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## Out With the Old and In With the New: Competing Imperial Models and the Political Engineering Behind Creation of Iraq

*Robert Wallace*

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While much has been discussed regarding Anglo-Arab, Anglo-French, and Anglo-Zionist relations during and directly after World War I, there is another important category encompassing the various offices within the British Imperial government itself which can be classified as Anglo-Anglo/Indian. During the war a clear division arose between the old ways of British Imperialism in India and the new, indirect model that was emerging out of London and Cairo. The common theme that was shared between these two models was control, but how to keep it was the source of the divergence. The Indian Office and the Government of India, which was largely in control of Mesopotamia throughout the war, favored a direct model that would bring Mesopotamia under the Indian sphere of influence. While the Foreign Office and British officials in Cairo were more worried about the expense this would create for the empire. These officials sought the creation of an Arab state under British “supervision,” which would decrease imperial responsibilities and thus expense. What resulted was a constant push-pull movement that led the British to weave a web of confusing, contradictory, and non-centralized foreign policy towards Mesopotamia that led would only be unraveled with the Mandate granted by the League of Nations. This paper will examine the earliest British interests in Mesopotamia through the placing of King Faisal upon the throne and the forging of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1922, in order to dissect the political motivations each British center of influence, as they pressed their differing opinions against the other.

At the onset of World War I, Mesopotamia was under the control of the Ottoman Empire and had been since 1534. Over this time span, the area remained a decentralized frontier for the Ottoman Empire. The government administrative duties were left to local families, sheikhs, and former Ottoman soldiers, and his localized form of government allowed the three vilayets of Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra to branch off into their own spheres of influence. Mosul looked to Anatolia for direction, while the Arabs in Baghdad sought a connection to

Damascus and Beirut, and Basra identified with other states of the Persian Gulf.<sup>1</sup>

The British came into the picture in the late eighteenth-century largely as a result of strategic and economic factors. This expansion grew out of an increasing emphasis on securing the growing trade routes to India by both land and within the Persian Gulf. The British began using Mesopotamia for naval stopovers, mail links, missionary stations, diplomatic residencies, and commercial ports,<sup>2</sup> establishing a permanent government agent in Baghdad in 1798 to help counter Napoleon if he marched towards India. By the 1830s, they had taken commercial and strategic interests in the Euphrates and sent steam ships up the river to judge its' navigability. By the 1850s and fears over a Russian push to the Persian Gulf, the British turned towards railroads, which gained both public and governmental support but no formal plans were undertaken.<sup>3</sup> The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 only enhanced the importance of the Indian Ocean trade routes.<sup>4</sup> The possibility of the French once again being able to dictate British commerce within the Indian Ocean, once again renewed calls for railways, but none materialized because the British soon had control of the canal.<sup>5</sup>

During the early and mid nineteenth-century, the British presence and influence was prevalent but very chaotic. Government ties within the British system were overlapping and complicated. Many of the officials placed in Basra and Constantinople reported to offices in Cairo and London, while the British Resident in Baghdad took orders form and reported to Delhi.<sup>6</sup> The problems this intricate system of loyalty created was causing problems already, but were very small when compared with what was to come.

It is also important to note that during the eighteenth century British officials from both Whitehall and Delhi showed no plans to incorporate Mesopotamia into its empire. The Indian Mutiny of 1857 led the British government into an unwillingness to acquire anymore "orientals" within the empire. Instead, Britain supported the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire through encouragement of economical and administrative reforms in the latter decades of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, seeking to bring the Ottomans into a more modern system of

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<sup>1</sup> Reeva Spector Simon and Eleanor H. Tejirian, "The Creation of Iraq: The Frontier as State", *The Creation of Iraq, 1914-1921*, eds. Reeva Spector Simon and Eleanor H. Tejirian, 1-17. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 4.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 8.

<sup>3</sup> Stuart A. Cohen, *British Policy in Mesopotamia, 1903-1914*. (London: Ithaca Press, 1976), 4.

<sup>4</sup> Simon and Tejirian, "Creation", 8.

<sup>5</sup> Cohen, *British Policy*, 4-5.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, "The Creation of Iraq", 8-9.

government and centralized society. By shoring up the Ottoman Empire it would be easier for the British to maintain a buffer state through influence, trade agreements, and diplomacy against any rival that could threaten India.<sup>7</sup> While some scholars argue the British take over of Cyprus (1878) and Egypt (1882) as the Ottomans withdrew contradicts this last statement, arguing the actions characterize imperial ambitions. It was here that European politics took precedence. The balance of power, fear of continental rivals, and economic necessity spurred the British action to fill a power vacuum in these provinces and protect their interests against rivals, not a desire for imperial power.<sup>8</sup>

However, the British were not able to keep their European rivals out of the affairs of the Ottomans at the turn of the century. In addition to the international incursion of the Baghdad Railway, the Young Turks Revolution of 1908 had placed the Committee of Union and Progress in power and the party had begun centralizing control over the empire and issued modernization programs. These programs required aided from European powers to succeed. While the British were the major trading partners for the Ottomans, the French were able to gain a toehold by investing in the large public works programs and the Germans became heavily involved with reforming the Ottoman military in 1909. This led the British into strained relations with the empire that would influence the Ottomans' allegiance at the start of the war, culminating in the seizure of two Ottoman ships waiting to leave port in Britain and the Ottomans turning to the Germans for naval aid.<sup>9</sup>

With the outbreak of war in 1914, things began to rapidly change for the British. The British and their allies were all forced to reassess their territorial ambitions in the Middle East in accordance with the threats that were now posed to their overseas territories by both enemies and each other. However, this was neither an easy, nor a centralized affair. The complexities of this rapid change came from three centers of power within the empire, London, Cairo, and Delhi, which all had officials stationed in Mesopotamia. In the beginning, the same concerns were shared between the three centers, oil and the defense of India. While no oil reserves had been discovered in the Ottoman Empire by 1914, reserves had been discovered in South West Persia in 1907 and found to contain a substantial amount of the "black gold." Oil had become an ever-increasing concern for the Royal Navy at the turn of the century, which drove the British government to obtain majority

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<sup>7</sup> Elizabeth Monroe, *Britain's Moments in the Middle East*. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1963), 15-16.

<sup>8</sup> Aaron S. Klieman, *Foundations of British Foreign Policy in the Arab World*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), 2.

<sup>9</sup> D.K. Feildhouse, *Western Imperialism in the Middle East, 1914-1958*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 37-38.

shareholder status in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in early 1914.<sup>10</sup> It had been receiving some 25,000 tons of oil a month southern Persia.<sup>11</sup> With the Ottomans entering the conflict on the side of the Central Powers, the British government, more specifically the Admiralty, was increasingly concerned there would not only fuel for its ships if the Ottomans or Germans seized supply lines.<sup>12</sup>

India, with its trade routes and strategic military position, was another aspect of high concern. The trade routes through Mesopotamia and in the Persian Gulf would be threatened by enemy incursions into the region, which could cut off India from the rest of the empire. On the scale of importance within the empire India was rate second, only behind the Royal Navy, in the inaugural report from the Committee of Imperial Defense in 1904. By 1913, India accounted for nearly 10% of total British trade in the commercial market. Beyond the economic realm, approximately half of the British army was stationed in India, along with nearly 250,000 Indian troops controlled by British officers.<sup>13</sup> Therefore, the fear of German-sponsored aggression in Mesopotamia against these vital interests led the British government to send the Indian Expeditionary Force D to invade the region.

Basra was the first objective on the list and as a precaution London and the Government of India had agreed upon and dispatched a force on October 2 to linger in the Persian Gulf in the Ottomans declared war on the Allies. They did not have to wait long as the Ottomans began to attack Russian ports on the Black Sea.<sup>14</sup> These forces landed and occupied Basra and Fao by the end of October 1914 with the objective of keeping German and Russian ambitions in check.<sup>15</sup> With Basra occupied, some form of established order was a necessity for the IEF, and the political officials went with the system they knew best. This model of administration revolved around the old ways of British imperialism of the nineteenth-century and has become known as the India model. This elitist thinking behind the old imperialism was still very strong in the Indian government in the early twentieth-century. It retained the strong racial stereotypes where Natives were largely seen as untrustworthy and incapable of governing themselves. It was the job

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<sup>10</sup> Peter Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq: Contriving King and Country*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 3-4.

<sup>11</sup> Monroe, *Britain's Moments in the Middle East*, 25.

<sup>12</sup> Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq*, 4.

<sup>13</sup> Monroe, *Britain's Moment*, 12.

<sup>14</sup> Monroe, *Britain's Moment*, 25.

<sup>15</sup> Judith S. Yaphé, "The View from Basra: Southern Iraq's Reaction to War and Occupation, 1915-1925" *The Creation of Iraq, 1914-1921*, eds. Reeva Spector Simon and Eleanor H. Tejirian, 20-35. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 20.

of the white officials to hold all the major offices in the government, leaving natives to largely menial tasks.

Therefore, just as in India, the British began setting up an administration dominated by white officials with direct rule over the “corrupt” natives.<sup>16</sup> With their new found control and influence, Indian officials began to dream of an empire within an empire network that would expand Indian rule to Mesopotamia. They rationalized this dream with the belief that since Indian forces had fought hard and sacrificed for the good of the empire Basra would suffice as ‘payment’ for this debt.<sup>17</sup>

This action was quickly opposed by British officials from Cairo and the Foreign Office in London, who saw a strategic asset in Mesopotamia and its Arab population. Cairo was more in tune with the emerging trends towards indirect imperialism and also recognized the negative affects that a British takeover of an Arab province could have on Arab Muslim opinion elsewhere, particularly Cairo itself, and hinder gaining their support against the Turks.<sup>18</sup> London reacted with uncertainty best stated by Sir Arthur Hirtzel, head of the Political Department, when he said: “It will probably be admitted that the government will be undertaken by the Government of India; but it is by no means certain that it will eventually prove desirable to take an Indian district as the model for it.”<sup>19</sup>

The de Bunsen committee was formed under the direction of Sir Maurice de Bunsen in April of 1915 in an attempt to remedy the situation that was developing over imperial policy in Mesopotamia, but would fail to do so. It consisted of officials from the Foreign Office, India Office, War Office, Admiralty, and the Board of Trade, with assistance from the Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, Maurice Hankey and his assistant Mark Sykes. While this brought all the major players to the table, the committee did little to outline a solid policy. Instead, the committee laid out several choices that hinged on different possible outcomes of the war, such as the fate of an independent Turkey with or without Constantinople and how the spoils would be divided based on partition or by spheres of influence.<sup>20</sup>

With no centralized policy to hold to, there was little London could do at this point to leash the lunging hound that was the military branch of the IEF. The military and political officials from India in Mesopotamia showed more ambition for extending their conquest of the

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<sup>16</sup> Sluggett, *Britain*, 15.

<sup>17</sup> Briton Cooper Busch, *Britain, India, and the Arabs, 1914-1921*, (California: University of California Press), 54-55.

<sup>18</sup> Busch, *Britain, India, and the Arabs*, 56-57.

<sup>19</sup> *Mesopotamia Commission Report*, 15 in Peter Sluggett, *Britain in Iraq*, 10.

<sup>20</sup> Monroe, *Britain's Moment*, 29-30.

region, and after securing Basra quickly began pressuring for a push to Baghdad.<sup>21</sup> This ambition would actually spark the beginning of the end for India's power in Mesopotamia, as the campaign did not go well. The IEF proceeded to push on to Baghdad and were within 25 miles by November 1915, but were met with fierce resistance by the Ottomans. They were at the end of their supply lines and while defeating the Ottomans at every turn the British now had half of the force they had started with. They were eventually forced to fall back to Kut and became surrounded. While they held out for 146 days, the longest siege in British history, supplies ran thin and a large Ottoman force prevented a relief force from reaching them. The British were forced to surrender on April 26, 1916. Their surrender marked 1915 as a terrible year for the Indian officials in Mesopotamia, with the exception of conquering Basra, and to add insult to injury the military command of the IEF was taken from the India Office.<sup>22</sup>

This gave the opposition of the India model a chance to shift away from the old colonial model and pressure for their new plans. The Foreign Office and officials in Cairo had begun working on plans to form an Arab state under the rule of the Sharif of Mecca and beginning in July of 1915 the British High Commissioner in Cairo, Sir Henry McMahon, began exchanging correspondence with the Sharif to negotiate a deal.<sup>23</sup> While the correspondence is full of vague promises and misguided interpretations that would lead to headaches on both sides, it was abundantly clear that in Cairo and London, direct control of Mesopotamia by any part of the British Empire was not favored. They did not clearly establish with the Sharif what exactly would encompass the new Arab state, but they did insist that British interests and established positions would require separate administrative arrangements to be made later, and thus an indirect model of controlling the region.<sup>24</sup>

Even without direct agreement, the Sharif went ahead and supported the British idea of an Arab revolt, which began in 1916. The outcome played right into the hands of the British in Cairo. With the revolts in Syria and their brutal suppression by the Ottomans, many social and educated elites and Arab nationalists in Baghdad began to shift their support to the British. This was all met with fierce opposition by the Viceroy of India, who feared that a revolt led by the Sharif would cause the leader to be regarded as a rebel by Indian Muslims and also

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<sup>21</sup> Peter Sluggett, *Britain in Iraq*, 10.

<sup>22</sup> Spector and Tejirian, "Creation", 11.

<sup>23</sup> Elie Kedourie, *In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth: The McMahon-Husayn Correspondence and its Interpretations, 1914-1939*, (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 3.

<sup>24</sup> Kedourie, *Foundations*, 10.

lead to outcry against the British for placing Muslim holy sites in danger.<sup>25</sup>

While Cairo was inciting Arab revolt, French and British official also established, in secret, the Sykes-Picot agreement. Negotiations began in November 1915 with the support of the Foreign Office, Indian Office, and the Quai d'Orsay.<sup>26</sup> The British and French were eager to make sure they got their fair share the Ottoman Empire, but in the process largely ignored the promises that were being made to the Sharif concurrently by McMahon. There were some similarities between the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the assurances being made to Mecca in the sense that both agreed to direct control over southern Mesopotamia under British rule, while the French would gain the coastal regions of Syria and Lebanon, and both vaguely secured the independence of the Arab people.

Where these agreements differed, the influence of the India model can be seen. Only in the Sykes-Picot agreement were the British awarded the enclaves of Acre, Haifa, and an established zone of control to Kut, the French awarded the sole "advisory" role over the interior of Syria to Mosul, and Palestine awarded to an international administration committee. In the McMahon correspondents the Sharif was led to believe that the interior of Syria would be completely independent from foreign influence. At its core, it mixes the basic views of London and the India Office, yet through the Sykes-Picot Agreement the British received both the buffer-state against Russia it wanted and established boundaries along spheres of influence, both of which the Indian officials advocated for.<sup>27</sup>

From 1916-1917 things did not get much better. The political dynamics left the British in a storm of political maneuvering, but the winds would soon change in London's favor. While the defeat at Kut resulted in the removal of the India Office from the military command of the Mesopotamian campaign, the political power and ideas of the office on the ground in Mesopotamia continued. London was increasingly growing more hostile to the abilities of the Indian officials to govern Mesopotamia. Mark Sykes himself stated in 1916 that India officials were not capable of running a Pro-Arab policy that London demanded "and if you work from India you have all the old traditions of black and white, and you can not run the Arabs on black and white lines."<sup>28</sup>

By March 1917 and the taking of Baghdad, Allied forces were confident that victory over the Ottomans was in their grasp. At this

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<sup>25</sup> Monroe, *Britain's Moment*, 36.

<sup>26</sup> Fieldhouse, *Western Imperialism*, 50.

<sup>27</sup> Monroe, *Britain's Moment*, 33.

<sup>28</sup> Memorandum on Sykes evidence to Cabinet, 6 July 1916, *Sykes Papers* (Oxford) in Busch, *Britain, India, and the Arabs*, 121.

point there was nothing to stop the Indian officials in Baghdad from instituting direct control over the new province. Also, a complete overhaul of the administrative system was not feasible for London to undertake at this point. The British network of officials stationed throughout the provinces would soon treat the two provinces as a single administrative unit and left little room for any other approach for controlling the region even with the shift of power over policy the British were beginning to experience. They had abolished old Ottoman institutions like the elected municipal councils and used direct links from British officers with local notables to maintain order. This gave the impression that the British were preparing to incorporate the region directly into the empire, while still supporting the ideas of an Arab state at the same time.<sup>29</sup>

In several months things would begin to get better for London, but Delhi and Baghdad were not giving up their ambitions. The US entrance into the conflict also strengthened the growing decisiveness that now came from London and Cairo in 1917 and President Wilson's ideas for a new international order that are found in his 14 Points speech. These new ideals challenged the direct occupation and the administrative model in Mesopotamia that had been in place for several years. This did not settle well with many Indian official, as the Foreign Office was now able to push to adapt the old ways and current administrative networks to meet this new demand and keep American support.<sup>30</sup> This situation continued until the end of the war.

With the following conferences and treaties of peace and territorial claims, the new, indirect model would emerge victorious under the guise of the League of Nations mandate. Between the Armistice of Mudros in October 1918 and the conference of San Remo in 1920 and the granting of the mandate the British largely dragged their feet in Mesopotamia. The Paris Peace Conference did little to determine the future of the region. When the conference ended in January 1920, the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations Covenant basically handed over the Near and Middle East to the consultation of England and France.<sup>31</sup>

While it was clear that Britain must conform to the League of Nations restrictions to be granted the mandate over the region and establish indirect control as "temporary advisors," there were still a few remaining Indian officials that sought to delay the inevitable before the mandate. One of the best examples of the resistance is Sir Arnold T. Wilson, the acting High Commissioner of Iraq at the time. He refused

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<sup>29</sup> Charles Tripp, *A History of Iraq, Second Edition*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 37.

<sup>30</sup> Sluggett, *Britain in Iraq*, 13.

<sup>31</sup> Klieman, *Foundations*, 2.



the basic Wilsonian ideas of self-determination and political autonomy in favor of what he had always known. He felt that establishment of an Arab-staffed administration would greatly impede good governance, efficiency, and law and order in Iraq. When asked to pay more attention to the situation and gather information about the popular sentiment of the region he made sure that only those opinions that agreed with him made it to London.<sup>32</sup> This came in the form of a survey of he organized in early 1919 that sought the opinions of Arab notables on the future of a state and its style of government. The findings of this survey did support an Arab state consisting of the three provinces of Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul, but the ideas over government were far from having a consensus. With these results, Wilson exaggerated the figures to make it seem like the local notables favored the direct rule by the British.<sup>33</sup> In a way Wilson was trying to maintain the direct model of rule, while turning the new ideas of self-determination as a means to support his old views.

The most significant moment for cementing a singular British policy came at San Remo in April 1920, when the Allies met to determine the territorial distribution under the Class A mandates from League of Nations. These mandates, focusing on the former territories of the Ottomans, forced the British to form a concise policy of indirect rule, with the understanding that the British would oversee the creation of the new Arab state and relinquish power to the new government as soon as possible. While the Foreign Office was scrambling to pose Britain as being supportive of the Wilsonian ideas of self-determination, they actually had little interest in giving up British control of Mesopotamia in the near future and could now do it on their terms. With this the Indian involvement in the politics of Iraq became increasingly separated because of its isolation from the post-war turmoil of Europe and the slow infiltration of Wilsonian ideas to officials in India.<sup>34</sup>

The British quickly sought to implement several of the key components in Iraq by recalling Sir Percy Cox to relieve Wilson, who had been his temporary successor. Cox immediately set to work by placing urban notables into a cabinet and overturned many of Wilson's old ways of administering. Not everyone was happy though. The issuing of the mandate sparked a revolt in the region that would spur the Arab population. The revolt was crushed in four months but it was also a costly for both sides. Casualties for the British were 426 troops killed and three times that wounded, while the Iraqis suffered some 8,000

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<sup>32</sup> Toby Dodge, *Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 16.

<sup>33</sup> Tripp, *A History of Iraq*, 37.

<sup>34</sup> Dodge, *Inventing Iraq*, 7.

casualties.<sup>35</sup> As a result questions developed among the British that included: how to best maintain indirect control over Iraq, how to best maintain the supremacy of British interests, and how the mandated country should be governed.

In the hope of finding solid answers to these troubling questions British officials, led by Winston Churchill, gathered at the Cairo Conference in March 1921. This conference would put the final nail in the coffin for those last remnants still supporting a direct model and created a common policy that established the tools for indirect control. The last revolt had been costly for the British and they now sought to maintain order and control over their interests in the least expensive way. While many of the conclusions had already been decided in London the previous December, there were four main resolutions proposed in Cairo: who should be the new Arab ruler, how to deal with the Kurdish situation in the north, how to reduce British expense at the current moment, and plan a defense strategy for after British ground forces withdraw.<sup>36</sup>

They found one solution in a constitutional monarch that was to be established under the Hashimite Amir Faisal, who had been the leader of the Arab revolt in 1916 and had good relations with the British.<sup>37</sup> This, for the British, would set up a government in Iraq that would be “obligated” to the interests of His Majesty’s government in return for their both past and present support.<sup>38</sup> Expense was to be reduced as ground troops would be withdrawn quickly and the RAF was given the prominent role in the defense of Iraq. While British army officers and political officials would stay and assist in troop training and be kept on as advisors answerable only to the High Commissioner, who himself would stay to guide the King in matters of foreign policy.<sup>39</sup>

King Faisal took the throne on August 23 1921 and received much indifference from his subjects. Iraqis largely saw little other options at this point.<sup>40</sup> They had already been through a failed revolt in the previous year that had been forcefully suppressed by the British and at the current moment the majority saw no alternatives, with the exception of the Kurds and some Shi’a. The move appeared to maintain the status quo for the international community. Even in the following two years, High Commission Cox still had supreme authority over the newly established Cabinet and the minister had British “advisor” to give

<sup>35</sup> Fieldhouse, *Western Imperialism*, 86.

<sup>36</sup> Fieldhouse, *Western Imperialism*, 89.

<sup>37</sup> Tripp, *History of Iraq*, 47

<sup>38</sup> Christopher Catherwood, *Churchill's Folly How Winston Churchill Created Modern Iraq* ( New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2004), 141.

<sup>39</sup> Fieldhouse, *Britain's Moment*, 90-91, 92.

<sup>40</sup> Tripp, *A History of Iraq*, 48.

them direction. The High Commissioners office had also maintained interactions with both the king and the cabinet of notables regarding daily governance, which was not allowed in the mandate, by the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1922.<sup>41</sup>

At its fundamental basis this treaty was a way for the British to sidestep the mandate, while still looking like it was upholding its ideals. The treaty subverted Iraq authority over the military and financial realms of the country, forcing the Iraqis to pay for the defense of their country on British terms. There were many problems with this for the Iraqis but many agreed to it on the belief that be amended or rejected by the Constituent Assembly. The King himself resisted the treaty but after falling ill in August and Cox establishing direct rule in his stead and throwing many opposition members in jail, Faisal realized his situation and signed the draft treaty. Opposition was only lessened in April 1923 when the time span of the agreement was shortened from 20 to 4 years after the conclusion of Lausanne Treaty with Turkey.<sup>42</sup> While London had managed to gain indirect control over a still incomplete Iraq, it was not so willing to relinquish the power it had gained in order to follow the mandate's requirement and Iraq remained under the British mandate until 1932.

The focus of this paper has been to examine the tensions with the British government over the course of World War I and the following five years, examining the political engineering behind the formation of Iraq and revealing the very complex political relations that existed. The two competing models, under the changing views of imperialism, never provided a simple distinction for the British government to establish a firm policy during the war, leaving scholars to unravel this tangled mess of political yarn. It is clear that the India model met its doom with the mandate, which in turn, gave the indirect model its chance to dominate Iraq through treaties that subverted the mandate's ideals. While the international views towards imperials had shifted, the imperial ghost continued to lurk in the Middle East for years to come.

*Robert Wallace, of Dundas, Illinois, wrote this essay in the spring of 2010 for Dr. Yayıcioglu's graduate level seminar Debates in Modern Middle Eastern History. He received his BA in History from EIU in May 2008 and his MA from EIU in the spring of 2011.*

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<sup>41</sup> Dodge, *Inventing Iraq*, 18.

<sup>42</sup> Fieldhouse, *Western Imperialism*, 93.