lome, at that time the capital of Togoland, and forced the indigenes to surrender.⁷ On August 12th, a patrol of the Gold Coast Regiment marched on the Germans, and shots were exchanged.⁸ On the conquest of German South-West Africa, Farwell posited the army was made up of volunteers and regulars.⁹ Unlike Edmonds, Farwell argued that the

² Edmonds, *A Short History of World War I*, 397.

³ Charles Lucas, *The Gold Coast and The War* (London: Oxford University Press, 1920), 48.

⁴ Edmonds, *A Short History of World War I*, 400.

⁵ Edmonds, *A Short History of World War I*, 400.

⁶ Byron Farwell, *The Great War in Africa* (New York: W.W Norton & Company, 1989), 21.

⁷ Farwell, *The Great War in Africa*, 25.

⁸ Farwell, *The Great War in Africa*, 26.

⁹ Farwell, *The Great War in Africa*, 86.

war extended to British East Africa, where some fighting took place with Germans inciting the natives to attack the white settlers.¹⁰

For the first time, Farwell acknowledges the role of women in the war as suppliers of water and other products, which is neglected in many works. Without water, man and beast grew thirsty, and the engines silted up with sand until women supplied them with water. Tracking parties led a procession of women carrying water to various camps.¹¹ The water which women supplied was taken to the traction engine that carried boat overland to Lake Tanganyika. Again, women filled the position of nurses and medical practitioners to deliver services to the troops and others who were injured. War spread diseases such as chigger.¹² In hospitals in South Africa, beds overflowed with people suffering from diseases or injuries.¹³ Farwell's focus on the role of women as suppliers during the war would probably be attributed to the explosion of women's history which grew in the 1980s. Furthermore, African carriers were the suppliers of food and water to the soldiers. The absence of these basic needs would have made it difficult for troops to survive.¹⁴ Although some villages had little to eat, resulting in malnutrition, the need to fight made military commanders and local authorities devise means to assist the troops with their basic needs.

Farwell argues the war caused the destruction of public and private buildings in some areas in Africa. German troops defecated on furniture, floors, and in buildings probably because they had abandoned the properties and wanted to prevent the Triple Entente forces from getting a place of refuge.¹⁵ Another devastating impact Farwell discussed was the destruction of some towns in Africa. The Royal Naval Forces bombarded various towns.¹⁶ Resulting upheaval fed diseases that killed many Africans with most suffering from malaria and blackwater fever.¹⁷ The war caused animal brutality. The shots and bombs killed many oxen, goats, and mules. The war imposed suffering on most cattle and horses, while others fled into the forest during the hostilities.¹⁸

Farwell's book contributes greatly to the historiography. Like Edmonds, Farwell depicts a war fought in both Europe and Africa, with Africans fighting to support their colonial masters. In contrast to Edmonds' book, Farwell devotes chapters to the campaigns in various towns, such as Lake Tanganyika, Tabora, Doula, Mora, Konigsberg, Longido, and Tanga. He categorizes them into regions like Cameroons and German East Africa, as Edmonds discuss. On the contributions of Africa, he avers that the French invaded Togoland on August 6, 1914, using 535 African soldiers and some 200 carriers, as well as Senegalese tirailleurs.¹⁹ Relying heavily on primary sources, Farwell approaches issues as ethnohistorians do, depending more on African narratives from eyewitnesses and using local terminologies like Atakpane, the local name for a region in German Togoland. For the first time, women's role as suppliers of water and other products as well as their service as nurses was acknowledged. On the impact of the war, Farwell briefly described casualties, death, and diseases Africa suffered. The war caused the death of many Africans, while other military and non-military men were injured brutally. He also laid emphasis on the mass destruction of towns, buildings, and furniture.

Nonetheless, Farwell avoids the Northern Africa campaigns. Besides, he neglected the Gold Coast, a region where Britain recruited most troops and used their territories for operation. He fails

¹⁰ Farwell, *The Great War in Africa*, 117.

¹¹ Farwell, *The Great War in Africa*, 228.

¹² Farwell, *The Great War in Africa*, 298-299.

¹³ Farwell, *The Great War in Africa*, 309.

¹⁴ Farwell, *The Great War in Africa*, 69.

¹⁵ Farwell, *The Great War in Africa*, 70.

¹⁶ Farwell, *The Great War in Africa*, 69-71.

¹⁷ Farwell, *The Great War in Africa*, 71.

¹⁸ Farwell, *The Great War in Africa*, 71.

¹⁹ Farwell, *The Great War in Africa*, 17-26.

to provide a detailed description of the defensive strategies which the local authorities of the colonies used in defending themselves against the German invasion. The existence of German Togoland on the borders of Gold Coast alarmed authorities into using diverse means to defend themselves against possible German attacks. Lastly, some economic impacts of the war are neglected, such as the £500,000 taken from the Gold Coast reserve funds and invested in the war loan in London, which reduced the colony's revenue, together with the rapid growth of cocoa and the Gold Coast Mahogany trade which developed between the Gold Coast and America. Before the war, Britain, and France first received export products before distributing to America and other regions for sale. At the peak of the war, the focus of European nations in fighting enemies made it possible for American sailors to move to and fro in Africa and trade with the Africans. Farwell might have addressed also the postwar trade boom which allowed laborers in the Gold Coast to bargain for higher wages.

John Keegan's *The First World War* argues that the major reason for the spread of the war to Africa was due to a power struggle among the European nations who sought to dominate Africa and its colonies. He affirms that British and French used West African Rifles and the Tirailleurs Senegalese to capture Togo, a German colony in West Africa.²⁰ In conquering Kamerun (now Cameroon), the Entente powers combined European and African forces numbering about 4,000; about 1,000 Europeans and 3,000 Africans. He also posits that German skills in fighting during the torrential rainy season forced the allied forces to halt their military operations for some months. Allied forces relaunched an attack when the dry season began. This argument illustrates that the allied forces were not skillful in fighting during the rainy season. The soldiers during the interval period cultivated gardens to support their food supply. In capturing German Cameroon, Keegan argues the Allies faced great resistance from the warrior tribes in the region.

Keegan's work contributes to the scholarship on Africa and the First World War. Like the previous authors, he affirms Africans contributed to the war in support of the colonial masters. He uses more statistical data to present the number of troops recruited and the number of people who died. Keegan asserts the soldiers survived in the forest during the war times by cultivating gardens. This new evidence brings out how the soldiers survived in the bush. His view that the combined forces of the West Africa Rifles together with the Senegalese captured Togo contrasts with the view of Farwell who argues it was the Gold Coast Regiment that marched and captured German Togoland.²¹

On the other hand, Keegan neglected the impact of the war on Africa. His focus was entirely on military operations in the various regions without looking at other contributions and the impact the war had on Africa. He neglected the 1,015 motor drivers recruited for overseas service in East Africa, the engineers and 613 civil officers recruited from the Gold Coast to serve as volunteers, and the outbreak of the pandemic influenza, malaria, and beriberi which the war caused. Moreover, the rampant rebellions that followed the war due to the Europeans appointment of chiefs who were not from the royal family also were neglected. He also overlooked the role of women as suppliers of water, food, other products, and as soldiers who fought in some of the local battles.

Like the previous scholars, Hey Strachan's book *The First World War in Africa*, (2004) affirms the whole of Africa was involved in the war and that blacks fought the white man's war. He asserts Africa contributed militarily by providing troops for their colonial masters. Hey categorizes the battles in Africa into four regional zones which are: Togoland, Cameroons, South-West Africa, and East Africa. He discusses how Britain implemented a defensive plan for the Gold Coast across the Volta and Ada while three companies were stationed at Kumasi and Ada in the bid to seize German

²⁰ John Keegan, *The First World War* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999), 206.

²¹ Farwell, *The Great War in Africa*, 25.

Togoland.²² He continues to explain how the Gold Coast protected its North Eastern Frontier and moved towards the Lower Volta as they secured their borders. Germany on the other hand also recruited 1,650 blacks at the initial stage to defend its Cameroons colony.²³

On the impact of the war, he argues it undermined traditional patterns of authority, destroyed economic activities, and pushed Africans to fight for independence. The growth of nationalistic activities and the formation of movements such as the National Congress of British West Africa was due to the aftermaths of the war. Diseases, such as dysentery, typhus, smallpox, malaria, and cholera which devastated the African army, were also major consequences of the war.²⁴ Diseases. These diseases spread throughout Africa to effect places where the war did not take place. Dysentery plagued Africa and resulted in numerous hospitalizations and intestinal diseases. Others suffered chest infections. Hey shows how illness displaced many African men and women from their homes. About 20% of the employed Africans died.²⁵ A percentage of the African population suffered from famine due to the war. Famine broke out in South West Africa and Maji-Maji in East Africa.²⁶ Rice eating tribes became victims of *beriberi*, since they now relied on maize due to the destruction of rice farms. Most Africans suffered from malnutrition.²⁷

Hey's study also shows how regions bordering areas at war implemented diverse strategies to defend their land. This proved especially the case in terms of British colonies shielding themselves against Germany. Hey's work focuses heavily on the military contributions of Africa, yet he neglects other contributions, such as the commitment of funds, non-military personnel and other materials. The war expanded into North Africa, yet, Hey seems to place little to no emphasis on this region.

Paice Edward's *World War I, The African Front* (2008) begins with the Boer War between the British and the Boer Republic of South Africa, which led to mass casualties for both the British and native South Africans.²⁸ He divides his study into five parts, each chapter covering one year between 1914 and 1918. He discusses each year and covers in detail the role of Africa and the impact on Africans. The Allies seizure of German South-West Africa became the first major victory achieved at an estimated cost of £15m. South African Prime Minister Louis Botha—an African not a European—spearheaded the Allied victory in German South-West Africa.²⁹ Europeans recruited numerous African troops to fight on their behalf. When Europeans attempted to recruit African troops to fight on their behalf, they faced some opposition from the Africans. Other times, Africans accepted recruitment joyfully, believing they were to be rich—if they returned alive.³⁰ In a place like the Gold Coast, most soldiers readily accepted the call to arms. In some parts of Africa, the Africans perceived the war as a burden on resources, which prompted them to continuously express resentment against European recruitment. Edward affirms that Europeans' mass recruitment of African troops had obvious advantages. Unlike other regions in the world, recruiting troops from Africa was cheaper, faster, and done without much opposition due to the commitment and dedication of most Africans.³¹

Edward estimates the death toll of African soldiers and carriers who fought on the part of Britain to exceed 100,000 people.³² While men died in war after being shot, others suffered from

²² Strachan Hey, *The First World War in Africa* (Oxford: University Press, 2004), 13-16.

²³ Hey, *The First World War in Africa*, 21.

²⁴ Hey, *The First World War in Africa*, 5-6.

²⁵ Hey, *The First World War in Africa*, 13.

²⁶ Hey, *The First World War in Africa*, 3.

²⁷ Hey, *The First World War in Africa*, 6.

²⁸ Paice Edward, *World War I The African Front* (New York: Pegasus Books, 2008), 1

²⁹ Edward, *World War I*, 125.

³⁰ Edward, *World War I*, 299.

³¹ Edward, *World War I*, 299.

³² Edward, *World War I*, 21.

diseases, including dysentery, which could not be treated in the forest. Sicknesses such as influenza, ear infections, and respiratory problems spread through Africa.³³

Unlike Farwell, Edward fails to emphasize the role African women played in the First World War. Again, he limited his focus to casualties and the financial cost of the war without considering the changes in territorial boundaries nor the tensions the war created which pushed the colonies to fight for political participation. Among the topics Edward neglects are the wartime experiences the military and non-military members gained, which later resulted in the formation of nationalist movements and demand for legislative control, the fall of cocoa price during the last months in 1916 due to the British blockade of trade with the Central Powers and their colonies, and the Prince of Wales Fund the Gold Coast sent to support Great Britain during the war.

Anne Samson's *World War I in Africa, The Forgotten Conflict among European Powers* argues the East African campaign was the longest among all the campaigns of the war, with major fighting taking place in East Africa and later extending to other neighboring regions in Africa.³⁴ Initially, Britain rejected the idea of using black and colored troops. By 1915, blacks and colored Africans functioned as drivers, grooms, and hands in both Europe and Africa. In the later years, the tensions Germany and her allies created compelled the Entente Powers to train "colored" and black Africans to fight in the war.³⁵ Soldiers relied heavily on local women to supply them with socks, food, and other necessities.³⁶ Assistance from local women sustained the troops for years, although the challenge of maintaining supplies remained to the end of the war. Samson also argues that, behind the scene, various nations built relations with other nations to gain military and economic support from each other.³⁷ In the end, the United South African nation aided the victory over German South West Africa.³⁸

Overall, Samson asserts the war drew on the natural resources of Africans as they sought to help their colonial masters. Africans paid much of the debt which the Europeans depended on in their attempt to fight and defend their colonies.³⁹ In addition, Africans paid for the war against German South West Africa which cost €23m and that of East Africa, the more disastrous of the two, which cost €72m. In human terms, the war in German South West Africa led to the death of over 2,266 men, while that of East Africa took the lives of over 100,000 men.⁴⁰

Samson's work complements previous works on Africa and the First World War. In particular, she demonstrates that the role of African women in the war, which could not be underestimated since they were the suppliers of food and other necessities to both soldiers and carriers. She also brings to light some activities which took place behind the scenes while the war was ongoing such as the formation of alliances among nations. In addition, she illustrates how the war was fought in the air, as compared to other earlier writers who focused on the land and the sea.

Nonetheless, Samson only briefly treats the impact of the war. Other developments such as the outbreak of diseases, changes in Africa's political map, and the reduction in the roles of traditional chiefs were left out from his analysis. Additionally, the Gold Coast regiments, which fought vehemently on the part of Britain, receive cursory treatment. While he depicts a war that extended to all regions in Africa, North Africa is left out of his discussions. Moreover, the Funds for Relief of Disabled Soldiers, which the Gold Coast provided; the Airplane Fund, which the chiefs and people of Kwahu, New Juaben, and Akim Abuakwa sent to support the war; and the expansion

³³ Edward, *World War I*, 89.

³⁴ Anne Samson, *World War I in Africa: The Forgotten Conflict among the European Powers* (London: I.B Tauris, 2013), 3-4.

³⁵ Samson, *World War I in Africa*, 89.

³⁶ Samson, *World War I in Africa*, 143.

³⁷ Samson, *World War I in Africa*, 167-185.

³⁸ Samson, *World War I in Africa*, 85.

³⁹ Samson, *World War I in Africa*, 25.

⁴⁰ Samson, *World War I in Africa*, 222.

of transportation and communication networks, which began from the war times to support military campaigns were neglected. Sir Frederick Gordon Guggisberg, the Governor of the Gold Coast from 1919, developed roads and communication systems in present-day Ghana to revitalize the economic and social status quo which the war had destroyed.

Timothy Stapleton's *Africa: War and Conflict in the Twentieth Century* is one of the most recent books on World War I in Africa. Stapleton argues that during the war, Europeans viewed Africa as a workforce and resource reservoir.⁴¹ The first British soldier to fire a shot happened in German Togoland. Besides, and the last German force seized before the war ended also took place in Africa, Northern Rhodesia (modern-day Zambia). Stapleton argues the war expanded to North Africa due to European interest in protecting their colonies. In North Africa, the Ottoman Turks began the war as a result of their invasion of Egypt, a British colony. The Sanussi in Libya joined the Central Powers to fight against the British.⁴² The Ottoman Turks supported the Sanussi to rebel against the Italians in Libya and the British in Egypt.⁴³ In discussing the role of Africans as troops, he asserts the British were initially reluctant to use black soldiers in their wars in Europe. They relied heavily on the white South African soldiers. However, at the height of the war, Britain recruited black African soldiers to fight in Palestine against the Ottoman Turks.⁴⁴

Stapleton explains how the war resulted in the restructuring of the colonial map of Africa and empowering of the colonial system.⁴⁵ After the war, part of German Togoland now became part of the British Gold Coast, while Western Cameroon also became part of British Nigeria. The war also led to an increase in rebellions in Africa due to the European powers' numerous military and financial demands. Stapleton explains how the absence of soldiers and police led to multiple revolts in Africa. Between 1915 and 1916, the British appointment of abusive and corrupt chiefs, as well as local police in the northern region of Gold Coast, led to a serious revolt.⁴⁶ In the Bongo area in the northern part of modern-day Ghana, riots broke out between local police and a corrupt chief who the British had appointed to rule the people.⁴⁷

The Europeans demand for resources and the need to raise funds to support the war made the colonial powers mount pressure on the African colonies. In response, some colonies rebelled.⁴⁸ Stapleton argues the experience gained from the war motivated Africans to form nationalist movements to demand independence. For instance, educated elites formed the National Congress of British West Africa in 1920 to fight for their rights, for representation, and for independence from European rule. Having fought in defense of Europeans, educated African elites were now optimistic they could represent themselves. In French West Africa, the war disrupted agriculture activities. The able-bodied men were recruited to the battlefield, while the few who were left at home fled into the bush.⁴⁹

Stapleton's work furthers the historiography of World War I. He reinforces the fact that most Africans died both on the battlefield and at home. Distinctively, he discusses the outbreak of the war in North Africa beginning in Egypt. For the first time, North African troops were given detailed discussion as soldiers who fought for the European powers. Also, he describes the demand for independence, the shifting African map, and rebellions in Africa which the war caused. It was after the war when the political map of Africa changed: German Togoland became part of the

⁴¹ Timothy Stapleton, *Africa: War and Conflict in the Twentieth Century* (New York, 2018), 36.

⁴² Stapleton, *Africa: War and Conflict in the Twentieth Century*, 43-44.

⁴³ Stapleton, *Africa: War and Conflict in the Twentieth Century*, 36.

⁴⁴ Stapleton, *Africa: War and Conflict in the Twentieth Century*, 44-45.

⁴⁵ Stapleton, *Africa: War and Conflict in the Twentieth Century*, 36-37.

⁴⁶ Stapleton, *Africa: War and Conflict in the Twentieth Century*, 46-47.

⁴⁷ Stapleton, *Africa: War and Conflict in the Twentieth Century*, 46.

⁴⁸ Stapleton, *Africa: War and Conflict in the Twentieth Century*, 45-46.

⁴⁹ Stapleton, *Africa: War and Conflict in the Twentieth Century*, 46.

British Gold Coast, and Western Cameroon became part of British Nigeria. The war presented Africans the opportunity to fight for independence after the eye-opening experience of fighting in the war and supporting the Europeans with food and funds. Stapleton also highlights the appointment of local chiefs in Africa. During the war, the colonial powers replaced traditional authorities which they believed were supporting rebellious activities. Europeans appointed new leaders who were not from the royal families to rule the region. These appointments of people resulted in constant wars between the royal families and family members of the newly appointed leaders.

Stapleton, however, neglects the defensive strategies the Gold Coast colony adopted in defending Elmina, Ada, Volta, Cape Coast, and the Northern borders. The Gold Coast, the British colony which shared a border with German Togoland, had to implement diverse defensive strategies to defend itself against a possible German attack. Nigeria, which also shared a border with German Cameroons, adopted defensive measures which went untreated in Stapleton's discussion. Besides, Stapleton did not mention any material support the Africans provided during the war. Private subscriptions for eleven airplanes in the Gold Coast given to the war council; the roles of non-military Africans who served as motor drivers, engineers; and medical assistants, the educated elites who were sent from Cape Coast in Gold Coast to the Cameroons as a support to the military; and the heavy postwar inflation which made it difficult for people to meet their needs all were ignored in the discussion.

The latest contribution to the discussion came from a group of African scholars who collaborated on a book titled *Africa and the First World War: Remembrance, Memories, and Representations after 100 years*. Their study starts with an introduction addressing the formation and the role of the Gold Coast Regiment in fighting for the British during the war.⁵⁰ The regiment conquered German Togoland.⁵¹ In capturing German Cameroon, the British relied heavily on the Gold Coast Regiment. After subduing Cameroon, the British and their allies marched against German East Africa. The Gold Coast suffered heavy casualties as most of the troops got injured or died in the battle against Cameroon.⁵² The British also recruited and trained Nigerian soldiers. In 1916, Nigerian soldiers supplemented the Entente Forces in fighting for the victory in German East Africa.⁵³ The Entente powers required the colonies to increase the production of foodstuffs and other materials to support the war. Moreover, the colonies provided financial contributions and the supply of cocoa, cotton, palm products, and minerals.⁵⁴ The Europeans used the colonial chiefs in the recruitment of troops, collection of taxes, transportation of minerals, and other products to support the various campaigns.⁵⁵

In their contributions to *Africa and the First World War*, De-valera Botchway and Kwame Osei Kwarteng posit that the war destroyed the West African economy since Germans who had engaged

⁵⁰ Colonel J. Hagan, "The Role of the Gold Coast Regiment towards the Defeat of the Germans in Africa during World War I," in *Africa and the First World War: Remembrance, Memories, and Representations after 100 years*, eds. De-Valera NYM Botchway and Kwame Osei Kwarteng, (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2018), 3.

⁵¹ Colonel J. Hagan, "The Role of the Gold Coast Regiment towards the Defeat of the Germans in Africa during World War I," 5.

⁵² Colonel J. Hagan, "The Role of the Gold Coast Regiment towards the Defeat of the Germans in Africa during World War I," 8-10.

⁵³ Ibiang O. Ewa, "Nigerian Soldiers in the East African Campaign of the First World War: 1916-1917," in *Africa and the First World War: Remembrance, Memories, and Representations after 100 years*, 12.

⁵⁴ Adebayo A. Lawal, "African Mobilization of Agricultural Resources in British West Africa during the First World War," in *Africa and the First World War: Remembrance, Memories, and Representations after 100 years*, 72.

⁵⁵ Samuel Bewiadzi and Margaret Ismaila, "Chieftaincy and Indirect Rule: The Nature, Politics, and Exploits of Chiefs during the First World War in West Africa (1914-1930)," in *Africa and the First World War: Remembrance, Memories, and Representations after 100 years*, 138-140.

in export of cocoa, palm oil, and palm kernel were excluded from export activities in West Africa. Additionally, the mass recruitment of African troops led to the shortage of labor since most able-bodied men were taken away.⁵⁶ The war also led to rampant revolts and protest movements which sought to challenge colonial authorities.⁵⁷

Botchway and Kwarteng break new ground in discussing Nigerian troops who assisted in conquering East Africa. They also emphasize how the colonies provided financial assistance, as well as resources like minerals and cocoa to support the war. Colonial masters used the chiefs in the mobilization of troops and collection of taxes towards the war. The authors explain how the war led to labor shortages due to the mass recruitment of troops. Everywhere, the war generated pressure on colonial resources, led to rampant revolts, and increased protest movements in the various colonies.

However, Botchway and Kwarteng neglected North Africa as a theatre of war. During the war, some battles took place in North Africa as Turks tried to capture Egypt from the British. In addition, the Gold Coast's dispatch of airplanes in support of the war is neglected. Moreover, Botchway and Kwarteng fail to discuss the roles of women, who served as nurses and suppliers of food and other products. Their broader treatment of the whole of Africa does not bring out the specific contributions and the specific impact on each colony.

Today, no serious scholar would deny that Africans made a substantial military contribution toward World War I. In both Africa and Europe, African soldiers were recruited to the battlefield. Moreover, Africans contributed materially and monetarily to support the war. The war had a tremendous impact on Africa. Various revolts, the formation of nationalist movements, and the demand for independence all were precipitated by the outbreak of the war. Although scholars do not agree on the number of Africans who died in the war, they all agree that Africans died in massive numbers due to the war. Over the last several decades, scholars have moved from seeing Africa Africans merely as a theatre and Africans as combatants to one when Africans were seen as material and monetary contributors. Recently scholars have factored in additional political, social, and economic impacts. Adding to scholarship that one focused mostly on the loss of life, diseases, and famine. On the other hand, issues such as the changes in family structure have not been explored. There remains a need for more research to focus on Africa as combatant, theater of war, a financier, and as a place that experienced the full impact of World War I.

⁵⁶Kwame O. Kwarteng, "World War I: The Role of the Gold Coast and Asante towards the British Victory," in *Africa and the First World War: Remembrance, Memories, and Representations after 100 years*, eds. De-Valera NYM Botchway and Kwame Osei Kwarteng, (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2018), 46.

⁵⁷Kwame O. Kwarteng, "World War I: The Role of the Gold Coast and Asante towards the British Victory," 49.

The American Civil War in the European Spotlight: Confederate Fumbles in France and Remorse in Russia

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The legacy of the American Civil War is surrounded by controversy and debate, even 154 years later. Debates focus on military campaigns and strategies, political turmoil leading up to and following the war, and the economic consequences of a nation in upheaval. Yet the argument without end surrounding the Civil War excludes, in any real detail, the international aspect of the conflict. As part of its survival plan, the Confederate States of America sought formal recognition and aid from Europe to cement its claims to nationhood. Confederate President Jefferson Davis sent diplomats to Europe in order to secure this diplomatic aid. He and his state department knew the importance of the mission. However, Davis' background in military and domestic politics led him to focus on those aspects of the Confederacy, rather than the dozens of commissioners sent out to conduct diplomacy. This lack of attention from Davis and the constant rotation of secretaries of state in Richmond led to an ineffective foreign policy that hindered commissioners in the field and doomed the confederate diplomatic strategy.

The two main targets in Europe were France and England. They were the two major powers in Europe during the 1860s and the most capable of assisting the Confederacy in securing independence. However, the Confederates also had commissioners in a multitude of other European nations fighting for "the Cause." Belgium, Spain, Russia, and the Holy See were all contacted by the Confederates during the war. Robert Toombs, the first Confederate secretary of state, wanted to cast a wide net in order to increase the likelihood of recognition from abroad. This was a good strategy in theory. However, it stretched the already inadequate Confederate resources to their limits.

On July 24, 1861, Robert Hunter was confirmed as the new Confederate secretary of state to replace Toombs. One month later, Hunter appointed John Slidell as the Confederate commissioner to France. Slidell was praised by both Davis and Hunter. In a rousing endorsement of Slidell and his mission, Davis wrote, "for the purpose of stabling friendly relations between the Confederate States and the Empire of France, and reposing special trust and confidence in the integrity of prudence, and abilities of the Hon. John Slidell, I have appointed him special commissioner of the Confederate States to the Empire of France."¹ Along with this general letter intended for French Foreign Office officials, Davis sent a personal note to the French Emperor Napoleon III. Davis described Slidell as "one of our most intelligent, esteemed, and worthy citizens."² Davis hoped Slidell would cultivate friendly relations with the French Emperor and the foreign minister, Édouard Antoine de Thouvenel. The new secretary of state also penned a strong endorsement of Slidell in his letter

¹ Jefferson Davis to all who shall see, August 24, 1861, in *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies*, vol. III, II (Washington: G.P.O., 1922), 112-113.

² Jefferson Davis to Napoleon III, August 24, 1861, in *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies*, vol. III, II (Washington: G.P.O., 1922), 114.

accompanying the commissioner's credentials. Hunter echoed Davis, crediting Slidell as "animated by a desire to unite and bind together our respective countries by friendly ties and has appointed the Hon. John Slidell, one of our most esteemed and trustworthy citizens, as special commissioner of the Confederate States to the Government of France."³ Both Hunter and Davis looked to the French for support against the Union, and they believed Slidell to be the man who could accomplish this goal.

Before Slidell had the chance to arrive in Paris, the Union delegation was already well established, or so they thought. The American minister in France was Charles J. Faulkner. He was born in Virginia and appointed by President James Buchanan to be the United States Minister to France in 1860; he served in that role until 1861. Faulkner was a pro-southern advocate and a supporter of secession. He worked to delay Union support in France. But quickly his confederate sympathies caught up with Faulkner. When he resigned his commission in 1861 and pledged his allegiance to the Confederate States of America, he became an enemy to the United States. Upon his return to Washington, he was arrested on charges that included "the successful efforts to procure arms for the rebels and the fact that he was going home to assume command of a regiment of rebels who had elected him colonel."⁴ The arrest of Faulkner "caused great excitement here [the Union]. Among Union men it is regarded with the highest favor, as indicating the final determination of the Government to prevent any further collusion between the rebels of the South and of the loyal States."⁵ To William Seward, the secretary of state in the Lincoln cabinet, the affair was deeply disturbing. Faulkner managed to make a deal with an arms manufacturer in France to help supply the Confederates. This damaged the reputation of the Union in the court of Napoleon III. Seward quickly found a replacement for Faulkner.

He found William Dayton from New Jersey. Seward regarded Dayton's task as "a very important foreign mission at a moment when our domestic affairs have reached a crisis."⁶ The nation had boiled over into a civil war because of, according to Dayton, "plethora and abundance." He went on to say, during a speech in Paris, that the Confederacy amounted to an "outbreak of a restless and excitable people who complain substantially of nothing."⁷ Dayton saw the rebellion like a parent sees a spoiled child throwing a tantrum, unnecessary and for no good reason. Southerners had nothing to complain about, according to Dayton, and, since they did not get their way entirely, they were rebelling. That was not a justification, in Dayton's view, of the South leaving the Union and starting a civil war. Dayton saw the Constitution "not as compact between states, to be broken, with or without cause, at the option of any, but it is a *nation*, treated with as such, recognized as such, by every civilized power on the face of the earth."⁸ This was a very strong and committed interpretation of the Constitution. Unlike his predecessor Faulkner, Dayton was an adamant Unionist. Seward and Lincoln trusted him to do his job and support the federal government back in Washington, D.C.

Dayton's instructions came in a rambling letter from William Seward dated April 22, 1861. Despite the length of the letter, Seward made clear to Dayton his charge: the French must not support the Confederate States of America under any circumstances. Seward implored Dayton to convince the emperor of all the good qualities and amazing things the United States has been able to

³ Hunter to French Minister of Foreign Affairs, August 24, 1861, in *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies*, vol. III, II (Washington: G.P.O., 1922), 113.

⁴ "Arrest of C. J. Faulkner of Virginia, Late Minister to France," *New York Times*, August 13, 1861.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Seward to Dayton, April 22, 1861, in United States Department of State, *Message of the President of the United States to the two houses of Congress, at the commencement of the second session of the thirty-seventh congress: Instructions and Dispatches: France*, Vol. I. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1861), 195.

⁷ "The American Meeting at Paris," *New York Times*, June 14, 1861.

⁸ *Ibid.*

accomplish in its short lifespan. The United States “has risen from insignificance to be the second in the world. Leaving out of view unimportant local instances of conflict, we have only had two foreign wars... and not one human life has hitherto been forfeited for disloyalty to the government.”⁹ Seward attempted to evoke American stability and prosperity. His viewpoint was obviously biased, but also heartfelt. He was baffled, he told Dayton, as to why the South would leave this great and prosperous Union and give up their rights in the Constitution. Seward reminded both Dayton and Napoleon III that “many nations have taken [the Constitution] as a model.” France especially, Seward stated, was “built on the same broad foundation with that of this federal republic.”¹⁰ The United States’ goal was only to prevent France from recognizing the Confederacy or intervening in any way. Lincoln “neither expects nor desires any intervention, or even any favor, from the government of France, or any other, in this emergency.”¹¹ Lincoln and Seward wanted Dayton to maintain the status quo antebellum with France, nothing more. Lincoln and the Union army would crush the rebellion without the support of France or any other power; the American Civil War was just that, a conflict that would be contained within America. The United States did not need any help solving its internal affairs. This was a bold claim by Lincoln, and something of a gamble. It shut the door on any possible help from a potentially sympathetic France, or any European power, in the future, should the United States need it to quell the rebellion.

France’s leader at the time of the Civil War was Napoleon III. He dreamed of restoring the French Empire to what it was under Napoleon back in the early 1800s. He also dreamed of expanding his holdings in the New World. French foreign minister Édouard Thouvenel was a good indication of how the French public felt about the Civil War in America and the Confederate States of America. He detested slavery, but like most of his countrymen, he was more concerned with Italian unification on his nation’s border and not troubled with the Union in turmoil thousands of miles away across the Atlantic Ocean.¹² This attitude made Slidell’s job that much more difficult. Another strike against Slidell was the French press. It attacked slavery, praised free labor in the North, and questioned secession.¹³ However supportive the French press was of the North, France, at the time, was not a democracy with freedom of the press. An imperial dictator ruled over the country with his own newspapers and “official” news outlets. This imperial press was pro-Southern.¹⁴ Napoleon III was also friends with Slidell and his fellow confederate commissioners. This close relationship formed at the very arrival of Slidell and his entourage. One of Slidell’s associates, Edwin Leon, proclaimed that the French Emperor was “in the house next to my hotel.”¹⁵ This close proximity offered Confederate diplomats easier access to the Emperor and his ministers. Slidell had almost constant access to French officials. This was in stark contrast to his counterpart in England, James Mason, who rarely met with English officials in either a formal or informal fashion.¹⁶ Slidell had the ear of the emperor and his ministers, but so did Dayton. Both men secured numerous appointments with Napoleon III or his ministers during the war. The success or failure of either diplomatic mission came down to personal skill and the emperor’s desire to listen to either side.

⁹ Seward to Dayton, April 22, 1861, in United States Department of State, *Message of the President of the United States to the two houses of Congress, at the commencement of the second session of the thirty-seventh congress: Instructions and Dispatches: France*, Vol. I. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1861), 196.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid, 200.

¹² *Statesmen of the Lost Cause*, 302.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Lynn Marshall Case and Warren F. Spencer, *The United States and France: Civil War Diplomacy* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970), 40-41.

¹⁵ Leon to Benjamin, July 30, 1862, in *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies*, vol. II, IV (Washington: G.P.O., 1900), 25.

¹⁶ *Statesmen of the Lost Cause*, 283.

A prominent meeting between Slidell and the emperor took place on October 28, 1862. Slidell aimed to push Napoleon III towards recognition yet again. The Emperor “had no scruples in declaring that his sympathies were entirely with the South,” but, he worried that “if he acted alone, England, instead of following his example, would endeavor to embroil with the United States and that French commerce would be destroyed.”¹⁷ This was an important meeting because it transparently showed the emperor’s personal support for the Confederacy. Despite the support of the French emperor, Slidell and the Confederacy had to either convince Napoleon III to act alone or James Mason and Slidell had to convince both England and France to work together. In an effort to further push the emperor away from the English question, Slidell informed him that the recognition of the Confederacy would not mean war with the Union. Slidell and the Confederacy only “asked for recognition, satisfied that the moral effect of such a step... would exercise a controlling influence.”¹⁸ Slidell floated the notion that the North, after hearing of French, and possibly of English, recognition of the Confederacy would come to the table and negotiate an armistice and eventual peace agreement. However, in the event of war with the United States, Slidell attempted to put the emperor at ease. The American navy “would be swept from the ocean and all their principle ports efficiently blockaded by a moiety of his [French] marine,” Slidell claimed.¹⁹ He played down the power of the Union’s industry and military. He was confident the Union would exhaust itself by staying in the war. The Union’s “energies and resources were already taxed to their utmost by the war,” and the Lincoln administration, “still had sense enough not to seek a quarrel with the first power in the world.”²⁰ The Union, according to Slidell, was hardly able to stay in the war against the Confederates, let alone fight a multifront war with European superpowers. The emperor proposed that France, England, and Russia mediate between the North and South. Napoleon III suggested the mediation could be urged “on the high grounds of humanity and the interests of the whole civilized world. If it be refused by the North, it will afford good reason for recognition and perhaps for more active intervention.”²¹ This mediation never occurred. France, England, and Russia could not agree on the terms and the Union would have never accepted the meditation even if it had occurred.

Slidell and the Confederate diplomatic mission in France was quickly falling apart. By the end of 1862, the window for recognition was closing. Military campaigns in the West were dominated by Union armies, and, in the eastern theater, the balance of power was starting to shift. Slidell and his team did their best. However, the military reality on the ground was not helping their case. Despite setbacks, Slidell did manage to negotiate a loan with Messrs. Emile Erlanger & Co. They conducted business with the Confederacy in the form of cotton bonds and channeled French money into the Southern railroads. Slidell was approached by the company while in Paris. The agents, he claimed, representing Messrs. Emile Erlanger & Co. “presented themselves to me [Slidell] without any suggestions on my part of a desire to borrow money for the Confederate States.”²² The Confederate States and France shared a strong business partnership due to the South’s cotton contribution to the commercial sector of France and it generated French businesses. The loan was \$15,000,000 repayable in gold or cotton bonds. This loan was one of Slidell’s biggest accomplishments in Paris. To Slidell, the advance represented “financial recognition of our [Confederate] independence, emanating from a class proverbially cautious and little given to be

¹⁷ Slidell to Benjamin, October 28, 1862, in *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies*, vol. III, II (Washington: G.P.O., 1922), 575.

¹⁸ *Ibid*, 575.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, 575.

²⁰ *Ibid*, 575.

²¹ *Ibid*, 575.

²² Slidell to Benjamin, October 28, 1862, in *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies*, vol. III, II (Washington: G.P.O., 1922), 568.

influenced by sentiment or sympathy.”²³ It proved to Slidell that France recognized the Confederate States of America as a sovereign, independent nation. The wealthy class of French society did not hand out loans on the good graces of their hearts. They believed in those whom they financed, and the Confederates, especially Slidell, saw that as proof of their legal existence in the world of nations. However, Slidell’s assumption that a loan was a pathway to legitimizing the existence of the Confederacy in the eyes of the world was misguided.

Confederate efforts in France were extensive and well calculated. Slidell knew his mission and the objectives he was supposed to accomplish during his trip. Slidell had numerous unofficial meetings with Emperor Napoleon III that were friendly and cordial. The Emperor favored the Confederate States and the breakup of the Union. However, Slidell could not convince the French ruler to act on his personal convictions. It seemed as if the Confederates were in a position in France to best the Union and acquire a friend. However, the Emperor would not act without English support. Slidell and his delegation could not manage to sway a friendly, sympathetic government to support their cause. Dayton and the Union managed to outmaneuver Slidell and undermine Confederate diplomatic operations in France.

Another important minor power in Europe was Russia. Under the rule of Czar Alexander II and on the fringes of Europe, Russia just emerged from the Crimean War in 1856. It lost to an alliance between France, England, and the Ottoman Empire. It was a humiliating defeat for Russia and the czar. France and England succeeded in propping up the Ottoman Empire, which was in decline. The West needed a counterweight to Russian expansion, and the Ottomans were strategically located to provide that balance to the rising Russian power. After the war, Russia was diplomatically isolated from the rest of Europe. Its alliances with Austria and others were dismantled, and Russia was left to fend for itself. Russia received little to no help in the years following the war. It was clear that France and England had other priorities. This diplomatic isolation and hostility towards England and France played a role in foreign relations during the American Civil War.

With England and France leaning towards the Confederacy initially, Russia went in the opposite direction. Russia sought support from the United States—her one potential ally. In the years leading up to the Civil War, Russian Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States Eduard de Stoeckl did his best to charm Washington, D.C. He first came to the United States in 1841 as an attaché from the Russian government. He was then promoted after the death of Alexander Bodisco in 1854.²⁴ Stoeckl managed to keep warm, friendly relations with the United States during the Crimean War, and he hoped to achieve the same success during the American Civil War. Stoeckl enjoyed entertaining guests. Although very sociable, he was also observant and tactical. Because he rubbed elbows with so many representatives in Washington, he was well aware of the sectional crisis brewing in the United States; it deeply concerned Stoeckl. His knowledge of the crisis led him to keep the Russian government well informed as well. This vital information was crucial to the decisions made by top Russian officials in St. Petersburg. An intact Union provided a counterweight to England and France. The Russians needed a strong United States.²⁵

The United States sent Cassius Clay, a Kentucky native with strong ambitions to end slavery, to Russia to fight for the Union cause. Clay was born on October 19, 1810 in Madison County, Kentucky.²⁶ His was a family rich in history, lineage, and wealth. His father was one of the largest

²³ Slidell to Benjamin, March 21, 1863, in in *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies*, vol. III, II (Washington: G.P.O., 1922), 721.

²⁴ Albert Woldman, *Lincoln and the Russians* (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1952), 15.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 54.

²⁶ Cassius Clay, *The Life of Cassius Marcellus Clay: Memoirs, Writings, and Speeches*. (New York: J. Fletcher Brennan & Co. 1886),

slave owners in the state of Kentucky, but Clay “began to study the system, or, rather, began to feel its wrongs.”²⁷ Clay’s exposure to slavery and the brutality that accompanied the system never left him in adulthood. The images of plantations and the slaves who worked the fields and in homes helped Clay mold and shape his antislavery position later in life. However, early life for Clay revolved around his father, Green Clay. His wealth, power, and influence opened many doors for Cassius and his brothers. Clay’s father encouraged Cassius to acquire as much education as he could. So, in 1827, he enrolled in the Jesuit College of St. Joseph in Bardstown, Kentucky.²⁸ Clay was a good student in college. He was smart, diligent, and persistent—all great qualities for a diplomat. In a twist of irony, however, Clay struggled the most with his French studies, the diplomatic language used in Europe. Later he moved to New England, where people lived in prosperity on soil that was of the poorest of quality compared to the South. He came to understand the power of markets and mobility in the creating of wealth.

Clay returned to Kentucky a changed man. He saw progress in New England and wanted the same for his home state of Kentucky. He saw potential for Kentucky to rise above the need for slavery and diversify and industrialize its economy. Clay foresaw himself as the lead advocate for the rebirth of Kentucky’s economy. He aligned himself with non-slaveholders in Kentucky. Clay envisioned a robust and diversified economy much in the way Henry Clay had with his American System. In 1834, Clay was elected to the Kentucky House of Representatives. He served three terms and was voted out due to his growing calls for abolition in Kentucky.²⁹ When war broke out with Mexico in 1846, Clay joined the 1st Kentucky Calvary, or the “Old Infantry” company. Clay served as their captain after bribing the commanding officer Captain James Jackson to step down.³⁰ Clay went off to war in staunch opposition to it. An extreme Whig, Clay was in the minority who opposed President Polk’s declaration of war from the very beginning. Like many Whigs, Clay believed President Polk used the Mexican American War as a means to expand slavery into the western territories.

In 1854, a new political party entered the scene, the Republican Party. Clay joined immediately. The Free-Soil Party had paved the way for a party to oppose slavery. He fought for but did not secure, the nomination in 1856 for president. That went to John C. Frémont. The Republican Party won in the 1860 election, and Abraham Lincoln took notice of Clay’s history of opposing slavery, his “conversion” from a slaveholder to a man screaming for abolition, and his persistence. Despite those positive qualities, Lincoln found Clay too aggressive for a prominent cabinet position. The Union was hanging in the balance, and Lincoln feared Clay might push it over the edge.³¹ William Seward, a friend of Clay, offered him a position in the State Department. Seward nominated Clay Minister to Russia. Clay was appointed on March 28, 1861, by Lincoln.

Clay’s mission to Russia was simple and direct: maintain the current friendly relations with the Russian Emperor and prevent the Confederate States from swaying the Russian government towards recognition. As usual, Seward provided his diplomats with specific directions, essentially talking points to get the diplomacy off to a strong start. These points gave the Union diplomats an edge because they were well crafted and thought through in great detail. Clay’s talking points were no exception. Seward reminded Clay, “Russia, like the United States, is an improving and expanding empire. Its track is eastward, while that of the United States is westward. The two nations, therefore,

²⁷ Ibid, 25.

²⁸ David, Smiley, *Lion of White Hall* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1962), 11.

²⁹ Ibid, 50.

³⁰ Ibid, 116.

³¹ Ibid, 169.

never come into rivalry or conflict.”³² The United States had no reason to quarrel with Russia. The two nations stood on opposite ends of the globe and left one another to their own devices. The Russians were not players in the Atlantic trade, like the English or the French. The United States did not need to worry about the Russians interfering. Seward wanted Clay to broach a wide range of topics while in Russia as well. The primary goal was dealing with the Confederacy. However, the Union still had other pressing matters. Clay was instructed to “inquire whether the sluggish course of commerce between the two nations cannot be quickened, and its volume increased.”³³ Seward also thought ahead to the relations between the two countries after the war. He was concerned over the issue of free travel between the two nations. The United States allowed Russians to “cross this western continent without once being required to exhibit a passport. Why will not Russia extend the same hospitality to us?”³⁴ This freedom to travel was an extension of the equality of man principle to which Seward, Clay, and other fervent abolitionists remained deeply committed. Seward and Clay warned the Russian czar that if the United States were to be broken into two republics, “the equilibrium of nations, maintained by this republic, on the one side, against the European system on the other continent, would be lost, and the struggles of nations in that system for dominion in this hemisphere and on the high seas...would be renewed. The progress of freedom...would be arrested, and the hopes of humanity...would be disappointed and indefinitely postponed.”³⁵ Seward obviously had an American bias and overstated the importance of the United States, at the time, in the global system. However, the point was to prove to the czar and the Russian government that they needed the United States as one united nation to stop the western Europeans from dominating the globe and starting further wars. At the end of the letter, in clear and direct language, Seward explained that the United States “refrains from all intervention whatever in their political affairs; and it expects the same just and generous forbearance in return.”³⁶ The United States desired to conduct its affairs with Russia as if the Civil War was not raging. The United States drafted the Monroe Doctrine to keep European powers out of the western hemisphere and followed a policy of non-interventionism. The fact that the United States was engulfed in a civil war, according to Lincoln and Seward, did not change that policy. This demand was strategically placed at the end of the letter as a point of emphasis and to draw the attention of the reader.

On July 14, 1861, Clay met with the Russian Emperor, Alexander II. The czar was very receptive and friendly with the American delegation. Clay remarked how the Emperor “had hopes of the perpetuity of the friendship between the two nations now, that in addition to all former ties we were bound together by a common sympathy in the common cause of emancipation.”³⁷ Alexander II issued his own version of the Emancipation Proclamation in March 1861 that freed all the serfs in Russia, and the emperor viewed the Civil War in terms of slavery versus abolition. The Union’s goal of abolition came much later in the conflict. Nonetheless, the emperor saw his interests and ideals aligned with the Union, rather than the Confederacy. Clay’s mission in 1861 was a breeze compared to his counterparts in England or France. He worked with a very sympathetic government from the outset of the war. The Russians understood that the United States was a vital ally against

³² Seward to Clay, May 6, 1861, in United States Department of State, *Message of the President of the United States to the two houses of Congress, at the commencement of the second session of the thirty-seventh congress: Instructions and Dispatches: Russia*. Vol. I (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1861), 293.

³³ *Ibid*, 293.

³⁴ *Ibid*, 293.

³⁵ *Ibid*, 296.

³⁶ *Ibid*, 296-297.

³⁷ Clay to Seward, June 21, 1861, in United States Department of State. *Message of the President of the United States to the two houses of Congress, at the Commencement of the Second Session of the Thirty-seventh Congress: Instructions and Dispatches: Russia*. Vol. I (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1861), 305.

the French and the British. Russia and the emperor understood that a strong United States could stand up against the threat of western European aggression and economic dominance.

The Union diplomats in Russia had no Confederate diplomatic competition in 1861. Clay had the ear and full attention of the Russian government, and the emperor was all ears. He was happy to hear the Union delegation speak. Soon, he and Clay developed a personal relationship alongside of their working relationship. Davis had focused all his attention on France and England for diplomatic support. He sent Lucius Quintus Cincinnatus Lamar II of Georgia and Mississippi to represent the Confederate interests in Russia. On November 19, 1862, Lamar was appointed Special Commissioner to Russia. Benjamin sent Lamar a letter detailing his nomination and mission in Russia. The Civil War raged for one year before any Confederate commissioner was nominated to head up relations with the Russian government. Benjamin warned Lamar that “our offers to enter into amicable relations with the great powers of Europe, whose proximity caused them to be first visited by our commissioners, naturally created some hesitation in approaching his Imperial Majesty Alexander II.”³⁸ The Confederate government had sent their best diplomats to the French and English courts right after the war began. Russia was geographically and politically insignificant when compared with England or France, based on the Confederate diplomatic goals. Lamar left for Russia in 1863. He arrived in London a few weeks later and awaited further instructions from Benjamin. Those instructions never came from Richmond. What did come was a notice that “the Senate failed to ratify my [Lamar] nomination as commissioner to Russia.” Adding, “the President desires that I consider the official information of the fact as terminating my mission.”³⁹ The Confederate mission to Russia never made it to St. Petersburg or even to mainland Europe. Lamar met with Mason and Slidell while in London. He was briefed on the status of their missions. However, his own mission was not seen as important in 1863. The Russians were far away and in the pocket of Clay and the Union.

The Russians had military as well as political reasons to support the Union. Since the United States was so friendly with the government of Alexander II, the emperor decided to send two fleets, one to San Francisco and one to New York in 1863. The Americans saw this as proof of Russian support for the Union and a step towards intervention. In truth, the Russians needed somewhere remote to hide their navy in the event of a war with England or France. In New York, the fleet arrived in September 1863. *The New York Times* noted the “Russian frigate *Osliba*, which has lain at anchor in our harbor for several days past, and has been an object of so much interest to our citizens, is about to be reinforced by a fleet of four or five vessels of the same nationality.”⁴⁰ The Russian fleet generated much excitement. It reassured Union leaders that they had outside support for the war, even if it was in Russia’s strategic interest to dock its fleet in American ports.

The missions in France and Russia demonstrate the struggle of the Confederate diplomats. France used the Civil War as an opportunity to attempt to restore a European monarchy on the throne of a weak Mexico. The Confederates could not convince France to join the war because they were planning their own with Mexico. Although sympathetic to the Confederate cause, Napoleon III had his own ambitions, and Slidell was not able to reign him in. This was a major diplomatic failure for the Confederacy. France had been an early supporter of the independence of the Confederacy, more so than England. The failure to obtain recognition from France left England as the only option. The Confederates shot themselves in the foot with their “tunnel vision” diplomacy with England and France. The Confederate State Department and Davis were so concerned about the

³⁸ Benjamin to Lamar, November 19, 1861, in *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies*, vol. III, II (Washington: G.P.O., 1922), 606.

³⁹ Lamar to Benjamin, July 22, 1863, in *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies*, vol. III, II (Washington: G.P.O., 1922), 848.

⁴⁰ “A Russian Fleet Coming into our Harbor: Their Arrival,” *New York Times*, September 24, 1863.

English and the French that they ignored many potential friends. Russia supported the Union from the outset. However, Davis and the Confederates failed even to send an envoy to Alexander II. The Confederates needed support from wherever they could find it, and their inability to engage Russia shows how focused—fixated in fact—they were on France and England. Davis and confederate officials remained far too concentrated on events at home and unimaginative about the potential for diplomacy abroad. The loss of a diplomatic front proved an important component to the Confederacy's eventual defeat.

Band of Brothers and Sisters: A Challenge of the Myth of the War Experience

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*"We few, we happy few, we band of brothers. For he today who sheds his blood with me shall be my brother..."*¹

These immortal words of William Shakespeare have embodied for centuries an ideology of masculine camaraderie and willingness to sacrifice oneself on the battlefield as an act of honor and fraternal duty. The late historian George Mosse analyzed this myth of taking part in the "noble" cause that is war in his 1990 study *Fallen Soldiers*. The formation of what Mosse called the "myth of the war experience" derived primarily from the experiences of men who willingly volunteered for the First World War. In his 1996 publication, *The Image of Man: The Creation of Modern Masculinity*, Mosse elaborated further, explaining that World War I was solely a masculine war. It was the experience of soldiers, specifically male white soldiers, in combat and on the frontlines that defined memory of the war. However—as this study argues—the elements that make up the myth of the war can also derive from the experiences of the non-combatative participants in the war, specifically women nurses. Although war nurses were not fighters, they also shared the patriotic drive to volunteer to serve their respective countries and were eager to take up the occupation of nursing. After waking up from their romanticized notions of the war, nurses faced the same fear of enemy bombardments as frontline soldiers. On the war front they, too, observed the horrors which advanced weaponry and trench warfare inflicted upon soldiers, and they saw the desolation of the front lines. Women, through the feminized occupation of war nursing, demonstrated and shared in the experiences of male soldiers. In other words, they too contribute to the mythology of the war. Women's involvement in the war was far from passive; this reality complicates Mosse's premise that World War I's renewal of war mythology was entirely masculine in nature.

Mosse argues that nineteenth century wars already were embedded in mythology. The myth was that wars contained this sacred sensation of camaraderie and honor, despite the mass deaths that accompany them. To Mosse, this mythology came into further fruition in World War I. He argues this myth existed during the French Revolution, but World War I brought the myth to a whole new level. Mass death is a necessary war experience, but during the Great War, the numbers of death rose to a grander scale and dimension. Twice as many men died in action or of their wounds than in the major wars that took place between 1790 and 1914.²

Furthermore, the mythology of the war was "constructed upon a longing for camaraderie, sense of meaning in life and personal and national regeneration."³ Men actively volunteered for the

¹ This line is taken from William Shakespeare's *Henry V*, Saint. Crispin's Day speech, Wade Bradford, "3 Most Moving Monologues From Shakespeare's Henry V," accessed November 27, 2017, <https://www.thoughtco.com/best-speeches-from-henry-v-2713258>.

² George Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars* (Oxford University Press, 1990), 6.

³ Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers*, 16.

war effort more. Males on either side of the war in Europe and eventually the United States volunteered by the thousands to sacrifice their lives for their country and to fulfill their desires for masculinized glory. It was about duty to one's country, and, through the act of volunteering for the war, men proved their masculinity. They also believed that the war would "energize their own life and that of the nation."⁴

Because of the sheer unprecedented magnitude of World War I, the mythology of the war experience took on greater importance and new elements. New technology and new forms of warfare emerged that would remain forever in the memories of those who fought, and those memories would be passed down to future generations who would learn of the war. The Great War was a dominating muse for the people of its time, and many veterans who returned from war found themselves seeking a sense of higher purpose and closure after the atrocities and sacrifices they had witnessed. They were conflicted about the war. Should it be remembered as a moment of glory or as a moment of mayhem that should be left alone? National commissions used positive accounts of the war in commemorations. Rather than allowing the public to dwell on the war's carnage, nations made efforts to reinforce notions that the war had an honorable purpose by constructing monuments and taking on various commemoration activities for fallen soldiers.

Each of these elements produced ideologies that re-focused the memory of the war and further solidified the myth of the war experience to "mask war and to legitimize the experience of war," claimed Mosse.⁵ The Great War must not be remembered solely for the introduction of trench warfare, the global mass slaughter, and unprecedented mass destruction. Instead, the mythology of the war experience revived the spiritual sense of noble sacrifice, comradeship, and national duty.

In terms of women and femininity during the war, Mosse does not provide an in-depth analysis. He merely stated that "the war, as far as the soldiers were concerned, only reinforced the appeal of traditional femininity which they idealized...in response to their longing for women and sexual imagery"⁶ Mosse neglects the fact that women played an active role in the war. He claimed that women were merely passive images of sexuality rather than active contributors to the war efforts. Although he acknowledges that not all women stayed at home while the men went off to war, Mosse focuses solely on the masculine warfront experience. He did not consider the active roles women played in the war, or what women witnessed during the war could have a contribution to the mythology, specifically the war nurses. To Mosse, "Although nurses on the battlefield were praised and admired and often their courage was signaled out, their image nevertheless remained passive as angels of mercy, standing apart from the fighting."⁷ The nurses' experiences, Mosse implies, could not contribute to the mythology because they were merely symbolic beings and not active participants in the war.

In his later 1996 publication of *The Image of Man*, Mosse does acknowledge that World War I represented a turning point for women, but he still maintained that "the Great War was a masculine event, despite the role it may have had in encouraging women...The men at the front saw women largely in a passive role as nurses or prostitutes."⁸ Mosse dismissed the idea that women made an active contribution to the war efforts and construction of the mythology. He oversimplified the role of nurses in the war effort, and he equated the role of nurses to that of sex workers, refusing to consider that the role of women went beyond sexual beings for the men who were fighting. Again, he viewed women as symbolic entities, not vital players in the war.⁹ Femininity was not a main

⁴ Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers*, 16.

⁵ Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers*, 7.

⁶ Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers*, 61.

⁷ Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers*, 61.

⁸ George Mosse, *The Image of Man: The Creation of Modern Masculinity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 107-108.

⁹ Mosse, *The Image of Man*, 108.

character in the story of World War I; it was too overshadowed by masculinity in Mosse's interpretation. "The First World War tied nationalism and masculinity together more closely than ever before and as it did so, brought to a climax all the facts of masculinity," wrote Mosse.¹⁰

Offering an alternative assessment of gender in World War I, historian Susan R. Grayzel argued in her 1999 book, *Women's Identities at War*, that the Great War was an event where "gender roles and identities survived remarkably unscathed."¹¹ Rather than stating that the war was a turning point for either men or women, Grayzel claims that the war reinforced gender roles. To her, the point was not whether "the war was 'good' or 'bad' for women."¹² Instead, she argues that one must see World War I as having had "the largest group of adult noncombatant efforts to make sense of their and national identities at a pivotal moment of the modern era."¹³ Grayzel, in this statement, advocates for a reexamination of the war, a movement away from the soldiers and combatants toward both the warfront and homefront participants of the war. She further adds that women were "central and active participants in societies mobilized for the first modern, total war."¹⁴ Women were not merely passive in World War I; they contributed to the war experience, contrary to Mosse's argument. To Grayzel, "motherhood served as an anchor for stabilizing gender during this total war...the resilience of the gender system shaped how the war was defined and experienced."¹⁵ It was only through assuming their feminine roles that women were able to contribute to the war.

Grayzel's article in *The Journal of Modern History*, titled "The Souls of Soldiers," addresses the war-front and home-front not as two separate spheres of the war, but as unique battles within one war: not exclusively a male soldier's war. Rather, "men and women alike are seen as proving they can "make war" by bravely risking death for the nation."¹⁶ The Great War was a war on all fronts, and it cannot be viewed through the experiences of soldiers alone. Grayzel cites a story in the French newspaper *Le Figaro* that reported how two nurses were awarded the Croix de Guerre avec Palme after being killed in a bombing of their hospital. She notes the article's description of how nurses "heroically fell in the accomplishment of their duty."¹⁷ Unlike Mosse, Grayzel demonstrates that masculine and gender roles were both active in World War I and establishes an understanding in which both combatants and noncombatants played vital roles in the war.

In a near identical fashion to men volunteering to become soldiers, women volunteered in the Great War by the thousands to serve their respective countries. British Nurse Violetta Thurstan recalled in her memoirs, *Field Hospital and Flying Column*, that nurses both, "trained and untrained were besieging the war office to be sent to the front. Voluntary Aid Detachment members were feverishly practicing their bandaging... an endless procession of women wanting to help, anxious for adventure."¹⁸ American nurse Elizabeth H. Ashe also shared a similar experience in her personal narrative, titled *Intimate Letters from France*, explaining how "nurses have responded splendidly. Everyone is eager for the privilege of going to the front."¹⁹

¹⁰ Mosse, *The Image of Man*, 108.

¹¹ Susan Grayzel, *Women's Identities at War: Gender, Motherhood, and Politics in Britain and France During the First World War* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 107.

¹² Grayzel, *Women's Identities at War*, 6.

¹³ Grayzel, *Women's Identities at War*, 1.

¹⁴ Grayzel, *Women's Identities at War*, 7.

¹⁵ Grayzel, *Women's Identities at War*, 10.

¹⁶ Susan Grayzel, "The Souls of Soldiers": Civilians under Fire in First World War France," *The Journal of Modern History* 78, no. 3 (2006): 617.

¹⁷ Grayzel, "The Souls of Soldiers": Civilians under Fire in the First World War France," 617.

¹⁸ Violetta Thurstan, *Field Hospital and Flying Column With the Red Cross on the Western and Eastern Fronts During the First World War* (New York: Leonaux 1919), 39.

¹⁹ Elizabeth H. Ashe, *Intimate Letters From France: and Extracts from the Diary of Elizabeth Ashe, 19 17-1919* (San Francisco: Bruce Brough Press, 1931), 77.

Scholar Victoria Holder's article "From Handmaiden to Right Hand" described how these women wished to serve "because they wanted to do their part as caregivers."²⁰ Women were taking up arms as nurses, they sought service on the front and contributed to the Great War, just as men desired to be soldiers on the front. The majority of these women came from Great Britain, France, and the United States. At the beginning of the 1900s, Britain and France had already included nurses into their military systems, and at the start of the war, nurses were ready and willing to help in the war effort. Initially, the numbers of British military volunteer nurses were only in the hundreds, but by the time of the Armistice about 23,000 women served as nurses; France ended up with 63,000 Red Cross volunteers, and the American Nurses Corps had 21,000.²¹

Historians Margaret Vining and Barton Hacker explain in their article, "From Camp Follower to Lady in Uniform," that "by the middle of the century, particularly in Britain and the United States, ideals of womanhood and women's unique nurturing and civilizing qualities supported claims for equality and civil rights, laying the groundwork for expanded military roles for women."²² Historian Neil M. Heyman also explores this idea of the desire to volunteer further in his book *Daily Life of World War I*. Women becoming nurses led to the "best chance of any woman to approach the fighting line and share the experiences of the combat soldier."²³ Women too were drawn to enlist and volunteer for the war because they shared in patriotism and a desire to serve their country. The war was not merely a man's experience, but also a shared experience, with women and their femininity and desire to volunteer for the war effort also contributing to the mythology of the war. Furthermore, women took on an active role and were not merely passive in the war effort.

By 1917 the majority of nurses were on the front lines, and they were faced with the harsh realities of war. In her monograph, *American Women in World War I*, historian Lettie Gavin discusses how the nurse's experiences quickly challenged the romantic impulses that drove them to volunteer for service:

Popular illustrations depicted a pretty young woman wearing a crisp white uniform emblazoned with a scarlet cross, a halo cap and flowing veil...Nothing in this popular fantasy could have prepared the nurse for the reality: lice-infested, mud-crusting uniforms, bloody bandages, gaping shrapnel wounds, hideously infected fractures, mustard gas burns...shrieks of pain, trauma from exposure, fatigue and emotional collapse...²⁴

Although noncombatants, nurses on the front faced the same fears of being bombed by the enemy and the horrors of the warfront as the soldiers they were aiding. Nurse Ashe shared her fear of the bombings. "We cannot tear ourselves from the exciting events around us. Every little while the sirens blow which means shells are flying and we are warned to get undercover," she recalled.²⁵ Relating to the mythology of the war, nurses too witnessed the new technologies, and they too described how its impact not only modernized war, but also it shaped memory for those involved in it. American Nurse Helen Fairchild described in a letter to her mother a mass bombardment at Base Hospital No. 10 LeTreport France on Aug 21, 1917. "It is...hard for me to write. We were

²⁰ Neil Hayman, *Daily Life During World War I* (Westport, Connecticut: The Greenwood Press, 2002), 119-120.

²¹ Heyman, *Daily Life During World War I*, 120.

²² Barton C. Hacker and Margaret Vining, "From Camp Follower to Lady in Uniform: Women, Social Class and Military Institutions before 1920," *Contemporary European History* 10, no. 3 (2001): 355.

²³ Heyman, *Daily Life of World War I*, 119.

²⁴ Lettie Gavin, *American Women in World War I: They Also Served* (Boulder: University Press of Colorado Press, 1999), 43.

²⁵ Ashe, *Intimate Letters From France*, 21.

bombarded by the Germans four nights ago...Bombs landed on a cook shack...The cook's leg came through the roof of the tent next door and the guy-ropes of Dr. Packard's tent were decorated with his entrails," she wrote. In addition to what she witnessed happen to the men at her location, her fellow nurses were also gravely injured by the bombardment of German troops. "The nurse who came up here with me had a frightful time...a piece of shrapnel came through our tent and penetrated her eye; another piece struck her cheek."²⁶ Nurse Fairchild's first-hand account of the attack on her camp makes clear that women nurses hardly were passive in the war and that they faced advanced weaponry attacks from the enemy while on active duty.

Nurse Violetta Thurstan described in her writings how a soldier's death lingered in her memory while she was working on the front lines:

There was one poor Breton soldier, dying of septicemia, who lay in a small room off the large ward. He used to shriek to every passerby to give him drink, and no amount of water relieved his raging thirst. That voice calling incessantly night and day, 'A Boire, â boire!' haunted me long after he was dead.²⁷

In her description, Thurstan implied that, like a soldier, she experienced the equivalent of post-traumatic stress disorder on the frontlines after having witnessed the death of a soldier. Her words make clear that nurses of the Great War were not only active witnesses to its destruction but also contributed to its literature and the creation of memory.

Despite the carnage, nurses still contributed to the mythology of the war by continuing their duties. Historian Victoria Holder shows in her article, "From Handmaiden to Right Hand," that nurses still carried out their duty and "put themselves at risk for disease and injury like any soldier, but they did not have the assistance of a weapon to defend themselves."²⁸ During battle, nurses tended to "the rush" of convoys of wounded soldiers coming from the battlefield and needed to treat hundreds of men.

Moreover, in terms of sharing the dangers of attacks from the enemy, nurses also witnessed the horrors of death from on the lines, not just those inflicted by the enemy. Ellen La Motte recalled an incident where a soldier attempted to take his own life to escape the war. "He fired a revolver up through the roof of his mouth, but he made a mess of it. The ball tore out his left eye, and then lodged somewhere under his skull," she recalled.²⁹ However, despite having witnessed this gruesome act, La Motte, based on her journal entry, displayed a militant mentality. Describing the suicide in her dairy, she explains, "He was a deserter, and discipline had to be maintained. Since he had failed in the job, his life must be saved...until he was well enough to be stood up against a wall and shot. This is War."³⁰ La Motte in this entry, despite having witnessed a soldier's attempted suicide, still took pride that she was in the service as a military nurse. She displayed no grief for the soldier's actions. She, like a soldier, was filled with a sense of honor and duty, and even in the face of this horrid event, La Motte carried on her responsibilities as a war nurse. Later, in her writing, she described the sense of pride she felt for being a nurse of the Great War. She recalled a moment when she saw soldiers nursed "back to health, to a point which they could again shoulder eighty pounds of marching kit...It was a pleasure to nurse such as these. It called forth one's skill and one's

²⁶ Helen Fairchild, *Philadelphia to Flanders* (Grantville, PA: Printed Privately, 1917), 150.

²⁷ Violetta Thurstan *Field Hospital and Flying Column* (London and New York, 1919), 39.

²⁸ Victoria Holder, "From Handmaiden to Right Hand -- World War I and Advancements in Medicine...Sixth in an Ongoing Series about the History of Perioperative Nursing," *AORN Journal* 80 (5): 919.

²⁹ Ellen N. La Motte *The Backwash of War* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1934), 3.

³⁰ La Motte, *The Backwash of War*, 6.

humanity.”³¹ La Motte, was proud of her work as a nurse and found a sense of joy in her part in the war. She helped the soldiers continue their fight and made an active contribution to the war effort.

In terms of commemoration, some nurses were remembered for their bravery on the front and for the sacrifices they made to carry on and defend the cause of their country. One nurse worthy of mention was British nurse Edith Cavell. Prior to the war, Cavell was the matron of the Berkendael Medical Institute in Brussels, Belgium. During Germany’s occupation of Belgium, Cavell joined the Red Cross. The Berkendael where she worked was also converted into a hospital that offered care to soldiers of various nationalities.³² Cavell, was a member of an underground group in Brussels that aided French, Belgian, and British soldiers escape from German capture during the early months of the war. Eventually, Cavell and 70 of her companions were seized by German troops in 1915. She and one other were the only two executed. Christine Hallett noted in her book *Celebrating Nurses* that Cavell “condemned herself by the totally honest responses she gave to her German interrogators.”³³ As the story suggests, Cavell, even in the hands of the enemy, did not lose her dignity and refused to allow herself to be intimidated by the enemies of her country.

Before her execution, Cavell’s last words were, “But this I would say standing before God and Eternity; I realize that patriotism is not enough-I must have no hatred or bitterness toward anyone.”³⁴ British allied forces utilized Cavell’s death as war propaganda material to encourage more aid for the war effort. Cavell’s story demonstrated that stories of bravery and selfless sacrifice for the duty of their country was not solely a masculine affair for soldiers on the field, but can be told through the stories of the non-combatant nurses of the Great War. British propaganda’s use of her story also exemplifies that men were not the only ones being recognized in the Great War’s memory of commemoration. The story of her bravery suggests that honor and duty are not solely a masculine experience. Cavell was far more than a passive character in the war. Through her role as war nurse, she performed her obligations with dignity and died for her country. Stories like Cavell’s and the testimonies of nurses also contribute to the mythology of the war experience. Cavell’s death shaped memory of the war, even generations after the war.

Like men fighting overseas, duty for the war nurses did not simply end on November 11, 1918, Armistice Day. Most nurses overseas were still assisting with sick and wounded soldiers several months after the end of the war, and it was several months before they were able to demobilize and return to their homes. In some cases, groups of women had decided to stay in their assigned area and continue with their duties with the Red Cross. In the years following the war, nurses were commemorated in the United States for their efforts. On April 24, 1919, New York City hosted a Nurses’ Day and parade of nurses with the Red Cross. President Woodrow Wilson’s daughter Eleanor Wilson McAdoo was in attendance. On this day, the nurses were also to receive insurance benefits like the veterans of the war. McAdoo stated that “We have worked in the comfort and safety of our homes while they have faced danger and death to save the men we love.”³⁵

In the years after the war, the Red Cross in New York hosted additional memorial events for nurses. May 16, 1922, marked the third annual tribute to honor the memory of Florence Nightingale (founder of modern nursing) and to honor 300 nurses who had lost their lives in World War I.

³¹ La Motte, *The Backwash of War*, 7.

³² Ginny A. Roth and Elizabeth Fee, "A Soldier's Hero: Edith Cavell (1865-1915)," *American Journal Of Public Health* 100, no. 10: 1865-1866.

³³ Christine Hallett, *Celebrating Nurses: A Visual History* (Barbican, London: Fil Rouge Press Ltd, 2010), 132.

³⁴ Hallett, *Celebrating Nurses: A Visual History*, 133.

³⁵ “Mrs. M’Adoo Lauds Women in the War: President’s Daughter Speaking for Loan, Praises Heroism of Red Cross Nurses,” *The New York Times*, April 24, 1919.

Three thousand nurses in uniform attended a church service at St. John the Divine.³⁶ An additional event the following year had four thousand nurses in attendance.³⁷ In many ways, nurses received the same heroic commemoration as soldiers of The Great War. The fallen men and women were both honored by the general public, and both genders contributed to the mythology of the war.

The Great War lives up to its title as being a massive war that engulfed both combatants and noncombatants, both male and female. The demand for volunteers encompassed all citizens, both men and women. Both soldiers and nurses witnessed the full extent of war's brutality, from its advanced weaponry, to the desolation of living in the trenches, to having to withstand bombardments from the enemy. Men and women not only wrote of the terrors and destruction they witnessed, but both genders were inspired by their unique roles in the war and continued to share a sense of honor and nobleness. Both genders played a vital role in the Great War's narrative and both contributed respectively to the war's beginning and end. The mythology of the war experience relates not only to males. The Great War had immense impact on all those who were participants in its story. Every gender contributed to the mythology of the war.

³⁶ "3,000 Nurses Honor Their Dead in War: March in Uniform to Nave of Cathedral of St. John the Divine Memorial," *New York Times*, May 16, 1927.

³⁷ "Nurses Spread Over the World: Their Forthcoming Tribute to Florence Nightingale and the Congress at Montreal Emphasize the Progress of Their Profession," *New York Times*, May 12, 1929.

The East India Company and Their Reasoning for Voyaging to India in the 17th and 18th Centuries

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The East Indies are a group of islands in Southeast Asia rich in many valuable products. John Watts and George White founded the English East India Company on December 31, 1600 to pursue trade and profits with the East Indies. The Dutch East India Company was created in 1602 by the merger of several companies, which allowed the companies to work as one instead of competing against each other. Among the main products that these two companies traded were cloth and spices. These companies might have started as trading enterprises, but in the end, they were looking for much more. They became empire builders, and their goals began to extend beyond mere trade to learning about other people's culture. What started as trade turned into a mission to learn about culture, religion, and ideas. According to historian William Pettigrew, "The engagements of the English East India Company in South Asia also went beyond politics and trade. This engagement opened new forms of exchange between England and South Asia, resulting in a two-way dissemination of knowledge, ideas, institutions, social practices, languages, religion and dietary practices."¹ Historian Anthony Farrington adds, "Over the next 233 years, the Company came to dominate European trade with South and East Asia."² The East India Company became the most dominant trading power of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Its far-reaching influence helped launch British imperialism.

According to historian Miles Ogborn, "The English East India Company was established in 1600 as a joint stock company with a monopoly on trade with the East Indies that was guaranteed by a monarch."³ It started as a joint stock company that focused on trade because the English needed more materials and resources, all of which could be found in the East Indies. During the seventeenth century, India had a successful cloth and spice industry. England was looking to export goods to serve markets back home. As historian Leanna Lee-Whitman states, "The charter was broad, granting power to cover all circumstances—company ships, for instance, were empowered to make war on any who refused to trade (as long as they were non-Christians)."⁴ England was willing to do anything and everything it could to get items it needed, even if that meant using force and intimidation. This allowed for England to trade their surpluses for the things it needed.

As *Gentlemen's Magazine* explained of the company in 1766: "In former times, when their flock was small and of little value, their trade confined, and their possessions nothing, it was viewed

¹ William Pettigrew and Mahesh Gopalan, *The East India Company, 1600-1857: Essays on Anglo-Indian Connection* (New York: Routledge, 2016), 3.

² Anthony Farrington, *Trading Places: The East India Company and Asia, 1600-1834* (London: The British Library Publishing Division, 2002), 92.

³ Miles Ogborn, *Global Lives: Britain and the World, 1550-1800* (London: Cambridge University Press, 2008): 78.

⁴ Leanna Lee-Whitman, "The Silk Trade: Chinese Silks and British East India Company," *Winterthur Portfolio – A Journal of American Material Culture*, 17, no. 1 (1982): 21.

all together in the light of a private adventurer.”⁵ This was one of the problems that the East India Company faced when it first started. Its fleet was too small, and many people thought they were not going to be able to succeed. To many the company appeared focused on adventure, rather than creating a sound business plan. It did not take long, however, for the company to grow large, become very successful, and profitable.

Trading with the East Indies not only allowed England to gain needed products, but also allowed them to learn how to manufacture these goods for themselves. In the beginning, the British were paying a lot of money for these products, because they did not have a choice. As time went on though, they were able to manufacture some of the products for a fraction of the cost at home—another reason for trading with India during this time related to fashion. Fashion was becoming more important for the upper classes in England, and India had everything one needed to be fashionable. According to Audrey Douglas, “the East India Company had discovered that the exploitation of fashion for profit is a more artful business than a mere dictatorship exercised by the ‘trade.’”⁶ The British hoped trade of this cloth and fabric would help start a booming fashion industry, and they were not wrong.


There were several other reasons to start trading with India. The British also hoped to test and improve open sea navigation. Understanding the ocean and general geography was a necessity for the island kingdom of England. For example, in times of war, the British would be able to navigate more effectively with an understanding of the ocean and what it was doing. In 1697, writer Charles Davenant explained that “it is as a great truth, that the strength of an island, as well as its treasure, depends more on trade and navigation, than that of a continent; the consideration whereof hath often prevailed with me to believe this nation might sooner bring France to its ancient bounds by our force in trade and Navigation.”⁷ So, people believed if England mastered trade and navigation, then it could unseat France as a power. The British monarchy believed that it did not need a strong army to dominate France. They were not wrong, mastering trade and navigation would advance English interests and advanced it as an empire. Times were changing, and countries did not have to have the strongest military anymore. As times changed, countries themselves needed to change, and that is exactly what England did. The British started trading companies and were willing to do what no one else at that time was doing. They changed themselves for the better, and that is why they were one of the first countries to master the art of trade and navigation. This would help England more than anything else in the long run.

During this time period, the English East India Company mostly traded in cloth and fabric. Meanwhile, the Dutch East India Company dealt largely with the trade of spice. Both carved out their own little niche in each aspect of trade. However, that did not stop the English East India Company from trying to intrude on the Dutch’s spice trade. The English East India Company’s

⁵ The East India Company was looked at as more of an adventure because they did not have the tools that they needed to succeed at the beginning. “A Brief State of the Situation of the East India Company’s Affairs, Abroad and at Home.” *The Gentlemen’s Magazine: And Historical Chronicle* 36 (September 1766): 395.

⁶ Audrey Douglas, “Cotton Textiles in England: the East India Company’s Attempt to Exploit Developments in Fashion, 1660-1721,” *Journal of British Studies*, 8, no. 2 (1969): 28.

⁷ Charles Davenant, *An Answer to a Late Tract, Entitled, An Essay on the East-India Trade*, (London: 1697): 2.



This illustration shows a ship from the East India Company's fleet sailing across open water. This is what one of the company's ships would have looked like at the beginning of the 17th century. In the upper right-hand corner of the picture at the top of the ship, looks to be the East India Company's flag. I cannot make out what the rest of the flags are but I assume they have something to do with the trading partners of the company or flags that have something to do with England. There also looks to be a sun and a moon at the top of the image, maybe representing the sun rising in the east and setting in the west.

interference with the Dutch company led to a war. A 1762 article, entitled *A Defence of the United Company of Merchants of England, trading to the East Indies*, notes:

There can be nothing more frivolous than this complaint: the factory in question overlooked Fort St. David's from a hill at the distance of seven hundred yards. The English who at the time apprehended the French would attack this fort, and avail themselves of the situation of the Dutch factory, came to an actual agreement with the Dutch factor, that the house should be demolished.⁸

Competition and bitterness grew between the two companies to the extent that the English company was willing to destroy a Dutch factory. Were they trying to send a message or were they trying to destroy some of their product? Either way, these two companies actively sought to intrude on each other's trade, resulting in significant damage. After the war, trade between the two

⁸ These companies were battling with each other so much that the English company was willing to demolish one of the Dutch factories. "A Defence of the United Company of Merchants of England, Trading to the East-Indies, and Their Servants...against the Complaints of the Dutch East India Company." *The Critical Review*. London (September 1762): 351.

companies ended. The English East India Company decided to stick to the textile trade and stayed away from the Dutch.

Not everyone in England supported trade. Late seventeenth-century pamphleteer John Cary argued:

trade which exports little or none of our product or manufactures, nor supplies us with things necessary to promote manufacturers at home, or carry on our trade abroad, nor encourages navigation, cannot be supposed to be advantageous to this Kingdom; especially when its imports hinder the consumption of our own manufactures, and more especially when those imports are chiefly the purchase of our Bullion.⁹

Many people thought the East India Company should stop trading with foreign countries. They argued England should focus on building its own manufacturing companies and stop spending money on voyages to get things that they could make in England. As time went on, however, the mindset began to change. According to *the Gentlemen's Magazine* in 1766 "at present there are near seven millions of property invested in that trade, an immense quantity of shipping employed, fleets and armies maintained, and great possessions acquired, every man almost in these kingdoms finds himself affected by its prosperity."¹⁰ With time, more and more people viewed trade with the East Indies as a positive thing. Supporters could point to the profits produced by the East India Company. They also stressed the jumpstart provided for manufacturing at lower costs. Additionally, there was the issue of cultural growth. As stated in the 1677 essay, *The East-India-Trade a Most Profitable Trade to the Kingdom*:

It is foreign trade, that is the great interest and concern of the kingdom; without foreign trade, all or the most part of those studies that that render persons so renowned, would be of little signification to the Public. What is all knowledge, if it be not improved to practice, but empty notions? If the people of the islands were learned in all languages, did know the situation of all places and countries of nature of all commodities; to what purpose would all be, if there were no foreign trade?¹¹

In short, the British could learn much about other countries' governments, laws, religion, society, institutions, language, and operations. In some senses, this was almost more important than the products being traded. In the long run, it was about how to better England and build empire. What is the point of going to these countries without gaining an understanding of diversity and other peoples' way of life? There is no reason to trade with these other countries unless the end game is to better every aspect of life.

The East India Company was a very successful company. It started as a company that mainly focused on trade because the times were changing, and it aimed to be a pioneer of trade. Trading patterns, consumer habits, and general economics, however, inevitably change. This proved true for both the English East India Company and the Dutch East India Company. Both continued to operate even as profits fell. Why you might ask? The East India Company, focused on trade in the beginning, but by the end, it sought knowledge about India's culture, religion, government, laws, society, institutions, and how the country operated in general. The East India Company took the information that it had gained and applied it to its own practices back home in England. The company had one agenda in mind when the company started, but at the end it adopted a completely different justification.

⁹ John Cary, *A Discourse Concerning the East-India Trade, Shewing it to be Unprofitable* (London: 1696): 1.

¹⁰ "A Brief State of the Situation of the East India Company's Affairs, Abroad and at Home." *The Gentlemen's Magazine: And Historical Chronical* 36 (September 1766): 395.

¹¹ Robert Ferguson, *The East-India-Trade a Most Profitable Trade to the Kingdom* (London, 1677): 1-2.

Japanese Women's Suffrage during the Interwar Period, 1919-1931: Western Influence, Nation Building, and the Limitations of Suffrage

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The push for women's suffrage in Japan during the interwar period was part of a larger social movement. During this pivotal time period, women were moving from the private to the public sphere and questioning their role within society. Meanwhile, the Japanese government, consisting predominately of men, also rethought the role of women in society. Should women have the right to vote? How would women's suffrage benefit the nation? Are women equal to men? These were some of the questions both men and women faced during the interwar era. For most Japanese, the answers to such bewildering questions rested in the western world. The West influenced Japanese men and women—but in considerably different ways. Japanese women demanded the right to vote, while the men in government sought to limit women's votes. As this paper will argue, in the end, western influence shaped the Japanese government in limiting the women's suffrage movement.

Over the last few decades, historical analysis of gender has expanded and become a category that cannot be overlooked. Joan Scott's revolutionary work, "Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis," constructed a framework to examine and critique traditional discourses.¹ This new framework helps scholars such as myself to research topics about Japanese women's suffrage through the lens of gender.

As historian Sheldon Garon contends, Japanese women's organizations including suffrage groups, collaborated with the state, not only in the 1930s and early 1940s, but as early as the 1920s. Although many scholars have debated this and continue to do so, undeniably women yearned to be a part of the political system, and the Japanese government used that motivation to mobilize women for peacetime goals.² Garon makes a compelling argument, but he misses a key component: limits constraining the suffrage movement. Whether women's groups collaborated with the Japanese government in the 1920s or 1930s is not essential to this study; what is important is that women chose to collaborate. By working with the Japanese state, women's groups effectively gave up their autonomy and limited their suffrage movement.

Garon is one of many who have studied the Japanese women's suffrage movement. Barbara Molony and Sharon Nolte also provide stimulating perspectives on the movement. Molony explains that "the salience of rights in Japanese thought, however, suggests that nineteenth-century concepts of rights drew from indigenous as well as imported ideas," and "what were understood as 'rights'

¹ Joan W. Scott, "Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis," *The American Historical Review* 91, no. 5 (1986): 1053–75.

² Sheldon Garon, "Women's Groups and the Japanese State: Contending Approaches to Political Integration, 1890-1945," *Journal of Japanese Studies* 19, no. 1 (1993): 9.

expanded by the 1920s.”³ As Molony explicitly states, foreign and domestic discourse stimulated the suffrage movement in Japan. Molony’s vision of combined domestic and imported influences is noteworthy, but she fails to expand beyond women’s suffrage groups. In fact, western influence affected the government too. The Japanese state, administered by elite men, had authority to determine who did and did not become a citizen and who did or did not have rights. Women such as Ichikawa Fusae, Hiratsuka Raicho, and Oku Mumeo understood this and fought fiercely for change.⁴

According to Nolte, “culturally constructed gender systems interacts with a society’s political system,”⁵ which means politics and gender were entangled with one another. What did that mean for women’s suffrage in Japan? One cannot discuss how women sought to transform the political system without addressing gender, because women were a part of society just as men were. However, patriarchal Japanese society considered the wife submissive to the husband. Also, within the patriarchy, Japan merged concepts of family and nation into one. Therefore, a wife obeyed her husband and helped cultivate future Japanese subjects, their children. By the interwar era, these “traditional” gender roles came under attack. Women organized and demanded the right to vote. Suffrage supporters believed that only with the right to vote could they fulfill their duty as wife and Japanese subject.⁶

Garon, Molony, and Nolte have all explored Japanese women’s suffrage during the interwar period. In Garon’s critique of the suffrage movement, women began collaborating with the government during the 1920s, instead of the 1930s or early 1940s, as others have claimed. However, he ignores the fact that women’s cooperation with the government limited the suffrage movement. Molony saw the suffrage movement as a blend of domestic and imported ideas that contested state limitations on women. However, she fails to note that the West influenced the Japanese government too. Lastly, Nolte demonstrates the intricate link between the political system and gender. However, like Molony, Garon and Nolte underestimate the importance of western influence within the Japanese government itself.

Another question is: why the interwar period in the first place? Women would not gain the right to vote until 1946, so why have historians such as myself been drawn to the interwar era? In order to understand this period, we must (regress slightly and) go back to the 1910s with the emergence in Japan of “New Women” and later the “Modern Girl.” Both were “part of global phenomena” that recast gender roles.⁷ New Women were educated, politically active, and the target of much criticism. Modern Girls were young, sexually liberated, and a part of the consumer culture. As part of a transnational movement, New Women and Modern Girls, like the suffrage movement, were heavily influenced by the West and challenged “traditional” gender roles.⁸

First, New Women believed or participated in romantic love whether that be male or female (same sex), they drank alcohol, and they visited brothels. How could a “good wife, wise mother,” fulfill her obligations to the family and state if both partners were female or if she was out drinking or visiting brothels? The “good wife, wise mother,” drew from an early Meiji ideology that women were to be virtuous and submissive to men for the good of the state. This was the same ideology that suffragists had to contend with during the interwar. By the 1920s, the Modern Girl challenged tradition and went out in the public sphere for work, pleasure, and consumer consumption. The

³ Barbara Molony, “Women’s Rights, Feminism, and Suffragism in Japan, 1870-1925,” *Pacific Historical Review* 69, no. 4 (2000): 640.

⁴ Molony, “Women’s Rights,” 645, 660.

⁵ Sharon H. Nolte, “Women’s Rights and Society’s Needs: Japan’s 1931 Suffrage Bill,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 28, no. 4 (1986): 690.

⁶ Nolte, “Women’s Rights,” 693, 700.

⁷ Barbara Molony, Janet Theiss, and Hyaeweol Choi, *Gender in Modern East Asia* (Boulder, CO: Routledge, 2016), 399.

⁸ Molony, et al. *Gender in Modern East Asia*, 197, 227-32, 237; for 1946 right to vote see Nolte, “Women’s Rights,” 227.

professionalization of women meant they had some disposable income, which was spent on popular magazines or fashion and makeup. Between New Women and Modern Girls, Japanese gender roles transformed. New Women and Modern Girl were highly criticized, but they shared similar struggles with suffragists. Both confronted traditional gender roles grounded in an ideology of “good wife, wise mother,” that many suffragists saw as limiting.⁹

As women moved out into the public sphere, some became politically active. The United States had the National Women’s Suffrage Association and American Women’s Suffrage Association in 1869. It was not until the New Women’s Association (NWA) in 1919 that Japan had a counterpart that advocated for suffrage. Ichikawa Fusae, Hiratsuka Raichō, and Mumeo Oku, founders of the NWA, quickly got to work and began to petition the Diet to revise the Public Peace Police Law, the infamous Article 5.¹⁰

The Public Peace Police Law, established in 1890, forbid women from either joining political parties or attending political rallies. By the end of the nineteenth century, women’s rights under the Civil Code were restricted even more. Women were not individuals, but a part of the household and thus under the subordination of men. During the interwar period, women such as Ichikawa, Hiratsuka, and Mumeo vigorously challenged such gendered roles. Two petitions were sent to the Japanese Diet to revise the Public Peace Police Law, Article 5. The first petition challenged the right to attend political rallies and join political parties. The second petition demanded that men submit to syphilis testing. For women to be a part of the political system, they first had to overcome the Public Peace Police Law, which banned women from political parties and rallies. If the law remained, women faced arrest. As for the second petition of testing men for syphilis, it was designed to protect both mother and child. If a husband had syphilis, a wife could then divorce and therefore defend herself and child, which gave her power within the patriarchal system. Both petitions were defeated in the Diet, but that did not stop women from continuing to petition.¹¹

Suffrage was added to the petition for the first time in 1921, but it left the NWA divided. Ichikawa and Hiratsuka were split on how to advance the women’s suffrage movement. Hiratsuka advocated for mothers’ rights, while Ichikawa voiced concerns for women’s rights. Mothers’ rights emphasized the differences between men and women, while women’s rights fought for equality among men and women. The differing ideologies among the NWA ultimately led Ichikawa to leave the women’s group in 1921. In early 1922, Article 5 was amended, although not to the extent the NWA had hoped. Now women were allowed to attend political rallies, but they were still banned from political parties.¹² It may have been a minor victory, but it was a victory nonetheless.

The irony of it all was that Ichikawa, who had been petitioning the Diet for more than a year, had left the NWA and Japan, and did not witness the amending of Article 5. In late 1921, Ichikawa had left for the United States, where she remained for roughly two and a half years. Ichikawa’s time in America allowed her to see what it was like for women who had the right to vote. American suffragists, such as Carrie Chapman Catt and Alice Paul, proved highly influential to Ichikawa. She threw herself into American culture and even stayed with an American family as a home helper, which gave Ichikawa an opportunity to learn from American suffragists. She returned to Japan with a renewed sense of hope that suffrage was possible, and she continued to fight for women’s rights.¹³

⁹ Molony, et al. *Gender in Modern East Asia*, 197, 227-32, 237.

¹⁰ Nolte, “Women’s Rights,” 691-2.

¹¹ Molony, et al. *Gender in Modern East Asia*, 146, 189-90.

¹² Molony, et al. *Gender in Modern East Asia*, 146, 189-90.

¹³ Ichikawa Fusae and Yoko Nuita, “Fusae Ichikawa: Japanese Women Suffragist,” *Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies* 3, no. 3 (1978): 58.

Ichikawa's departure from Japan shortly before Article 5 was amended illustrates the immense influence of the West. If the West shaped a prominent women's suffrage leader, such as Ichikawa, would men not be influenced too? Elite men differed from women because men were in administrative positions and had authority to manipulate domestic politics. In general, men resisted giving women the right to vote. Therefore, western influence may have benefitted women's vision of suffrage, but men limited women's suffrage.

In 1925, all Japanese men over the age of twenty-five and who did not receive public welfare obtained the right to vote. Universal manhood suffrage occurred under Prime Minister Kato Takaaki, ending a battle that had been fought since the 1890s. With the passage of manhood suffrage, women saw an opportunity to voice their belief that they deserved suffrage too. The Women's Suffrage League, formed in 1924 under Kubushiro Ochimi and Ichikawa, used the right to attend political meetings to campaign for men who supported women's rights. The number of parliament members who supported the rights of women continued to grow until 1931. The interwar period had become a "period of hope," and activists continued to push the Japanese Diet for reform.¹⁴

This "hope" that engulfed the interwar period has inspired historians, such as myself, to study the Japanese women's suffrage movement. Women transformed their role from "good wife, wise mother" to women who attended political meetings and petitioned the Diet, activities that would have been inconceivable during World War I or before (although there remained women advocating the "good wife, wise mother" line). Men also experienced transformation because even the lower ranking male members of society could now vote, for the first time, in the 1928 election. While universal manhood suffrage had been achieved, women did not stand idly by as men practiced their right to vote. The Women's Suffrage League joined with other women's groups and created the Women's Suffrage Coordinating Committee in 1928. Women's groups cast aside ideological differences to collaborate for the betterment of all women. Although the group disbanded in 1929, a tremendous commitment to the women's movement had been demonstrated.¹⁵

In 1930 and 1931 women's suffrage bills passed in the Lower House of the Diet, but, to become law, they still required passage in the House of Peers.¹⁶ Most women's suffrage groups rejected the suffrage bill. If the bill passed, women would be permitted to vote on the municipal level, but married women required permission from their husband to run for an official position. Women would have been able to vote, but still within the confines of the patriarchy. Asking for permission effectively stripped married women of autonomy. Men would have remained in control, and women would be left in a subordinate position. Although the bill failed in the House of Peers, both in 1930 and 1931, that such legislation was even proposed suggests that men were willing to change, albeit in a limited way and within the confines of traditional patriarchy.¹⁷

The events that transpired in 1930 and 1931, undoubtedly showed the limitations of the women's suffrage movement. Through organizations and associations, women showed tremendous fortitude in the pursuit of suffrage. However, when the proposed suffrage bill passed the Lower House of the Diet, women rejected it because it required male consent. Male permission took away agency. Suffragists essentially rejected limited suffrage.

Understanding the limitations of the suffrage movement in Japan requires an examination of World War I. The events of that war shaped the Japanese government's policy during the interwar era. For example, the Japanese Provisional Military Investigative Commission in 1917, reported on the activities of European and North American nations. Its report described the home front

¹⁴ Molony, et al. *Gender in Modern East Asia*, 193.

¹⁵ Molony, et al. *Gender in Modern East Asia*, 192-3.

¹⁶ Garon, "Women's Groups and the Japanese State," 7.

¹⁷ Molony, et al. *Gender in Modern East Asia*, 194.

mobilization during the war, showing the essential role of women. With war a future possibility, peacetime goals had to include preparations for war. Japan sought to match the might of western nations, and in order to do so, it had to mobilize women. The following year, the Home Ministry conducted its own survey and found “wartime assistance of women in each country [and that] ministry officials lauded their work in manufacturing, nursing, comforting the wounded and bereaved families, and other philanthropic activities.”¹⁸ The Japanese government saw women as a vehicle for mobilizing the nation even during peacetime. Wartime mobilization reports conducted by the Japanese government shaped domestic policy and restricted the suffrage movement.

The relationship between Japan and the West was a precarious one. The mindset of the Japanese was summed up by a western observer as follows: “there is no doubt that the Americans will be quite ready to acknowledge their mistake in regard to Japan, once they become convinced of it.”¹⁹ For the death of a I have a if I am a but The *Yomiuri*, a Japanese newspaper, according to an article in *The Japan Magazine*, believed the relationship between Japan and the United States was improving. Japan wanted to prove itself the equivalent of other “modern” western nations. How would Japan show its capabilities? By mobilizing women on the home front. However, mobilizing women was not the same as suffrage. Women may have felt a greater sense of freedom during mobilization, but the overall objective of the government was not expanding suffrage. Women were expected to perform their duties in preparation for war and loyalty to the state.

If Japan were going to mobilize women on the home front during peacetime, what did that entail? Also, how far would the Japanese government go to accomplish peacetime goals? Some men within the administration endorsed concessions for women, but in a limited and controlled way. Others flat out rejected any proposed gains for women. For example, Count Shigenobu Okuma, a Japanese statesman, formed the Japanese Progressive party in 1881; he was one of the early advocates of a constitutional government and abolishment of the feudal system. Not only did he travel throughout Europe, but he also studied there. He held numerous high-ranking positions, such as president of the Japanese commission at the Exposition of Vienna (1876), member of numerous ministries, and Prime Minister of Japan in 1898. Okuma went on to found Waseda University and became the school’s president.²⁰ As a member and founder of the Progressive Party, one could imagine Okuma fighting for the rights of men and women alike. However, as Okuma states,

The octogenarian thinker believes that the traditional teaching of China and Japan that filial piety should be the foundation of all human acts is out of date; it should be recast into “love is the foundation of all things human.” He further believes that monogamy, for which institution the world owes to Jesus Christ, is responsible in considerable measure for the greatness and majesty of European civilization. The Orient has long erred in its estimation of woman and marital relations, and this accounts very much for the racial inferiority of the East as compared with the West. While recognizing equality for woman in personal status, Marquis says that the physical differences between men and women point to the corresponding difference in their heaven ordained function. Political activity is strictly man’s province, not woman’s.²¹

Here, Okuma (referring to himself in the third person) revealed his ties to the West and his views regarding women. He, like numerous other Japanese officials at the time, saw Japan as lagging

¹⁸ Garon, “Women’s Groups and the Japanese State,” 20.

¹⁹ Dr. J. Ingram Bryan, “Current Japanese Thought: By the Editor,” *The Japan Magazine: A Representative Monthly of Things Japanese*, v.8 (1917-1918), 56, [https://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.\\$c182582](https://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.$c182582).

²⁰ Albert Shaw ed., “The Progress of the World,” *The American Review of Reviews* (1914), 546.

²¹ Y. Takenob, “Views on Japanese Womanhood & Woman Education,” *The Japan Year Book: Complete Cyclopaedia of General Information and Statistics on Japan and Japanese Territories for the Year 1920-21*, 310-11.

behind “modern” western powers. For Japan to catch these western nations, something had to change in Japanese society, but extending political rights to women, he insisted, should not be part of those changes.

In June of 1919, the United States Congress amended its constitution to give women the right to vote. A year earlier, the British Parliament enacted the Representation of the People Act, which also extended to women (over thirty) the right to vote; the act was further amended in 1928, lowering the age to twenty-one. New Zealand passed one of the earliest women’s suffrage bills in 1893, so under the proper circumstances, suffrage could be achieved.²² However, Okuma saw no need for such dramatic transformation in Japan. Women’s status in marriage might change, but as far as politics was concerned, that was “strictly man’s province,” and male dominance continued. The Japanese administration accepted women as nation builders, but when it came to rights, it remained far more limited.

The early 1920s was a turning point for Japanese state policy. The Great War ended, and a recession hit Japan, which created several social problems. How could Japan tackle these social problems? With the help of women. The Home Ministry encouraged the creation of women’s associations to help Japan through tough economic times. The ministry was one of the groups that conducted wartime surveys on the western homefront. The report found that women could help curb social problems within Japan under the guidance of the state.²³ Social issues included, “improving the people’s diet, hygiene, work habits, housing, consumption patterns, and ritual life.”²⁴ One prime example of how the state implemented these methods, for the benefit of the nation, happened during the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake. Once the earthquake hit, dozens of women’s organizations and associations shot into action to help on the ground those who had suffered. The Tokyo Federation of Women’s Associations formed to help coordinate with city officials.²⁵ The “war,” had come right to Japan’s front door, in the form of an earthquake, and it demonstrated the state’s need for women. The Japanese government justified working with women because above all else the strength and well-being of the nation came first. Male state officials directed women to what they believed the social problems were, but how did women perceive social problems? Did they see things differently than men?

An article written by Kikue Ide in 1928, examines social issues throughout Japan and attributes many causes to the government. Kikue was a well-educated woman who specialized in law and believed in women’s rights. She presented the article at the Pan-Pacific Conference in Honolulu in August of 1928, a women’s conference. Throughout her study, she references past notable women, specifically Kazunomiya (sister of the Emperor during the Meiji Restoration), who saved Edo (present day Tokyo) by brokering peace between the royalist and shogun. Kikue argued that this was the type of figure that women across Japan should emulate. How would this be accomplished? In order to secure suffrage, woman first had to address inequalities in the educational system, economic system, political and civil system. The constitution, which was the fundamental basis for citizenship, had to be modified. The constitution could take power away or grant authority to individuals, and only the government had the power to change the constitution.²⁶

At the heart of Kikue’s argument lay an assault on the constitution, the Japanese government—and western nations. How were western states involved? Because of the context in

²² Michael H. Roffer, *The Law Book: From Hammurabi to the International Criminal Court, 250 Milestones in the History of Law* (New York: Sterling Publishers, 2015), 180, 216.

²³ Garon, “Women’s Groups and the Japanese State,” 22.

²⁴ Garon, “Women’s Groups and the Japanese State,” 23.

²⁵ Garon, “Women’s Groups and the Japanese State,” 23-4.

²⁶ Kikue Ide, “Japan’s New Woman: Legal and Political Relationships of Women of Japan Today. An Interpretation,” *Pacific Affairs* 1, no. 4 (1928): 1-2, 4, 6-7.

which the constitution was created. In 1881, the drafting process of the constitution had begun under the direction of Ito Hirobumi. Ito and others spent a year and a half traveling Europe to study constitutional systems, specifically that of Germany. Under the guidance of German scholars, the Japanese created a constitution that maintained the power of the emperor. In 1889, the Japanese constitution established the rights of men and limited those of women.²⁷ The constitution showed two things. First, the power that western influence had in Japan, and second, how long Japan had looked to the west. At the time of the interwar era, Japan had for decades looked beyond its borders for inspiration. By the interwar period, Japan merely followed the precedent of western influence established in previous decades. To Kikue, nineteenth century European practices of excluding women from politics resulted in a toothless Japanese constitution.

By the early 1930s, the Japanese government was acknowledging women's work. Prime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi commended women's part in mobilizing against the recession by promoting safe economic practices of savings and curbing consumption. It was in the context of women's service that the state considered extending suffrage, not for the benefit of women but for the betterment of the nation.

Some members of the Japanese Diet were willing to give women rights, but only enough rights to help further the state. Legislation introduced to the Diet in 1930 and 1931 therefore fell far short of equal rights. Both bills would fail in the House of Peers because Japan, for the past decade, had employed women to further state initiatives without giving women rights. So why give women the right to vote? Women saw the work they were doing as a reason to be given rights, while those in the Japanese government did not see them as one and the same.²⁸ All of this stems from Japanese surveys conducted during the war of the homefronts of western nations. The suffrage movement was also limited because of the Japanese constitution.

Japan's peacetime goals of using women to help the nation were successful, but these same goals limited women's rights. Women were limited in the amount of progress they were able to achieve because of these interwar goals. Japanese women and men had looked to the West for guidance, but in very different ways. Japanese women were inspired by the West's suffrage movements. However, men also looked to the West and saw women in a much different way. Women were seen as objects that could benefit the state, not as people deserving rights. Japan had not been using its resources to their full potential, and that was how women were seen: as a resource. Shaped by the West, the Japanese government's vision of a prosperous nation limited the suffrage movement. In the latter half of 1931, peace would come to an end, and with it, any hope women had for suffrage.

Near the end of 1931, the Manchurian Incident brought a wave of militarism to Japan. This put the suffrage movement in a difficult spot. Should women continue to draw on international support in the fight to gain rights or support nationalist expansion practices?²⁹ Ultimately women would set aside their demand for suffrage and support their nation. For example, after the Manchurian Incident in 1931, the Lytton Commission gathered facts and made suggestions to the League of Nations Council on how the League might proceed toward peace in China. The Japanese outright rejected the report. The League of Nations complained that Japanese national interests in Manchuria were not compatible with the League's mission. The League tried negotiating with Japan to withdraw its troops and recommended negotiations take place between Japan and China. Japan, however, remained committed to a military agenda. It would never accept the Lytton Commission's

²⁷ William Theodore de Bary, *Sources of East Asian Tradition, vol. 2: The Modern Period* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 508.

²⁸ Molony, et al. *Gender in Modern East Asia*, 194.

²⁹ Molony, et al. *Gender in Modern East Asia*, 194-6.

report, and in 1933, Japan left the League of Nations. The exit left Japan at odds with China and the international community as a whole, including the United States.³⁰

The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, U.S. branch, had been allied with women's groups in Japan, including the Women's Christian Temperance Union and Women's Peace Association, but the Manchurian Incident strained those alliances. Women in the United States lobbied their government to impose sanctions against Japan for disregarding international peace. The Japanese government refused to give women political rights, and this strained relations with American women's groups and helps explain why women shifted away from suffrage.³¹ Japanese women who looked to women in the United States for guidance were now at odds with one another. If women in Japan could not look to the international community for support or limited support from their government, what other options were there?

As historian Elyssa Faison explained, "increased protections for women during wartime gave many women's rights activists enough of a sense of full subjecthood within the imperial state that they were willing to defer other goals for the duration of the national crisis."³² When hostilities between Japan and China grew, the suffrage movement was put on the back burner, and the cause would not be proposed again until the end of World War II. Even women such as Ichikawa began to shift from suffrage to mother-child protection. The mother-child protection legislation became a part of the League for Women's Suffrage (LSW) and eventually overtook the league's mission of suffrage in favor of mother-child protection. Hiratsuka had made similar arguments in 1918 because the protection of mothers was vital to the protection of the nation's future, children. Thus, mothers and children were one. A draft of the mother-child protection was presented to the Diet in 1934, but it would not pass until 1937. It was another small victory for women and their children because it championed the "good wife, wise mother" approach. By protecting mothers and children, the state was essentially safeguarding future generations.³³

The Japanese women's suffrage movement during the interwar period encouraged women to move out of the private and into the public sphere. Women's organizations and associations looked to western nations for inspiration, as did the Japanese government. The Japanese administration before the end of World War I conducted surveys and saw the power of women in western nations. However, the Japanese state viewed women as little more than objects to accomplish peacetime goals and not as citizens deserving suffrage. The state yielded only limited rights and sidestepped suffrage. Women such as Ichikawa were deeply influenced by the women's movements in the United States, which moved her further to fight for suffrage in Japan. Inspired by women's contributions to war mobilization in the West, the Japanese state used women as nation builders through various social programs, which empowered women to improve their country—but only in a restricted capacity. Therefore, western influence shaped the Japanese government and limited the suffrage movement. After the Manchurian Incident, any hope women had for suffrage began to diminish significantly. In the early to mid-1930s, the suffrage movement was shelved as women altered their goals from suffrage to other rights for women.

³⁰ Ian H. Nish, *Japanese Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 87-90.

³¹ Molony, et al. *Gender in Modern East Asia*, 319.

³² Elyssa Faison, "Women's Rights as Proletarian Rights: Yamakawa Kikue, Suffrage, and the "Dawn of Liberation" In *Rethinking Japanese Feminisms* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2018), 26.

³³ Naoko Tomie "The Political Process of Establishing the Mother-Child Protection Law in Prewar Japan," *Social Science Japan Journal* 8, no. 2 (2005): 244.

The Madness Multiplies: The Expansion of Kentucky's Early Lunatic Asylums

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Public care of the mentally ill in America began in 1773 with the construction of Eastern State Hospital in Williamsburg, Virginia.¹ This was the first public institution in America created solely to care for and treat the “insane,” and it was a unique establishment for quite some time. The next state-funded psychiatric institution, which would be located in Lexington, Kentucky, would not be created until well after the American Revolution and over two decades into the nineteenth century. While this clearly demonstrates that the care of the mentally ill was still considered a private matter, in other words, the care of the person afflicted was the responsibility of their family or friends, the amount of time it took to create such an institution is quite surprising, considering there was certainly no shortage of ailments and circumstances that were believed to cause “insanity.” American doctors in the early nineteenth century recognized that there seemed to be a hereditary component to several cases, and even observed in some that the symptoms seemed to initially occur before or around a certain age.² However, other cases seemed to be brought about by illness, trauma, or “moral causes,” which could include anything from an inability to find work, gambling, “religious excitement,” or even “novel reading.”³ With so many ways that a person could be deemed “insane,” it is no wonder that the number of state funded insane asylums grew so rapidly in the second quarter of the nineteenth century. The asylum in Lexington began this wave of construction aimed at helping the mentally ill, but America’s second asylum proved ill-prepared to deal with the many challenges involved in caring for its patients. Even its attempts at custodial care were impeded by a persistent issue of overcrowding.

Following the creation of the asylum in Williamsburg, it seemed that care of the mentally ill would continue as it had for years previously, remaining a private issue rather than a public responsibility. As historian David J. Rothman said, “The colonists left the insane in the care of their families, supporting them, in case of need as one of the poor,” and though Virginia endeavored to set a precedent by funding an asylum, it was destined to be the exception, not the rule.⁴ However, in 1792, the western portion of Virginia broke away, forming the new state of Kentucky, and thirty years later made the decision to follow the example of its eastern neighbor and founded its own asylum. In 1822, the Kentucky House of Representatives read and ratified “an act to establish a Lunatic Asylum,” by a vote 44 in favor, 43 against.⁵ While Kentucky’s asylum would not be the first asylum in the country, it is clear by the close vote that its creation was still a new and controversial idea. The science of psychiatry was still in its infancy, and few had considered questions such as how best to care for those affected by mental illness, and whose responsibility it should be to provide this

¹“Eastern State Hospital,” accessed 29 October 2018, <http://www.esh.dbhds.virginia.gov/>.

² Pliny Earle, “On the Causes of Insanity,” *The American Journal of Insanity* 4 (1847-1848), 186,191.

³ Earle, “On the Causes,” 193-96.

⁴ David J. Rothman, *The Discovery of the Asylum: Social Order and Disorder in the New Republic* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), xiii.

⁵*Journal of the House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, . . . 1822* (Frankfort, KY: Kendall and Russell, Printers for the State. 1822), 333.

care. Regardless, it was determined that this new asylum would be erected in Lexington, and a purchase was made of ten acres of land, boasting a freshwater spring and a “skeleton of a house, well-constructed for the purpose required.”⁶ This “house” had originally been Fayette Hospital, a general medical hospital connected to Transylvania University for which construction had begun in 1817, but, following the Panic of 1819, was never completed.⁷



Image from Richard Collins and Lewis Collin, *Collins Historical Sketches of Kentucky: History of Kentucky* (Covington, Ky: Collins & Co. 1874), 223.

The Kentucky Lunatic Asylum opened its doors and accepted its first 33 patients in November 1824—over fifty years after the opening of the first state funded asylum in Virginia.⁸ Surely its creators intended for the asylum’s patients to be cared for in the best way they and the doctors of the day knew. However, as scholar T.O. Powell points out, “The prevailing ideas were altogether custodial. Restraint was common, and violent methods of repression were in vogue, such as shower-baths, tranquillizing [*sic*] chairs, bleeding and vomiting.”⁹ This reflects the primitive state of

the science of psychiatry in the early nineteenth century, and, regardless of how well-intentioned they may have been, lawmakers and doctors alike were still unsure of the best ways to care for those afflicted with mental illness.

Though Kentucky’s first lunatic asylum started off small, it grew rapidly, reaching a patient population of ninety by December 1830 and having 285 patients throughout the year of 1845.¹⁰¹¹ While a substantial amount of this growth was due to new patients being admitted, what made the population explode was that so few were being released. For example, as seen in Table 1, in 1845, of the 285 cases to pass through the asylum during the year, only 28 recovered. In particular, out of the 153 patients still in the asylum from the previous year, only six recovered.¹² Two years later, in 1847, there were 311 patients throughout the year (225 from the previous year and 86 new patients), only

⁶ *Journal of the Senate of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, Begun and Held in the Town of Frankfort, on Monday, the Third Day of November, in the Year of Our Lord 1823, and of the Commonwealth the Thirty-Second* (Frankfort, KY: Amos Kendall and Company, Printers for the State, 1823), 120.

⁷ Ronald F. White, “Custodial Care for the Insane at Eastern State Hospital in Lexington, Kentucky, 1824-1844,” *The Filson Club Quarterly* 62, no. 3 (July 1988), 309-310.

⁸ White, “Custodial Care for the Insane,” 310.

⁹ T. O. Powell, “A Sketch of Psychiatry in the Southern States,” *The American Journal of Insanity* 54, No. 1 (July 1897): 21-37.

¹⁰ *Journal of the Senate of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, . . . , 1830* (Frankfort, KY: Dana and Hodges, Printers for the State, 1830), 154.

¹¹ *Journal of the Senate of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, . . . , 1830* (Frankfort, KY: Dana and Hodges, Printers for the State, 1830), 154; *Annual Report of the Directors and Physician of the Kentucky Lunatic Asylum, . . . , 1845*, (Frankfort, KY: A. G. Hodges: State Printer, 1846), 17.

¹² *Annual Report of the Directors and Physician of the Kentucky Lunatic Asylum, . . . , 1845* (Frankfort, KY: A. G. Hodges: State Printer, 1846), 16.

29 of whom recovered, 14 of which were new cases.¹³ This, combined with patient statistics from other years, shows a general trend that the majority of patients admitted were afflicted with a chronic illness, or, as the reports put it: “Prospect: Incurable.” The number of patients remaining outnumbered the patients recovering and being released, thereby dramatically impacting the population growth.

Table 1. Patient Population and Recovery, Kentucky Lunatic Asylum

Year	Total Number of Patients	Patients from the Previous Year	New Patients	Recoveries	Recoveries in Old Patients (% of total recoveries)	Recoveries in New Patients (% of total recoveries)
1845	285	13	32	28	6 (21.43%)	22 (78.57%)
1846	302	22	0	32	14 (43.75%)	18 (56.25%)
1847	311	25	6	29	15 (51.72%)	14 (48.28%)
1848*	345	27	8	25	5 (20%)	20 (80%)
1849	366	20	6	32	10 (31.25%)	22 (68.75%)
1851	336	23	33	1	13 (31.7%)	28 (68.29%)

Source: *Annual Reports 1845, 1846, 1847, 1848, 1849, 1851*. Frankfort, KY: A. G. Hodges: State Printer. HathiTrust.

*Total recoveries for the year listed as 30 in the Superintendent’s Report, but only 25 recoveries found in the table showing patients

With this growth in population came growing costs to maintain the asylum. From 1845 to 1851, the amount of money appropriated by the state of Kentucky in order to maintain the Lexington Asylum more than doubled, increasing from \$12,000 to \$26,000, respectively.¹⁴ However, it was not only the general increase in patient population that contributed to the ever-increasing costs of maintaining the asylum. Each year a greater portion of the patients were also supported by the state. As seen in Table 2, the number of patients supported by the state had been very high in 1845, 209 of 285 patients, or 73.3%, were supported by the state.¹⁵ By 1851, this number had increased to 279 of 336, or 83.04%.¹⁶ With such staggering numbers, it is little surprise that some compared the asylum to something akin to an almshouse or, as another put it, “a mad-house for the safe-keeping of lunatics rather than an asylum for their care.”¹⁷

¹³ *Twenty Fifth Annual Report of the Board of Directors of the Kentucky Lunatic Asylum*, 1847.

¹⁴ *Annual Report of the Directors and Physician of the Kentucky Lunatic Asylum, . . . , 1845*, 6; *Annual Report of the Directors of the Lunatic Asylum, at Lexington, Kentucky, for the Year 1851* (Frankfort, KY: A. G. Hodges & Co.: State Printers, 1852), 6.

¹⁵ *Annual Report of the Directors and Physician of the Kentucky Lunatic Asylum, . . . , 1845* (Frankfort, KY: A. G. Hodges: State Printer, 1846), 7-14.

¹⁶ *Annual Report of the Directors of the Lunatic Asylum, at Lexington, Kentucky, for the Year 1851* (Frankfort, KY: A. G. Hodges & Co.: State Printers, 1852), 7-16.

¹⁷ Gerald Grob, *Mental Institutions in America: Social Policy to 1875* (New York: The Free Press, 1973), 343; Powell, 98.

Table 2. Annual costs, Kentucky Lunatic Asylum

Year	Annual Costs	Amount Appropriated by State of Kentucky	Percent of Expenditures Paid for by the State	Number of Patients (Total)	Number of Patients Supported by the State (% of Total Number of patients)
1845	\$23,228.12	\$12,000.00	51.66%	285	209 (73.3%)
1846	\$19,268.55	\$12,500.00	64.87%	302	229 (74.11%)
1847	\$26,080.74	\$15,000.00	57.51%	311	224 (72.03%)
1848	\$28,547.02	\$18,500.00	64.81%	345	248 (71.88%)
1849	\$27,347.08	\$18,500.00	67.65%	361	293 (81.2%)
1851	\$42,258.87	\$26,000.00	61.53%	336	279 (83.04%)

Source: *Annual Reports 1845, 1846, 1847, 1848, 1849, 1851*. Frankfort, KY: A. G. Hodges: State Printer. HathiTrust.

For years, the asylum’s administration pleaded with Kentucky’s state legislature for funding to provide adequate accommodations for their growing number of patients with little success.¹⁸ While the state senate did finally agree to provide funding to build a second Kentucky Lunatic Asylum in 1848, its neglectful delay had proved detrimental for many of the souls inside the Lexington Asylum.¹⁹ Another cholera pandemic was brewing, and just as it had seventeen years before, the pestilence swept from India, across Europe, and found its way to American shores on ships coming across the Atlantic in late 1848.²⁰ By 1849, the disease was at the asylum’s doorsteps, and its effects can be seen in the Manager’s Report for the year. While the report explained that many of those affected by the disease recovered, of the 366 patients that had been in the asylum over the course of the year, 98 died. Sixty of these deaths were attributed directly to cholera, and an additional 12 were victims of “Fever, sequel to cholera,” and four died as a result of “Dysentery, sequel to cholera.” This means that approximately 77.6% of the patient deaths in the year, equivalent to about 20.8% of the patient population, were linked to the cholera epidemic.²¹ In their annual report, the managers of the asylum even went as far as to assign blame for the outbreak:

Yet we must say, that the extremely crowded state of our buildings was well calculated to invite its appearance. For two years we had assured your honorable body that our present buildings were entirely inadequate to provide proper accommodations for the number of patients admitted to our care, and our suggestions were not adopted. We saw that these helpless and unfortunate beings were crowded upon us in far greater numbers than could be comfortably kept within our walls, but we had no resource; the law was mandatory.²²

¹⁸ *Annual Report of the Managers of the Lunatic Asylum . . . 1849* (Frankfort, KY: A. G. Hodges: State Printer, 1850), 4.

¹⁹ *Journal of the Senate of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, . . . 1848* (Frankfort, KY: A.G. Hodges: State Printer, 1848), 202.

²⁰ Rosenberg, 101.

²¹ *Annual Report of the Managers of the Lunatic Asylum . . . 1849* (Frankfort, KY: A. G. Hodges: State Printer, 1850), 18-19.

²² *Annual Report of the Managers of the Lunatic Asylum . . . 1849* (Frankfort, KY: A. G. Hodges: State Printer, 1850), 4.

Patient deaths were by no means uncommon in the first several decades that the asylum was in operation. In fact, between the years 1824 and 1843, of the 1,048 patients that passed through the asylum, 402 died, which calculates to a 38% mortality rate.²³ The managers' grief permeates the *Report*, but at times this sadness is overcome by a tone of outrage. While the report's authors claimed to be disinterested in assigning blame for the disease's appearance, they clearly had suspicions about what made them vulnerable to the epidemic, as seen in the passage above and their plans for improvements. At times, it is as though, in their eyes, this tragedy could have been prevented if the Kentucky legislature had only listened to their pleas during the past several years. In the same report, the managers of the asylum, asked for money to erect more buildings to house the growing number of patients as they had in reports past, but this time they emphasized that this sum would be necessary to relieve them "from the unpleasant but inevitable necessity of using basement rooms, which are unfit for human habitation."²⁴ This shows just how big of an issue the overcrowding at the asylum had become—the managers were clearly aware that the rooms in the basement were not the ideal place to keep their patients, but were left with no choice. While it is uncertain if the effects of the cholera epidemic would have been less catastrophic if the legislature had taken action sooner, it is clear that the directors of the asylum could see that their requests were not considered to be a terribly high priority.

Unfortunately, conflicts similar to this were not uncommon between state legislatures and asylum administrators. By the 1840s, those involved in the study of psychiatry and care of the mentally ill recognized that, while they might occasionally receive some form of support from legislation, it was unlikely that they would become a priority anytime soon. In the 1847-48 volume of *The American Journal of Insanity* (now called *The American Journal of Psychiatry*), the superintendent of another mental hospital in Rhode Island wrote, "We hardly expect that legislation for the insane will become, in our day, precisely what it should be...It presents to the Solons of the times, no other claims than those of suffering humanity and hence is too often allowed to go its way until a more convenient season."²⁵

While Kentucky's first lunatic asylum was hardly the ideal treatment center by today's standards, it was far from a failure. The asylum may have had a difficult start, struggling not only with the underdeveloped ideas of psychiatry, but also the lack of aid, particularly financial, from their state legislature. However, its progress opened the door for other states to follow suit and its opening showed changing attitudes towards mental health. People were beginning to believe that rather than leaving the "insane" to be cared for privately by whoever could afford to do so, the care and treatment of these individuals should instead be a public responsibility. The opening of Kentucky's first asylum, only the second in the nation, created a chain reaction that would not end until the deinstitutionalization movement in the mid-twentieth century and the development of modern psychiatric facilities. Though they have changed greatly over the years, modifying and improving treatment of patients as the field of psychiatry expanded, both the first and second Kentucky asylums are still standing and in operation today using the names Eastern State Hospital and Western State Hospital, respectively.

²³ White, 321.

²⁴ *Annual Report of the Managers of the Lunatic Asylum . . . 1849*, (Frankfort, KY: A. G. Hodges: State Printer, 1850), 4.

²⁵ I. Ray, "Legislation for the Insane in Maine," *The American Journal of Insanity* 4 (1847-1847): 211.

The Confederacy in Person: Confederate Nationalism and Robert E. Lee during the Civil War Era, 1830-1870

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How did the Confederate States come into being? How did they unify so rapidly under one flag? How did the confederacy fall apart after only a few years of existence? Historians have studied and debated these questions for years. One of the few conclusions they have reached was that nationalism and devotion to the confederate way of life unified southern people and drove them from the United States in the 1850s to the Confederacy in the early 1860s. This study examines the historiography of confederate nationalism and argues that General Robert E. Lee played a significant role in forging nationalism during and after the Civil War.

Lee, in particular, held a special place for those fighting and living in Virginia, as he was originally from that state. Nonetheless, he became a national symbol for the Confederacy by the spring of 1862, after he achieved stellar victories, including Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, and also "close" defeats, like Antietam and Gettysburg. The Confederate population, for the most part, continued to hold him up on a pedestal even after Petersburg and Richmond fell, and even after the surrender at Appomattox. Thanks to efforts by sympathetic historians, as well as other prominent leaders after the war, many southerners hailed Lee as a hero and an invincible general, no doubt helping to stir and maintain the "lost cause" ideology, which arose after the war. Alongside Lee, one must still consider what nationalism was and meant to the southern people, whether they were from Virginia or Alabama. Furthermore, the writings of historians on this subject must be taken into consideration, as opinions about confederate nationalism have transformed significantly over time.

In essence, General Robert E. Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia were indispensable to the Confederacy, serving as a source of national unity along the frontlines and the home front, through victory or defeat. They provided a symbol and figurehead where Confederate President Jefferson Davis and the government attempted to unify their population, but largely failed to deliver. If Davis was viewed less favorably in the postwar South, the opposite proved true for Lee. He became an integral part of southern culture and was viewed positively, even by some in the North. Well after his death in 1870, Lee provided a heroic and honorable image to justify the Confederacy's existence, even in defeat.

Historians and Confederate Nationalism

Before addressing Lee and his army as a focal point in the Confederate will to fight, Confederate nationalism as a whole should be discussed. According to historian Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities*, nationalistic development emerges out from personal and cultural

feelings.¹ However, this is only one interpretation, and an agreed-upon definition of nationalism has proven elusive. The sort of nationalism Anderson describes can clearly be seen in the antebellum South, where a sort of “southern honor” tradition took prominence, as well as a devotion to the institution that held much of the South together, slavery. Anderson also notes the development of “print capitalism,” which helped spread nationalism during and after the American and French revolutions, describing it as a way to inspire the masses. Print capitalism helped create national consciousness and connected people into an imagined community.²

One important interpretation of the Confederacy that specifically addresses nationalism is offered by Pulitzer-prize winning historian Gilpin Faust in her book *The Creation of Confederate Nationalism*. Her focus is “how Confederates defined themselves and their commitment to a common, corporate existence.”³ Faust stresses commonality and unity as part of the nationalism that bound the nation together. She goes on to describe nationalism as a “dynamic of ideas and social realities that can, under the proper circumstances, unite and legitimate a people in what they regard as reasoned public action.”⁴ She cites favorably historian David Potter’s concerns about the teleological challenges of understanding confederate nationalism.⁵ However, along with historian Anne Sarah Rubin, Faust disputes Potter’s contention that nationalism died with the Confederacy in 1865.⁶ Faust believes, contrary to some of the historiography at the time, that Confederate nationalism developed not in a “spurious” manner, but over time. She describes this as a process, not something that happened overnight.⁷

One of the key components of the development of southern pride and eventually Confederate nationalism was religion, a case made by Faust and several other historians. Much of southern nationalism was nurtured through the pulpit in the antebellum period, through the justification for slavery, as well as through a common hatred for the North and the abolitionists. It was in this way that the Confederacy defended secession, as a means to preserve their traditions, even if one of those traditions was slavery. Finally, Faust looks briefly at some of the class differences that may or may not have fed Confederate nationalism. Faust concludes that nationalism was more prominent among the elite, rather than the working, yeoman farmer. The non-slaveholding class wanted reform in taxation, governmental structures, and public services. Whereas the elite was more heavily fixated by amorphous notions of nationalism.

Historian John McCardell, like Faust, also sees nationalism as a process that developed over time. However, McCardell places a date on the process: He begins as early as 1830 in his book, *The Idea of a Southern Nation*. Part of his analysis of the development of prewar nationalism relates to the generational difference between the old and the young (this will be discussed later). McCardell offers a more simplified view of southern nationalism, describing it as keeping the South’s interests as a priority. Furthermore, he argues that secessionist ideas derived from a minority of the population, rather than the majority of southerners, who hoped for some sort of compromise.⁸

As previously mentioned, many historians link religion and nationalism. McCardell spares no detail developing this aspect of confederate nationalism. He examines the split between the Baptist and Methodist churches over the issue of slavery, which helped solidify a sense of independence in

¹ Benedict R. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (New York: Verso, 2006), 6-7.

² Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 44.

³ Drew Gilpin Faust, *The Creation of Confederate Nationalism* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988), 2.

⁴ Faust, *Creation of Nationalism*, 6.

⁵ Faust, *Creation of Nationalism*, 3.

⁶ Sarah Anne Rubin, *A Shattered Nation: The Rise and Fall of the Confederacy 1861-1868* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 5.

⁷ Faust, *Creation of Nationalism*, 6.

⁸ John McCardell, *The Idea of a Southern Nation: Southern Nationalists and Southern Nationalism, 1830-1860* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1979), 9.

the South. By the 1830s, southern churches were teaching slavery as “not a moral evil... [but] as a civil and domestic institution.”⁹ Further, McCardell goes beyond churches to study how religious colleges and universities helped promote the ideas taught on Sunday morning.

Rubin supports ideas similar to those of Faust and other scholars. She devotes, similarly to Faust, attention to “the myriad strands of ideology and identity that made up the Confederacy and shows how the complexity and texture of people’s attachment to their nation as an idea, a state, and a memory.”¹⁰ She differs from Faust, however, by arguing that Confederate nationalism was to a certain degree spontaneous. Yet Rubin agrees that it lasted long after 1865. She makes a crucial point that nationalism existed independently of the political Confederacy.¹¹ She quotes Wilbur Zelinsky and Richard Handler, describing the differences between a nation and a state. In essence, the contrasting views are simple: the state is more of a political construct, where a nation is, “an emotional, ideological and frequently sentimentalized construct, created by people who...are united by a common culture, history, and social personality.”¹²

One of the more surprising parts of the Confederacy was how quickly it formed and operated. Rubin argues this was partly due to the unity and common goal of the states fused into the newly formed Confederacy. She concludes that “Confederates created a national culture in large part by drawing on the usable American past,” that past being the American Revolution. However, Rubin also discusses some of the fallacies of the Confederates vision of nationalism. She describes the problem of zealotry among Confederates: “So much of the Confederate identity seemed bound up with demonstrating Confederate virtue and superiority. The problem, however, was that such ideals were unattainable.”¹³ She continues, explaining that under pressure, people’s true devotion to either themselves or the Confederacy came out. Rubin attributes this to the delicate newness of the nation.

The Confederacy came into existence in the winter of 1860-61. Historian Paul Escott disagrees to some degree with the argument that the South succeeded in maintaining nationalism and unity until the end of the war. Escott focuses on Jefferson Davis in *After Secession*, in particular the president of the Confederacy’s efforts to “build a spirit of Confederate Nationalism and on the internal problems he encountered.”¹⁴ Davis’ labors, Escott shows, in the end proved fruitless. Escott cites examples such as class division and reluctance to secede in some places. He continues, describing how Davis lost the support of the planter class, and eventually the non-slaveholding classes, because of loopholes that allowed elites to escape military service and obtain certain privileges. Later, Escott discusses whether there was confusion between what he calls “Regional Identity or Confederate Nationalism.”¹⁵ In Escott’s opinion, with secession, the South was choosing between its own southern nationalism and the greater American nationalism. Escott believes that southern nationalism began around the 1840s and 1850s, as McCardell suggests, but Escott thinks this nascent southern nationalism failed because of its sole focus on states’ rights. He references early advocates of secession, such as William Lowndes Yancey and Robert Rhett and their plans to gain complete independence from the Union.

Going back to the secession movement, Escott looks at the political motives of some southern states in the presidential election of 1860. States like Arkansas and North Carolina voted for southern Democratic candidate John C. Breckinridge simply because he was the representative of the party which they favored, rather than a supporter of secession. In fact, Escott makes clear

⁹ McCardell, *The Idea of A Southern Nation*, 184.

¹⁰ Rubin, *A Shattered Nation*, 1.

¹¹ Rubin, *A Shattered Nation*, 2.

¹² Rubin, *A Shattered Nation*, 3.

¹³ Rubin, *A Shattered Nation*, 50.

¹⁴ Paul D. Escott, *After Secession: Jefferson Davis and the Failure of Confederate Nationalism* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1978), ix.

¹⁵ Escott, *After Secession*, 19.

that Breckinridge was against secession and was a staunch unionist. In the upper south, secession was not the primary motivator for voting in the election either. Escott points to the secession vote in Alabama to gauge views in the deepsouth regarding secession. The state was split between north and south, with non-slaveholders dominating the northern part of the state. Georgia, Tennessee, and Virginia supported unionist views and compromise, as long as peace was an option. Escott makes clear with these examples that many of the southern states did not have a collective majority who wanted to secede from the Union. Many white southerners were willing to compromise.

These sharp divisions presented a challenge for secessionists. In order to accomplish their goals, they drew on common ideas of rebellion in America, like the revolution from the British that occurred some eighty years earlier. This tactic proved successful to some degree, and for some southerners, the connection to the American Revolution remained relevant throughout the war. Davis also attempted to stir up nationalism by blaming others for the confederate predicament, like the North for instance. As a result of all of these actions, by the end of 1861, nationalism was beginning to take shape in the Confederacy. In turn, military recruitment went up significantly, a sign of growing nationalism.

Yet by 1863, according to Escott, the Confederate people were growing tired of war as well as their government's failure to fulfill promises. Davis quickly realized that his vision of strict states' rights was crumbling and that the national Confederate government would have to assert more authority. He also continued emphasizing the connection to the American Revolution. As Davis explained, "the new southern nation was the true heir of the founding fathers and existed to continue the work which they had begun." Davis "tried to demonstrate that the United States had fallen away from its heritage and become 'a land of fanaticism, executive usurpations, and tyranny.'"¹⁶ Many southerners still viewed the North as a nation, but Davis insisted only the Confederacy was a true nation. Escott sums up his chapter on the Confederacy by describing its desperation later in the war. "By the end of 1863 the prospects of the southern nation had darkened greatly, and Confederate ideology became little more than the invocation of threats that the future would be intolerable without victory," he writes.¹⁷

The Question of Robert E. Lee

One key aspect of confederate nationalism, related to Lee and his army, was the generation gap in the South. In his book, *The Last Generation*, Peter Carmichael makes the case that there was a significant difference in generations in Virginia. He focuses on the younger generation, and how it shaped confederate nationalism. The typical southern youth, according to Carmichael, was seen as lazy, immoral and hotheaded. However, the "emotional history of Southern men must be understood within the context of the religious and intellectual life of the Old South," he further explains.¹⁸ The "younger" generation were men born in the south from 1830-1842. One demographic of this group was that they were typically better off and a part of the elite class. To some, the generation appeared rebellious and reckless. Carmichael argues that this showed up in rash decision-making on the battlefield. The younger generation was fed up with the issues that plagued the state of Virginia, which they blamed on the older generation and its devotion to old traditions. They "reserve[d] their harshest criticism for "old fogyism," an explanatory device that underscored the backward nature of Virginia's political class without identifying party affiliation or specific

¹⁶ Escott, *After Secession*, 170.

¹⁷ Escott, *After Secession*, 195.

¹⁸ Peter S. Carmichael, *The Last Generation: Young Virginians in Peace, War, and Reunion* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 6.

individuals.”¹⁹ One thing was always clear with this younger generation. Despite all of the problems the state had, and how much young men did not like it, they remained loyal to the state of Virginia as well as the Confederacy. In that same sense, most of the younger generation in Virginia supported secession from the Union. They viewed this as the most logical step in maintaining the institution of slavery and their sense of honor. Carmichael draws the reader back to their reasoning for seceding. “They advocated secession as a way to realize their generational mission to restore the Commonwealth to greatness. Honor did not always turn Southerners into unthinking warriors, deluded by a romantic sense of self that compelled them to fight. In the case of young Virginians, sober reflection trumped honor,” he writes.²⁰ Unfortunately, they also believed that secession would fix their internal problems, but, as history continued to unfold, internal strife partly became the Confederacy’s undoing.

In the case of Lee and Confederate nationalism, it was not until the spring of 1862 that people had begun to view the general in high regard. Early on there was great concern over Lee’s skills commanding an army. From May through December 1861, Lee was sent up the western part of Virginia to recruit troops and secure a foothold. From there, confederate planners hoped Lee’s forces might have the ability to strike at the North. Unfortunately for Lee, the people of western Virginia did not favor secession. Also, General George McClellan’s union army was there to counter confederate forces. Lee chose to retreat instead of fight, which upset southerners who began dismissing the general as Robert “Evacuating” Lee. Popular opinion changed however when Lee drove the union army of around 100,000 men away from Richmond, and eventually off the York-James Peninsula in roughly a week’s time. This stunning feat of strategy and luck quickly changed the people’s opinions of the general. Now they hailed him as a hero. In her journal, Mississippian Kate Stone celebrated the army’s win and described Stonewall Jackson’s progress attacking McClellan’s rear as, “That was a ‘stonewall’ McClellan found hard to climb.”²¹ Likewise, in her diary, South Carolinian Mary Chesnut praised Lee’s victory for driving away the Union army from Richmond. After this battle, skepticism lingered among some concerning Lee’s battlefield skills. However, in the following months, at the close loss at Antietam and victory at Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville, the Confederacy’s opinion of the newly named Army of Northern Virginia would change.

Initially, Virginian Kate Stone was not prepared to celebrate Lee because her brother was supposedly killed at the December 1862 battle. *The Richmond Examiner*, however, wrote a little more favorably about Fredericksburg. The editor, John M. Daniel wrote on December 17, 1862, shortly after the battle, “The Confederate general’s plan was purely defensive, and was perfectly supported in all its parts.”²² After Chancellorsville, General Jackson’s death overshadowed the stunning victory. Kate Stone wrote a compelling tribute to him on the twenty-third of May: “In the death of Stonewall Jackson we have lost more than many battles. We have lost the conqueror on a dozen fields, the greatest general on our side...As long as there is a Southern heart, it should thrill at the name of Stonewall Jackson...his death has struck home to every heart.”²³ Daniel of *The Richmond Enquirer* writes similarly, just after Jackson’s death on May eleventh, “This announcement [of his death] will draw many a tear in the South.”²⁴ This moment proved not only a turning point for Lee’s popularity, but Jackson soon became a martyr for the Confederate cause.

¹⁹ Carmichael, *The Last Generation*, 38-39.

²⁰ Carmichael, *The Last Generation*, 122.

²¹ John Q. Anderson ed., *Brokenburn: The Journal of Kate Stone, 1861-1868* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1972), 129.

²² Frederick S. Daniel, *The Writings of John M. Daniel* (New York: Arno Press, 1970), 62.

²³ Anderson ed., *Brokenburn: The Journal of Kate Stone, 1861-1868*, 211.

²⁴ Frederick S. Daniel, *The Writings of John M. Daniel*, 83.

In his book, *Lee and His Army in Confederate History*, historian Gary Gallagher examines the aftermath of Gettysburg from the perspective of the Confederate home front of Vicksburg several months after Jackson's death. Like historians Emory Thomas and James McPherson, Gallagher sees the losses at Gettysburg and Vicksburg as detrimental to Confederate morale. Yet Gallagher also sees other issues at work. He mentions how the peace movement in North Carolina began to pick up as a result of the loss at Gettysburg, yet he also points out that southern newspapers, primarily the *Richmond Daily Dispatch* and the *Lynchburg Virginian*, believed that Gettysburg amounted to a strategic victory for the Confederacy, thwarting northern attempts to attack Richmond. Others viewed Gettysburg as an insignificant loss, since the North barely held its positions. However, Gallagher points out that the *Charleston Mercury* took a critical stance, calling it, "impossible for an invasion to have been more foolish and disastrous."²⁵ Meanwhile, people like Catherine Edmonston of North Carolina labeled the loss at Gettysburg a "sore disappointment."²⁶ Overall, Gallagher finds that few really took this loss seriously, simply because they thought Lee was unbeatable and invincible. "Confederates across the South persisted in viewing Lee as an invincible commander whose army increasingly sustained the hopes of the entire nation," writes Gallagher. "For them as for most of the men in the army of Northern Virginia, Gettysburg was not a harbinger of eventual ruin."²⁷

Even towards the end of the war in the spring of 1865, Confederate morale remained surprisingly high in large part due to faith in Lee and his army. However, after Lee's surrender at Appomattox on April 9, 1865, many southerners saw their nation now as a lost cause with the war now over. In another book, *The Confederate War*, Gallagher describes one soldier's response to Lee's surrender, "My las hope died within me when Genl Lee surrendered [sic]."²⁸ A Floridian wrote, "Oh, I wish we were all dead! It is as if the very earth had crumbled beneath our feet."²⁹ Many in the South did not respond well to Lee's surrender. The one figure in whom they placed so much faith and hope, gave up, leaving the North to take over the independent Confederacy. However, not all came to that conclusion.

Postwar Confederate Nationalism

As Rubin mentions in her book, confederate nationalism continued well after the war, and even through reconstruction. The most prominent manifestation took the form of memory creation. Shortly after the war, Jubal Early, former Confederate general, declared that the Confederacy's loss was because of the sheer overwhelming might of northern forces, rather than superior tactics and fighting. This was the beginning of what is known as the "Lost Cause" ideology, in which blame for the war was shifted from the Confederacy to the Union. Lee himself supported this notion. He explained, "the Army of Northern Virginia has been compelled to yield to overwhelming numbers and resources."³⁰

The lost cause stressed Confederate valor and honor. Early cast Lee and Jackson as good Christians, rather than ruthless military leaders. "[Lee] had been a general of unparalleled brilliance, Stonewall Jackson stood just behind Lee in the southern pantheon...despite defeat, Lee and Jackson

²⁵ Gary W. Gallagher, *Lee & His Army in Confederate History* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 87.

²⁶ Gallagher, *Lee & His Army in Confederate History*, 88.

²⁷ Gallagher, *Lee & His Army in Confederate History*, 106.

²⁸ Gary W. Gallagher, *The Confederate War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 95-96.

²⁹ Gallagher, *The Confederate War*, 96.

³⁰ Gallagher, *Lee & His Army in Confederate History*, 256.

offered an ideal of Christian military leadership in which the white South could take continuing pride,” insisted Early.³¹

In both of his books, Gallagher wrote of Lee’s importance, during and after the war. The general remained highly regarded after his death, possibly more so than during the war. Some in the North also bought into this Lost Cause ideal. This strain of thought continued to the 1930s, articulated by historians such as Douglas Southall Freeman. Other historians, including Thomas Connelly and Barbara Bellows, thought that “Lee’s reputation as the invincible Confederate general was a postwar phenomenon,” arguing that it was not until the 1880s that he achieved this status.³² Yet Gallagher’s argument seems more accurate: “by the summer of 1863 at the latest,” he writes, “Lee was the most important southern military figure, and he and the Army of Northern Virginia had become the principal national rallying point of the Confederate people.”³³

Conclusion

Throughout the antebellum South, during the war, and postwar, southern nationalism evolved. Whether it was based on hatred for the North, devotion to slavery, secession, Robert E. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia, it was always present to some extent. Even after the war, the memory of the Civil War in southern eyes stood as a sort of test of southern nationalism that southerners cherished through Reconstruction and after. Although some aspects of southern nationalism never took, such as Jefferson Davis’ views, sentiments shifted and coalesced instead around Robert E. Lee and his army. Even though it took some time for the Confederate people to get past their skepticism of Lee, it could be argued that devotion to Lee gave southerners the morale and motivation to fight into 1865 and, then, later maintain pernicious myths about the Confederacy even today.

³¹ Gallagher, *Lee & His Army in Confederate History*, 258.

³² Gallagher, *Lee & His Army in Confederate History*, 266.

³³ Gallagher, *Lee & His Army in Confederate History*, 269.

Lost Eagles: Character, Ambition, and the Parthian Invasion

Thomas A. Hardy

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Today, the fields of modern-day Altınbaşak, Turkey, appear undisturbed. In the year 53 BC, however, it was the site of a conflagration between East and West that left tens of thousands of Roman and Parthian troops dead—Marcus Licinius Crassus, one of the First Triumvirate, and his son amongst them. Rome received distressing news of Crassus's disastrous defeat and word that the Parthians had stolen several *Aquila*, Roman standards; to Romans it was a disgrace that compounded upon the already unpopular war, all of which traced back to Crassus himself. Once the wealthiest man in Rome, who commanded legions that he paid out of pocket, and a hero who defeated the likes of Spartacus, Crassus was now disgraced and defeated by the barbarians he sought to subdue. Disgruntled opponents, former allies, and later authors branded Crassus the embodiment of avarice, a man of weak virtues whose failures culminated with the loss of Rome's *Aquila*.


These impressions of Crassus have continued into the modern era; his contribution to the history of the Late Republic has been maligned by the perceived failure of Crassus's character in the face of the invasion of Parthia and his defeat at Carrhae. This, however, is an unjust assault on Crassus's character, an attack that has relegated him unfairly to the status of a minor actor in the overall narrative of the Late Republic. Crassus's deeds may have been backhanded and possibly illegal, but his character and motivations deserve reinterpretation. Marcus Crassus and his invasion of Parthia was not a failure of his character, but rather a reflection of the political atmosphere in Rome and the Roman sentiments toward the East. Crassus, in both ancient and modern sources, has received unjust treatment; detractors painted him as a villainous individual full of deceit and avarice, deserving of his death at the hands of the Parthians. This is just part of the reason behind the need for a new study of Crassus. Those who stick to the orthodoxy and belittle Crassus's character and career lack understanding of the realities of the political landscape of Rome during the Late Republic. Historians who write about Crassus in negative terms rarely look at the political atmosphere and pressures, nor at how the invasion of Parthia could have been a response to that pressure. Ancient sources and historians thereafter dismiss his invasion as merely a result of his greed. They see the invasion as a total failure that rested upon Crassus and his weakness of character. Yet the Roman



French Imperial Eagle, made in the style of Roman *Aquila*, on display at the Louvre des Antiquaries in Paris.

defeat is rarely analyzed in political or social terms; most see it only in tactical terms. This study avoids details of the battle at Carrhae itself, rather it focuses on the political situation and events surrounding Crassus' failed expedition into Parthia.

This study sides with a growing group of revisionist historians who argue for a reappraisal of Crassus. T.J. Cadoux was one of the first to come to the defense of Crassus in his article "Marcus Crassus: A Revaluation" published in 1956. Cadoux stresses that the moralist writers chose to turn Crassus' failure into a cautionary story. Yet evidence did not support their claims. In Cadoux's words, Crassus "had the accomplishments and graces of a gentleman."¹ As a gentleman, he was not



Roman bust of Crassus made during the 1st century BCE, on display at the Louvre in Paris.

the moral scoundrel that everyone believed, and this sparked a select few authors to reevaluate Crassus. With Cadoux stands Allen Ward, whose book *Marcus Crassus and the Late Roman Republic* focused upon the interpretations of Crassus and his character, explaining how Crassus had gotten an unfair assessment due to his violation of aristocratic customs and his disastrous defeat at Carrhae.² Understanding how or why sources are written is important to Ward, as authors such as Cicero, and Plutarch used the character flaws of Crassus as moral lessons. The most well-known author to stand in defense of Crassus is Erich Gruen in his revolutionary work *The Last Generation of the Roman Republic*. Gruen notes that the historical tradition "has not been kind to Crassus."³ Instead, he set out to show that the orthodox view of many figures in the Late Republic, including Crassus, was incorrect, and that evidence does not support the arguments being made by moralists and other historians. Following Gruen's line, none of the revisionists present Crassus as neither a great man nor even a good man. Instead, they explore how complex times and particular challenges shaped Crassus's career.

The counterargument to the revisionists (the orthodox line) is championed by authors such as Susan Mattern-Parkes in her article "The Defeat of Crassus and the Just War," where she writes that Crassus' greed and lust for glory drove him into an unjustified and illegal war against the Parthians.⁴ "Moral thinking is more important than strategic thinking in the interpretation of the Battle of Carrhae," writes Parkes.⁵ This is because the sources, namely Cicero, posit Crassus' war as morally wrong. So the counter-revisionists reintroduce a moral perspective. Their argument is mirrored by other works including Neilson Debevoise's book *A Political History of Parthia*, which argues similarly to Parkes that the invasion of Parthia was not only morally wrong, but also a strategic error resulting from a lack of effective tactics and leadership. Debevoise cites numerous instances where Crassus blundered in his handling of the situation in the East, which led to his defeat at Carrhae.⁶ Finally Adelaide Simpson's "The Departure of Crassus for Parthia" is less of a counterargument than an evaluation of the sources. She acknowledges that Cicero and

¹ T. J. Cadoux, "Marcus Crassus: A Revaluation," *Greece & Rome* 3, no. 2 (1956): 160.

² Allen Mason Ward, *Marcus Crassus and the Late Roman Republic* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1977).

³ Erich S. Gruen, *The Last Generation of the Roman Republic* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 67.

⁴ Susan P. Mattern-Parkes, "The Defeat of Crassus and the Just War," *The Classical World* 96, no. 4 (2003): 387–396.

⁵ Mattern-Parkes, "The Defeat of Crassus and the Just War," 389.

⁶ Neilson Carel Debevoise, *A Political History of Parthia* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938).

contemporaries saw the war against Parthia as morally objectionable, but, also concedes that some of the events attributed to Crassus and the war were fabricated by later authors decades or even centuries after.⁷ The orthodox line insists that Crassus' personality, his avarice and his lust for power made him susceptible to making poor decisions and invading Parthia. His character flaws were so front-and-center in his decision-making that they eventually led to his defeat at the hands of the Parthians. Much of the evidence harnessed by the counterargument against Crassus is non-contemporary with the events, and therefore colored by the outcome and sentiments of immorality sown about Crassus after his death in 53.

Both this study and orthodox scholarship use the ancient authors as they are available, primarily Plutarch's *Life of Crassus*, Cicero's *Epistulae ad Familiares*, *De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum*, and finally Cassius Dio's *Roman History*. These authors, as limited as they are in evidence concerning Crassus, provide the clearest picture of his life and exploits. Yet, even Plutarch and Cassius Dio have their drawbacks, being non-contemporaneous, and Cicero has heavy biases and political leanings that color his judgment. The lack of sources surrounding Crassus can be explained as follows: history does not like losers, so they rarely get a full accounting in the historical record.⁸ No source is perfectly without bias, but this study seeks to compile the evidence and offer the reader a deeper understanding of Crassus, showing that he is not the dichotomous caricature that modern scholarship suggests.

To deal with Crassus's character one must look deeper into the ancient sources and draw on evidence that other historians may choose to leave out. These ancient sources tend to agree that Crassus was a greedy and morally dubious individual whose character conflicted with the morality of the Roman Republic. But, the picture is not as clear as they claim. Take the notion of Crassus as in conflict with the mores of the Roman Republic: it is fairly well noted that he was a career politician and businessman who sought the *via media*, taking advantage of the fragmentation of the aristocracy and traditional power bases. This was the only way a career politician, such as Crassus, could thrive.⁹ Two rival power bases dominated Roman politics at the time: the *Populares*, the people's faction championed by men like Caesar and Mark Antony, and the *Optimates*, the aristocratic faction, represented by men like Pompey the Great and Cato. Both sides wanted to control the Senate for their own gain, each vying for power and privilege through various means. Crassus did not wish to align himself with either. Cassius Dio explains that "he took, as usual, a middle course and said that he would do whatever was advantageous for the Republic" (Dio 39.30.2). Crassus, in his mind, was not trying to rule Rome for power or greed. Rather, he sought what was necessary and advantageous for the Republic he wished to see prosper. It was not personal wealth that he sought; he already had enough to live on quite well for the rest of his years, especially given his modest lifestyle. Instead, he needed to grow his wealth for influence and what he saw as protecting the interests of the Republic.

Reluctance to take a stand with either the *Optimates* or the *Populares* was dangerous during the Late Republic, when mob violence and the opinion of the masses was critical for political success. To counter the political realities and establish his viability as a political leader, Crassus garnered a large following in the Senate by his "readiness to grant loans, free of interest."¹⁰ Granting loans without interest hardly fits the image of a greedy man who only desired to maintain and collect more gold; it sounds instead like a strategic statesman who aimed to hold and cement his power and position within Roman society. As Gruen says, "Money was power... His riches were a means to an end."¹¹ Crassus was not amassing his wealth for no reason; he had tangible political aims that were in

⁷ Adelaide D. Simpson, "The Departure of Crassus for Parthia," *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* 69 (1938): 532–541.

⁸ Ward, *Marcus Crassus and the Late Roman Republic*, 3.

⁹ Gruen, *The Last Generation of the Roman Republic*, 66.

¹⁰ P. A. Brunt, *Social Conflicts in the Roman Republic*, New edition edition (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1974), 122.

¹¹ Gruen, *The Last Generation of the Roman Republic*, 67.

line with his morals and ambitions for the Republic. It was not about owning the most villas or having the most lavish parties; it was about being able to hold power and cement himself in Roman society as a significant player without challenge. Evidence such as this undermines the orthodox understanding of Crassus and begins to broaden the picture that surrounds his exploits.

Crassus sought balance and navigated the political realm of the Late Roman Republic. Another piece of evidence that suggests that Crassus' character was more complex than some would allow is the fact that for the first or second wealthiest man in Rome during his lifetime, he lived in relative modesty. Plutarch mentions that "he built no house for himself other than the one in which he lived; indeed, he used to say that men who were fond of building were their own undoers, and needed no other foes" (Plut. *Crass.* 2.5). His ability to understand the downfall of others and how one can avoid that very same fate is a reason why Crassus was such an interesting figure. From historical tradition, it is easy to believe that he was a miser and only cared about how many talents he held. Yet Crassus appeared more generous than even the aristocracy. His home was not a private affair, but rather was open to the public, and the parties that he threw were modest but frequent.¹² He was able to gain popularity with the masses without having to choose a side. The avarice cited by historians is not found in these quotes; he was not a hedonistic man, who sought only excess and found pleasure in the wealth that he possessed. Rather, his money was always used for a purpose and intent for his vision of the Republic.

Crassus' vision for the Republic and his own ambitions brought him onto the Roman political stage where, by the time of the Parthian invasion, he was already a veteran. Despite claims by some historians that Crassus was seen as the black sheep of the triumvirate and its weakest member up until the late 60's BC, evidence tells a different story. Even some historians will condemn his ambition as yet another character flaw in an ever growing list of failures attributed to him. But, if we condemn Crassus, so must we condemn all Roman aristocrats in this period, from Cicero to Pompey.¹³ As the wealthiest man in Rome, Crassus commanded respect and influence across many facets of Roman society. Beyond that, he was a career politician and a successful general. Crassus started his true political career with Cinna and Marius who marched on Rome. After Crassus' family was blacklisted by the dictators, he fled to Spain (Plut. *Crass.* 4.1-3). During the following civil wars, he joined Sulla, who became a dictator in his own right. But here he won battles and made a name for himself as a military commander. After the civil wars, he dove into politics: "Crassus was most expert in winning over all men" (Plut. *Crass.* 6.7). The political leverage that he held through his influence and from the money that he was willing to spend or lend cannot be understated. His power allowed for men like Caesar and aristocrats from rather obscure families to become prominent. In this way, he was so influential that even the sources that might condemn him later credit Crassus "as a man of *summa potentia* or as *praepotens* or even *rei publicae princeps*."¹⁴ Such reverential titles show that even to the most prominent statesman, Crassus was in a class of his own, a class that held power beyond that of the ordinary aristocrat. Such power did come with the desire to maintain it, and this caused conflict within the political realm, even with those who Crassus meant to keep close at hand.

Caesar and, more specifically, Pompey vexed him, and rivalries brewed. The ancient sources claim that Crassus was angered by the idea of men like Caesar and Pompey surpassing him not only in prestige but wealth as well (Dio 37.56.4). Pompey had returned to Rome after successful campaigns against pirates and against the eastern powers. With the spoils of victory, he supplanted Crassus as the wealthiest man in Rome. To orthodox historians, a quest to be the wealthiest man in Rome motivated Crassus. Yet, considering his political background and his penchant for mediation,

¹² Gruen, *The Last Generation of the Roman Republic*, 68.

¹³ Cadoux, "Marcus Crassus," 155.

¹⁴ Gruen, *The Last Generation of the Roman Republic*, 67.

it is more likely that he was angered that these men, each of whom represented the main factions of Roman politics, were growing in power, while his own influence was being diminished. In order to maintain his station, he had to find a way to counteract the growing power of Caesar and Pompey.¹⁵ Forming the triumvirate and seeking to rule and steer the direction of the Republic fits Crassus's character, committed to doing anything advantageous for the Republic. A union of the *Populares* and the *Optimates* would secure the political landscape of Rome, and that was good for the Republic. Yet, while he did have bitter internal rivalries with his fellow triumvirs, it was mainly Crassus's opponents who maligned his character so aggressively.

Cicero, a statesman and *Optimate*, had a strained and ever-changing relationship with Crassus, especially leading up to the Parthian Invasion. As a politician, unwilling to choose a side, Crassus was very unpopular with the senatorial class and men like Cicero, who was wary of the growing power of the *Populares*. Despite the mistrust and considerable rivalry, the relationship between the two statesmen usually remained outwardly cordial. Crassus had given Cicero information on the Catilinarian conspiracy, despite he himself being a veteran of Sulla's army. This act alone serves as proof of Crassus' flexibility as a politician, showing that his connection to the Catilinarian Conspiracy was a calculated move to align him with both sides of a conflict until a victor emerged.¹⁶ Such flexibility made Cicero wary and untrusting of Crassus, and, in an oration, Cicero implicated Crassus in the Catilinarian conspiracy; so the relationship between two of the most powerful men in Rome was strained at best (Plut. *Crass.* 13. 2 – 4). In the wake of this tension, it was no surprise that Cicero, Cato, and other prominent *Optimates* came into conflict with Crassus and opposed his plan to invade Parthia. On the surface, it seemed an obvious choice given the position of Rome and Parthia during the Late Republic. Challenges, however, from the masses and senators alike to what they perceived as an unjust war upended Crassus's efforts to garner money and troops for an invasion. As Crassus readied for war and began to levy troops, spurred on by his fellow triumvirs, the opposition grew. Men like Cicero, who had a strained relationship and off-and-on friendship with Crassus, began to turn against him. Bitterness directed at Crassus compounded after his defeat and death when his reputation was sullied by being defeated and losing the *Aquila*. The disgrace of defeat could not be forgiven, and the political enemies of Crassus used it to their advantage. Even Cicero wrote in his post-humous work that the war was *nullo belli causa*, meaning it had no cause and was therefore unjust and illegal. Cicero linked the unjust nature of the war to Crassus's character, bemoaning the entire invasion plan as a failure of its leader's character and a result of his avarice (Cic. *De Finibus* 3.22.75). This war was unpopular due to the levying of troops from Italy earning Crassus opposition in the Senate by Cicero and Cato. While the war was said to be unjust, it was a result of Roman attitudes and assumptions about the East and the role that it held within world politics.

When Romans thought of the East, they had a very different image in their minds than the reality on the ground. Many held images conjured from the stories of Herodotus and Xenophon, who wrote about a bygone era of glorious wealth in the East and an accompanying decadence that made its people soft. The accounts of Alexander the Great steamrolling across the Middle East into Asia and down into places like Egypt colored the perspectives of Romans, who experienced the East only through popular writings, not necessarily first-hand. It is this lack of knowledge and experience that informed a man like Crassus when he prepared for conflict with the Parthians. These popular Roman perceptions of the East have been documented by scholars. What is important here is how these perceptions and assumptions led to the conflict seen in the Parthian Invasion. Sources written in the Principate and Imperial years, provide good evidence of Roman perceptions, and they provide us the clearest evidence we have regarding these attitudes.

¹⁵ Ward, *Marcus Crassus and the Late Roman Republic*, 193.

¹⁶ Ward, *Marcus Crassus and the Late Roman Republic*, 184–185.

One of the main perceptions and ideas that runs true throughout the sources is that Parthians were deceitful and lacking in the Roman virtue *veritas* or truthfulness. Lucan, writing about the Civil Wars of Pompey and Caesar, claimed that Parthians did not fight with honor: “they shot their arrows without trusting only to their iron tips; the buzzing missiles having been soaked in poison” (Luc. 8.303-04). Plutarch wrote similarly, but he claimed that the Parthians employed barbed arrows instead of poison and the barbed arrows cut through arteries and killed many soldiers.

For, in the agonies of convulsive pain, and writhing about the arrows, they would break them off in their wounds, and then in trying to pull out by force the barbed heads which had pierced their veins and sinews, they tore and disfigured themselves the more (Plut. *Crass.* 25.5).

Either by poison or by doctored arrows, the Parthians earned a reputation for deceitfulness, thus Romans viewed them as inferior. Very few Roman authors presented Parthians as equal to the Romans, even though in many respects they were the equals and the true rivals to the Roman Republic. This began to change after the death of Crassus, at which time Parthia rose to an equal or a superior footing against that of Rome in the Mediterranean and in the Parthian lands.¹⁷ The wars between the East and the West would continue through the Late Republic and into the Principate period, when the empire expanded into the east. The supposed Parthian deceitfulness also made Parthians appear easy to defeat, as their character flaws counterbalanced their martial prowess. The Parthians, according to Romans, saw battle as a “skirmish, their war is flight... their soldier is better at retreating than driving an enemy out” (Luc. 8.379 – 81). These kinds of statements show that Roman perceptions were fairly negative regarding the Parthians, and this was part of Crassus’s world. The Romans were led to believe that the Parthians run from battles and could only win through deceitful tactics. Parthians would not fight like Romans, and therefore they were not equal to the Romans. While their accounts cannot be taken as factual, they show the sentiments and ideas that circulated about Parthians, perceptions to which a man like Crassus would have been exposed. The enemies of Crassus cited his avarice; this ties into the general idea of the decadency and hedonism of the East that started with authors like Herodotus and continued throughout antiquity.

The East was, from the time of Herodotus, depicted as a land of wealth and decadence. Romans heard stories of how the gold and finery available to the Persians were beyond that of any Greek. These stories, compounded by the spoils brought back to Rome by men like Pompey, refilled the treasury of Rome and then some, making Pompey more powerful than Crassus, wealth-wise. Plutarch writes that:

In addition to all this the inscriptions set forth that whereas the public revenues from taxes had been fifty million drachmas, they were receiving from the additions which Pompey had made to the city's power eighty-five million, and that he was bringing into the public treasury in coined money and vessels of gold and silver twenty thousand talents, apart from the money which had been given to his soldiers, of whom the one whose share was the smallest had received fifteen hundred drachmas (Plut. *Pomp.* 45.3).

¹⁷ Debevoise, *A Political History of Parthia*, 93.



Chest piece of Augustus from the Prima Porta statue showing the return of Crassus' Aquila to Rome by the Persians. On display in Braccio Nuovo of the Vatican Museum, Rome.

Rome saw this influx of gold, silver, and spoils from the East as evidence of wealth and prosperity that could be exploited. The East was a source of gold and glory, craved by Crassus and other Roman leaders. This sense of the Parthians as a weak and deceitful enemy, who were wealthy and soft was critical to understanding how a seasoned general like Crassus would seek out war in Persia. To secure himself and to navigate the pressures of Rome, he made a choice that proved to be fatal.

What drove Crassus, beyond gold and glory, was the interest of Rome and the Republic's aspirations to expand, especially to the East. The East was the natural area of expansion for the Republic, as Caesar was pacifying the Gallic territories and Pompey had just added a foothold with Syria following the Mithridatic War. The reality Crassus had to face was that of political necessity: he needed to maintain his position against

Caesar and Pompey. It was ambition not greed that compelled him to invade Parthia.¹⁸ Rome was not looking in the West or the South for expansion; it was looking to the East. Romans sought an alliance with Armenia, a plan it continued to pursue throughout antiquity, until both the Romans and the Persians had new enemies in the Muslim Arabs who spread their religion through conquest. This contested territory meant that those who wished to seek glory and status looked east.

After Crassus' death, his political rivals were able to use him to attack their new opponents as un-roman. In this way, they used the evidence they had to make his story a moral lesson: Crassus was greedy and hubristic, and due to these fatal traits, he lost in battle and lost his life in a futile attempt to be greater than his destiny. That was the conclusion of Cicero in his *de Finibus* where he depicted Crassus as a slave to his own appetites. These sentiments were mirrored in later ancient sources and also in the mainstream scholarship done in antiquity and later rewritten by modern scholars. These authors recycled the negative line, without looking into the political sentiments or reasons behind why the sources were written the way that they were. It is the duty of the historian to question orthodox interpretations and to challenge them when answers seems too obvious.

To suggest that the Battle of Carrhae and the invasion of Parthia was simply the result of the character flaw of one man appears a gross oversimplification. One of the most powerful men in Rome, Crassus had enemies who used his death and the disgrace of losing his *Aquila* to disparage his reputation and turn him into a caricature of a statesman, whose greed drove him to launch an ill-considered invasion of a foreign empire. Harnessing primary evidence, this study sought to show the reader why Marcus Crassus was a complex actor in the Late Republic. He was a career politician who for decades navigated the political world of Rome. His downfall was due to the realities of politics and stereotypes, rather than fatal character flaws.

¹⁸ B. A. Marshall, *Crassus: A Political Biography* (Amsterdam: A.M. Hakkert, 1976), 146.

Magical Medieval Medicine: The Science of Pagan Practices within Medieval Medicine

Sara English

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Rev. John Gregorson served as the parish minister of the Island of Inner Hebrides in the late nineteenth-century. Inhabitants would acknowledge him not only as a cleric, but as one of the most important successors to the great folklore collector and “Master of Folktales,” John Francis Campbell of Islay, who lived during the mid-nineteenth century. Campbell preserved and published traditions from the “Red Book of Appin” in approximately 1860. In *Folklore*, Hugh Cheape recounts the tale of an old carter from Glenfyne who narrated stories of his boyhood, one in particular where his family turned to the “Red Book” with the help of its custodian when their cows ceased to give milk. The wife of the family’s neighbor had essentially stolen the “produce” or “substance” of their cows and this action was considered a product of Witchcraft. Ironically, the recommended remedy was the use of a counter-charm in the form of an iron shoe of “an entire horse” that was to be hammered upside down “and byre door; but let no living person know.”¹ These folkloric practices were not uncommon in the nineteenth-century. Most notably, they serve as proof of the continuity of older pagan practices that the Church in the later Middle Ages sought to repress or assimilate.

Intellectually serious works such as Gies’ *Life in a Medieval City* and *Life in a Medieval Village*, along with E. LeRoi Ladurie’s *Montaillou* and Georges Duby’s *William Marshall the Flower of Chivalry* have transformed our understanding of Medieval Life. One theme that runs central within these scholarly works is the influence and importance of religion. However, when defining the spiritual component of the Middle Ages, historians today tend to focus predominantly on the influence of the Church on society, avoiding those religious influences considered problematic. Within the old religions and folk traditions rested practices that do not seem to be readily acknowledged by historians today. Historian Ludovic Milis, author of *The Pagan Middle Ages*, is quick to point out, when defining the lines of religious ideals, issues become decidedly blurry.²

Renowned history professor and author Ronald Hutton argues that this was not always so. He points to the first half of the twentieth century when historians of the day argued that Christianity in Medieval England was simply a façade. Scholars felt that Christianity was an elite religion and not one practiced amongst the masses as they predominantly adhered to the old religion.³ Milis points out in *The Pagan Middle Ages* that most historians paint the picture they think best fits what life was like in Middle Ages of the European world. It is safe to say that most would not hesitate to place Christianity at the helm of medieval development. Pagan rituals gradually lost much of their social relevance during the “Christian Middle Ages,” but several of their practices did not disappear, rather they were simply assimilated into Christian culture to make them more acceptable. The Middle Ages, according to Milis, is viewed by some as particularly intolerant. This is

¹ Hugh Cheape, “The Red Book of Appin: Medicine as Magic and Magic as Medicine,” *Folklore* 104, no. 1/2 (1993): 111–23.

² Ludovicus Milis, ed., *The Pagan Middle Ages* (Woodbridge, Suffolk ; Rochester, N.Y: Boydell Press, 1998), 3-7.

³ Ronald Hutton, “How Pagan Were Medieval English Peasants?” *Folklore* 122, no. 3 (2011): 235–49.

arguably true, and our language today reflects this view. Indeed the terms “medieval” and “feudal” are often used to describe something crude, primitive, old fashion or cruel. Given this supposed authoritarian, tightly-controlled society, it would seem logical that in the heavily Catholic Middle Ages nothing remotely “pagan” could have survived.⁴

The term *paganus* is a derivative of the Latin word *pagus*, meaning “rustic, or hick.” This term was commonly used by the elite urban dwellers, or the *Urbs*. As mentioned, the elites who lived in the cities were more than likely Christians, who would refer to someone who lives in the countryside as a *paganus*. *Urbs* also assumed rural dwellers were non-Christians, hence the term pagan became associated with someone without true religion.⁵

Alain Dierkens emphasizes that archeology has had a major impact on the study of paganism. His work helps modern historians ascertain how the practices, traditions and activities of paganism came to be “Christianized,” thus, socially acceptable during the Middle Ages. Dierkens cites a letter from Gregory the Great to a missionary who ordered the protection of the former pagan shrines. His hope was that if they continued to feel reverence in the places where they once worshiped, then they would eventually become Christians. Through archeological studies, the existence of Roman carvings in these Christian places of worship were discovered.⁶ Archeology has also proven that former pagan structures were dismantled and used as stone quarries with some stones from these structures being utilized to build great Catholic cathedrals.⁷ The building materials were not the only pagan items to be absorbed into Christianity in some form. Milis stated that “Christianity carries on where Paganism leaves off,” like the stones of the monuments, some of the rites, usages, ideas and ways of presenting things” were adapted and adopted by Christianity.⁸

As this paper seeks to prove, pagan folkloric traditions not only survived but persisted throughout the Middle Ages beneath the level of written culture, despite the Church’s eventual view that it was evil. First by explaining and discussing the medieval viewpoint and definition of the term magic, an argument will be made that the actual intent of pagan practices was less than threatening; it was even welcoming. Second, by discussing the Church’s understanding of magic, the acceptance and study of what was considered by some in the Middle Ages to be natural magic, and its eventual comparison to science, we can better understand how pagan practices were molded into medieval Christian practices. Finally, evidence of the continued existence of these pagan practices, grafted onto Christian rituals makes clear that folkloric tradition and pagan practices not only continued and were tolerated but also were welcomed.

What did the context of the word “magic” mean to the inhabitants of medieval Europe? Robert Scribner’s definition of magic as “the exercise of a preternatural control over nature by human beings, with the assistance of forces more powerful than they are” helps because it lends credence to findings laid out later within this paper. To those inhabitants of medieval society, “magic” existed within Church sacraments. These practices included exorcism and blessing objects used during mass or other Catholic rites. The consecration of objects was thought to originate from a sacred power, thus giving the clergy an “other worldly” orientation. This magic later attracted disdain and aggression of the protestant reformers in the sixteenth century. Monks as wielders of sacred power adopted Christianized forms of healing charms as the non-Christian magical healing practices persisted with the names of Christ, or Christlike figures, replacing those of the pagan gods. Through clerical use, arbitrary lines between prayer and the use of magical spells or charms were

⁴ Milis, *The Pagan Middle Ages*.

⁵ “Pegnasus,” accessed January 25, 2019, <http://faculty.georgetown.edu/jod/paganus.html>.

⁶ Milis, *The Pagan Middle Ages*, 42.

⁷ Joseph Gies, *Life in a Medieval City*, (New York : Crowell, 1969), 141.

⁸ Milis, *The Pagan Middle Ages*, 7.

created. When these spells or charms were used outside the reach of the clergy, the lines became even more distorted.⁹

Valerie Flint maintains that this enigmatical aspect of magic gave the continued use of these practices' validity, as long as it was kept in check. She writes, "There are forces better recognized as belonging to human society than repressed or left to waste away or growl about upon its fringes . . . Many of our forebears knew this." Flint's recognition of the encouragement (or at the very least tolerance) early medieval churchmen lent to what will be called "natural magic" has been accepted in his field of study.¹⁰ According to historian Richard Kieckhefer, the use of the term "magic" within medieval Europe was only prevalent amongst those who viewed its use as normal. In doing so, they openly accepted and firmly believed that not only was magic real, but that it was governed by explainable theological or physical principles.¹¹ However, some historians argue the term "magic" in its generic form was not common until the sixteenth century, yet there is evidence that the terms *magia* or *magica* were commonplace earlier.

Kieckhefer believes it is pertinent to point out that the definition of the term "magic" was rarely consistent, and it was reserved for the rituals of the elite, those on the inside and also, those outsiders who used magic. While the practice of magic may have been observed in some circles as natural, the labeling of one as a magician was the equivalent of taking a once commonplace term and labeling it as an offensive, giving it an abusive connotation. In doing so, one removed the "natural" and original aspect of the term and associated it with occult powers, and demon intervention on behalf of the wielder.¹²

Some historians have sought to define magic as an attempt at manipulation and an exercise of unnatural power over human beings, often for a sinister purpose. Ralph Merrifield feels the definition certainly holds some weight, however, according to Hutton these manipulations were nothing more than simple acts of "symbolic protection against misfortunate or magical attack."¹³

Historical research has provided scholars with many new types of sources that give academics a new understanding of medieval viewpoints on magical cures. Pastoral manuals instructed priests on the daily care of their congregation. Included in the manuals were magical cures, often under the heading *Sortilegium*, a category used to cover a varying array of beliefs and practices of an unorthodox nature, such as divination, omens and fairies, along with the misuse of ecclesiastical rituals and more noteworthy, magical cures. Early thirteenth-century scholar John of Kent suggested that priests could ask their confessors (other priests to whom they confess): "Do you know any incantation for fevers and for any illness, which is called a blessing?" This line of questioning sheds light on the problems that medieval churchmen faced when discussing "magical" cures for illnesses. What exactly was magic, and where was the line between magic and other forms of healing? John of Kent acknowledged that no absolute answer existed when defining magic; too many contradictions existed. Verbal cures, known as incantations, for instance, could be considered both "blessings" invoked of God or appeals to the devil. This shines an important light on how the assimilation of these practices was accepted, since invocations of God were considered legitimate religious actions.¹⁴

Church proclamations show us that there was indeed opposition to priests who used pagan spells and charms. Councils ruled that pagan rites and customs should not be practiced by anyone,

⁹ Robert W. Scribner, "The Reformation, Popular Magic, and the 'disenchantment of the World,'" *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 23, no. 3 (Winter 1993): 475.

¹⁰ Valerie I. J. Flint, *The Rise of Magic in Early Medieval Europe* (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1994), 12.

¹¹ Richard Kieckhefer, "The Specific Rationality of Medieval Magic," *The American Historical Review* 99, no. 3 (1994): 813–36.

¹² Kieckhefer, "The Specific Rationality of Medieval Magic," 813–36.

¹³ Ronald Hutton, ed., *Physical Evidence for Ritual Acts, Sorcery and Witchcraft in Christian Britain: A Feeling for Magic*, 1st ed. 2016 edition (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 17.

¹⁴ Catherine Rider, "Medical Magic and the Church in Thirteenth-Century England," *Social History of Medicine: The Journal of the Society for the Social History of Medicine / SSHM* 24, no. 1 (April 1, 2011): 92–107.

especially Christian priests. Declarations came later from the Church ordering the defrocking or excommunicating of priests who even considered or sought out advice on such matters.¹⁵

The pastoral movement of the thirteenth century brought magical practices to the attention of medieval writers and churchmen. This also encouraged several canonists to raise questions regarding the legitimacy of magical practices and how they worked. Surprisingly, this led the way for tolerant viewpoints. A system of regular Church courts developed after the Fourth Lateran council of 1215, and magic was discussed in terms of magically induced impotence. These conversations resulted in the Church acknowledging the existence of magic when discussing potential causes, as well as cures. Previous acknowledgement in the 12th and 13th centuries could be found in decretals, which were new papal rulings that derived from cases involving impotence. The *Litteras, Fraternitatis*, and the *Litteras Vestre* all dealt with marital issues of a sexual nature, more importantly, magically induced impotence. These and many more decretals became canon law. By the mid-thirteenth century, magic was an acceptable topic within canonistic dialogue. Pastoral manuals indicated that the use of magical cures could be used by couples who had yet to consummate their marriages, but only when the impotence was found to not be caused by a physical problem.¹⁶

Curses inscribed on Norwich Cathedral share significant similarities with curse tablets retrieved from Roman contexts. Furthermore, churches in Norfolk and Suffolk appear to have geometric designs identical to drawn charms that acted as a cure for fistulas.¹⁷ Confession within the Church had been written about long before the thirteenth century. The production of many penitentials, or rule books, recommended penances for a wide array of sins, but it also included magical cures. The pastoral manuals of the thirteenth century were different than earlier works as they considered the circumstances of sin and took into consideration the varying sins that different social groups were at risk to commit. Earlier texts concerning magical cures continued to be copied, so one could assume that the attitudes towards “magic” were tolerated. The papacy’s stance on magical cures written by educated churchmen was shaped by the transmission of these earlier texts. Physical evidence of magical practice within medieval Europe exists in the form of amulets, some 1,700 still exist within museum collections. Amulets are considered portable charms, and their uses vary from guarding against negative influences to evoking positive ones. One example we can point to is the existence of hagstones which were ironically used to guard against witchcraft. Other examples include the use of fossils to keep away lightening or even the carrying of a mole’s foot to fight cramping.¹⁸

Historian Peter Murray Jones argues that not all late medieval clergy objected to all amulets, but they sought to differentiate religious amulets from ‘superstitious’ ones. Magical cures therefore occupied an uncertain status between churchmen and medical writers, as both groups condemned cures they considered magical. These cures were oftentimes prepared to contain a somewhat comprehensive range of treatments or remedies within practice, meaning when written, a treatment for one illness could be used to heal several others. However, even within these groups, the potential existed for diverse opinions. Those who have researched magical cures as part of medieval religion have discovered a varying range of beliefs about magic in their sources. Some clergy condemned cures they considered magical or that existed with a sense of superstition, but Valerie Flint contends that there were clerics who were more than willing to find the middle ground

¹⁵ Mary Ann Campbell, “Labeling and Oppression: Witchcraft in Medieval Europe,” *Mid-American Review of Sociology* 3, no. 2 (1978): 55–82.

¹⁶ Catherine Rider, *Magic and Impotence in the Middle Ages* (Oxford ; Oxford University Press, 2006), 114-117.

¹⁷ Hutton, 32.

¹⁸ Hutton, 188.

between heresy and science.¹⁹ Flint maintains that not only was magic tolerated by the Church, it was also recognized and encouraged, thus taking over a non-rational practice.²⁰

Catherine Rider explains that medieval writers began to develop a new category of magic, *magia naturalis*, “natural magic.” Magical writers found that this new category did not operate according to the typical categories of medieval science, yet it was not considered demonic. Using the symbolic connections between objects, such as animal testicles serving as a symbol for human fertility or sex, writers of this natural magic were frequently able to show how the use of words could be used to affect the physical world. They illustrated how sometimes the use of these objects could be classified as natural magic, although, some medieval writers felt this skirted the line between demonic and natural assistance. When the existence of inexplicable remedies became recognized, it is here that Rider believes that natural magic overlapped with medicine.²¹

William of Auvergne, a thirteen-century French priest and later bishop, admitted begrudgingly that some works of what he considered “natural magic” should be viewed as a branch of science “by means of its whole nature.” He began researching in the 1220’s and compiled his findings into a collection of works entitled *Magisterium divinale ac sapientiale. De Universo*, which simply translated means “Universe.” This he divided into three parts: the magic involved in sleight of hand, natural confections or unusual gadgets and, lastly, those acts that relied on the invitation of demons to carry out their work. His overall belief was that *opera magica* should be considered illicit and evil from beginning to end, simply stated, these were not natural occurrences, as in order to work, you need the manipulated and the manipulator.

There were, he concluded, natural activities that occurred by one of two different methods: by contrariety or by assimilation. Then there were such cases where the action was oftentimes a factor of a hidden force or power, still natural although not ordinary or planned and rather difficult to describe. According to William, there were “books of experiments” and “natural histories” that were chock full of descriptions of these “natural powers,” and, most importantly William was adamant that medicinal practices relied upon them. These “powers,” in William’s opinion, were not considered *opera magica* so long as no harm was applied when they were at work. “Natural magic” according to William, must be utilized, and more importantly, should be highly praised.²²

Several translated twelfth and thirteenth century works containing information on occult properties of natural objects discussed the subject of amulets used for medical purposes. These works also discuss plants, birds, stones and charms acknowledged as having “magical” abilities.²³ William’s own observations refer to the power of a sapphire in conjunction with curing sickness, calming fears and reigning in passion. In this case, according to William, it was not the matter or form of the sapphire, but the healing accomplishments it demonstrated. Simply stated, the sapphires existence contributed to a cure, or at least to restrain the problem. The gemstones presence within a room was enough, it did not require direct use and it did not have to come into contact with one’s person. He believed that these actions belonged to a category he deemed “magical.”

Who then might be considered a practitioner of “magic” in its acceptable form throughout Medieval Europe? First, it is important to differentiate between a pagan or folkloric ritual and the practice of witchcraft. This can be accomplished by turning to the theology and history behind the study of both when deciphering the ultimate objective of those practicing the ritual. Second, turning to folklore and folk religion studies can help one to understand how the distortion between pagan ritual and the practice of witchcraft happened in the Middle Ages. Last and most important is acknowledging how, although the two seem intertwined, there is a difference between paganism and

¹⁹ Rider, “Medical Magic and the Church in Thirteenth-Century England,” 92–107.

²⁰ Flint, *The Rise of Magic in Early Medieval Europe*, 127.

²¹ Rider, *Magic and Impotence in the Middle Ages*.

²² Steven P. Marrone, “Magic and the Physical World in Thirteenth-Century Scholasticism,” *Early Science and Medicine* 14, no. 1/3 (2009): 158–85.

²³ Rider, *Magic and Impotence in the Middle Ages*, 84.

folklore. In the medieval definition of life, all challenges to the authority of the Church amounted to a challenge to God and to the order of society. Those who opposed pagan practices were considered “God’s Defenders,” and as Jeffrey Burton Russel describes them “were carried away with man’s infinite capacity for self-delusion and ecclesiastical self-righteousness.”²⁴

During this time, peasants were typically accused of witchcraft, mostly women, old women, and those who lived alone or in groups. Ironically, many of these women were healers, who practiced herbal medicine, midwifery as well as healing via charms and spells. Yes, many at the time worshiped nature, following the ancient pagan religions and adoring many gods, rather than the Christian God. Some rituals consisted of dancing and feasting, some were of a hedonistic nature. But they predated Christianity, as did “cures,” mostly herbal, which had been passed down through generations before “modern medicine.” If one fit any label above—healer, woman, pagan or peasant—then the danger existed to be labeled as a witch. Any combination of those labels could prove fatal.²⁵

Premodern Britain saw charms and texts contain directions for a vast array of calamities. These included but were not limited to eliminating irritations and healing injuries caused by accidents, but for this essay, the most important contained cures for illness and other human contingencies.²⁶ As we see illustrated in Geis’ *Life in a Medieval City*, charm use is widespread within medieval society, especially in childbirth. During labor, a medieval midwife might rub the belly of the patient with ointments or encourage the expectant mother with soft and reassuring words, but if that labor was difficult, sympathetic magic was invoked. The “opening” of items within the house—doors, drawers, cupboards and the loosening of pinned up hair and tied knots—were all symbolic gestures performed as a means of opening womb. Geis notes that the gemstone Jasper was known to have childbirth assisting powers, as well as powers of contraception, controlling menstrual flow and reducing sexual desire. The right foot of a crane, or even its dried blood was considered useful. In extremely difficult cases, the midwife could resort to the use of magical incantations whispered into the patient’s ear, but Geis is quick to point out that priests frowned upon the practice.²⁷

European birthing charms were somewhat of a tradition for quite a long time. Some were written in Latin, while others were in German or English. In the tenth century, a charm from the south of France was used to help women in childbirth. The charm *Tom I Da Femina* or translated, “A Swollen Woman,” was used by a birthing woman’s helper. This incantation or poem would be recited during the most intense moments of childbirth, spoken in a soft magical tone. Bernhard Bischoff discovered this charm in 1984 in the margins of a manuscript of Roman legal texts. It was written upside down on both the sides and the bottoms of the text.²⁸

Scrolls that contained Middle English texts are sure to be of interest to folklorists or to someone who studies the history of medical charms. Such texts included chronicles and genealogical manuscripts (moreover writings that display the English Crown and its descent), religious prayers and supplications books, and “estate rolls,” which held a wide variety of religious prayers and supplications. It is of great likelihood that such texts were used as medical charms²⁹

As we have seen, many of the pagan trappings, specifically in rituals and medicine, were maintained in the daily lives of generations of Medieval Europeans. Christianity itself, also

²⁴ Jeffrey Burton Russell, *Witchcraft in the Middle Ages* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 2-6.

²⁵ Campbell, “Labeling and Oppression.”

²⁶ John C. Hirsh, “Credulity and Belief: The Role of Postconditions in the Late Medieval Charm,” *Preternature: Critical and Historical Studies on the Supernatural* 1, no. 1 (2012): 130–46.

²⁷ Gies, *Life in a Medieval City*, 60.

²⁸ William Paden and Frances Paden, “Swollen Woman, Shifting Canon: A Midwife’s Charm and the Birth of Secular Romance Lyric,” *PMLA* 125, no. 2 (2010): 306–511.

²⁹ Curt F. Bühler, “Prayers and Charms in Certain Middle English Scrolls,” *Speculum* 39, no. 2 (1964): 270–78.

incorporated many of these same rituals within its worship practices.³⁰ The practice of pagan healing rituals, use of charms as well as herbs and stones, was not viewed as problematic until the late 15th century. With the Inquisition began the decline of paganism and the assimilation of its practices into Christianity. Those who acknowledged its existence and tolerated its practice began to turn away, but its presence has been recorded for us to study and debate.

³⁰ Ronald Hutton, "How Pagan Were Medieval English Peasants?" *Folklore* 122, no. 3 (2011): 235–49.

Southern Sympathies in Illinois as Expressed through Nelson vs The People **Kathrine M. Gosnell**

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Throughout the Antebellum Period, Illinois proved itself to be a problematic state when compared to that of its Northern counterparts. Geographically, it was a northern state, but population-wise, it was split between northern and southern migrants. Around the Chicago area, abolitionism had a strong pull as seen in the various “colored” conventions held there, as well as the variety of Whig/Republican newspapers. Yet, from the state capital of Springfield and southward, many people held Democratic viewpoints and showed sympathy for their southern neighbors. As two slave states bordered Illinois, it is easy to understand how these neighbors had an impact on Illinoisan culture and politics. Illinois was not the only northern state to enact Black Laws, which put severe restrictions on blacks and often banned them from settling in certain states. Still, Illinois’s laws were among the harshest. While enforcement of these laws was sporadic, most prosecutions came in the southern part of the state. Among the most controversial of Illinois’ Black Laws was the Black Exclusion Law of 1853. This law prohibited blacks from coming into the state with the intention of living there. Punishment proved especially harsh in that violators were subject to penalties that amounted to forced labor, essentially slavery. The Illinois Supreme Court case, *Nelson versus The People*, reflects strong southern sympathies in the state. The Nelson case was set in motion by a violation of the Black Exclusion Law of 1853 in Hancock County. An exploration of how the Black Exclusion Act came into being, and was enforced reveals the powerful southern ideas and cultural forces that percolated in Illinois until the Exclusion Law was repealed in 1865.

History of Illinois and the Black Laws

In the early 1700s, the territory that would become known as Illinois was settled by the French who imported slaves into the region. When the British annexed the territory in the 1760s, they decided to keep the tradition of slavery. It was already the custom established by the French, therefore it made sense to keep it alive and use it as an incentive to convince French settlers to accept British rule.¹ By some accounts, the British version of slavery was much more relaxed than that of southern American slavery. Illinois slaves were given time off for holidays, restrictions were laxer on Sundays, and they received better treatment in general. At this point in time, Black Laws were nowhere near as severe as they would later become.² In the following decades, however, Illinois saw a dramatic decrease in population. Many of the French settlers did not want to submit to British authority, so they left the area, taking their slaves with them. With land in Illinois opening up as the

¹ Norman Dwight Harris, *The History of Negro Servitude in Illinois, and of the Slavery Agitation in That State, 1719-1864* (Ann Arbor, MI.: University Microfilms, 1968), 4-5.

² Elmer Gertz, "The Black Laws of Illinois," *Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society* 56, no. 3 (1963): 457-58.



Image 1 & 2: The first image is territory that was under the control of France in the early 1700s. The second image shows how the landscape changed when the land was given to the British as of 1765.



French left, others moved in.³ The people who jumped on this opportunity were generally slaveholding planters from the Carolinas, Tennessee and Kentucky.⁴ Along with slaves, the new settlers also brought their ideas about slave regulations. It was after the turn-of-the-century that their power was fully manifested.

In 1803, Illinois' first legal code was put in place. Under this code, slaves could be brought in under the guise of indentured servants. However, there were age restrictions on how long someone could serve, and all had to be registered with the county clerk. In return, masters had to provide slaves with everything they needed to survive and to not mistreat their servants while punishing them.⁵ Keeping with southern sentiments, a section mandated that if the servant refused to work, he/she could be sold south of the Mason-Dixon Line into slavery.⁶ With these provisions in place, Illinois' population once again grew. This time however, a good number of slaves were being registered as indentured servants. With ideal social and agricultural conditions, slave owners from the South continued to arrive in significant numbers.⁷

In 1818, there was the push for Illinois to join officially the Union, but this would mean confronting the issue of slavery and indentured servitude. To meet requirements of being a northern state, Illinois had to remove indentured servitude as it had been set up under the legal codes of 1803. According to historian Elmer Gertz, legislators had a plan to remove the codes by giving them a "verbal gloss" to make them look better on paper. Then, once Illinois was admitted as a state, the codes could be put back in place.⁸ However, some delegates at the convention were firmly against any kind of servitude, while others sought a compromise. Ultimately, the party of compromise won out. Thus Article VI emerged: all forms of slavery and indentured servitude would be abolished except as a form of punishment.⁹ An obvious loophole existed in this statement: as Gertz explains, slave holders were not attempting to hide their agenda in the slightest.¹⁰ When the 1818 State Constitution made its way before the US Congress, it received mixed reviews. Some, such as Representative James

³ Harris, *History of Negro Servitude*, 4-5.

⁴ Jerome B Meites, "The 1847 Illinois Constitutional Convention and Persons of Color," *Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society* 108, no. 3-4 (2015): 273.

⁵ Gertz, "The Black Laws of Illinois," 459-500.

⁶ Gertz, "The Black Laws of Illinois," 460; and Harris, *History of Negro Servitude*, 7-12.

⁷ Harris, *History of Negro Servitude*, 11-12.

⁸ Gertz, "Black Laws of Illinois," 460-61.

⁹ Gertz, "Black Laws of Illinois," 461.

¹⁰ Gertz, "Black Laws of Illinois," 462.

Tallmadge (Dem-Rep-NY), said that the proposed Illinois Constitution was not firmly set against slavery and needed to be rejected. Others, such as Representative George Poindexter (Dem-Rep-MS), proclaimed the provisions laid out in the constitution well suited to the political, social, and economic climate in Illinois. After some debate, Congress passed the Illinois Constitution by a vote 117 to 34. The Senate passed it as well without debate.¹¹ With this vote, Illinois became what Gertz calls “a southern-oriented citadel in the North.”¹² The passage of the 1818 Constitution shows acceptance of indentured servitude and by extension slavery, despite the Ordinance of 1789 prohibiting slavery in the North.¹³ This was a victory for southern ideals that made clear the law sympathized more with southern norms than the abolitionist north. It also set the stage for the comprehensive Illinois Black Laws of 1819.

The 1819 codes established Illinois as having the most severe Black Laws in the North. Territorial laws had been passed all over the North, but this was the first time black regulatory laws were passed over a large area rather than a small locality. The changing codes also coincided with the demographic change taking place in the early 1820s. Fewer slave-owners arrived in Illinois. Newcomers were lower to middle-class farmers from the South who did not own slaves. This population change brought a new trend in legislation in which Illinois, a northern state, began to function like a slave state. Under these laws, the local county clerk issued all black citizens a certificate of freedom. To be certified blacks had to pay a \$1000 bond to prove that they had the funds to be more than a mere county charge and hence would not be a burden to taxpayers. This was particularly important because one of the leading arguments for excluding black immigrants was that they would all be poor and would need state support. They would also potentially compete with poor whites for jobs. If a convicted black failed to pay the bond, they would be fined an additional sum and face possible arrest. Under these laws, slave owners were prohibited from bringing their slaves into Illinois and setting them free. Violators would be fined. There was also a section pertaining to blacks living within the state. If a black person was caught without freedom papers, it would be assumed that they were a run-away slave. If the individual could not produce papers, the local sheriff would advertise his/her sale at auction for six weeks. The convicted black would then be sold to the highest bidder for a year of work. After that year, the person would then receive the wages for that year of work. If a master had not come forward to claim the individual, he/she would be given a certificate of conditional freedom, which meant they could still be claimed if someone came forward. Also, if a white citizen hired a black person without freedom papers, they would be subject to fines for every day’s worth of work done. There were, however, some sections within these laws that worked to protect the black community, at least to some extent. Any person who lied to procure a black person as a slave or indentured servant would be punished for committing perjury. There were also explicit prohibitions against kidnapping free or indentured blacks.¹⁴

Most of the laws, however, were meant to control blacks. The South designed its black laws to control slaves and prevent uprisings. In Illinois, these laws served a similar purpose. They aimed at controlling blacks. It was also a means by which to discourage blacks from coming into the state. White settlers viewed blacks as inferior, unacceptable neighbors, and financially untrustworthy people. In no way did they want to support a person they felt unworthy of being a member of their society. This also implies an inherent fear of blacks. From the stories of slave revolts, whites feared what would happen to them if they left the black community uncontrolled. The Black Laws of 1819 were updated in 1848. More sanctions were put in place to punish whites caught helping blacks.

¹¹ Gertz, “Black Laws of Illinois,” 462-63; and Harris, *History of Negro Servitude*, 25.

¹² Gertz, “Black Laws of Illinois,” 463.

¹³ Harris, *History of Negro Servitude*, 25-6.

¹⁴ Gertz, “Black Laws of Illinois,” 463-64.

Whites could be heavily fined for helping blacks without freedom papers.¹⁵ It is worth mentioning that by 1840, the black population in the census was 4,065, less than one percent of the total population.¹⁶ They posed little threat to the whites living there, yet hatred for African-Americans pushed forward legislation to control blacks and prevent more from entering Illinois. A short time later, at the 1847 Constitutional Convention, came the Black Exclusion Act, otherwise known as Article XIV.

The Black Exclusion Act

Illinois's questionable spending habits, extreme debt, and a general distrust of the state's banks triggered the 1847 Constitutional Convention, called to rewrite the state's constitution. However, the concept of race quickly became an issue. A few at the convention wanted to introduce legislation that promoted equality between the races, such as voting rights and removing all distinction between the races in legislation. It soon became apparent, however, that most of the assembled delegates did not share the opinions of the abolitionist minority. The Senate Judiciary Committee pronounced in its report that "No act of legislation will or can raise the African in this country above the level in which the petitioners find him... he can never aspire to those privileges while there remains one of the Anglo-Saxon race."¹⁷ The legislators simply did not view blacks positively, and in keeping with the mandate to control the black population, on June 25th the Black Exclusion Act came to the floor at the convention. Previously, parts of Illinois had passed territorial exclusion laws restricting blacks from settling in select counties. Now under this new legislation proposed by a former state senator, Benjamin Bond, blacks could not settle anywhere in the state. This applied not only to free blacks, but also any masters wanting to bring their slaves with the intention of freeing them.¹⁸ Once this provision made it into the constitution, overturning the law would be very difficult. In short, a repeal meant that a majority of Illinoisans would have to support its removal in a popular vote. In Illinois's particular political climate, removal was unlikely. As Edward West, a Whig from Adams County, explained: many whites came to Illinois from the South to escape slavery—and African-Americans.¹⁹

The Convention of 1848 provided the foundation for the law to be enacted. It was not until February 12, 1853, that the legislation was put into law and enforced. During several conventions held between 1848 and 1853, Article XIV was introduced, but it failed to garner sufficient support. It was not until Jacksonian Democrat John "Black Jack" Logan rallied enough support that the proposals finally became law in 1853.²⁰ Voted on separately from the constitution, it was passed with 87 in favor and 55 against. Those in favor of the bill were largely Democrats from the southern part of the state. Those against were largely Whigs from the Northeast. The Exclusion Law passed easily when 87 of Illinois's counties voted in favor. The only counties that voted against the bill were in the Chicago area. On the opposite end of the state, 13 counties in Little Egypt voted with over a 90 percent approval rate. Saline County heartily approved with a 98 percent vote in favor of the law.²¹ This vote clearly demonstrates how the majority of the state, especially the parts in close proximity to slave states and settled by upland southerners, strongly supported this legislation. Southern opinions clearly had an effect.

¹⁵ Gertz, "Black Laws of Illinois," 464-65.

¹⁶ Meites, "The 1847 Illinois Constitutional Convention," 266.

¹⁷ "Report on the Committee on the Judiciary Relative to Negroes," Senate Report, 15th G.A., 1st Sess., 165-66, March 1, 1847, quoted in Meites, "The 1847 Illinois Constitutional Convention," 270-71.

¹⁸ Meites, "The 1847 Illinois Constitutional Convention," 277.

¹⁹ Meites, "The 1847 Illinois Constitutional Convention," 278-79.

²⁰ Meites, "The 1847 Illinois Constitutional Convention," 284-85.

²¹ Meites, "The 1847 Illinois Constitutional Convention," 282-84.




Image 3: The green section is the section of the state known in the 19th century as “Little Egypt”.

The Exclusion Law itself was made up of several parts. First and foremost, it established that whites were not permitted to bring blacks within the borders of Illinois. If any white person was caught doing so, they would be fined. If the individual could not pay the fine, they would be jailed for one year. According to this section, it mattered not whether the black person was free. A white person would still be fined for bringing them into Illinois. Race, not social class, appeared the target. This is expressed in Section Three of the law that any “negro or mulatto,” no matter free or a slave, would

be subject to a fine of 50 dollars if caught in Illinois for more than ten days with the intent to settle. The individual would receive a trial by jury of 12 white men. Upon a guilty verdict, the convicted would have to pay the fine. If they could not, the sheriff would then announce an auction ten days following the notification. At the auction, the highest bidder would pay the criminal’s fine, and the convicted then would work off the money the bidder spent. After the fine was paid, if the “negro” had not left the state within ten days, they would again be liable for arrest. However, this time the fine would increase to 100 dollars. If the criminal could not pay the 100-dollar fine, they are again subject to the same manner of punishment as the first offense. If, after the second time, the individual failed to leave the state, the fine would keep increasing by 50 dollars until they left the state or died.²²

However, there was a section that worked in favor of any accused blacks. Section six allowed blacks to appeal a verdict within five days of the sentence. As a sign of good faith that the accused would not run and would appear in court, their fines were doubled. If found guilty, the “negro or mulatto” was subject not only to the fines associated with the verdict but would also have to pay the fines and costs associated with the lawsuit. In later sections, any white man could claim any “negro or mulatto” who had been caught if he provided sufficient proof that he was the owner. Upon demonstrating ownership, the owner would be subject to pay all fines and court fees amassed. The second to last section of this law proved to be among the most interesting despite its brevity. Section ten stated, “Every person who shall have one-fourth negro blood shall be deemed a mulatto.”²³ The issue increasingly seemed less about slaveholding. It had become more about race. Section ten

²² *Laws of Illinois 1854*, 18 Illinois 390 1853, 57-8.

²³ *Laws of Illinois*, 58-60.

echoed the ideology of racial superiority prevalent in both the South and the North. Even the slightest bit of black “blood” meant the “mulatto” could not reach the heights needed to associate with white society. Blacks must be separated, or, in the best-case scenario, removed altogether. It was on this point that many northerners could sympathize with the South. Numerous northern states also enacted black laws. However, the severity of these regulations was often weaker than that of the South. Only in Illinois did the black laws rival those of the South. Even southern newspapers admitted that there was a certain ruthlessness displayed in Illinois.²⁴ In the South, blacks were treated as lesser beings, yet they were still a part of everyday life and could exist alongside their white counterparts. That is, as long as they remained respectful of the societal hierarchy.

The exact reason for the passage of this law is up for debate. It may have been intended as a blow against the abolitionist cause. Another possibility was that it was an attempt to boost the economy and provide the state with extra funds. Certainly it reflected deep racism present in the state, yet, at the same time, there was some disapproval of the law.²⁵ A majority of the opposition came from Chicago and its extremely active black community. The passage of the 1853 legislation brought about a new drive to demand action to remove the black laws.²⁶ Active disapproval was not limited to Chicago. Newspapers across the state clearly expressed concerns. Most held to the claim that the Act of 1853 was unconstitutional and could not be easily enforced. The *Alton Telegraph* expressed fears the law would allow a kind of slavery to be institutionalized within Illinois. The *Quincy Herald* and Springfield’s *State Register* were the only Democratic papers loyal enough to the administration to defend the law.²⁷ Yet, ardent opposition was limited. As stated earlier, the Exclusion Act won easily a majority of the counties in Illinois. No action was ever taken to undo any of the black laws at this time. In fact, no black laws instituted since the early 1820s were removed until 1865, the week after the Thirteenth Amendment was passed.²⁸ There was continued pushback against the black laws, yet nothing was done to remove them until after the Civil War. Illinoisans were sympathetic to southern ideas, morals, and standards. While many Illinois citizens probably did not support slavery, they most certainly did not want blacks living in their communities.

Nelson versus the People

Although critics claimed the Black Exclusion Law of 1853 would be difficult to enforce, it did not stop people from trying. Within the first year of its enactment, three arrests were reported. Following the specifications of the law, authorities auctioned off two of the arrested individuals. The last of the three was an escaped slave whose master came to claim him. When the case was brought to court, the local judge declared section eight, which stated that masters were liable to pay for court costs and fines, illegal because it interfered with the master’s right to claim their slaves, power given by Congress through the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850.²⁹

²⁴ Victoria L. Harrison, “We Are Here Assembled: Illinois Colored Conventions, 1853-1873,” *Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society* 108, no. 3-4 (2015): 327.

²⁵ Harris, *History of Negro Servitude*, 188.

²⁶ Harrison, “We Are Here Assembled,” 326-29; and Roger D. Bridges, “Antebellum Struggle for Citizenship.” *Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society* 108, no. 3-4 (2015): 300.

²⁷ Harris, *History of Negro Servitude*, 236-37.

²⁸ Meites, “The 1847 Illinois Constitutional Convention,” 275.

²⁹ Harris, *History of Negro Servitude*, 237.

The next year, authorities made additional arrests. The *Quincy Daily Whig* reported, on July 7, 1854, the arrest of seven black men from the week prior. Three of them were cooks on a steamer passing through Illinois—these cooks were quickly released after paying a minimal fine. The remaining four were brought to the court of Judge Sheldon, who promptly discharged them. The *Daily Whig* editor states, “Men from free States and men from slave States were alike mortified and humbled to know that in Illinois, such things, at this day, could be possible.”³⁰




Image 4: Illinois Counties

This statement demonstrates a distaste for the Exclusion Law, and not just on the part of the *Daily Whig*.

A few years later, the *Quincy Daily Whig* reported another arrest. On December 2, 1859, an article appeared reprinted from the *Olney Times*, a week earlier. An Irishman with black hair and a dark complexion was arrested in Little Egypt having been mistaken as a “mulatto,” trying to settle in the state. Upon questioning, authorities discovered his name was Thomas Leary and he had been in the state for 12 years, living in the Chicago area. Despite the knowledge that he was not, in fact, violating the Act of 1853, his “captors” would not release him until the state paid out the reward promised to citizens who turned in illegal blacks. In keeping with the opposition of some Illinois newspapers to the Exclusion Act, the short article on Leary ended with a passionate plea for forgiveness from the people targeted by the black laws and an expression of sorrow that not more was being done to stop it. The article proclaimed, “we are sorry that our country within her borders [has] one man so steeped in moral degradation as to voluntarily attempt to arrest a man because he happened to be a little dark, and was not blessed with an ordinary degree of intelligence, to carry him into perpetual bondage.”³¹

The editor clearly viewed with contempt Illinois citizens who turned in blacks in a state barring slavery. However, as stated earlier, actions speak louder than words. Despite protests against the Exclusion Act, little was done to stop it.

Arrests continued to occur after 1859. In 1862, events set in motion the Nelson case challenging the Black Exclusion Law. In December 1862, “a tall slim mulatto, about 55 years old,” along with his wife, came into Hancock County from St. Louis, Missouri. They came at the invitation of Orestes Hawley, a Republican, to work on his farm for ten dollars a day along with room and board. The preliminary version of the Emancipation Proclamation had been issued September 22, 1862, and when Nelson heard of this, he thought he had been freed and could leave to work for Hawley. In February 1863, authorities arrested both Hawley and Nelson for violation of

³⁰ “The Black Law,” *The Quincy Daily Whig*, July 7, 1854.

³¹ “Excitement In Egypt,” *The Quincy Daily Whig*, December 2, 1859.

the Black Exclusion Law of 1853. The two were taken along with five other blacks who had also violated the act. They promptly appeared before Judge George M. Child in Carthage, Illinois. Child, a lifelong Democrat, was involved in an open feud with Republican Governor Richard Yates. With this trial, Child saw an opportunity. The proceedings would be the perfect tool with which to separate Illinois law and order from that of the Republican Illinois native, President Abraham Lincoln. At the trial, three witnesses testified that Nelson had violated state law. One was Metgar Couchman, a white resident of Hancock County and a prominent Democrat. The second was Hancock's white County Sheriff, William Hamilton. The last was a black man who had come into the state at the same time as Nelson, named John. Nelson's defense argued that John's testimony was inadmissible because blacks could not testify in court. However, Child overruled the defense and declared John's testimony would stand because the law did not apply to a black man testifying against another black man. On February 6, 1863, a jury of 12 white men found Nelson, Hawley, and the other five blacks guilty. Nelson was fined 50 dollars, as well as court fees.³²

Of course, Nelson could not afford to pay these fines, so the sheriff posted notification for an auction. In response, Nelson along with the other five appealed to the Hancock circuit court at the end of his five-day limit. On March 6, 1863, a new jury convened, and more witnesses testified, including Orestes Hawley. The prosecution presented the same argument: by coming into the state for more than ten days with the intention of settling down, all six men had violated the Exclusion Law. The defense argued that the act was unconstitutional, immoral, and that it conflicted with the Fugitive Slave Act passed in 1850. It is here where the historical record becomes vague. The prosecution objected, but to what exactly remains unclear. The presiding judge sustained the objection, and the defense's argument was thrown out. Thus, the jury had no choice but to decide upon another guilty verdict. On March 7, the defense requested a change of venue to nearby Adams County. The new trial ran accordingly until the closing statements. Both the prosecution and the defense had prepared closing "instructions" for the jury. These statements featured a summary of each respective side's argument and jury instructions. The prosecution's instructions were read. The defense's instructions were not. The defense tried to pass a motion declaring an error on the trial, but the judge overruled them. Despite all of this, the jury in Adams County found Nelson guilty again.³³ The defense pushed for Nelson's case to go to the Supreme Court arguing that the Exclusion Law was unconstitutional. Finally, the Supreme Court did acknowledge the error committed during the Adams County trial.³⁴

Representing Nelson was the law office of Grimshaw and Williams. Jackson Grimshaw was born in Pike County Illinois and moved to Quincy in Adams County as a young adult. Archibald Williams was born in Kentucky before he also came to Quincy to settle in the 1820s. Both men are remembered as among the best lawyers to have practiced in the state of Illinois. Both were also closely linked to Abraham Lincoln.³⁵ On the prosecuting side was State's Attorney James B. White, born in Greene County, Ohio, in 1828 before coming to Illinois. In 1857, he was recommended for prosecuting attorney for the state, a position he filled until 1865. He was known as a progressive and liberal Democrat with the unique ability to separate his politics from his work.³⁶ During this time period, the State of Illinois did not have an attorney general position, so White was to fill the role. Completing the cast of characters: Pickney H. Walker served as Illinois' chief justice. Born in

³²Adams County Circuit Clerk, records, "Quincy Illinois, File Number 1877" (March 1863.); and Thomas Bahde; and *The Life and Death of Gus Reed: A Story of Race and Justice in Illinois during the Civil War and Reconstruction* (Ohio University Press, 2014) 137-42.

³³ Adams County Circuit Clerk, records, Quincy Illinois.

³⁴ *Laws of Illinois*, 246.

³⁵ *The Bench and the Bar of Illinois: Historical and Reminiscent* (Chicago: Lewis Pub. Co., 1899), 880-82.

³⁶ *History of Christian County, Illinois with Illustrations Descriptive Of Its Scenery and Biographical Sketches of Some of its Prominent Men and Pioneers* (Philadelphia: Brink, McDonough & Co., 1880), 207-8.

Kentucky, Walker moved to McDonough County, Illinois, as a youth. He first served in the Pike County Circuit Court before being moved to the Illinois Supreme Court in April 1858.³⁷ One other judge provides an interesting sidebar to this case, but he will be discussed later.

The final opinion published in February 1864 by the Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the decisions made by the three previous trials. The court stated that the servitude detailed under the Act of 1853 amounted to a form of punishment, and it was the state's right to define crimes and prescribe punishments. The court also determined that the State of Illinois could prevent blacks from immigrating as part of its police powers.³⁸ In the state's eyes, poor free blacks and freed slaves would be a burden on the state. Therefore, a danger existed to the livelihoods of white people living in the state. In the court's opinion, the Exclusion Law appropriately protected the well-being of its citizens. The court also took issue with a clause in the law mandating a master must pay all fines associated with the capture and prosecution of his runaway slave. The Supreme Court agreed that masters would be liable for fines accumulated through the capture of their slaves, but paying the remainder of their fine acted as an obstacle between the master and his property. Associated with this, the state of Illinois tried to set up a separate "tribunal" to ascertain whether a black person was a runaway slave. The court also ruled this as running counter to the federal Fugitive Slave Act, because it acted as a block between a master and his property. The owners only had to do as much as the Fugitive Slave Law required for proving ownership. In all, the portions that did not comply with national law were removed. The remainder, including the use of labor as punishment, remained in force.³⁹

Nelson's case was not the first to come before the Illinois Supreme Court regarding the issue of slavery. In 1843, *Eells v. The People* came before the Supreme Court. The basic problem behind this case was owners' rights over slaves. In the early 1840s, Richard Eells was an abolitionist who was caught helping a slave. He was convicted of aiding runaway slaves and providing work for them. Eells argued that he did not know the individual in question was a slave, so he was not stealing the owner's property. However, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the owner. This case contributed to the established precedent that was relied upon in ruling on Nelson's case. As historian Paul Finkelman explains, this ruling established the precedent that slave owners would receive the benefit of the doubt to keep state relations intact. He also emphasizes the important fact that Illinois was proving "its willingness to convict citizens of the state for helping fugitive slaves."⁴⁰ Illinois was surrounded by southern states; it is vital to the state government to be on civil terms with its neighbors. Following precedent that citizens will be punished as established by *Eells v The People*, the state could distinguish what was legal and what was not. The state possessed the right to define its penal code, and the court did not have a say in the matter.⁴¹

This brings us back around to another interesting figure in the case. There was one dissenting vote in *Nelson v. The People*, Justice Beckwith.⁴² Corydon Beckwith was a celebrated lawyer, considered to be one of the best in Chicago.⁴³ The original vote on the Exclusion Law had little support in the Chicagoland area. The one justice who did not approve of the opinion was from this area. Chief Justice Walker was an upland southerner who settled in a border county. The majority of the population held views almost opposite of their northern counterparts. They had the most exposure to a culture in which blacks were of lesser standing. While the newspaper coverage can be

³⁷ *The Bench and Bar of Illinois*, 876.

³⁸ *Nelson (a mulatto) v. The People Of The State Of Illinois* 33 (Illinois 390 1864), 244-45.

³⁹ *Nelson v The People of Illinois*, 245-46.

⁴⁰ Paul Finkelman, "Slavery, the "More Perfect Union," and the Prairie State," *Illinois Historical Journal* 80, no. 4 (1987): 263-64.

⁴¹ *Nelson v The People of Illinois*, 250-52.

⁴² *Nelson v The People of Illinois*, 252.

⁴³ *The Bench and Bar of Illinois*, 645.

deceiving, Justice Beckwith's unsupported opinion demonstrated a broader picture of Illinoisans support for the Black Exclusion Law of 1853, and southern way of life.

Conclusion

After the Nelson decision, things remained relatively quiet until the end of the Civil War in 1865. It was following the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment that change began to occur. A week after the amendment's passage, the "infamous Black Laws" were repealed. This included the Black Exclusion Act of 1853. As historian Victoria Harrison explains, in a "glorious new era" of freedom, the Republicans were riding high, pressing a progressive agenda, aided by the fact they held the majority in the Illinois General Assembly.⁴⁴ There was a clear effort to take steps to embody the causes for which the North fought. The *Chicago Tribune* describes petitions created and signed all over the state for the removal of the Black Laws. The article goes on to sing the praises of John Logan, ironically the man who had originally introduced the Black Exclusion Law.⁴⁵ In 1865, Logan served as a general under the command of General Ulysses S. Grant in the Civil War. In a dramatic role reversal, he had become a radical Republican and would later serve as a senator.⁴⁶ The article portrayed Logan as proud of the work undoing what he had created. He was a changed man. In 1907, the *Quincy Daily Journal* published an article entitled the "The Dark Pages in Illinois' History." The piece provided a comprehensive timeline for all the legislation passed regarding the Black Laws. It acknowledged the southern attitudes that thrived downstate. Yet, it stressed how these pieces of legislation later were loathed and how many celebrated when the laws were removed.⁴⁷ In the editor's eyes, in hindsight these laws were a stain on the legacy of President Lincoln's home state.

However, not everyone rejoiced. Newspapers loyal to the Democratic agenda had no kind words to spare for the repeal. The *Illinois State Register* published a scathing piece ripping Republicans to shreds, calling their actions "a most glaring piece of effrontery."⁴⁸ By removing it, the editor argued, the Republican-General Assembly ignored the will of 175,000 citizens who voted in favor of the legislation. This thought brings up an interesting point: The people who sympathized with the South had not gone anywhere. They were still citizens of Illinois and a change in legislation did not mean a change of opinion. Hostilities toward blacks remained, and Republican newspapers were desperate to project an image that downplayed racism.

As for Nelson, himself, the record becomes foggy. After the Supreme Court ruled against him, his fines would have been reinstated. He still would have been unable to pay his fines and would have been auctioned off. However, when the laws were repealed in 1865, Governor Yates pardoned the men charged.⁴⁹ Presumably one was Nelson, but surviving records are unclear. The fate of Nelson may have been lost, but his journey speaks volumes. Illinois was a geographical northern state driven by a southern culture. A good number of middle-class, white planters settled in Illinois, and they brought with them their ideas about how blacks and whites should interact. This tension kept building, ultimately culminating in the Black Exclusion Law of 1853. Those found guilty of violating this law were subjected to punishment that amounted to forced labor: slavery. Nelson quickly found upon his arrest that the Illinois Court system generally did not find favor anyone who threatened to rock the boat, so to speak. There was a consensus that extra care should

⁴⁴ Harrison, "We Are Here Assembled," 341.

⁴⁵ "Repealing the Black Laws," *Chicago Tribune*, January 15, 1865, in Mark Voss-Hubbard, *Illinois's War: The Civil War in Documents* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2013), 181.

⁴⁶ Meites, "The 1847 Illinois Constitutional Convention," 286.

⁴⁷ "The Dark Pages in Illinois' History," *Quincy Daily Journal*, February 12, 1907.

⁴⁸ "The 'Black Laws' Repealed," *Illinois State Register* (Springfield), February 5, 1865, in Voss-Hubbard, *Illinois War*, 182.

⁴⁹ Meites, "The 1847 Illinois Constitutional Convention," 286.

be taken with slave owners to maintain Illinois' reputation with neighboring slave states. The Supreme Court held a similar philosophy. The fact that only one justice dissented from the stated opinion demonstrated the predominately southern attitude of the state. While Illinois might be the Land of Lincoln, it had a darker side, mirroring the divisions that beset the nation.

Communism and the Telengana Movement of 1946

Emily D. Moreno

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Human rights are an integral part of human society. They allow people the freedom to make choices, and they protect individuals from coercion by the state or a host of other threats. There are many places on earth, past and present that have created, agreed to, and formulated different conceptions of human rights. Through much of the twentieth century, India's strict caste system violated all notions of human rights. The lowest caste, *Dalits*, more commonly known as "untouchables," were subject to disproportionate human rights violations. As journalist Julie McCarthy explained:

For millennia, caste has been the organizing principle of society in India. Determined by birth, caste draws distinctions between communities, determining one's profession, level of education and potential marriage partner. Privileges are reserved for the upper castes and denied the lower ones. The lowliest in this pecking order are the Dalits, once called 'untouchables' as they are consigned by the Hindu hierarchy to the dirtiest occupations. It's a sizable community of some 200 million people. The word Dalit comes from a Hindi word meaning 'oppressed, suppressed, downtrodden.'¹

Those labeled "untouchable" saw their basic human rights violated through the caste system. The *Dalit* class had no way to move up in Indian society and culture. During the last years of the British occupation in India, after World War II, resistance movements spread, and Indians demanded independence. Many joined the charge for Indian independence, none more famous than Gandhi, and none more notorious, in western and capitalist eyes, than the Communist Party. The main communist goal was to unite India and create a Marxist state that would benefit all people. While many places in the world condemn communism for its excesses, there were times that communism benefited the people of India. The rise of the Telengana Movement of 1946 was one such time. The underlining goal was to help the people of Telengana rebel against the Nizam regime and establish basic human rights for all. The main actors and benefactors of the rebellion were the peasants of Telengana. Without the help of the Communist Party of India (CPI) and the communist ideals of granting and protecting fundamental human rights, the Telengana Movement of 1946 would have never transpired or succeeded.

The Telengana Movement of 1946 was one of India's most historic and important developments. It helped the world understand the treatment of India's rural peasantry and the injustices of the caste system. While many scholars agree that the Telengana Movement was important, there remains disagreement on when the movement started, whether communist involvement was necessary and how successful the movement of 1946 really was for the Indian people. Historians Barry Pavier and I. Thirumali both agree and disagree when it comes to the

¹ Julie McCarthy, "The Caste Formerly Known as 'Untouchables' Demands a New Role in India," last modified April 16, 2016, <https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2016/08/13/489883492/the-caste-formerly-known-as-untouchables-demands-a-new-role-in-india>.

Telengana Rebellion. For one thing, both believe the movement started much earlier than 1946. Thirumali theorizes that the movement may have started in 1938 and ended in 1948, a ten-year life span instead of the original six years that most historians contend. In Thirumali's article, "The Political Pragmatism of the Communists in Telengana, 1938-1948," he argues the movement began with the arrival of communism in India and that it was both a success and a failure. Its success came through its ousting of the Nizam regime and the creation of the Andhra Maha Sabha (AMS), a people's organization. However, to Thirumali, the movement was also a failure due to the party's semi-abandonment of the labor castes. As Thirumali explains:

The Party moved primarily according to the pressures and evolved and was shaped by the understanding and perspectives of the dominant participants i.e., rich peasant castes. The Communists did not pay attention to the underlying caste solidarities in a tradition-bound and caste-ridden Telengana society which caused dissensions in the movement, particularly during the Indian Union's military action. The labor caste groups resented and disassociated themselves from the party, dominated by the upper caste peasants and either became inactive, or organized themselves separately.²

Pavier, on the other hand, believes the movement started in 1944, when tensions were extremely high, and the Nizam regime attempted to forcefully maintain an autocratic state. Pavier's book, *The Telengana Movement, 1944-51*, brands the movement an outright failure due to the Communist Party's inflexible politics, which remained unchanged from the 1930s into the 1950s. With such differing viewpoints, many historians find it difficult to assess the movement. While Pavier and Thirumali believe that the Telengana Movement started much earlier than 1946, the scholarly consensus on the topic is that it started on July 4, 1946, when Visnuru Ramachandra Reddy, a hated landlord of the Jangaon district, was stopped from taking land from a peasant woman. In response, he hired a group of thugs to attack those who dared try to interfere, thus sparking violence and a rebellion.³

Telengana is nestled in the princely state of Hyderabad, a southern state within India, ruled over by the autocratic Nizam. Telengana was an agricultural region, home to many peasants. The state of Hyderabad was created in 1724 and ruled over by the Muslim Asaf Jah family on orders of the British, who oversaw the Hindu-majority state. During the Telengana rebellion that lasted from 1946 to 1951, the Nizam ruler at the time was Asaf Jah VII, who also happened to be the last of the Asaf Jah to rule Hyderabad before it was brought fully into India.⁴ "The politics of the state were built on a combination of this economy, autocracy, and religious communalism. The Hyderabad state, was an agglomeration of territories carved out by Asaf Jah, Mughal subedar of the Deccan, from the collapsing [Indian] empire," wrote Pavier.⁵ With this odd makeup, the descendants of Asaf Jah were able to rule successfully over Hyderabad, even with Britain invading and colonizing India.

Under Nizam family rule of Hyderabad, the caste system, languages, and laws were slightly different from those of the majority of India under British occupation. One example of the differences between India and the state of Hyderabad was its relation to land wealth and the caste system. Unlike other places in India, the caste system of Hyderabad was organized around agriculture, labor, and how much land a person owned. This applied to the higher caste system

² I. Thirumali, "The Political Pragmatism of the Communists in Telengana, 1938-1948," *Social Scientist*, 24, no. 4/6 (April-June, 1996):164-183, 179-180.

³ Akhil Gupta, "Revolution in Telengana 1946-1951 (Part One)," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East*, last modified March 30, 2018, <https://read.dukeupress.edu/cssaame/article/4/1/1/538>.

⁴ Gupta, "Revolution in Telengana," 26.

⁵ Barry Pavier, *The Telengana Movement 1944-51* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1981), 64.

which centered on land ownership more than it did on *Brahmans* (priests that are the highest caste in Hindu culture). Under the landlords was a peasant class. According to A. Satyanarayana, “An examination of the hierarchy of caste system and occupational structure indicates that some castes were obliged to work as cultivators and agriculture became their main occupation, hence they were known as peasant caste, they accounted for about 28 percent of the total population in Telengana in 1931.”⁶ The peasantry formed under a harsher and rigorous system that stifled any chance of improving one’s standings. Peasants were forced into labor and were heavily taxed to subsidize the higher classes.

Many peasants were ruled over by landlords called *Deshmukhs*. “Their origin lay in the administrative reforms of Salar Jung I, prime minister of the Hyderabad State in the 1860s and 1870s. The reforms included the state assuming the direct collection of land revenue in the government administered areas,” according to Pavier.⁷ Before the *Deshmukhs* reforms, in order to pay for taxes, land was auctioned off which allowed farmers a chance to accumulate as much land as they possibly could in order to boost their status. This created the formation of both the *Deshmukhs* and the *Vetti* (forced labor), mainly peasants from the rural areas of Telengana, who were forced into labor by the landlords seeking workers to maintain the lands they owned. Because of the success of the *Deshmukhs*, who effectively combined land-lording with moneylending, the group had “a deciding influence on the policy of the Communist Party of India during the struggles of the 1940s.”⁸

To further complicate matters, there were five subclasses of peasantry in Telengana during the Nizam rule: rich, middle, poor, and the *Bhagela* (similar to the “Untouchable” caste), and the *Vetti*. The wealthy Telengana peasantry were,

“distinguished from a landlord by the use of family labor in cultivation. The rich peasant farm requires the use of paid laborers. It has more land than can be worked by the family unit, and produces a surplus above the level needed to maintain the family. In the case of Telengana the rich peasants used this surplus, mainly rice and grain-lending. This was the route by which a rich peasant family could grow into a landlord family if they were allowed to. The rich peasant complaint was that they were as much subject to illegal exactions and the depredations of landlord-controlled officials as anyone else.”⁹

The middle-class peasantry was similar to the richer peasantry class with some slight differences. For one, the middle-class peasant family had enough land to satisfy their needs, money and status wise, but they also could become part of the labor force. They were more prone to having larger families, and some lived a “hand-to-mouth” existence. If a disaster hit or some type of economic or societal issue came up, they could turn to the rich peasantry or landlords for loans.

The poor peasantry and the *Bhagela* were worse off. They had little to no land, and their fate most often was forced labor. A landless class, the *Bhagela*, were looked on as a part of the “untouchables.” They usually worked for the *Deshmukhs*, with barely any rights or pay. Considered inferior in both mind and status, the *Bhagela* were barely paid, if they were paid at all. The *Vetti*, unlike the *Bhagela*, basically served as slaves.

⁶ A. Satyanarayana, “The Quartet of Thugs; Caste and Power in Rural Telengana,” in *Statehood for Telengana: Essays on Telengana Agitation, History, Culture, and Society*, ed. KY Reddy (Hyderabad: Deccan-Telengana, 2010), 30.

⁷ Pavier, *The Telengana Movement*, 3.

⁸ Pavier, *The Telengana Movement*, 4.

⁹ Pavier, *The Telengana Movement*, 13.

“*Vetti* (sometime called free compulsory labor), was rather different in that it was raised generally from all the rest of the villagers who were not sufficiently wealthy to resist the *Deshmukhs* demands. Often there were a number of *Madiga* (an untouchable caste) families in the village who were hereditarily attached to the *Deshmukhs* and performed a number of duties, but these were not the same as the general levy. *Vetti* was demanded without notice or payment, and consequently there was no limit to the amount of labor that might be extracted.”¹⁰

The treatment of peasants and the peasant caste system of Telengana became one of the many catalysts that resulted in communist involvement and creation of the Telengana Movement of 1946. The deplorable state of the peasantry in Telengana forced people to think in terms of human rights and humanitarianism. Such thoughts led many to communism. This allowed the Communist Party of India to infiltrate the rural areas of Telengana and gain the support of the peasantry.

Articulated by Karl Marx in works such as *The Communist Manifesto*, the ideals of the communist movement spread across the globe in the early twentieth century, creating revolutions and new forms of government in pursuit of an equality that neither benefitted the rich nor belittled the poor. The earliest communist groups in India emerged during the 1930s in the Warangal district before they spread out across India. In the late 1930s, connections were forged between different communist groups. In 1941, the Telengana Regional Committee of the Communist Party of India formed, led by a man named Peravelli Venkataramaiah. Then the first Warangal District Committee came into existence in 1942.

When news of the treatment of peasants in Telengana reached the CPI, party officials saw the potential for a rebellion which could prove the party’s strength, help it forge alliances, and possibly gain an entry point into the Indian government. “The communist organizations were formed among the educated elite of the rural rich in Telengana and the urban middle class of Hyderabad city. They transformed the landlords’ Andhra Mahasabha (AMS) into a people’s organization with pragmatism, ideological commitment and a sense of sacrifice,” wrote Thirumail.¹¹

Revolts and rebellions, in fact, had already started in Telengana long before the CPI ever showed up in the rural area. Many peasants felt anger and resentment towards the Nizam rule and attempted, like the rest of India, to gain their independence from the dynasty. Before the Communist Party of India came to the rescue, the Nizam of Hyderabad seemingly had nothing to worry about. Earlier revolts had been shut down, allowing the Nizam to continue to rule over Hyderabad with the support and help of the British and his Muslim supporters. This made it hard for India to unite. It was not until the CPI stepped in to create a successful revolt that the Nizam began to worry. In order to maintain his rule, the Nizam needed to turn to people from similar origins, namely the Muslim population residing in Hyderabad. “Economically tied to the dynasty and regime, it was no hard task to organize urban Muslims from the petit-bourgeoisie to fight for the regime—especially if the only alternative appeared to be unemployment and impoverishment,” wrote Pavier.¹²

The Nizam had every reason to fear the Communist Party of India, for the CPI helped the Telengana peasants to organize and coordinate their demands for freedom, justice, and basic human rights. Once the Communist Party had made its way into Telengana, it “formulated the demands of the people, transformed the class issues into political issues in an attempt to bring about unity

¹⁰Pavier, *The Telengana Movement*, 8-9.

¹¹ I. Thirumail, “The Political Pragmatism of the Communists in Telengana, 1938-48,” *Social Scientist*, 24, no. 4/6 (April-June, 1996): 164-183, 164.

¹² Pavier, *The Telengana Movement*, 64.

among the anti-feudal classes to overthrow the landlord/Nizam regime.”¹³ The Nizam, fearing the growing mobilization of the peasants of Telengana, and their communist backers, began taking extreme precautions in an attempt to quell the movement before it could get out of hand.¹⁴ Having already sent his police, the Nazim then called upon the armed guard, granted to him by the British Empire, to subdue the communists and their followers. According to the “Policy in India: Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India,” under the third clause of paramountcy: “In certain treaties, notably that with Hyderabad, there are particular provisions for the maintenance of a protective force by the British Government for these purposes.” The Nazim thus had access to British forces. “The Treaty with Hyderabad provides that this force shall consist of not less than 5,000 Infantry and 2,000 Cavalry with 4 field battalions of Artillery.”¹⁵ The CPI decided to split its focus into two groups, the urban middle class in the cities of Hyderabad and the rich rural peasantry in Telengana. Spreading the word through newspapers, pamphlets, poems, and songs, the communists projected their message to the peasants of Telengana, calling on them to rise up and demand equal rights. While the Communist Party used both rural and urban societies in their quest to create a movement, their main focus was on the rural peasantry of Telengana, among whom there was much anger and desire for change.

The Communist Party of India’s focus on the peasantry of Telengana proved a smart move. On the one hand, rural peasants were put in a tougher predicament than the urban middle caste workers. While the urban middle class did have troubles, the peasant caste had, especially with forced slavery, worse problems due to India’s social structure.

Early on, however, as communism began to spread in Telengana, many of the peasants were weary of the CPI and what it stood for. In 1940, the communist movement had set up shop all over Telengana with the creation of the AMS (Andhra Maha Sabha), which was the third branch of the Communist Party. This organization became focused primarily on the plight of the peasants of Telengana and what should be done to help them. They were a voice for the voiceless, and the AMS helped gain support from the hesitant peasant caste community in Telengana and Hyderabad. The AMS stood not only for the much needed promotion of basic human rights in India, but they also stood for an end to imperialism, support for a socialist government, and for the destruction of the class and caste separation. With the creation and help of the AMS, which allowed many of the rural peasants a safe space to discuss their grievances with the caste system and the Nizam’s rule, the CPI was able to unify the rural peoples of Telengana under the flag of communism. “The very method of their [communists] work in the villages improved the consciousness of the people through people’s united strength. Between 1941 and 1943, they established a strong bond, perturbing the landlords and the government equally,” explained the Secretary to India.¹⁶

During 1945, the Communist Party of India created a plan to help the peasant caste in Telengana. The strategy featured four main points that coincided with the communist agenda. The first of the four points was to ban Vetti extraction and slave labor. The second point was to dismantle the collection of taxes and fines, allowing everyone a chance at financial stability. The third point emphasized the return of land held by landlords acquired through illegal means, and the fourth strengthened Patta rights and the oversight of the landlords to prevent illegal taking of land. “The agitations and self-assertions of the *Vetti* workers, small peasants, and the cultivators of *jagir* (special tenurs) lands made the communists attempt a broad unity of the oppressed and the

¹³ Thirumail, “The Political Pragmatism,” 164-183, 164.

¹⁴ Thirumail, “The Political Pragmatism,” 167.

¹⁵ Cabinet: India and Burma Committee, Paper I.B, “(46)50, Policy in India Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India, December, 18, 1947, in *The Transfer of Power: 1942-1947* vol. 9, ed. Nicholas Mansergh, et. al. (H.M.S.O, 1980), 371-377.

¹⁶ Cabinet: India and Burma Committee, Paper I.B. (46)50, Policy in India Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India,” 171.

exploited,” according to a memoranda written by the secretary of state of India.¹⁷ At first glance, relations between the Communist Party of India and the AMS seemed stronger than ever, though in fact, cracks began to form throughout the party.

Before 1946, the Communist Party of India and the AMS had begun to feel pressure from both the Indian government and the people they were trying to protect and help. As the Communist Party of India gained support and power in the Telengana area, many government officials, like the Nizam, began to fear the power the Communist Party exuded. Around this time, many people in the Indian government came together in an attempt to create an Indian Constitution and independent country—with the aim of driving out the British. In a letter to Lord Pethick-Lawrence, Sir W. Croft fretted about the British leaving India and plotted to preserve what little Britain still had. He hoped Britain would resist leaving without implementing rules that would continue to favor Britain even after independence.¹⁸ It was also around this time when the AMS began to adopt nationalistic views, much different from the views of the Communist Party. AMS also began to plot against the Communist Party, attempting to ban communists from Congress and weakening its hold over Telengana. Through the use of newspapers and pamphlets, the AMS began a propaganda campaign of vilification against the Communist Party. The aim was to take control over the Telengana region. But why had the AMS, a group created by the communists to help give the people of Telengana a voice, betray its communist patrons? The answer can be found among the *Deshmukhs*. Many landlords loyal to the Nizam and fearful of growing communist power, began infiltrating the AMS. Some won elections to lead the AMS, and from there, gained the upper hand in a growing power struggle between the nationalists and the communists. When Konda Venkata Ranga Reddy was elected to a seat as part of the AMS council, there were mixed feelings. As contemporary British observers noted, Reddy’s stance was very nationalistic in every sense of the word.

“He [Reddy] attempted to divert the debate to more abstract issues, advocating ‘good will towards all classes’ and ‘all around progress of the Andhraites, be they zamindars or peasants, capitalists or laborers’ in a bid to present the AMS as the organization of all classes. Consequently, he could not convince the fighting rural poor how the ‘progress’ of the tenants and Vetti workers could be achieved along with the ‘progress’ of the landlords. Further, he did not even maintain political or class neutrality. Instead, he took a stand against the Communist AMS workers immediately after his election.”¹⁹

While there were still people in the AMS loyal to the communist cause, Reddy saw them as a threat and moved to eliminate them and communism altogether from Telengana. The Indian government and the Nizam dynasty also feared the Communist Party, which was gaining support in rural areas. Meanwhile, the Indian government was debating a new constitution and how to deal with the British Empire. During the time of the AMS split and growing in-house fighting with the Communist Party, the Indian government sought to move ahead. A memorandum was created by the Secretary of State for India, dealing with both the Cripps Offer of 1942 and the creation of the Muslim League. The document also focused on the Nizam of Hyderabad and his refusal to assimilate Hyderabad into India to create a whole country.²⁰ At first, the Communist Party was willing to humor the right-leaning AMS, for it still had some support on the left, mostly the laborers

¹⁷ Cabinet: India and Burma Committee, Paper I.B. (46)50, Policy in India Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India,” 177.

¹⁸ Sir W. Croft to Lord Fredrick Pethick-Lawrence, January, 7, 1947, in *The Transfer of Power: 1942-1947*, vol. 9, 478-480.

¹⁹ Sir W. Croft to Lord Fredrick Pethick-Lawrence, January, 7, 1947, in *The Transfer of Power: 1942-1947*, vol. 9, 478-480.

²⁰ Note of an Interview between Cabinet Mission, Field Marshal Viscount Archibald Wavell, and the Nawab of Bhopal, April, 2, 1947, in *The Transfer of Power: 1942-1947*, vol. 7, ed. Nicholas Mansergh, et. al. (London: H.M.S.O, 1980), 83-87.

and peasants whom the right blatantly ignored. For a short time, the party backed away from openly challenging the Nizam to prevent an outright panic, while still focusing on its goal for independence and human rights for the rural peasantry of Telengana. It was not until 1944 when things began to change for the Communist Party.

By this time, the Communist Party of India had integrated itself into the lives of the rural peasantry of Telengana for almost a decade and had won over many of the peasants. It was not until 1944, when the CPI and supposed nationalists split, that the communists were able to showcase the power they had over the Telengana community, sparking fear and awe from both the Indian government and the nationalist party. Angered by the fact that most of the people of Telengana sympathized with the Communist Party, the nationalists decided to take control of the AMS in order to thwart the work of the CPI. Nationalists believed that if they took control of the AMS, they would be able to control Telengana.

Unfortunately for the AMS, the charisma, the work, and the time communists put into its efforts to help the people of Telengana gained them the sympathy and support of the people and allowed them to continue to rise in power. Even when nationalists attempted to stop CPI meetings with the threat of force, the communists persevered, with the support and backing of the rural peasantry and laborers. At that point, the Communist Party of India believed it had subdued the Nationalist Party. Now the communists were free to pursue their original plans of disbanding the Nizam regime and taking a place in Congress to promote their communist agenda. The Nizam regime, the Nationalist Party, and the Indian government increasingly feared the Communist Party, and they did everything in its power to deter them from gaining even more power. When a few rebel leaders were attacked by an angry landlord, who was denied the chance to obtain land from a poor peasant woman in the summer of 1946, the communists used this as a catalyst to move forward with their rebellion against the Nizam rule. Combining peaceful protests, the communist teachings of Lenin, and the use of guerrilla warfare towards the Nizam's police and army, the Communist Party successfully created a revolution that would turn the tides for the peasantry and for communism as a whole.

The Communist Party of India was the driving force in creating the Telengana Movement of 1946. Members integrated themselves into the Telengana community with the promise of creating better lives for the rural peasantry overall. Thus began the Telengana Movement that lasted from July of 1946 to 1951. The Indian government, the nationalists, the Nizam regime, and the British government, all came to understand the strength of the Communist Party of India. In 1947, the British government knew the Nizam and Hyderabad were lost causes. In a letter to Lord Pethick-Lawrence, the viscount explained that since the British Empire was finally leaving India, the British believed the Nizam would be fine on his own, though they knew it was a lost cause.²¹ The movement's limited success offers an inside look at the treatment and grievances of the rural peasant class in Telengana. Playing on societal and class conflicts in Indian society, the CPI made major advances in Telengana. The main cause for the rebellion was the Communist Party's ability to gain the trust of the local population with the promise of a future grounded on human rights.

²¹ Field Marshal Viscount Archibald Wavell to Fredrick Lord Pethick-Lawrence, February, 26, 1947, in *The Transfer of Power: 1942-1947*, vol. 9, 816-817.

The Future of History: Corrosion and Conservation

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As the production of air pollutants increase and climate change becomes more visible, it is not only the health of living things that are affected. Museum objects, documents, collections, and statues confront uncertain futures in the face of growing environmental threats. Although not all curators and collections managers agree about the threat posed by climate change to museum collections, for most, the mandate to preserve the past has never been as high as today.¹ In 2005, 30,000 institutions in the United States were surveyed regarding the threat of air pollution to historic artifacts.² Of the institutions surveyed, 47% responded that air pollution caused “some or significant damage to the collections.”³ The greatest risks to artifacts, as will be explained in this essay, are the increase of air pollutants, such as Sulphur Dioxide (SO₂) and the rapidly changing climate. These potential hazards affect artifacts in a variety of ways, not only statues in the open elements but also artifacts secure within museums. By raising awareness of these dangers to preserving history, the proper steps can be taken to stop the destruction of the past.

For the sake of this essay, an “object” will be defined as any three-dimensional historic artifact found in museums, including paintings. Any reference to “documents” will entail historic papers also found in museums or archives. A “collection” is any group of objects or documents found in either a museum or private facility; this will include archives as well. “Artifacts” will refer to objects, documents, or collections, as defined previously.

The effects of air pollution are not a recent phenomenon in the world of public history. Reports of poor air quality effecting artifacts come as early as 1850.⁴ Michael Faraday, a nineteenth century British scientist, wrote about the impact of air pollution on works of art in the National Gallery in London, attributing them to the growing use of coal in an industrializing nation.⁵ Though early museum workers were aware of the effects of the visible air contaminants, like smog, they were often unaware of the invisible pollutants, such as Sulphur Dioxide. Many would excuse the damage as natural decay, which is an understandable view. Still, by the industrial period, the rate at which artifacts began to become damaged was greatly accelerated.⁶

Sulphur Dioxide (SO₂) is created after sulphur is emitted while burning oil, coal, or diesel and mixes with oxygen.⁷ After the SO₂ becomes air born, it will mix with water vapor and become H₂SO₄, which is the incredibly corrosive mixture known as acid rain.⁸ The disastrous effects of SO₂

¹ David Saunders, “Climate Change and Museum Collections,” *Studies in Conservation* 53 (2008): 288.

² Morten Ryhl-Svendsen, “Indoor Air Pollution in Museums: a Review of Prediction Models and Control Strategies,” *Reviews in Conservation* 7 (2006): 27.

³ Ryhl-Svendsen, “Indoor Air Pollution,” 27.

⁴ Stephen Hackney, “The Distribution of Gaseous Air Pollution within Museums,” *Studies in Conservation* 29 (1984): 105.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Ryhl-Svendsen, “Indoor Air Pollution in Museums,” 27.

⁷ “Identifying and Reducing Air Pollution,” *Museums Galleries Scotland*, accessed November 24, 2018, <https://www.museumsgalleries.scotland.org.uk/advice/collections/identifying-and-reducing-air-pollution/>.

⁸ Hackney, “The Distribution of Gaseous Air Pollution within Museums,” 106.

are best seen on the exterior of buildings and outdoor statues. The H_2SO_4 creates white streaks on limestone and pitting on sculptures of various materials.⁹ Acid rain also has the capability to burn off the protective layers of material that keep the statues or buildings from the deteriorating effects of other pollutants and corrosive mediums, some as simple as rain water.¹⁰

Bronze statues are at a great risk for damage from acid rain, which can produce a streaky appearance along with black spots that would remain until restored.¹¹ Conservators in Ottawa, Canada, were particularly interested in the lasting effects of acid rain as many areas of Canada have seen an increase in acid rain from sources in both Canada and the United States.¹² Local sources of acid rain derive from the continued use of burning firewood in open fireplaces in both the public and private areas and the dominant use of coal in factories until the 1960s.¹³ The Canadian study performed over a span of five years aimed to find harmless ways to conserve bronze statues from the lasting effects of acid rain. Researchers studied 34 metal samples and 168 surface samples and used a variety of methods to keep the H_2SO_4 from wreaking havoc on the samples.¹⁴ Though some methods were more helpful than others, a general consensus emerged for the future conservation of outdoor art pieces and building exteriors. Water-soluble compounds would have to be cleaned off thoroughly to eliminate risk of damaging the protective layer, and a protective layer to keep all corrosive materials away from the statue or building medium must be permanently maintained.¹⁵

Marble is also very susceptible to the damaging effects of acid rain, as seen in many cities and national parks. The Gettysburg National Military Park in Pennsylvania has witnessed an increase in the acid rain production due to the growth of traffic in the area.¹⁶ The effects of acid rain on the marble statues vary greatly due to the changing climate and the shape of each statue.¹⁷ The various types of marble react differently, as well, which skewed the data compared to the consistent nature of the bronze statues.¹⁸ Acid rain clearly affected each statue in some way at the Gettysburg National Military Park: from streaking to pits within the marble.¹⁹

Interior exhibits are not immune from the lasting effects of sulphur dioxide. Historic documents and paintings, like papers and textiles today, contain large amounts of cellulose, which is a large component in the cell walls of plants.²⁰ H_2SO_4 causes a reaction in paper and textiles called hydrolyzation. The hydrolyzation process is the unbinding of water molecules within an object of any sort, but especially within textiles and papers.²¹ This process causes the document or canvas to “become brittle and yellowed.”²² This causes not only structural damage, but, can also make the document or painting difficult to read or examine. Due to the age of most artifacts and the lack of knowledge of air pollutants, it is very difficult to see the extent of H_2SO_4 damage since light pollution often has affected these artifacts for a number of years.²³

⁹ Hackney, “The Distribution of Gaseous Air Pollution within Museums,” 106.

¹⁰ Martin E. Weaver, “Acid Rain and Air Pollution vs. the Buildings and Outdoor Sculptures of Montréal,” *The Journal of Preservation Technology* 23 (1991): 17.

¹¹ Weaver, “Acid Rain and Air Pollution vs. the Buildings and Outdoor Sculptures of Montréal,” 17.

¹² L.S. Selwyn et al., “Outdoor Bronze Statues: Analysis of Metal and Surface Samples,” *Studies in Conservation* 41 (1996): 205.

¹³ Selwyn et al., “Outdoor Bronze Statues,” 205.

¹⁴ Selwyn et al., “Outdoor Bronze Statues,” 205.

¹⁵ Selwyn et al., “Outdoor Bronze Statues,” 205.

¹⁶ Susan I. Sherwood and Donald A. Dolske, “Acidic Deposition and Marble Monuments at Gettysburg National Military Park,” *APT Bulletin: The Journal of Preservation Technology* 23 (1991): 52.

¹⁷ Sherwood and Dolske, “Acidic Deposition and Marble Monuments,” 56.

¹⁸ Sherwood and Dolske, “Acidic Deposition and Marble Monuments,” 56.

¹⁹ Sherwood and Dolske, “Acidic Deposition and Marble Monuments,” 52.

²⁰ Stephen Hackney, “The Distribution of Gaseous Air Pollution within Museums,” *Studies in Conservation* 29 (1984): 106.

²¹ “Hydrolysis,” *Wikipedia*, accessed November 24, 2018, <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hydrolysis>.

²² Hackney, “The Distribution of Gaseous Air Pollution within Museums,” 105.

²³ Hackney, “The Distribution of Gaseous Air Pollution within Museums,” 106.

Many museums were constructed before the availability of climate control; this has also contributed to the deterioration of artifacts. The lasting effects of air pollutants in a public history setting have been noted for several hundred years, though few understood the implications of air pollution's effects on artifacts. Even as these air pollutants had been noted, scientists only recently became aware of certain pollutant's impact on artifacts, especially if the museum or archive lacked a central air system. The concentration of the various gases within museums have been measured in many different ways, some as simple as adding chemicals of various dilutions to a piece of canvas and marking down the amount of color change occurring on the parts of the canvas.²⁴ A certain degree of fading of the canvas's brown coloration shows the concentration of Sulphur dioxide in the air of the museum tested.²⁵ This test, while not especially useful for determining the exact amount of Sulphur dioxide in the air, is very helpful for showing whether or not cabinets, containers, or storage areas are useful in keeping the harmful gases away from artifacts.²⁶ As seen with the outdoor bronze and marble statues, it is critical to keep the gases or acid rain away from artifacts, since it is very difficult to stop the deterioration process once it begins. Protection and preservation are the best tools to save artifacts that tell the story of history.

Climate change is another contributor to the degradation of historic documents, artifacts, and outdoor art pieces. While some reject the authenticity of human-produced climate change, it is quickly becoming a challenging part of the lives of humans today, whether they believe it or not. Climate change has had an extreme impact on the well-being of many important parts of nature and life itself, but also the life of history, as many objects and documents were created hundreds of years ago during periods of time that had vastly different climates than that of today.

"Climate Change and Museum Collections," an article published in *Studies of Conservation* (2008), provides an in-depth look into the problems museum workers and archivists will face in the near future. It focuses especially on climate change within museums. While this article is ten years old, it is likely little progress has been made in terms of providing climate control, since museums and historic sites often have limited budgets, which are frequently dedicated to general upkeep or creating new exhibits. Additionally, according to this article, museum workers often feel overwhelmed in facing such a large scale problem as climate change.²⁷

A related issue that affects the world of public history is humidity. It is not only difficult to manage, but if not kept at an appropriate level, humidity can damage historic artifacts in irreparable ways. Wooden objects can experience bowing and swelling of the wood, which can morph pieces and render them ineffective to teaching history.²⁸ The wood on panel paintings becomes warped on only one side of the wood since the paint is holding back the humidity, which leads to a more obvious warping.²⁹ Even museums that have climate control, like the Vesterheim National Norwegian-American Museum and Heritage Center in Decorah, Iowa, have a difficult time managing the humidity. This is due to the amount of foot traffic—usually a very good thing for a museum, but one that can allow in humidity and sulphur dioxide from the streets.

Like the Vesterheim Museum, most museums have objects within plexiglass or glass cases, but those cases can do very little to keep humidity and sulphur dioxide from affecting the objects or documents. There has been an increased use of "sorbents" to attract the gases and humidity from

²⁴ Hackney, "The Distribution of Gaseous Air Pollution within Museums," 108.

²⁵ Hackney, "The Distribution of Gaseous Air Pollution within Museums," 108.

²⁶ Hackney, "The Distribution of Gaseous Air Pollution within Museums," 108.

²⁷ Saunders, "Climate Change and Museum Collections," 288.

²⁸ Saunders, "Climate Change and Museum Collections," 290.

²⁹ "Paintings Aging Gracefully or Grievous Bodily Harm?" Valentine Walsh: Conservation and Restoration of Fine Art, 2009, <http://valentinewalsh.co.uk/conservation/ageing/>.

display cases and storage facilities.³⁰ These sorbents are made from activated carbons or Purafil in order to draw out the gases.³¹ The activated carbons work best in removing the harmful gases from the display cases and storage facilities.³² Other museums have taken to creating display cases that cut off all air circulation, while using the sorbents, in order to keep all bad air from existing in the vicinities of the objects or documents. The Getty Conservation Institute has been especially interested in this after noticing some of the artifacts and display cases were exhibiting signs of erosion or degradation from the toxic fumes within the museum.³³ The Philadelphia Museum of Art has also taken a special interest in preserving objects from air pollutants. The website of the Philadelphia Museum of Art includes a detailed account of its efforts to minimize the pollutants within the museum. This work can help educate the public and other conservators on how to keep artifacts safe.

While it is not a looming topic in the collective global consciousness, artifacts found in museums, archives, or any conservation space have a growing problem with the amount of pollutants in the air. Though pollutants are not noticed by the average person, these gases and particulates can greatly damage artifacts older than most cities. The only way to truly save history is to create a greater dialogue about the future of history.

³⁰ Daniel Grosjean and Sucha S. Parmar, "Removal of Air Pollutant Mixtures from Museum Display Cases," *Studies in Conservation* 36 (1991): 129.

³¹ Grosjean and Parmar, "Removal of Air Pollutant Mixtures from Museum Display Cases," 129.

³² Grosjean and Parmar, "Removal of Air Pollutant Mixtures from Museum Display Cases," 129.

³³ "Pollutants in the Museum Environment," *The Getty Conservation Institute*, The J. Paul Getty Trust, accessed November 24, 2018, http://www.getty.edu/conservation/publications_resources/newsletters/11_1/gcinews8_1.html.

Popular Entertainment: Politics and Society in Chicago's Riverview Park

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On May 4, 1886, Haymarket Square entered the American vocabulary not as a location in Chicago, but as a byword for aggressive strikes, brutal oppression, and chaotic violence. That day had the dubious honor of being among the darkest in the history of American labor history; in the wake of a momentous series of strikes for an eight-hour day, strikers, immigrants, anarchists, and dozens more collided with Chicago police in an explosion that left at least eleven dead, including seven police officers. The subsequent backlash against anarchism, European immigrants, and the labor movement in general would convulse all of America. The chaos would culminate in the arrest of fifteen people and subsequent execution of four in an expression of mass hysteria not unlike the future Red Scares. Supporters of worker's rights would find themselves treated as potential terrorists by the population at large, much of their hard-fought goodwill evaporated, and their movement set back decades. The events of the Haymarket Square Riot would become so deeply traumatizing to worker's rights movements, both in America and around the world, that May 1st, the beginning of the inciting riots, would after become known as International Workers' day, or May Day—the single most important day on the labor calendar.

Two years later, a group of German workers and veterans—radicals no doubt among them—would buy up acres of land not far outside the city. Interestingly, as far as can be ascertained, even in this environment of nationwide suspicion, no one seemed to have batted an eye. The police seemed uninterested, the conservative *Chicago Tribune* offered no polemics, nor were there expressions of concern from the city or state governments. Even when veterans began using the land as a firing range, the grounds seemed to have remained largely invisible, not because it was hidden, but because it was not considered particularly important—to the people at large, it was essentially still just a park. That land would later become Riverview Park, the largest amusement park in Chicago and the self-proclaimed largest in the country. Throughout much of its existence, Riverview hosted rallies and events for groups and figures on the political fringe, yet somehow it remained above the political fray. Socialists, pacifists, German nationalists, and fascists all found a home at Riverside. Opinions that might prompt violent retribution on the streets of Chicago were accepted at this amusement park, albeit not always with open arms, yet the only retribution appeared some unfriendly newspaper editorials. Radical politics found a home right next to roller coasters and carnival games. Riverview was not always, as the advertising of the time claimed, the place to “laugh your troubles away,” at least as far as politics went. Instead, it was a place where troubles were tempered and moderated, and ideas were quite literally entertained. A place that would give almost any idea a chance to be heard, so long as it paid its entrance fee. Whereas, Haymarket Square remained bitterly contested territory, Riverview Park hardly seemed to stir passions.

This interpretation of Riverview's role in society—as a platform and engine for political activity—has not historically been a focus for scholarship on amusement parks, although it is far from a foreign notion. The study of amusement parks hardly has been a priority for scholars, and significant works on the topic that do not stray into nostalgia or the minutia of roller coaster architecture are difficult to find. As such, the historiography of amusement parks has in some way

been frozen, with major interpretations remaining in rough agreement for the past 50-some-odd years. A good example of the sort of argument that has historically dominated is Russell B. Nye's *Eight Ways of Looking at an Amusement Park*.¹ Nye presents a number of sociological hypotheses regarding the appeal of amusement parks in society. At times they served as vehicles for childhood socialization, or in other times as a manifestation of the collective social "Id" (a theory shared by the excellent Ric Burns documentary *Coney Island*).² Other writers have also considered amusement parks as elements of the economy and class conflict. Raymond M. Weinstein's *Disneyland and Coney Island: Reflections on the Evolution of the Modern Amusement Park* suggests a dichotomy between parks for the wealthier and poorer elements of society, and discusses how such a divide provides opportunities for class identification and economic frustration.³ Discussions of parks as part of the public and political world has been fairly rare in and of itself, although one could easily extend some of these previous theses to suggest insight into how they function as such. The impact of various individual parks has been analyzed—such as Art Fitz-Gerald's article "Serious Fun: The Politics of Riverview Park, Chicago"—but not as much exists for the role of parks in general.⁴ All the same, this notion—that amusement parks in general and Riverview Park in particular have had historically close connections to political movements and often serve as public forums for such—is far from beyond the academic pale and is a natural extension of preexisting scholarship and thought.

Riverview's aforementioned attraction for the political and controversial began early in its life – in fact, it was among the reasons the park was first built. The early decades of its operation were defined by a deep connection to the Central European immigrant communities that called Chicago their home. The many cultural events, charity rallies, and so on which took place in Riverview were usually operated by Germans, as the largest group and "owners" of the park, until America entered the First World War in 1917. With the war, German groups and rallies became increasingly suspect, and other Central European ethnic groups in Chicago, like the Polish, Czech, and Danish, all also saw their organizations shrink in influence in the wake of the suspicions of the First Red Scare. In time, these populations too would fade into the background as their attachments to their homelands grew weaker and weaker, but in its early years, these immigrant communities would prove to be Riverview's bread and butter. In the process, they would keep the park on the forefront of initiatives for public change.

Indeed, before there was a "Riverview," the site on which the park was later built had connections to immigrants and politics. In 1888, a group of first-generation German immigrants bought a roughly 22-acre plot of empty parkland on the corner of Western Avenue and Roscoe Street.⁵ This group, German veterans of the Franco-Prussian War known as the *Nord Chicago Schuetzenverein*, or "North Chicago Shooter's Club," intended to use the largely empty land as a range to keep up their shooting skills. By 1896, this goal fell by the wayside, as the recent Chicago World's Fair inspired the owners to install a carousel, a ferris wheel, and a few carnival games on the property.⁶ As an increasingly popular meeting place for Chicago's German population, it was natural that politics would begin to follow. William Jennings Bryan, in a portent of things to come, would

¹ Russell B. Nye, "Eight Ways of Looking at an Amusement Park," *Journal of Popular Culture* 15 (1983): 63-75.

² "Coney Island," in *American Experience*, directed by Ric Burns, aired February 4 1991 (New York, NY: Steeplechase Films, 1991).

³ Raymond M. Weinstein, "Disneyland and Coney Island: Reflections on the Evolution of the Modern Amusement Park," *Journal of Popular Culture* 26 (1993): 131-164.

⁴ Art Fitz-Gerald, "Serious Fun: The Politics of Amusement at Riverview Park, Chicago," *Illinois Heritage*, 17, no. 2 (2014): 33-36

⁵ Derek Gee and Ralph Lopez, *Laugh Your Troubles Away*, (Livonia, MI: Sharpshooter Productions), 2.

⁶ Gee and Lopez, *Laugh Your Troubles Away*, 4.

spend his Labor Day that year speaking to the crowds at what was then known as Sharpshooter Park.⁷

The political activism of Chicago's German community at Riverview continued. Indeed, German-Americans would remain a political force of some power in the area for the majority of the park's existence. In the earlier days, however, the community, far from being a one-note interest group, was large and secure enough in their nationality to hold events for themselves that were unrelated to their "German-ness." In 1907, a joint German-Czech-Polish track meet was organized in support of the "United Societies for Local Self-Government."⁸ The next year, the founding of the Illinois chapter of the "Alliance of Germans" was celebrated with an appeal to the Taft White House calling for the end of speech regulation via the Postmaster General's office.⁹ As time went on, Germans continued to meet and politically agitate at Riverview, but events became more and more exclusively centered on the affairs of their community. This shift was helped along considerably by the sudden outbreak of the First World War in 1914, which obviously engendered great interest among immigrants in "German affairs," as well as growing suspicion of the community by the greater population. Events at Riverview during this period were deeply affected by the war. In 1914, for instance, preparations for German Day in Chicago were cancelled at the request of President Woodrow Wilson in the interests of preserving neutrality.¹⁰ As the war went on, many Germans continued to focus on the war effort in their homeland, and Riverview was their meeting place of choice. German Chicagoans could attend a benefit at the park for the Red Cross organized by the German-Austro-Hungarian Relief Association, watch German newsreels smuggled across the Atlantic at the park's theatre, or hold a picnic in the shadow of the statue of Otto von Bismarck that served as the namesake of the surrounding Bismarck Garden, if they were feeling particularly patriotic.¹¹

It seemed as though Riverview had no objections to wearing its sympathies on its sleeves, and allowing its patrons to do the same. However, when the war found its way over to American shores, opportunities to celebrate German sympathies quickly dried up. German cultural events were now deeply suspect, and Germans in Riverview paid the price. At least two peace rallies were held at the park during American involvement in the war, both reportedly with large German-speaking contingents, and both were treated as borderline treasonous affairs by the *Chicago Daily Tribune*—one outright labeled as "Anti-Americanism."¹² Riverview's administration no doubt had dozens of reasons to force them off the property and could have easily used the park's own security or called for Chicago police to do so. Instead, they not only allowed rallies to take place, on one occasion they accepted an event that had already been driven out elsewhere in the city. In doing so, Riverview clearly manifested that it was, if not in favor of the pacifist movement, at least willing to allow Germans to speak their mind. Interestingly, what sources can be found indicate that little attention was paid to the park's political practices, in spite of America's aggressive anti-German sentiments during the war years—a testament to Riverview's place in Chicago society as a publically-acceptable site for fringe politics.

Germans were not the only community that called Riverview home. Other groups of Central and Eastern European immigrants also made it their meeting place of choice on many occasions. An editorial in the Danish-language *Revyen* in 1912 strongly endorsed a speech made at Riverview by

⁷ Gee and Lopez, *Laugh Your Troubles Away*, 4.

⁸ "MUNDT HERO OF THE MEET," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, September 8, 1907.

⁹ "STATE ALLIANCE OF GERMANS," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, October 8, 1908.

¹⁰ "'GERMAN DAY' ABANDONED ON WILSON APPEAL," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, August 20, 1914.

¹¹ "GERMANS GIVE \$2,000," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, July 22 1916; Gee and Lopez, *Laugh Your Troubles Away*, 71.

¹² "PACIFISTS HOLD ANTI-AMERICAN TALK CARNIVAL," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, August 20, 1917; "LABOR PICNIC CROWDS HEAR PEACE ORATORS," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, July 9, 1917.

Kier Hardie, founder of the British Labour Party, seemingly implying that some Chicago Danes were involved in rallies at Riverview.¹³ The Czech community also seemed to feel comfortable celebrating at Riverview. The park hosted a “Bohemian Night” on June 14, 1914, for the benefit of a Czech hospital.¹⁴ Several years later, immigrants still were using Riverview as a meeting ground for their communities and agitation. As late as 1923, large immigrant groups organized a Socialist rally, including Italians and other immigrant groups. The park appeared to welcome the presence of the left-leaning immigrants.¹⁵

This trend could not continue forever. Within a few years, records of ethnic meetings in Riverview dwindled. Yet the kinds of discussions the park now entertained were in some ways a continuation of what immigrants had already been supporting, with native-born Americans picking up the struggle at Riverview in the post-World-War I years—the fight for labor, progress, and socialism. Over the next decades, politics at the park would be defined by these and other related issues, making it a key and obvious location for protests and events of many kinds in the city. Even as Haymarket’s shadow stretched long across the city, with riot widow Lucy Parsons and her supporters struggling with Chicago authorities for speaking permits, Riverview’s rallies remained uncensored, well-attended, and seemingly invisible. During this time speakers at Riverview included the socialist Eugene Debs, progressive former President Theodore Roosevelt, and later New Deal liberal Adlai Stevenson.¹⁶ By the same token, although talk of labor was the language of the day, Riverview was by no means some kind of socialist park. Indeed, a fair number of moderates and conservative-leaning speakers felt welcome at the park, despite standing on and likely paying for the same ground that Bryan and Debs had shouted from a scant few years previous. These people and their organizations would feel increasingly comfortable as Chicago grew larger, Riverview more popular, and the overall politics of the park more muddled and neutral. Nonetheless, for a few decades, Riverview, unrepentantly a for-profit bread-and-circuses institution, would be politically defined by a close association to the populist left.

This trend was not some kind of new phenomenon in Riverview. There is a great deal of overlap in the park’s periods of leftist politics and attraction to European immigrants. William Jennings Bryan spoke at the park about eight years before it even opened. As time went on, the park began acting as an increasingly strong magnet for Chicago’s general working class. In 1913, there was already a public bus line running up and down Western Avenue, right past Riverview, which even by 1947 still charged only 10 cents for a ride and nothing for transfers.¹⁷ Add to that the park’s 1934 creation of “Two Cent Days and Five Cent Nights,” when patrons got heavily discounted prices on Tuesday afternoons, and Monday and Friday evenings, and you have a major source of urban entertainment that was easily accessible and easily affordable for almost every citizen of Chicago¹⁸. This working-class audience drove much of Riverview’s politics, and did so early on. A key example of this is Riverview’s attachment to the Progressive, or “Bull Moose,” Party to the site during its time of influence in the 1910s. In 1913, the party chose the park to celebrate its first anniversary, bringing in about 20,000 guests and boasting major Progressive speakers like future Nebraska Governor Henry J. Allen, Arizona newspaper publisher Dwight Heard, University of Chicago Professor and city Alderman Charles Mirriam, and the Bull Moose himself, Theodore Roosevelt, by way of a letter read aloud.¹⁹ In 1925, over a decade later, the Progressives of Illinois

¹³ (Editorial), *Reynan*, September 21, 1912.

¹⁴ “Bohemian Night in Riverview Park,” *Denni Hlastel*, June 14, 1914.

¹⁵ “The Picnic at Riverview,” *La Parola del Popolo*, nd.

¹⁶ Fitz-Gerald, “Serious Fun,” 35.

¹⁷ Tomaz F. Deuther, “Real Rapid Transit at Least Cost,” <https://i.redd.it/p17pti67a5e11.jpg> and “A Brief History of Chicago Surface Lines,” ChicagoBus.org, Stanley Garmon, Access November 11, 2018, <https://www.chicagobus.org/history>

¹⁸ Gee and Lopez, *Laugh Your Troubles Away*, 123.

¹⁹ “MOOSE TO HONOR BIRTHDAY TODAY,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, August 30, 1913.

chose Riverview again to commemorate the death of one of their earliest leaders, Senator Robert La Follette Sr., of nearby Wisconsin.²⁰ And given that the party was basically dead by this point, with only about 200 diehards showing up to the event, their choice to meet in Riverview must have been a deliberate one—anyone who would not have cared had already left the party. One could infer, then, that Riverview was an important location for the rebel Progressives, and as such Riverview was tied even closer to the populist left.

Progressives alone did not drive Riverview's left-liberalism. To the contrary, early on the park's politics were fed by a wide variety of sources across the American left, from New Deal Democrats to outright Socialists. In the case of the latter, Riverview entertained no less than the definitive leader of American socialism, Eugene V. Debs, by that point the three-time nominee of the Socialist Party for President. Debs in fact commenced his fourth campaign for the presidency from Riverview in 1912.²¹ In a speech, as was typical for Debs, he issued a searing polemic against capitalism and the two-party system, recounting "battles of the workers in the war of the classes" and calling for "the unconditional surrender of the capitalist class." Like Bryan, the fact that he was doing this in an amusement park, perhaps the most enduring and popular invention of American capitalism, could not have possibly escaped his notice. He not only chose to speak at Riverview in spite of this, but opened his national campaign for president there. For Debs to have even considered that idea, Riverview would have had to be a liberal hotspot, some place where the strength of leftist sympathies could have overwhelmed whatever capitalist associations the park would bring with it. Even park officials themselves exercised some interest in the advancement of American labor: in 1915, Riverview was the first major amusement park nationwide to abolish the "vampire system" for its waitstaff, which required waiters to purchase a certain number of drinks at particular bars to gain or maintain their positions.²² "If organized labor only had a few more of these democratic employers to co-operate with, how much better it would be for all of us," raved a CFL official of park's owners.²³

Besides radicals like Debs, those with generally leftish credentials also politicked at the park. These included Harry Truman, Adlai Stevenson, and later Robert Kennedy. Chicago Mayor William "Big Bill" Thompson, a Republican, also used the park to promote himself and his politics.²⁴ Generally a left-of-center figure, Thompson started the brief tradition of what was variously known as "Kid's Day," "Riverview Day," and "Schoolkid's Day" in 1919, where he would cancel school citywide and provide free tickets to Riverview for every enrolled child in the city.²⁵ This was a baldly populist move, a pandering gesture intended to win votes from parents and others sympathetic to children, and its success was mixed at best. (The claim that Riverview Day was educational because copies of the Constitution and short biographies of Washington and Lincoln were distributed free probably did not help his case.)²⁶ Thompson, in doing this, provided further evidence of the politicization of Riverview. The park also saw use by the political right, if to a much smaller degree. Conservative Republican President Warren G. Harding campaigned at the park, largely for humanizing photo opportunities. Much later, in 1965, the Republican Party held a "Republican Day" at the park, an event without political speeches of any kind.²⁷ For much of its existence, the park

²⁰ "Hold Memorial for La Follette; Push New Party," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, August 2, 1925.

²¹ Eugene V. Debs, "Political Appeal to American Workers," Eugene V. Debs Internet Archive, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/debs/index.htm>.

²² "Dust Vampire System from Riverview Park," *The Day Book*, September 16, 1915; "Waiter's Mass Meeting; Bill against Employment Bureaus in Saloons Endorsed," *The New York Times*, February 1, 1894.

²³ "Dust Vampire System from Riverview Park," *The Day Book*, September 16, 1915.

²⁴ Fitz-Gerald, "Serious Fun," 35.

²⁵ Fitz-Gerald, "Serious Fun," 35.

²⁶ Fitz-Gerald, "Serious Fun," 35.

²⁷ Fitz-Gerald, "Serious Fun," 35; "No Speeches at Riverview Day Says GOP", *Chicago Daily Defender*, August 11, 1965.

continued like this, semi-regularly hosting various political events and generally providing a platform for the American left to express its ideas and find a receptive audience. Perhaps no other private institution in Chicago could be a viable political tool to both “Big Bill” Thompson and Eugene Debs within a decade of each other, and this would remain the case for some years. As Chicago grew and Riverview became more and more comparatively small, however, its relative security as a bastion of the left grew more and more tenuous.

With crowds from all across the city and surrounding environs growing every year, the left-leaning politics tied to the park grew increasingly faint as time went on. Many more people came to see the park as a platform without bias. Some even felt at home proclaiming beliefs that ran totally contrary to the park’s original political heritage. The American Bund was a case in point. Between the German invasion of Poland in 1939 and the American entrance into the war in 1941, the American Bund, a more recent pro-German organization, commemorated German Day in the park with an disturbing flare, reportedly openly waving swastika flags, praising Hitler, and haranguing Polish-Americans in public demonstrations in Riverview.²⁸ Accounts generally suggest that this was not received particularly well by guests, but this was more out of general distaste for Nazis than any strong leftist sentiments. The fact that Nazis, who despised leftism, felt welcome at Riverview spoke volumes about how the park had changed in recent years.

The changing politics of Riverview also can be seen in a disturbing “attraction” known as “The Dips,” a game renamed several times over its many years of existence between the end of World War II and its closing in 1964, retired monikers included the “Darktown Tangos” and the “Chocolate Drops.” The game was a simple rendition of the old carnival standby of throwing a ball at a target to drop a person into a tank of water.²⁹ But this version had an additional gimmick—all the people to be dunked were black. The attraction’s appeal was completely based on the desire of patrons to at least harass African-Americans, and the park openly encouraged this: employees to be dunked hurled insults at passers-by in the hopes of goading them into buying a few balls.³⁰ In a different time, when socially-progressive agitation was the norm at the park, one might have expected public demand or concerned management to quickly shutter “The Dips.” This did not happen. Instead, the incendiary game’s eventual closure came in the mid-1960s, when the civil rights movement was perhaps at its strongest point. And even then, it only came at the request of a single editorial, not mass public protests or even public notice in any significant sense.³¹ Again, nestled in an amusement park, the “attraction” remarkably escaped public notice. Elsewhere, the obvious bigotry at the core of the game would have prompted protests, not at Riverview.

Two decades of tolerance for the “Dips” does suggest, however, a significant change in the park’s core ethos. Once defined by left populism, Riverview was now willing to allow politics—or at least a game with harsh political implications—totally contrary to the ideals of many of their old speakers and rallies out of either a desire for greater profit, or simple ambivalence. Take into account that during this same period, Haymarket Square, the site of the 1886 riot—by then around 70 years old—still inspired two bombings in downtown Chicago within a year. The indifference of politics at Riverside in comparison seems even starker.³² One is also struck by the reaction of Chicago’s black community to the game, or lack thereof. References to it in the *Chicago Defender*, the chief civil rights newspaper in the city, were few and far between. References to “The Dips” came in letters-to-the-

²⁸ Fitz-Gerald, “Serious Fun”, 36.

²⁹ Gee and Lopez, *Laugh Your Troubles Away*, 145.

³⁰ Gee and Lopez, *Laugh Your Troubles Away*, 145.

³¹ Gee and Lopez, *Laugh Your Troubles Away*, 145.

³² James Green, *Death in the Haymarket* (New York: Anchor Books, 2007), 314-316.

editor, not officially sanctioned news stories.³³ One might be tempted to think that the lack of an African-American reaction might be due to impressions that Riverview was a “white” park, but this is not the case. On the occasion of the closing of Riverview the *Defender* carried a small sidebar quoting reactions from various African-Americans in the city, which were not only strong, but strongly in favor of the park.³⁴ There are several conclusions some might draw from the seeming ambivalence of the black population to “The Dips,” but it is most likely that the park simply no longer functioned as a platform for the radical left. Such racist attractions were not considered worth serious attention, particularly considering the state of Chicago race relations overall and the relative benignity this attraction possessed.

Given the decline in left-leaning politics in the park over time, it seems fitting that Riverview should close in 1967, the year before the assassinations of Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy, as well as the election of Richard Nixon. The reasons for the closure are not fully known, and explanation are many: some said it came as a result of crime and racial tension making the park unsafe, others said it was the result of a struggle among shareholders to make as much profit as quickly as possible, and yet another group claim it was brought on by rising land values which made the park more profitable sold than maintained.³⁵ In any case, Riverview died, alongside its old ideological allies, a very changed institution. At its birth, it was a mecca for European immigrants in Chicago, which made it a site where the undervalued of society might express their political views. However, growth eventually pushed the park towards political moderation (with occasional detours into the politics of bigotry and intolerance), and by the time it closed, very little seemed to remain of Riverview’s progressive past. One thing did remain true of Riverview throughout its lifetime, however, even into the later years of its life: it was a park where controversy was welcome, debate was common, and politics was omnipresent. By the time it shut its gates forever, Riverview had become as much of a public forum for the everyman and—women of Chicago as city hall and newspaper columns. Moreover, it was one of the few political venues where opponents could walk alongside one another and mutually agree that although they held clashing view, they were not going to start some kind of fight. They might sneer or sigh at the crowds swarming the park wearing identical elephant or donkey buttons, but Riverview was a place for families and relaxation, a place where common people could publicly stand by their values in peace, no matter their radicalism. Given that, perhaps it should come as no surprise that it was untouched by the sort of chaos that haunted Chicago’s Haymarket Square; why would people hunt for political enemies in an amusement park?

³³ “WHAT THE PEOPLE SAY: Riverview Park Exhibit Disgusting,” *Chicago Defender*, July 1, 1944; “What The People Say: Rap Riverview Park,” *Chicago Defender*, July 8, 1950.

³⁴ “QUESTION: HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT RIVERVIEW PARK BEING TORN DOWN? IF THE MATTER COULD BE VOTED UPON, HOW WOULD YOU VOTE?” *Chicago Defender*, October 9, 1967.

³⁵ Gee and Lopez, *Laugh Your Troubles Away*, 146 and Fitz-Gerald, “Serious Fun,” 36.

Tattoos, American Sailors, and U.S. Maritime Communities, 1860-1945

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As the United States of America expanded, so did its maritime presence, especially its commercially and militarily. This expansion led to changes in other maritime-related activities as well, tattooing being one of them. Over the course of the nineteenth century permanent tattooing parlors popped up in ports around the country, as increasing numbers of sailors looked for a souvenir of their maritime adventures. Early tattoo artists drew inspiration from nature and maritime achievements. As the world became increasingly interconnected, the popularity of tattoos spread. The growth of tattooing paralleled the development of the United States Navy. In a rapidly changing world, American sailors in maritime communities from 1860 to 1945, found their identity through a unique tattoo culture.

1860: Humble Beginnings in a Mobile Industry

Americans, whether sailors, those working in land-based maritime trades or living in ports, were not the first to experiment with leaving permanent marks upon the skin. The practice of marking the skin dates back thousands of years.¹ It fell in and out of style, but in the modern era the practice was becoming more prevalent in western civilization by 1860. Tribes in the Pacific exposed European and American explorers to the concept of tattooing or marking in the 1700s.² The practice of marking skin would make its way back to European shores on the bodies of sailors. This study of tattooing among American sailors and in maritime communities begins in 1860 for several reasons. First, American maritime presence mushroomed in the years after the Civil War. Also, the first permanent tattoo parlors in the United States, an important factor in the growth and continuity in tattooing, emerged around 1860. Lastly, European immigration to the United States in the latter half of the nineteenth century, changed and diversified the cultural landscape. These three factors combined and drove the expansion of tattooing among American sailors and maritime communities.

The outbreak of the Civil War in 1861 ushered in a new era. The United States federal government, along with the US Navy, devised a plan to blockade the seceding states along a 3,500 mile stretch of the American coast. This plan forced the federal navy to begin building up its fleet.³ The mobilization of men on both sides of the conflict made for a shared experience in which tattooing became part of the culture. The earliest recorded professional tattoo artist in America was Martin Hildebrandt, who claimed to have opened the first shop in 1846, but it is known for certain

¹ "Facts about tattoos," Royal Museums Greenwich. National Maritime Museum, accessed November 17, 2018, <https://www.rmg.co.uk/discover/explore/facts-about-tattoos>. When Ötzi the iceman, a 5,000-year-old bronze-age man was discovered in a European glacier in 1991, his skin tissue was so well preserved that researchers were able to identify multiple tattoos.

² Clinton Sanders, *Customizing the Body: The Art and Culture of Tattooing* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989), 14. Sanders makes a point to mention modern European tattooing begins with the Cook expedition in the Pacific and the island of Tahiti.

³ "The Rise of the American Navy 1775-1914," *History Net*. World History Group, accessed November 18, 2018. <http://www.historynet.com/the-rise-of-the-american-navy-1775-1914.htm>. Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles started the war with 12 warships, 17 steam warships, and only 2 operational steam sloops. In 1861 he would purchase 176 ships and contract another 49 to be built.

that he was operating a tattoo business in New York City by 1877.⁴ Hildebrandt reportedly tattooed thousands of sailors and soldiers, learning his trade from an engraver whom he served with on board the USS *United States*.⁵ While the testimony of one tattoo artist has questionable validity, there is enough primary evidence to conclude that tattooing members of the American maritime community was a widespread practice from the creation of the United States Navy through the Civil War.




Image of Samuel O'Reilly's electric tattooing machine submitted to the US Patent Office. Source: Patent and Trademark Office, Patent No. 464,801.

tattoo parlor in the United States, yet there were clearly other individuals also setting up shop in New York City. These artists would transform the practice, from using crude tools—described as “a queer little instrument made by binding six No.12 needles to the end of a stick as large as a penholder and half as long”—to using electric tattoo machines.⁹ Samuel F. O'Reilly designed a device around 1890 which would quicken the process and decrease the pain involved, while allowing for greater detail in coloration and shading.¹⁰ This technological advance gave greater depth to the designs and the number of tattoos an artist could administer grew. These designs included but were

Seamen's protection certificates and navy enlistment returns issued in the 1790s noted when sailors had tattoos or other distinguishing body marks.

Examination of seamen protection certificates by Ira Dye led him to conclude that “seafarer tattooing appears to have been fixed and stylized from its initial appearance in these records, indicating that the custom was well established” by the end of the nineteenth century.⁶ The practice during the Civil War can be charted using navy enlistment returns. One such record from 1863 shows Irish immigrants enlisting into the navy and having their tattoos documented as part of official record keeping.⁷ The exact reasoning behind an individual's decision to permanently mark themselves is complicated, but in the late nineteenth century, individuals lacked forms of universal identification. However, tattooing served as a source of identification. This could be a leading cause of tattooing in the late 1800s: a body lacking identification was likely to be placed in an unnamed mass grave.⁸

Tattooing during the late 1800s was still a highly mobile practice among sailors and the arrival of permanent tattoo parlors in ports would soon take hold within the coming decades. Hildebrandt's claim to fame is that he established the first permanent

⁴ “Tattooing as a Fine Art,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, October 28, 1877.

⁵ “Tattooing as a Fine Art,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, October 28, 1877.

⁶ Ira Dye, “The Tattoos of Early American Seafarers, 1796-1818” *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 133, No. 4 (Dec. 1989):528.

⁷ Damian Shiels, “Inked Irishmen: Irish Tattoos in 1860s New York,” *Irish American Civil War*, accessed May 23, 2018, <https://irishamericancivilwar.com/2018/05/23/inked-irishmen-irish-tattoos-in-1860s-new-york/>.

⁸ Aida Amer and Sarah Laskow, “Tattooing in the Civil War was a Hedge against Anonymous Death,” *Atlas Obscura*. Atlas Obscura, accessed December 5, 2018, <https://www.atlasobscura.com/articles/civil-war-tattoos>.

⁹ “Tattooing as a Fine Art” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, October 28, 1877.

¹⁰ Alan Govenar, “The Changing Image of Tattooing in American Culture, 1846-1966,” in *Written on the body: The Tattoo in European and American History*, eds. Jane Caplan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 215

not limited to anchors, crosses, crucifixion scenes, sailors, women, an eagle, coat-of-arms, and national flags, all early designs that were common among sailors.¹¹ These examples provide an idea of what designs were being tattooed on sailors' bodies. The underlying importance of identity and tattoos is clear: these tattoos were "conveying experiences for those around to read, even without a verbal exchange taking place."¹² As time progressed, this would still hold true for American sailors and in maritime communities.

1900: The Rise of Tattooing and the Expansion of the Navy

By 1900 there were considerable advances in tattooing and the United States global maritime presence. These advances led to innovative tattooing devices, more tattoo artists, permanent parlors, and a distinct culture of tattooing in the United States. All of this came at a time of expanding American military power. The rising nation looked especially to its navy to show the world its growing power. This led to the establishment of military epicenters and a distinct nationalized maritime culture within the United States.

Tattooing and tattoo parlors became integral parts of these American maritime communities, in locations such as Chicago, New York City, Norfolk, and San Diego.

The turn-of-the-century also proved to be a turning point toward a more aggressive United States foreign policy. In 1898, the United States challenged Spain for dominance in the Caribbean and the Pacific Ocean. Victory over Spain resulted in United States control over Cuba, Guam, and the Philippines. Swift victories over Spanish fleets would give the United States a perspective that it had not experienced before, becoming a rising and formidable naval power on the global stage.¹³ Soaring national pride among sailors led many to commemorate their victories and experiences with tattoos. On a ship stationed in Manilla Bay in 1899, men aboard the USS *Olympia* lined up for tattoos memorializing their wartime experiences, according to a fellow sailor. Surviving artwork of tattoo designs, descriptions of tattoos, and photographic evidence aboard the ship, suggests that the practice was not limited in its scope.¹⁴ A 1898 *Chicago Daily Tribune* news article notes that expansion of body art inland included Camp Meade in Pennsylvania among other locations. The article



Francis B. Johnston. USS Olympia (Cruiser #6) tattooing, 1899. Library of Congress photo #LC-J698-61327_Lot 8688. Men aboard the USS Olympia look on as the tattooing process is put in practice aboard their ship.

¹¹ "Tattooing as a Fine Art," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, October 28, 1877.

¹² Louise Moon, "Tattoos, Tars and Sailortown Culture," *Port Towns and Urban Cultures*, University of Portsmouth, accessed November 30, 2018, <http://porttowns.port.ac.uk/tattoos-tars-sailortown-culture/>.

¹³ "The Rise of the American Navy 1775-1914," *History Net*. World History Group, accessed November 18, 2018, <http://www.historynet.com/the-rise-of-the-american-navy-1775-1914.htm>. "At the beginning of Roosevelt's first term, the United States ranked among the top five naval powers of the pre-dreadnought era."

¹⁴ Hope Corse and others, *Skin & Bones: Tattoos in the Life of the American Sailor* (Philadelphia: Independence Seaport Museum, 2009), 45.

described how a retired sailor found success in traveling to military installations, tattooing eager and bored servicemen.¹⁵ As President Theodore Roosevelt expanded the navy and used it to show the United States naval power through the Great White Fleet expedition (1907-1909), the United States further established far-flung military posts to continue this legacy.

Tattoo artists established themselves at military bases and developed their trade. Demand for tattoos skyrocketed among American service men. The navy established the Great Lakes Naval Station in Illinois in 1911, the Norfolk Naval Station in Virginia in 1917, and the San Diego Naval Base in 1922. Naval dockyards, such as San Francisco's Hunters Point Naval Shipyard and New York City's Brooklyn Navy Yard, also employed thousands of maritime workers. Each of these cities already had their own unique maritime culture which mixed with national identities created by the navy's expansion. Tattoos became mechanisms for social communication within the complex maritime communities where these men spent most of their time.¹⁶ Tattoo artists often incorporated aspects of unique local culture into their tattoos. By the early 1900s, Samuel O'Reilly was training numerous artists in New York City to continue the trade. His students made modifications to his patented electric tattoo machine. As tattooing became faster and easier to perform, more artists were able to learn the trade, which proliferated the number of tattoos created.

While the expansion of tattooing was popular among soldiers, sailors, and those within maritime communities, the practice did not go unnoticed by the public. An article in 1902 from the *New-York Tribune* notes an interview with a local tattoo artist, "Professor" Elmer Gitchell. This article demonstrates the growing presence of tattoos within American civilian culture as well as "pushback" against the practice. American society at this time worried about the tattooing of children and hastily made decisions by individuals to permanently tattoo themselves. Yet even as early as 1902, some tattooists viewed their trade as an art as opposed to simply an income.¹⁷ Tattooist George Burchett contended that Sutherland Macdonald coined the word tattooist or tattoo artist rather than tattooer, explaining "that an artist is a tattoo-ist and only dabblers and low alley-fellows should be described as tattoo-ers."¹⁸ Another article from 1902 claimed that while older officers and sailors were adorned with tattoos, younger sailors entering the Navy were resisting the trend.¹⁹ This article underlines a greater issue about social respectability and tattooing. "The relationship between the popular press and the actual demographics of tattooing in America is unclear," concluded the article.²⁰ This can lead to a skewed understanding of the actual growth or decline of the practice among sailors and around the nation. Due to the increased presence of tattooing in the 1940s, with more men in the military during World War II, an argument can be made that prior to the war, there may have been a decline in tattooing. This was due to reduced naval forces and sailors who likely could not afford tattoos during the Great Depression.²¹ Still, if there was a decrease, the practice was not entirely put to rest among sailors and in maritime communities.

Comparatively, the tattooing industry witnessed an upturn in Victorian England, where tattoos became popular among almost all classes—soldier, sailor, aristocrat, and royalty alike. Sutherland Macdonald, an artist much like Samuel O'Reilly in New York City, operated in London

¹⁵ "Former Sailor Tattoos the Soldiers," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, November 20, 1898.

¹⁶ Clinton Sanders, *Customizing the Body: The Art and Culture of Tattooing* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989), 20-21.

¹⁷ "A Tattooing 'Artist,'" *New-York Tribune*, October 26, 1902.

¹⁸ George Burchett, *Memoirs of a Tattooist*, eds. Peter Leighton (New York: Crown Publishers, 1958), 106.

¹⁹ "Tattoo Work Decreasing," *The Pacific Commercial Advertiser*, November 19, 1902.

²⁰ Alan Govenar, "The Changing Image of Tattooing in American Culture, 1846-1966," in *Written on the body: The Tattoo in European and American History*, 213.

²¹ Alan Govenar, "The Changing Image of Tattooing in American Culture, 1846-1966," in *Written on the body: The Tattoo in European and American History*, 219.

by 1889.²² The most common tattoo consumers for Macdonald were sailors, craftsmen, military and members of the aristocracy. Tattooing of royalty also gained the attention of the press. Notable customers being Czar Nicholas II of Russia, King George of Greece, King Oscar of Sweden, Kaiser Wilhelm of Germany, and most male members of the British royal family.²³ King George V would be tattooed in 1882 by one of the first famous Japanese artists, Hori Chyo aboard the H.M.S *Bacchante* and King Fredrick of Denmark would be tattooed by the famous British artist, George Burchett. The exact numbers of tattooed American sailors is unknown, however, tattooing crossed class lines and created an unspoken social connection through tattoo artists, like Macdonald.

1945: The Marked Generation

Allied victory in World War II ended a period of unprecedented and historic growth in the United States military and industry due to the war. This growth led to an increased number of individuals gaining first-hand experiences on the sea and in maritime communities. In 1939, United States military personnel numbered 334,473. Six years later that figure stood at 12,209,238.²⁴ In the same period, the United States Navy's active ship force expanded from 394 ships in 1939 to a staggering 6,768 in 1945. Through the Second World War, the United States would effectively send ships around the globe, crossing the Atlantic and Mediterranean to defeat Germany in Europe and the Pacific to combat Japanese imperial expansion.

During this period, tattooists enjoyed a wartime boom, as members of the military from all branches across the United States crowded tattoo parlors. Tattoos spread like wildfire. Patriotic tattoos reminiscent of a generation before which would have read "Remember the Maine" now read "Remember Pearl Harbor." Meanwhile, servicemen also were eager to commemorate their particular branch of the armed forces: tattoos that read "Happy Landings" were popular among airmen, while "chutes and boots" signified a paratrooper. While most of these men were not life-long servicemen, the same principle of identity applied, as tattoos were a means of establishing bonds and group solidarity among platoons, divisions, and branches of government.²⁵ Other popular designs expressed devotion to family, girls back home, or patriotism.

Increasingly, body art became an international business. Even if men missed their opportunity to get their skin scratched by a tattoo artist in the ports of the United States, tattooists would be waiting for them in England. Burchett understood what a war meant when it came to Europe in 1939. "I prepared for action. Unlike the folk who feared annihilation from a sky darkened with black bombers, I knew exactly what to expect. There would be queues, and one of the biggest would line up outside my surgery," he recalled.²⁶ Burchett's account of tattooing Americans evokes the idea of "commemorating experiences." "They are great tourists, even in the middle of a war, and I had many more orders for the Tower of London, Buckingham Palace, London Bridge, Big Ben, Nelson's Column and any amount of Eros statues from Piccadilly Circus," he recalled.²⁷ Overall, the acceptance of tattooing remained widespread among servicemen during World War II, a height never again experienced on the same scale. Broad acceptance and social approval of body art within

²² Jessica Stewart, "Sutherland MacDonald Tattoo History," My Modern Metropolis, LLC, May 29, 2017, accessed December 7, 2018, <https://mymodernmet.com/sutherland-macdonald-tattoo-history/>.

²³ Clinton Sanders, *Customizing the Body: The Art and Culture of Tattooing* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989), 15.

²⁴ "Research Starters: US Military by the Numbers," *National WWII Museum*, National WWII Museum, accessed December 7, 2018, <https://www.nationalww2museum.org/students-teachers/student-resources/research-starters/research-starters-us-military-numbers>

²⁵ Alan Govenar, "The Changing Image of Tattooing in American Culture, 1846-1966," in *Written on the Body: The Tattoo in European and American History*, 226.

²⁶ George Burchett, *Memoirs of a Tattooist*, 123.

²⁷ George Burchett, *Memoirs of a Tattooist*, 125.

the military services can be attributed to patriotism and nationalistic fervor within the United States.²⁸

As the war came to an end, the wartime boom for tattooists also ended. Millions of Americans were discharged by the military, and many returned home with permanent souvenirs. Resocialization into civilian life proved difficult for some military men, as their tattoos, which were an important symbol of status in the military, stirred different, sometimes negative, associations at home.²⁹ Changes in American society, such as earlier marriages, larger families, and settling in suburban areas away from cities, ran counter to tattooing culture. New values emphasized conformity and comfort. Increasingly, tattooing had negative connotation in the United States.³⁰ These changes defied many of the rebellious stereotypes associated with tattooing, likely due to its maritime heritage. The practice would decline due to these societal changes, but tattooists would adjust to the changes in demand as they had done before. The key to success for many tattooists in this period was staying close to military installations and maritime communities. Designs and styles which were heavily influenced by maritime experiences and passed down to their apprentices, can be seen today in the “classic” tattoo revival. Tattoos provided a different sense of identity, but the designs of a by-gone era are still being permanently marked on the skin of individuals today.

²⁸ Margo DeMello *Inked: Tattoos and Body Art Around the World*, vol. 2 (New York: ABC-CLIO, 2014), 413.

²⁹ Alan Govenar, “The Changing Image of Tattooing in American Culture, 1846-1966,” in *Written on the Body: The Tattoo in European and American History*, 229.

³⁰ Alan Govenar, “The Changing Image of Tattooing in American Culture, 1846-1966,” in *Written on the Body: The Tattoo in European and American History*, 230.

A Fresh Shipment of Disease: The Navy's Legacy on the Transference of the 1918 Influenza

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My train was an old Pullman going to Chicago. I went right through our town and saw the light in the window that mother put there. I got to Chicago in the morning. When someone opened a paper in front of me I saw "6,000 in the hospital have Spanish Influenza in Great Lakes, Illinois." I said, "Oh, that's where I'm going. What is Spanish Influenza?"¹

– Nurse Josie Brown

Humble beginnings, like those Josie Brown experienced, were common in the early twentieth-century. Raised on a farm, Brown decided she wanted more than the backbreaking life of a farmwife. After three years in training to be a nurse, she was called into action shortly after the United States entered World War I. Her actions and support were needed to fight the unspoken battle that the United States and nearly every other nation on the planet was silently fighting at this time. This was not a war of weapons, ideas, or beliefs. It was a war that did not discriminate, and one that is still quite hidden from sight today. It was the war against disease.

The battle against the 1918 Spanish Influenza was fought for nearly a year, and the disease itself was swift, strange, and deadly. Contemporary death toll estimates for the pandemic are at least fifty-million people worldwide.² But epidemics were nothing new. There had been countless—and arguably more potent—influenza outbreaks in the past. Why, then, was this disease so far spread as to be fought in nearly all corners of the globe at once, when other diseases and outbreaks of the past were more contained? The large scale transfer of soldiers to distant points on the globe can be traced back to the colonies of the British Empire, bringing the illnesses back and forth between the West Indies, Africa and Asia. Soldiers traveled in what proved the perfect vehicle for even distribution of pestilence: overcrowded and underprepared naval transport ships, whose commanders were not worried about the yearly “flu.” Rather they concerned themselves only with the ever pressing war. Since the war had distracted leaders, and the impact of influenza and the need for quarantines fell to the wayside, the U.S. Navy’s ships literally became vessels of disease. By and large, society remains uninformed about the effect and legacy of this pandemic on the world. This study emphasizes the disease’s impact on the U.S Navy *itself*, revealing the navy’s protocol shortcomings that failed to contain the disease. The spreading of the deadly flu remains of immense importance. In hindsight, health officials made changes in hopes that a disease like the Spanish Flu would never be able to travel via ship again.

¹ “A Winding Sheet and a Wooden Box,” Naval History and Heritage Command, accessed April 7, 2018, <https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/i/influenza/a-winding-sheet-and-a-wooden-box.html>.

² “Remembering the 1918 Influenza Pandemic,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, accessed May 7, 2018, <https://www.cdc.gov/features/1918-flu-pandemic/index.html>.

A Reflection on Naval Hygiene and Sanitation

Historically, the idea of sailors and cleanliness is often paired together as a joke. Men traversing the sea for weeks, months, sometimes even years at a time, had to contend with little to no fresh water, overcrowding, and unsanitary work. For instance, whalers lived and worked in an environment where every part of a whale was cut up and spread all over the ship as it was processed.³ Medicine was in such infancy in this era when most still believed sickness was caused by unpleasant odors, or “miasmas.” Later, with the transition to steam-powered vessels, conditions transformed as well—but not for the better. Sailors on steamships had to deal with coal dust settling into their skin and lungs, even as they continued to deal with the hierarchical disadvantages of being a lowly sailor. “Here on this ship they won't allow us enough water to wash in. We have to get water to wash in any old place we can, from the feed pump while at sea, and from reserve tanks and boilers whilst in port,” recalled Frederick Nelson, a sailor on such a ship in 1900.⁴

The Royal Navy insisted it excelled at keeping ships “sanitary,” with surgeons taking advantage of the new steam technologies to provide cleaner and drier spaces below deck, a goal they had been working towards since the eighteenth century. Even so, steamships provided their own new avenues for uncleanness: heat from boilers, limited airflow below deck, and dampness from condensation on metal made a pleasant breeding ground for many unwanted lifeforms. Nonetheless, great steps to maintain hygiene aside, new efforts to promote “cleanliness” came more in the form of taking measurements and collating statistics, rather than studying what actually *caused* disease. Disease detection was still leagues away from real scientific understanding.⁵ Given this limited level of knowledge, it is plain to see how disease could easily spread, even on these “sanitary” Royal Navy ships. After stepping ashore and perhaps standing too close to someone sneezing, a sailor would eventually return to his ship, sleep among others crammed below deck, and—clean ship or not—spread contagion in this tightly enclosed petri dish. Additionally, it was not simply the fact that ships were difficult to keep clean and well ventilated, but that the very act of sailing was instrumental in spreading sickness. Trying to maintain health in this isolated environment was a challenge of its own. Limited supplies and space depleted quickly, especially on long voyages, and simple deficiencies of basic food weakened the human body, leaving sailors all the more susceptible to diseases.⁶

To make matters worse, the Royal Navy strongly opposed *quarantining* at this time. The General Board of Health, which was created by the Public Health Act of 1848, agreed that maintaining good health on naval vessels depended on the “avoidance or removal of those [unsanitary] conditions” that caused disease, rather than measures like the quarantine, which, “were deemed medically useless and damaging to trade.”⁷ Despite the opposition to quarantining, the Royal Navy remained the most prominent naval power at this time. Thus, the United States most likely modeled its laws on the British, as Americans did with many other laws and regulations from Common Law. And, as is the case with Common Law, unless there was a very specific legal case to repeal the law, it stayed in effect.⁸

³ James Williford, “Whaling the Old Way,” National Endowment for the Humanities, April 2010, accessed May 7, 2018, <https://www.neh.gov/humanities/2010/marchapril/feature/whaling-the-old-way>.

⁴ David Colamaria, “A Sailor’s Life in the New Steel Navy – Hygiene: Officer vs. Enlisted,” The United States Navy, accessed May 7, 2018, <http://www.steelnavy.org/history/hygiene>.

⁵ Elise Juzda Smith, “Cleanse or Die: British Naval Hygiene in the Age of Steam, 1840-1900,” National Center for Biotechnology, accessed May 7, 2019, Information, <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5883164/>.

⁶ Smith, “Cleanse or Die,” accessed May 7, 2018, <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5883164/>.

⁷ David Boyd Haycock and Sally Archer, *Health and Medicine at Sea, 1700-1900* (Woodbridge, UK: The Boydell Press, 2009), 124-127.

⁸ “General Provisions (5 ILCS 50/1) Common Law Act,” 1874, accessed May 7, 2018, <http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/ilcs3.asp?ActID=78&ChapterID=2>.

Origin and Timeline of Spanish Influenza up to the Second Wave

With poor health conditions on ships and the aversion to quarantining in mind, let us now look at the background and context of the Spanish Influenza itself. Historians have debated and analyzed the origins of “Spanish Flu” for decades. This common name of *Spanish* flu is a misnomer, becoming popular since Spain was neutral and did not have a media censor during the war, making it virtually the only European country that could report on such an outbreak.⁹ One theory had the flu originating in a British army camp in Étaples, France. For a time, historians believed the flu emerged from Fort Riley in Kansas. More recently, consensus formed around a third hypothesis: the virus probably began its journey somewhere in northern China, traveling to Europe among the 140,000 Chinese laborers enlisted to perform manual labor as part of the war effort.¹⁰ Besides the debate over the disease’s illusive place of origin, the rest of the timeline of its travel is well-documented.

The influenza’s arrival and attack occurred in three separate waves over the period from Summer 1918 to Spring 1919. The U.S. Navy’s role in spreading the virus took place predominately during the second, and most deadly wave. Yet, some transference happened during the *first* wave as well, which is worth mentioning, as it reinforces how the second wave became so volatile.

As stated, the first wave of the Spanish Flu began in the Spring/Summer of 1918, with the first symptoms of sickness seen in the United States in March at Fort Riley, Kansas. Simultaneously, the flu also arrived in European trenches during fighting. This first wave seemed sporadic at best, hardly an epidemic yet. A conspiracy theory emerged that wartime gas attacks and overall trench-filth were the cause. This thought prevailed, even though the number of cases in Fort Riley quintupled in less than a week, a location which was obviously far from gas attacks.¹¹ This first wave, in comparison to that which would follow, seemed unlikely to reach regular citizens of the United States. This wave hit army camps and soldiers in the United States for the most part, and even though ships known to be carrying flu-like symptoms arrived on the East Coast during this time with more than enough potential to infect nearby citizens, there was no sudden outbreak. One such ship was a naval transport carrying 64th Infantry troops from Europe to America with forty-two confirmed cases of flu onboard. After arrival, however, the flu never spread substantially inland.¹² The reason for this remains unknown. One theory is that the earlier flu was weaker, but that with one and a half million men passing back and forth from the mostly flu-free continent to flu-riddled continent, the virus later mutated into a deadlier version.¹³ This version would become the second wave, striking the United States later that fall.

It is clear then that the second wave was responsible for the outbreak and overall devastation in the United States, but why was this epidemic able to occur in the first place? How was such an obvious ailment allowed to enter through the nation’s ports? After all, the navy was supposed to protect Americans, not infect them.

⁹ Alfred W. Crosby, *America’s Forgotten Pandemic: The Influenza of 1918* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 26.

¹⁰ Lindsey Konkel, “Why Was the 1918 Influenza Pandemic Called the ‘Spanish Flu?’,” *History Stories*, accessed May 22, 2018, <https://www.history.com/news/why-was-the-1918-influenza-pandemic-called-the-spanish-flu>.

¹¹ “1918 Pandemic Influenza Historic Timeline,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, accessed May 3, 2018, <https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/1918-commemoration/pandemic-timeline-1918.htm>.

¹² Crosby, *Forgotten Pandemic*, 29.

¹³ Crosby, *Forgotten Pandemic*, 30-31.

A History of Maritime Quarantine and Protocol

The very idea of a “quarantine” is practically ancient in origin. Written evidence since at least the age of the Old Testament describes the isolation of lepers from healthy members of the community.¹⁴ Legally-mandated maritime quarantines date from the fourteenth-century. Adopted in Venice during the spread of the Black Death across Europe, the Venetian practice kept ships out at sea for at least forty days before coming to port.¹⁵ As such, the word “quarantine” was derived from the Latin word for “forty.” Still, the Royal Navy resisted quarantining—resistance that transferred to America. To see how the U.S. Navy’s protocol for quarantine during the era of the Spanish Flu was so vital to its spread, we need to look back at the development of quarantine procedures, for there within lies the shortcomings. Alongside the navy, public health organizations, such as the National Board of Health (NBH), and the United States Public Health Service (USPHS), also bare some blame.

While there were other, prior examples of laws and dealings with maritime quarantine, the Quarantine Act of 1863 – now also called the General Quarantine Act—deserves special attention. This act was likely the first of its scale, creating a permanent office of quarantine commissioner and a quarantine procedure for the port of New York.¹⁶ This was the first time in the United States that we see a permanent quarantine law. The health commissioner in charge of this office had designated powers, such as detaining ships in port for as long as was deemed necessary and requiring cargo to be removed or fumigated. This system provided a foundation to build upon, while, simultaneously creating limitations too.

Almost immediately after this newly formed commissioner’s office began its work, a crisis arose testing officials. In April 1866, the steamer *Virginia* arrived in New York Harbor riddled with cholera. “Thirty-eight deaths occurred on board during her passage, of which two were among the crew. The *Virginia* was anchored at the Lower Quarantine, which is about twenty miles from the city,” reported *The New York Times*.¹⁷ Due to the quick action of the newly appointed quarantine commissioner, the ship was isolated. Similar isolation practices for cholera in the region ultimately led to only about six-hundred deaths occurring from the outbreak, far fewer than earlier epidemics of cholera.¹⁸ Legally enforced quarantining was in fact creating a noticeable decline in fatalities. The morbidity of cholera was very much reduced by the quarantine, which, as mentioned earlier, could easily become a quarantine “legal habit,” and thus become common practice.

Adding to these legal precedents, in 1879 the National Board of Health was created. While it only lasted until 1883, it still made an impression that should be recognized. The nation was becoming ever more interconnected, and it became increasingly obvious that new laws and governing bodies for regulation of interstate commerce would need to be created. As such, Congress created the National Board of Health, charging it “[t]o Prevent the Introduction of Infectious or Contagious Disease into the United States and to Establish a National Board of Health.”¹⁹ In addition to these responsibilities, the NBH’s main goal was obtaining information on all matters regarding public health, with special attention dedicated to developing quarantine legislation and a

¹⁴ Peter Tyson, “A Short History of Quarantine,” PBS, Oct. 11, 2004, accessed May 7, 2018, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/article/short-history-of-quarantine/>.

¹⁵ Tyson, “History of Quarantine,” <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/article/short-history-of-quarantine/>.

¹⁶ “Quarantine Stations (Plague houses),” Ellis Island Database, accessed Dec. 1, 2018, http://www.ellisland.se/english/quarantine_islands_newyork.asp.

¹⁷ “The Cholera,” *The New York Times*, April 19, 1866.

¹⁸ Tyson, “History of Quarantine,” accessed May 7, 2018, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/article/short-history-of-quarantine/>.

¹⁹ Jerrold M. Michael, “The National Board of Health: 1879–1883,” National Center for Biotechnology Information, Feb. 2011, accessed May 7, 2018, <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3001811/>.

national quarantine system. The weakness of the board though, was ironically written into the very law that created it. A clause within the founding act gave quarantine powers to the board for only four years, which meant the bill would need to be reenacted after that time for it to continue. Due to disagreements over state and federal power, the NBH's apparent overarching authority became controversial. Supporters of the NBH argued for its reenactment, but, most likely due to the absence of infectious epidemic diseases at that time, it was deemed unnecessary, resulting in the NBH's discontinuation.²⁰ The argument came down to: what takes prime importance in Americans' lives. Should Americans keep funding a department that prioritized quarantining and control of epidemics at a time when there were no epidemics? Or should Americans abandon it because it seemed like a waste of time and money?

The abandonment of the National Board of Health reminds us of how humans tend to focus on what is in front of them at that moment, rather than looking to the future. The NBH was important because it started a pattern of giving epidemic disease prevention inadequate attention, a model that others would follow. This would indeed be reflected in the not-so-distant-future by the navy's resistance to quarantine-action. These issues of wrongful prioritization and unpreparedness that led to disaster in 1918 were not sudden, but had been building for quite some time.

Quarantine Protocol and the Navy: The Lead Up to Epidemic

Three combining factors then—naval hygiene, Spanish Influenza itself, and maritime quarantine practices—contributed to the Spanish Flu's power to wreak havoc in the interior of the United States. The Royal Navy viewed quarantining as useless, and the United States Navy accepted that view without questioning it. Furthermore, the limited laws for quarantining cholera in New York set precedents that lingered. Alongside the failure of the National Board of Health, the U.S. Navy's policies, themselves, proved severe obstacles to effective quarantining. These two issues, underestimating the need for quarantines, and a narrow interpretation of how quarantines should operate, would turn out to be the main contributors to this epidemic in America.

Not all the blame, however, can be solely placed upon the navy for the Spanish Influenza's spread inland (although the navy had options to further prevent this spread, but decided not to take these options). Responsibility also should fall on the United States Public Health Service, a branch of the Treasury Department and the primary agency responsible for defending the United States against the influx of infectious disease. This government agency, however, was not ready for an epidemic of such scale. "Its [the USPHS] problems were roughly the same as those which had faced the army when the war broke out: it was suddenly called upon to do a job for which it had been created in theory, but for which it had never been prepared in reality," concludes historian Alfred W. Crosby in his book *America's Forgotten Pandemic*.²¹ The USPHS's inadequate response was a legacy of the National Board of Health's failure and unpreparedness. The NBH failed because people believed there was no reason to have a department that focused all its time on the prevention of epidemics via quarantine, with their main argument amounting to that notion that the country "did not have any epidemics." Yet, here was one, knocking at the door. The NBH's passivity was passed down to its successor organizations, no doubt resulting in its unpreparedness. In addition, the USPHS also embodied the problem of "law habits." Besides the Navy's failures, this is the single-largest issue that caused such spread of the second wave of flu.

²⁰ Michael, "National Board of Health," accessed May 7, 2018, <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3001811/>.

²¹ Crosby, *Forgotten Pandemic*, 49.

As of 1914, there were only six diseases that the United States Public Health Service deemed quarantinable, and this was stated directly in the navy's official medical handbooks. These diseases, as per the 1914 edition of the *Manual for the Medical Department of the United States Navy*, were: Cholera, yellow fever, smallpox, typhus fever, plague, and leprosy.²² Influenza was therefore not a quarantinable disease. More evidence of a dismissive attitude toward quarantining flu can be seen in another naval handbook, *Hospital Corps Handbook, United States Navy*. Under a section on threatening diseases titled "Methods of Control," influenza is dismissed with a simple notation: "Quarantine—None."²³ What this further proves is that the Public Health Service or the Navy *did* in fact take influenza into consideration, but it deemed it not worth isolating. The "law habit" effect is evident here, as only diseases that were problematic *at that time* (when the law was established) were considered, thus resulting in "habits" of only focusing on certain diseases: cholera—as in the New York incident—or the past epidemics of yellow fever in the United States. Officials looked to precedents for what diseases should be quarantined, when in reality, many more should have been on the list. But, with limited understanding of sanitation, disease, and a narrow conception of quarantining, the Public Health Service aided the navy in spreading the disease inland without ever realizing it. While not legally at fault, responsibility can be directly placed upon the navy for bad decision-making and prioritizing war, rather than public safety and containment of the flu.

Priorities and the Spread Inland

The U.S. Navy, of course, is not a cruise ship company or private yacht club. It is a branch of the U.S. Armed Forces. This means that the navy's priority and main concern was and remains the wars at hand and conflicts at sea. This may seem obvious, but it was perhaps the main contributor to the Spanish Flu's spread into America. While the Public Health Service may not have had any written legal way to quarantine the influenza at the ports, the navy could have taken matters into its own hands and curbed the flu's spread, but it largely did not.

The responsibility of the navy, in contrast to that of the Public Health Service, can be seen clearly in its medical protocol handbooks. Section 2733 of *Manual for the Medical Department of the United States Navy* reads: "The senior medical officer of the ship shall be prepared to furnish the quarantine officer, if required, with a statement relative to the health conditions prevailing on board ship." The section also states this stipulation: "Certain diseases of a contagious or infectious manner, not included among the quarantinable diseases under the quarantine laws and regulations of the Treasury Department will ordinarily be viewed by local or State authorities as constituting quarantinable diseases and their presence on board should be considered as rendering the vessel subject to quarantine restrictions."²⁴ Unmistakably, this says infectious diseases that were not listed under the quarantinable diseases section of the manual (such as Spanish Influenza, which was not one of the limited six seen earlier) *can* and *should* be subject to quarantine, and quarantines should be placed into effect by officers on the ship. However, the language states that the presence of such infectious disease "*should be considered* as rendering the vessel subject to quarantine restrictions." This usage of "should be considered" in the manual perhaps seemed less authoritative to naval officers: they had the power to *decide* if they wanted to quarantine their ships or not. With war at hand, a time-wasting quarantine was more than likely deemed pointless.

²² Government Printing Office, *Manual for the Medical Department of the United States Navy* (Washington: The Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, 1914), 158.

²³ Government Printing Office, *Hospital Corps Handbook, United States Navy* (Washington: The Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, 1923), 242.

²⁴ Gov. Printing Office, *Manual for the Medical Department*, 158.

Crosby demonstrates this issue of war-prioritization effectively. The acting surgeon general at the time, Crosby reveals, recommended to the army chief of staff that all troops bound for Europe be quarantined for one week prior to embarkation, that non-urgent troop movements overseas be suspended to prevent further spread of the Spanish Flu, and that the number of troops onboard ships be cut in half. But, “such were the demands of the Western Front that the War Department implemented only the first recommendation without stinting and rejected the others.”²⁵ This meant that the same number of ships with the same number of troops were spreading flu, with only a one-week quarantine in place. This resistance to disease prevention can also be seen in the actions of Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels. Daniels was a very controversial secretary, and many of his decrees and acts were later investigated and criticized. Since he was secretary of the navy, one might assume that Daniels would have made mention of this terrible epidemic in his records at some point and made strides to help. However, after scouring sources, including a book written by Daniels himself about his wartime experiences, titled *The Navy and the Nation: Wartime Addresses by Josephus Daniels, Brief Messages, Letters, and Utterances on Special Occasions*, no mention was found of the epidemic. This leads to the probability that even high up on the chain of naval command, the outbreak was put on the back burner.²⁶

Also, for comparison sake, it is worth noting that maritime quarantine practices did occur for the Spanish Flu with overwhelming success—just not by the U.S. Navy, nor in America. Australia actually had a very strict maritime quarantine against this flu, from fall of 1918 all the way until the winter of 1919. In addition, the nation’s Quarantine Service issued strict quarantine procedures for every ship leaving port and going elsewhere in the Pacific in order to limit any spread. Thus, every island that was connected to the world exclusively by ships from Australia saw nothing of the epidemic. The urgency of war, however, seemed to make all the difference for America.²⁷

What this Meant for America: Chicago as a Case Study

Chicago epitomizes the rapid changes defining early twentieth century life in urban America. From advances in architecture, to healthcare, manufacturing to movies, Chicago was the quintessence of progress in all forms. So, it is ironically fitting that this epidemic, symbolic of both needed change and of flaws in the health system, would have such an impact there. The fact that such devastation, leading to over 14,000 deaths from the flu or flu-complications, was brought to the midwestern city may seem strange, as it is so far inland.²⁸ The flu’s spread to the city, in fact, resulted from naval transport ships, only, in this case, instead of by ocean, flu-infested vessels came via the Great Lakes. The precise location of the portal into Chicago was the Great Lakes Naval Training Base. Once the disease reached the base (and the story is the same with many other naval bases), yeoman sailors rather than naval personnel spread the disease. Although, health officials on base did try to implement some quarantine measures, it was too late, and the virus reached further into the city.²⁹ Curiously, what may have aided in this spread besides the late quarantine measures and yeoman sailors, was that for some reason civilians were still allowed to visit the base, even when it was under quarantine.³⁰ After visiting, civilians could step on a train, head downtown to the

²⁵ Crosby, *Forgotten Pandemic*, 124.

²⁶ Josephus Daniels, *Brief Messages, Letters, and Utterances on Special Occasions* (New York: George H. Doran Company), 1919.

²⁷ Crosby, *Forgotten Pandemic*, 234.

²⁸ Crosby, *Forgotten Pandemic*, 60-61.

²⁹ University of Michigan Center for the History of Medicine and Michigan Publishing, “The American Influenza Epidemic of 1918-1919: Chicago, Illinois,” *Influenza Encyclopedia*, accessed Dec. 6, 2018, <https://www.influenzaarchive.org/cities/city-chicago.html#>.

³⁰ “Says Influenza at Great Lakes is Not Alarming,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, Sep 22, 1918.

country's largest railway junction, and spread flu everywhere they went. Businesses, pool halls, churches, dance clubs, and streetcars were closed to the public, but these measures were usually too-little too-late. As mentioned, all in all upwards of 14,000 Chicagoans died of influenza or influenza related complications, such as pneumonia, by the time the third wave of flu was over in March of 1919. To put this number in perspective, the population of Chicago as of 1918 was estimated at 2,596,681 people.³¹

Chicago offers a window to view the convergence of factors that led to the dire spread of this epidemic. The absence of legal quarantine procedures on the books and lack of experience in dealing with such issues, along with the navy's underestimation of the disease compounded initial mistakes and put millions at risk. This same story was repeated in countless port cities along the East Coast, creating an explosion of sickness.

What Has Changed, and What It Means Today

Most people at the time understood that the navy was one of the prime movers of Spanish Flu, though very little evidence was found suggesting people necessarily blamed or protested the navy at the time. No instances were found of any newspaper, sailor, or laymen specifically accusing the navy, or even suggesting the epidemic would be less virulent had the quarantine measures been stronger or if the navy had been less war-occupied. It appears people were more focused on how to survive the disease and war at hand, rather than determining fault.

This brings us full circle. Nurse Josie Brown risked her life heading into the flu-riddled city of Chicago in 1919. As soon as she stepped foot onto that Pullman, she was focused on helping others, not on who or what was to blame. The blame game did not garner any importance at the time. It is only in hindsight that historians see these common threads and focus on them. Still, understanding the past is important to planning for the future.

In regard to the responsibility of the navy, there have been significant changes in naval quarantine protocol leading up to current day—many a direct result of the Spanish Influenza epidemic. “Quarantine Regulations of the Navy,” a document issued by the Department of the Navy in June 2006, states directly: “The communicable diseases for which quarantine are authorized are cholera, diphtheria, infectious tuberculosis, plague, smallpox, yellow fever, viral hemorrhagic fevers (e.g., Lassa, Marburg, Ebola, Crimean-Congo South American, and others not yet isolated or named), severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), and influenza caused by novel or reemergent influenza viruses that are causing, or have the potential to cause, a pandemic.”³² This statement lists previous quarantinable diseases, but with the very telling addition of influenza, as having the “potential to cause a pandemic.” The fact that flu was made a quarantinable disease is in direct reference to the incidents of 1918.

Today, many in the United States and in developed countries around the world believe they are past the “ancient” problem of pandemics, let alone pandemics of the simple flu. What they may find surprising, however, is that experts say another pandemic is not only very possible, but to be expected. The most probable source of a future pandemic is not anticipated to be that of Ebola, MERS, or SARS, but influenza. In an interview, Centers for Disease Control Director Dr. Robert Redfield explained that “people ask me what keeps me up at night. And the thing that keeps me up at night is just what you brought up, pandemic flu. So, I think it's very possible.”³³ The lack of

³¹ Crosby, *Forgotten Pandemic*, 60.

³² Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, “OPNAV Instruction 6210.2” (Washington, D.C., 2006 Navy Pentagon), 3.

³³ “CDC Director Robert Redfield Says Pandemic Flu is ‘Very Possible,’” CBSN, Oct. 30, 2018, accessed May 7, 2018, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/cdc-director-robert-redfield-fears-pandemic-flu-is-possible-today/?ftag=CNM-00-10aac3a>.

knowledge and underestimation of the Spanish Flu virus of 1918 resulted in decimation. One hundred years later, we may have more knowledge of the flu, but this has perhaps led to complacency, once again. We have learned much since the days of the 1918 influenza, and we have become more prepared. But in some ways, we should also look at the past again, and see that we do not repeat our mistakes.

Using Propaganda to Understand English and Dutch views of the Indies, Asia, and Each Other in the Early 1600's

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In February 1623 events on the other side of the world from Britain and the Netherlands would strain the relationship between these two nations for the next century. On Amboyna, one of the Spice Islands (known colloquially as the Banda Islands) in Indonesia, a lone Japanese soldier asked a few too many questions—launching a conspiracy hunt by the Dutch Garrison. During a trial, that man, along with his fellow sailors and merchants, would be questioned and tortured as part of a search for conspirators. By the end of the trials, the Dutch executed ten Englishmen, nine Japanese, and one Portuguese for confessing to treason. When news of the executions hit Europe, a propaganda war flared. Both sides—the Dutch and the British—issued competing pamphlets assailing the other side's actions at Amboyna. During the subsequent Anglo-Dutch Wars, these pamphlets would be brought out time and again during the subsequent wars. Events on the Spice Islands, as depicted in pamphlets, continued to be debated and helped to fuel the fires of war.

The question of whether or not the executed men ever intended to seize the Dutch fort in Amboyna has been argued fervently to this day. Historians such as Karen Chancey argue that the English could not have taken the Island because they lacked the manpower for such an undertaking and had no reinforcements nearby.¹ Instead, the Dutch wanted to use the occasion to oust English competition in the Moluccas. Other scholars, such as D. K. Bassett and Alison Games, argued that it did not matter if the English could have taken the fort or not: the Dutch truly believed the English wanted to take it.² While both sides made good points, this paper approaches the question from a different perspective: that of looking at the propaganda produced by both factions to better understand English and Dutch views of the Indies, Asia, and each other in the seventeenth century. While much of the printed materials of the 1620s amounts to propaganda, it still provides important revelations about international relations and the Banda Islands. In other words, this paper, while not ignoring the charges of conspiracy and torture, instead asks what the English and Dutch knew about the Spice Islands and trade in the 1620s.

The conflict over the Spice Islands happened in the early seventeenth century, when European nations were looking to establish trading companies to import spices and goods from the East. Two of the most influential companies emerged at the turn of the century. The first was the British East India Company or EIC, created in the 1600s. The second and initially more profitable was the Dutch East India Company (VOC). The Dutch East India Company formed in 1602 and started with 540,000 guilders, a sum more than eight times the amount invested in the EIC when it formed.³ This was due to the fact that the Dutch allowed all citizens to invest in the company, not just a few hundred wealthy shareholders, as in the EIC's case. Since the VOC possessed more

¹ Karen Chancey, "The Amboyna Massacre in English Politics, 1624-1632," *Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies* 30, no. 4 (1998): 583-98.

² D.K. Bassett, "English Trade in Celebes, 1613-1667" *Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 31, no. 1 (181) (1958): 1-39; Alison Games, "Anglo-Dutch Connections and Overseas Enterprises: A Global Perspective on Lion Gardiner's World," *Early American Studies, An Interdisciplinary Journal* 9, no. 2 (Spring 2011): 435-61.

³ Robert Markley, *The Far East and the English Imagination, 1600-1730* (London: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 50.

capital, the Dutch functioned more effectively on the other side of the world than the EIC. Lacking the resources of the Dutch East India Company, the British focused on short-term moneymaking ventures to turn a quick profit; while the Dutch used their capital to establish a system capable of working over a long period of time. Thus, the Dutch made multiple calls on their many journeys to India and back. First, vessels would stop in China to sell silver bullion, then reinvest in Chinese silks, which were subsequently sold in Japan for copper and gold. These metals then were sold in India for textiles, which were traded in the Spice Islands for cloves, maces, and nutmeg. The Dutch returned to Europe with valuable spices. At each point in this cycle, the VOC profited by selling products in demand at their various markets.⁴

This said, the English and Dutch did not operate entirely independent from each other in the East Indies. According to historian Miles Ogborn, “The Dutch and the English shared an interest in breaking the monopoly of the Portuguese, but they were also competing against one another for valuable cargoes, for the political alliances with local powers, and for control over the markets in Europe that would produce profits for their shareholders and taxes for their governments.”⁵ In 1619, the Dutch and the English in Europe negotiated a treaty that was supposed to have their East India Companies work together. The short version of it had the English paying the Dutch one third of the costs of maintenance for forts and upkeep in the Indies for access to one third of the trade. This treaty sounds acceptable on paper for the English, who were having a difficult time getting established in India. In reality though, the English in India despised the treaty. The situation in the Spice Islands proved especially intolerable for the English, as they had to share housing with the Dutch. As Allison Games writes, “This cohabitation grated in important ways. It was not just the daily assaults on their dignity and the high rates the English were charged, although the English regarded these as infuriating insults. It was the inability to find any refuge. Each meal was another occasion to take offence; each month’s reckoning a reminder of Dutch power to extract high wages.” It was under these conditions that the English and Dutch came to clash: the first time in the Banda Islands, and the second on Amboyna Island. Each collision sparked propaganda that proved telling not only for what each group thought of the situation and their rivals, but for how future citizens would view the Indies as these pamphlets provided the propaganda and ideological background for wars between the English and the Dutch.

The Dutch issued the first propaganda volley in 1622 with the pamphlet, *The Hollanders declaration of the affaires of the East Indies*. It opened by declaring: “All the Islands of Banda...were by a special treaty...put under the protection of the high and mighty, the states general of the united Provinces, on condition to defend them from Portugal, and other enemies.”⁶ The legal-minded Dutch saw the East Indies primarily in terms of treaties: Who has treaties with whom, particularly if it is with the Dutch, and if those treaties are being kept. Here the Bandanese are depicted in terms of the treaty that they made with the Dutch for defense, and how that treaty means they owe the Dutch “all their fruits and spices at a fixed price.”⁷ The document proceeds to discuss how the Bandanese, aided by the British, broke their treaty with the Dutch and sold their spices to everyone besides them. A line within the document bemoaned how the Bandanese attacked and murdered people (most likely Dutch). They also stole goods from the warehouses. Yet, the focus remained on the treaties made and broken on the island. When the Dutch stormed the island with force, their justification was not the various attacks by the Bandanese, but the flagrant breakage of the treaty between the two groups. The English were introduced into the document in terms of the newly

⁴ Markley, “*The Far East and the English Imagination*,” 50.

⁵ Games, “Violence on the Fringes: The Virginia and Amboyna Massacres,” *History: The Journal of the Historical Association* 99 (July 2014): 505–29.

⁶ *The Hollanders Declaration of the Affaires of the East Indies. ... Faithfully Translated According to the Dutch Copie*, (London, 1622, Early English Books Online, Cambridge University Library), 1.

created treaty between the English and the Dutch. Furthermore, when the Dutch explained their reasoning for invading the Banda Islands, they explained “the Portugals, who are both their and our Enemies, with whom they seek to make nearer alliance of friendship, as already in the great Island named Banda, were some fifty or three score Portugals, who by some more assistance... would have been sufficient to have deprived both the English and the Netherlands Companies of the rights therein.”⁷ The Dutch here claimed a right to attack the Banda Islands because their “rights” would be denied otherwise. What were these prerogatives: in short, the rights they had in their treaty with the Bandanese. In this pamphlet the Dutch linked their case to treaties, except where issues concerned the Portuguese, who were always termed a threat and the word “enemy” was always in the same sentence when Portuguese were mentioned.

The Dutch did not stop with one document outlining their views on the East Indies. They produced sequels making similar claims about what happened in Amboyna. One such document opened by addressing treaties, though this time the treaties were with the people of Amboyna and England; the Dutch accused them of breaking their treaties. The pamphlet blasted the English for refusing to provide the Dutch ships of war as promised by the treaty. By withholding their ships, the English, the Dutch claimed, allowed the Spaniards to trade and emerge a threat into the area. The accusations against the people of Amboyna were worse: they were actually seeking a truce with the Spaniards, which violated their treaty with the Dutch. This added to the fact that the Spaniards were the “ancient adversaries” of both the Dutch and the people of Amboyna. This part pushed credulity: there was no way the Spanish could be ancient enemies of the people of Amboyna—there had not been contact between Europe and the East Indies long enough for that. Since the Spanish could not



Dutch torturing English Prisoners

be ancient enemies of the Ambonese, the Dutch must have viewed those who made treaties with the Dutch, in the Indies, as sharing the same enemies and friends as the Dutch.⁸

The Dutch’s view of the East Indies, as presented in their propaganda, centered intrinsically on treaties. Whether a group kept or broke provisions in treaties determined whether the Dutch saw them as ally or foe. It has only been by following treaties that a nation or group remained morally upright in the eyes of the Dutch. Trouble started when others began breaking the treaties, “as one outrage provokes another.”⁹ The Bandanese and Ambonese were attacked for committing immoral actions, such as murder, which was a clear violation against treaties made with the Dutch. Dutch views of the Portuguese and Spanish, however, were worse; they were morally reprehensible—the “sworn enemies” of the Dutch. To make treaties with the Portuguese or Spanish, only invited trouble from the Dutch.

English views of the East Indies differed from the Dutch on a fundamental level. While the Dutch saw the entire area in terms of treaties, the English view remained more nuanced. The British stressed working out relationships with people in the Indies, such as the Bandanese and the Chinese. This was evident in an English pamphlet which condemned the Dutch invasion of the Banda Islands. “So long as the fight endured, our Factors and

⁷ *The Hollanders Declaration of the Affaires of the East Indies*, 10.

⁸ *A True Relation of the Vnjust, Cruell, and Barbarous Proceedings against the English at Amboyna in the East-Indies*, (1625, Early English Books Online, Cambridge University Libraries), 12-16.

⁹ “*A True Relation*,” 5.

servants there (three English and eight Chinese) kept themselves within doors. ... Nevertheless, they sacked our house, took away all our goods, murdered three of our Chinese servants, bound the rest (as well English as Chinese) hand and foot, and treated then to cut their throats.”¹⁰ Obviously, the English had a working relationship with their Chinese servants, and they did not throw the Chinese servants out during the invasion. Chinese servants suffered the same miserable fate as English servants when the Dutch attacked them.

Compared to the Dutch, the English seemed to appreciate and view others in the Indies, like the people of Banda, in more than just contractual terms. The people of Banda had invited the English to set up business on the Islands through the free consent of the Bandanese.¹¹ This allowed for over eleven years of free trade with the English. When the invasion by the Dutch occurred, the Bandanese looked to the English for defense. While a treaty may have been the basis for this friendship with the Bandanese, it was never brought up. To the English, the people of Banda were allies, but while the English wanted to defend them, they were unable to do so. In fact, they were unable to even defend themselves from the Dutch, much less anyone else.

English pamphlets took a consistently negative view of the Dutch. To the British, the Dutch only succeeded in the East Indies because they used force and violence to get their way.¹² Even the names of English articles about Amboyna emphasize Dutch brutality. For instance, one title read: A true relation of the unjust, cruel and barbarous proceedings against the English.¹³ A woodcut on the cover of the pamphlet reinforced this idea (Figure 1).¹⁴ Here the Dutch are shown torturing the English with water and fire on the top. At the bottom, one Englishman prays on his knees while his executioner stands above him. The scene would have been very powerful to English audiences as torture in England was outlawed. The Dutch would later defend their actions as “soft torture” that did not permanently affect the body. This defense hardly stood up to the scrutiny of the English, who claimed the confessions obtained from the torture were inevitably lies.¹⁵ Thus anything gained from the tortured suspects was worth nothing in the eyes of the English. This whole panel further paints the Dutch as barbarous people. Inside the document, readers learned how the English protested their innocence to the Dutch over and over, yet their pleas fell on deaf ears, and they were tortured into confessing crimes.

Japanese soldiers employed by the Dutch also were depicted in the literature—although readers get little sense of the identity of the Japanese.¹⁶ This would imply that a person in England would have only limited knowledge of Japan, and that Japanese men were often employed by European powers. Some English men viewed the Japanese as sheep-like in Japan, but wolf-like elsewhere.¹⁷ However, the English had little real interaction with the Japanese. As the Dutch

¹⁰ *A Courante of Newes from the East India. ... Written to the East India Company in England from Their Factors There.* (London, 1622, Early English Books Online, Cambridge University Library), 5.

¹¹ *A Courante of Newes from the East India. ... Written to the East India Company in England from Their Factors There*, 5.

¹² “*A Courante of Newes from the East India,*” 1-6.

¹³ John Skinner and Dudley Digges. *A True Relation of the Late Cruell and Barbarous Tortures... As It Hath Byn Lately Delivered to the Kings Most Excellent Maiesty*, 1624, (Early English Books Online, Cambridge University Library).

¹⁴ The water torture used by the by the Dutch was legal in Holland and most of Europe at the time. England was the only exception which had a lot to do with why the English reacted to badly. The torture used by the Dutch is very similar to the waterboarding used by the Bush administration. The reactions to the torture by both the people using the torture and those using it played out remarkably similarly.

¹⁵ John Skinner and Dudley Digges, “*A True Relation of the Late Cruel and Barbarous Tortures,*” 20.

¹⁶ *The Emblem of Ingratitude a True Relation of the Unjust, Cruel, and Barbarous Proceedings ... Modern Records*, 1672, (Early English Books, Cambridge University Library), 9.

¹⁷ Adam Clulow, “Like Lambs in Japan and Devils Outside Their Land: Diplomacy, Violence, and Japanese Merchants in Southeast Asia,” *Journal of World History* 24, no. 2 (2013): 335–58.

¹⁷The Japanese soldiers recruited were often employed as mercenaries by the Dutch and other European powers. It does not seem as though the Japanese government was very upset about the execution of the Japanese soldier. That is probably because

prepared to execute the English and Japanese for treason, the Japanese were said to have called out to the English: “O yee Englishmen, where did we ever in our lives eate with you? Talke with you? Yea or to our remembrance see you?” This implies that the English, even though sharing a treaty with the Dutch, did not interact with the Dutch soldiers. This would seem to suggest that the English do not want to interact with other peoples. Yet, historian Robert Markley describes a related encounter between British and Japanese described in a pamphlet:

In Digges’s Answer unto the Dutch Pamphlet, Price is described as a drunken debauched sot who had threatened Tower and who ‘alone of all the English ... had some kinde of conversation with some of the Japons; that is, he would dice and drinke with them as he likewise did with other Blacks, and with the Dutch also... Price is a threat to the English factory as well as the Dutch because he moves easily among different national communities undermining the imaginary coherence of nation.¹⁸

Digges was doing two important things in his pamphlet. First, by mentioning that Price had “conversation” with the Japanese and non-British peoples, he contradicted the idea that the Japanese never interacted with the British. This flies in the face of other claims that the Japanese had no contacts with the British. Still, the pamphlet blames Price for being too willing to break cultural boundaries, a faux pas for the British. While working with other nationalities was a positive, cultural boundaries had to be maintained.

The propaganda released by the English and the Dutch offers a cornucopia of information about international relations. The Dutch, time and again, viewed the East Indies in terms of treaties. Dutch allies kept their treaties, while enemies broke treaties. The act of breaking a treaty with the Dutch inevitably led to violence on the part of the Dutch, such as in Amboyna and the Banda Islands. The English view tended to be much more nuanced. While treaties played a role in shaping English views of other nations, they are not the only underlying factor. For instance, the English viewed the Dutch as barbarous for using torture and treacherous for breaking their treaties and for the way they acted towards other groups of people. The English viewed other nations as friends, such as the people of the Banda Islands, but ultimately thought all nations needed to keep distinct identities from each other.

Tokugawa had made a statement a few years before that all Japanese outside of Japan were subject to local laws and customs. The Japanese government cared about protecting their authority but not as much about protecting their citizens outside of Japan.

¹⁸ Clulow, “Like Lambs in Japan and Devils Outside Their Land,” 335–58.

**Review of *The Death of Caesar: The Story of History's Most Famous Assassination*, by Barry S. Strauss (New York: Simon and Shuster, 2015).
Chase A. Kramer**

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The events surrounding Julius Caesar's assassination in March 44 BC long have interested scholars and general audiences alike. Yet the story of the killing has been repeated so many times in historical fiction and drama that many only remember the incident through Shakespeare's play and other fictional accounts. Reading Cornell University Professor Barry Strauss's *The Death of Caesar*, however, readers can finally get a more realistic take on one of the most pivotal events in Roman history.

Most impressive, the author meticulously dispels the imaginative dramatizations and myths that poets and fiction writers have spun out of a single bloody event. In their place, Strauss knits together accounts from sources closest to the time such as Plutarch and Suetonius. This provides a better understanding on the motives and points of view of conspirators like Brutus and Cassius, as well as some major players like Decimus, who is not as remembered as other conspirators.

However, at the same time, the vast number of sources Strauss uses can sometimes leave the reader confused. This is not surprising given the multitude of diverse sources Strauss weaves together, none of which can convey the whole story, but each of which has important elements of truth related to one of history's most important moments.

Regardless, this book is highly recommend for anyone who wants to study a notorious subject on which much has been written but much remains hidden behind myths and fictional stories. While Strauss' work can be challenging to follow, it offers a new and modern look at the stunning murder of one the ancient world's most colorful individuals.