

## The (Not So) Poor Knights of the Temple

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The Knights Templar present historians with an interesting if murky subject. The literature devoted to this military-religious order, though usually quite well-researched, remains steeped in folklore. These legends include all manner of bizarre practices, and links to such divers groups as the infamous Cult of Assassins, the Merovingian dynasty, and the Freemasons.<sup>1</sup> However if we focus our attention on the historical Templars, we find a unique military order which achieved remarkable successes during its existence. These accomplishments included not only military victories, but the creation of an international supply network linking Latin Europe with the lands of Outremer. It allowed the Templars to take advantage of certain political, religious and especially economic realities created by the success of the First Crusade. The formation and evolution of this network, its function, and its makeup are the focus of this study.

The Poor Knights of the Temple of Solomon rose quickly to power. In 1119, Hugh de Payens and eight other knights began protecting pilgrims on the treacherous roads of the Holy Land.<sup>2</sup> King Baldwin of Jerusalem welcomed these pious warrior-monks and granted them lavish quarters on the site of the Temple of Solomon.<sup>3</sup> Despite this splendor, the new Order lived by the Rule of St. Augustine, binding them to the Church instead of secular authorities. The Templars toiled and fought in relative obscurity during their first years before receiving enthusiastic support from

<sup>1</sup>Readers interested in this aspect of the subject should consult any of the secondary works cited hereafter.

<sup>2</sup>Peter Partner, *The Knights Templar and their Myth* (Rochester, Vermont, 1989), 3.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, 3-4.

the great religious leader, Bernard of Clairvaux. One of Bernard's greatest patrons was Hugh, Count of Champagne, a Templar who had granted the monk the land for his monastery.<sup>4</sup>

In 1128, after some correspondence with Bernard and other church dignitaries, a council met in Troyes to give the Templars official status.<sup>5</sup> Bernard himself helped draw up the original Templar Rule, based on that of the Cistercian Order.<sup>6</sup> This Rule combined "those who pray", the first medieval estate with "those who fight"; the second, to produce a religious order dedicated to protecting the faithful and fighting the infidel. Ideally it would confer on its followers harmony between sword and altar. The Templars would become "Knights of Christ."

### Establishing the Means

The Council of Troyes coincided with an extensive charitable campaign in Western Europe. The Templars were well-placed to take advantage of the outflow of donations to the Church which occurred in the twelfth century. Within twenty years the Templars had established estates throughout Europe, and were funneling supplies, funds, and men to the Holy Land.

The success of this campaign is more easily understood when one recognizes the changing mentality of crusading Europe. Economically, Europe was in a stage of transition from gift to profit economy.<sup>7</sup> Attitudes, especially among the nobility, tended to favor a system of reciprocal exchange similar to those documented by anthropologists among traditional societies.<sup>8</sup> Kings, dukes, and counts showed their appreciation for a cause or person and demonstrated their own generosity by bestowing donations and presents. William Marshall, in the years when he lived by his sword (1160-1180), showered gifts freely upon fellow knights after successful tournaments, even though he was

<sup>4</sup>Stephen Howarth, *The Knights Templar* (New York, 1982), 49.

<sup>5</sup>Partner, *The Knights Templar and their Myth*, 5.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, 6.

<sup>7</sup>Lester K. Little, *Religious Poverty and the Profit Economy in Medieval Europe* (Ithaca, New York, 1978), ch. 1.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*

often in debt to others.<sup>9</sup> Thus, the aristocratic ethos demanded frequent donation of estates and money without regard of economic return.

The Templars reputation and the cause they defended designated them as a prime target for such gift-giving. They were initially perceived as "poor knights" engaged in a very noble and holy endeavor, which helped to build their patrimony. Bernard embraced the Templars because unlike other knights, they were not barbarous pillagers living in excess, who would later seek absolution from the Church. High ranking nobles and churchmen responded positively to the Templar image as well, even if there was some apprehension about "fighting monks." Warriors saw the Order as a new and better path to salvation. They could take up the sword for Christ and continue as knights, instead of singing and writing in the monastery.

The very first grants preceded the Council of Troyes. Theobald, Count of Blois (also nephew and successor to the Templar Hugh, former Count of Champagne) granted the Order "a house, grange, and meadow, together with one tenement of one carucate, at Barbonne..., as well as conceding to his own vassals the right to make gifts from their own lands."<sup>10</sup> Hugh de Paycens, Grand Master, gave up his own holdings to the Order, and campaigned for more grants. He received lands almost immediately from William Clito, Count of Flanders, as well as holdings in Anjou and Poitou.<sup>11</sup> Hugh campaigned in England as well, receiving several grants, including the original London Temple.<sup>12</sup> All of these initial gifts came in 1127-28 as Bernard and Hugh were seeking official recognition.

Early donors to the Order included some of the greatest lords in Christendom. Henry I and Stephen, Kings of England, made substantial gifts to the order, as did Eleanor of Aquitaine.<sup>13</sup> Lesser European nobles embraced the Templars, and the Order soon established preceptories throughout the West. Perhaps the

<sup>9</sup>Georges Duby, *William Marshall: The Flower of Chivalry* (New York, 1985), 110-1.

<sup>10</sup>Malcolm Barber, *The New Knighthood: A History of the Order of the Temple* (Cambridge, 1994), 13.

<sup>11</sup>*Ibid.*, 13.

<sup>12</sup>Howarth, *The Knights Templar*, 64.

<sup>13</sup>Barber, *The New Knighthood*, 24-6.

most famous grant was that of Alfonso I of Aragon, who left them one-third of his kingdom.<sup>14</sup> Though the gesture impossible to implement, it strongly illustrates this initial enthusiasm among the nobility.

Poorer laymen expressed generosity towards the Templars also. Donations from the former included sums as low as one *denier*, as well as small estates, horses, armor, and weaponry.<sup>15</sup> Great church dignitaries also made generous gifts. The Archbishop of Reims, and Bishops of Soissons and Angers all made early contributions comprising coin and certain profitable burial rights.<sup>16</sup> In the 1130s, Pope Innocent II donated a mark of gold (a substantial sum) annually, while his Chancellor gave two ounces of gold. Archbishops, bishops, and abbots were encouraged to give a mark of silver.<sup>17</sup>

Perhaps nearly as important as grants of land and money were the many privileges and exemptions extended to the Templars. In England, King Stephen exempted the Order from all taxes. This policy was further strengthened by a charter granted by Richard the Lion-Heart in 1189, later renewed by John Lackland, by Henry III, and by Edward I.<sup>18</sup> These privileges included freedom of warren, waste, and regard, as well as the right to impose fines and punishments within their holdings.<sup>19</sup> In Wales these rights led to entire villages coming under the control of the Templars, a process which surely had parallels throughout the West.<sup>20</sup>

The Church was not to be outdone by the secular magnates in the granting of privileges. Innocent II not only confirmed the Rule of the warrior-monks, he codified their extensive privileges with the papal bulls, *Omne datum optimum, Milites Templi*, and *Militia Dei*.<sup>21</sup> These granted collection rights to Templars, permission to take tithes, obligations, and burial rights in places

<sup>14</sup>Partier, *The Knights Templar and their Myth*, 10.

<sup>15</sup>Barber, *The New Knighthood*, 24-5.

<sup>16</sup>*Ibid.*, 23.

<sup>17</sup>*Ibid.*, 56.

<sup>18</sup>Howarth, *The Knights Templar*, 237-8.

<sup>19</sup>*Ibid.*, 238.

<sup>20</sup>William Rees, *A History of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem in Wales and on the Welsh Border* (Cardiff, 1947), 48-51.

<sup>21</sup>Barber, *The New Knighthood*, 58.

where they had oratories, the power to appoint their own chaplains, and exemption from the controls of local bishops.<sup>22</sup>

Generous grants of land and coin, tax exemptions, and ecclesiastical privileges were the foundation of a vast economic network which would supply the Templars in the Holy Land. Providing for a permanent fighting presence in the East was an immense and costly enterprise. But this largesse carried a negative cost as well. It led to some tarnishing of the Templar image, the result of jealous accusations and resentment, given unfortunate credence by cases of abuse within the order. These problems long remained secondary, offset by the great task undertaken by the Templars. By the middle of the twelfth century, the situation of the crusader states was becoming more and more critical.

#### Needs in the East

The Templar presence in the Outremer grew after 1130. They quickly became a prominent fixture on the landscape of the crusader kingdoms, assuming larger and more complex roles. By the close of the twelfth century the Templars were no longer mostly concerned with protecting pilgrims; they were now building castles, mounting campaigns against the Muslims, and advising the King and his barons as well. One estimate of Templar numbers counts "600 knights and 2,000 sergeants on active service in the east"--an enormous standing force at that time.<sup>23</sup> The expenses of such an army were diverse and formidable.

Knights were by definition mounted warriors, and calvary maintenance was a prime concern. This alone must have been a difficult task in the semi-arid crusader kingdoms. In Burgundy, a frontier region for breeding the kind of heavy destriers needed by heavily armored Western warriors, the cost of equipping and maintaining a knight was about 30 manses (750 acres) in 1180, and about 150 manses in 1260.<sup>24</sup> Inflation proved nearly as great

<sup>22</sup>*Ibid.*, 58-9; Howarth, *The Knights Templar*, 80.

<sup>23</sup>Barber, *The New Knighthood*, 2.

<sup>24</sup>*Ibid.*, 230-1. One manse measured the amount of land a single household farmed for the local lord.

a foe as the infidel. The Order might have begun with second-hand equipment and donated clothing, but as it gained prominence, its need for "state of the art" equipment increased. Templars were not extravagant (indeed their Rule forbade costly ornament), but their list of equipment was "splendid and complete, their living quarters [kept] clean."<sup>25</sup> The Rule of the Templars provided strict guidelines, including up to four horses,

iron hose, a helmet or *chapeau de fer*, a sword, a shield, a lance, a Turkish mace, a surcoat, arming jacket, mail shoes, and three knives: a dagger, a bread knife, and a pocketknife. They may have two caparisons, two shirts, two pairs of breeches and two pairs of hose; and a small belt.<sup>26</sup>

Other statutes within the Rule detailed everything from horseshoes and saddles to tents.

Equipping each knight was only one expense; the Templars also built many stone castles. Some, like 'Alit and Safad were quite extensive. The Templars maintained and garrisoned thirty-two castles in Outremer.<sup>27</sup> Rulers in the West appreciated the expense of castles, and recognized the necessity of these great structures in maintaining control over a hostile population. The Templars took care to publicize their achievements.<sup>28</sup>

The Templars were no longer just protecting pilgrims, and their expense accounts reflected the variety and complexity of their expanded mission in the East. Even though they lived in relative humility as their Rule demanded, their remoteness from the West increased the cost of upkeep. The annual cost for maintaining a knight in Acre was ninety *livres tournois* in 1267.<sup>29</sup> The expense of 600 knights was 54,000 *livres tournois*, about twenty-two percent of the annual income of the Royal Dynasty of

<sup>25</sup>Partner, *The Knights Templar and their Myth*, 14.

<sup>26</sup>No. 138, *The Rule of the Templars*, translated by J.M. Upton-Ward (Bury St. Edmunds, 1992), 53.

<sup>27</sup>Barber, *The New Knighthood*, 78.

<sup>28</sup>Jelen Nicholson, *Templars, Hospitallers, and Teutonic Knights: Images of the Military Orders, 1128-1291* (London 1993), 106.

<sup>29</sup>Barber, *The New Knighthood*, 232.



France—250,000.<sup>30</sup> And this did not include castle maintenance. Defending the faith was indeed an expensive endeavor, yet the Templars never wanted for proper equipment. They were ever-ready to battle the enemies of Christianity, and prospered in doing so.

### The Network in the West

The expansion of the Templar's activities required a complex network of funding and supply, more advanced than any known in the West since the days of Rome. These needs were initially met by spontaneous donations and grants, but infrastructure quickly developed to administer Templar holdings and look after their interests.

The extensive, diversified, and sometimes isolated estates of the Order in Western Europe required skillful management. Initially, this system was inspired by the model developed in Cistercian monasteries, with a "mother" house keeping oversight on its "daughter" foundations. This method, however, proved too inefficient for Templar needs.<sup>31</sup> They instead mirrored the efforts of their rivals, the Hospitalers, focusing on geo-political realities.<sup>32</sup> At the base of this system were individual estates awarded to preceptories, local communities living under the authority of a commander. Lines of authority became codified, as each preceptory laid claim to particular parcels of land. The minister or *bailli* of a preceptory saw to its needs, and answered to the Master of the region (such as England or France).

The specific functions of individual *bailli* varied from region to region. England was a prime source of agricultural wealth for the Templars. They profited from grain, fish, and especially wool.<sup>33</sup> The Templar's development of the wool trade mirrored that of their Cistercian cousins, as they were able to capitalize on the profits generated when English wool was made into Flemish cloth. Land acquisitions by the Order in England following the

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., 232-3.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., 19-20.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., 20.

<sup>33</sup>Howarth, *The Knights Templar*, 239.

original grants illustrates a policy of exploiting this industry.<sup>34</sup> They purchased properties along continental land routes whenever possible, as *baillies* sought to "consolidate and rationalise through land transactions and careful management."<sup>35</sup> The house in Provins for example, took advantage of the Champagne fairs, the regional center of economic dynamism at that time. The *bailli* quickly established a powerful presence within the town.<sup>36</sup> Templars eventually ran some of these profitable fairs.

Specific functions of a preceptory may have depended on geography, but certain activities were practiced in every house. The Western houses recruited for the Templar headquarters in Acre. Sometimes this process became fairly complex. The Order often attempted to acquire the lands of a particular recruit, and sometimes that knight wished to leave his lands to his family. The Templars were usually willing to negotiate. In one instance the younger son of a noble was promised to the Order, with the understanding that if his older brothers all died within six years, he would return to his family fiefs and provide the Templars with a payment of 1,000 *sois* instead.<sup>37</sup>

The Templar houses also commonly collected additional revenue through privileges and rights. Templars could fine law-breakers, and impose taxes which followed the tenets of local magnates. In one example, the Templars received permission from the Crown to raise taxes in Wales. This area, unused to a heavy fiscal hand, resisted, embroiling all parties in a morass of maneuvering and litigation.<sup>38</sup> The Order could also earn income from their ecclesiastical exemptions. Templars might perform burial rights, and through their own priests, administer the sacraments at certain times of the year. They used these rights to form confraternities.<sup>39</sup> These groups sought salvation (and enjoyed certain tax-breaks) through providing small annual donations.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., 239.

<sup>35</sup>Barber, *The New Knighthood*, 250.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., 262-3.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., 261.

<sup>38</sup>Rees, *A History of the Order*, 48.

<sup>39</sup>Paracet, *The Knights Templar and their Myth*, 11-2.



The Templar network exhibited a propensity for vertical expansion, exemplified by their activities in the wool-cloth trade, local fairs, and over-land trade routes. It should not be surprising that they soon developed naval capabilities as well. The Order possessed houses in the major Atlantic ports of Dover, Nantes, La Rochelle, and Bordeaux. Their presence in the Mediterranean centered on Marseille, with other key holdings in Italy.<sup>40</sup> Establishing a fleet was not only vital for supply and communications with Acre, but allowed burgeoning Templar trading enterprises as well.

As with their other activities, the Templars enjoyed certain privileges in maritime commerce. In La Rochelle for example, Eleanor of Aquitaine allowed them to transport "freely and securely, without all customs and all exactions, either by land or by water."<sup>41</sup> In Marseille, the Templars enjoyed similar privileges: the freedom to transport pilgrims and merchants with few if any restrictions.<sup>42</sup> In the early days, the Order contracted out maritime affairs to individuals (chiefly Italians), but by 1207 they owned their own ships.<sup>43</sup> The benefits of transporting for the Templars--guaranteed payment, business, fiscal advantages--must have been tempting to private entrepreneurs. Later, when they owned their own ships, the Order certainly had no problems finding worthy captains. The Templar fleet became so successful that records mention an official of the Order in Marseille called "Master of Passages."<sup>44</sup>

Perhaps the most famous (or infamous) piece of Templar infrastructure was the banking network. The development of effective financial institutions was the final link in the chain which supplied Acre, and shows that the Templars were quick to embrace the realities of the profit economy. Templar banking evolved rapidly, driven by a need to deal with the initial gifts of coin and property the Order received. The fact that the Templars were recognized as the bankers of the French kings by 1147 (a

<sup>40</sup>Barber, *The New Knighthood*, 250-1.

<sup>41</sup>*Ibid.*, 26.

<sup>42</sup>*Ibid.*, 237.

<sup>43</sup>*Ibid.*, 237.

<sup>44</sup>*Ibid.*, 238.

mere nineteen years after the Council of Troyes) illustrates this process.<sup>45</sup>

The Templars needed banking, and with the growth of the profit economy, so did many others. It should not be surprising that the Brothers became so adept at finance. Who better to trust than the knights of Christ? The Orders Rule specifically prohibited Brothers from placing "a fund of money anywhere except in the treasury," to which only the Treasurer or Master had access.<sup>46</sup> They swore fealty to no one, and were objective enough to broker to both the Capetians and Angevins simultaneously. The kings, nobility, and merchants of Europe felt secure enough in the Order to deposit jewelry, gold, and silver within the preceptories.<sup>47</sup>

The Orders function as a depository was just the beginning. Their many locations throughout Christendom allowed for the transfer of funds in a primitive credit or checking system.<sup>48</sup> The Templar network began financing loans for both kings and the Church. The crusade of Louis VII is an early example. The king had spent nearly all of his money by the time he reached Antioch in March of 1148. The Templars offered him assistance and borrowed from local merchants on the security of their possessions.<sup>49</sup> Later, Louis ordered his regents in France to settle payment with the Temple in Paris. The Capetians continued their financial link with them until King Philip IV brutally suppressed the Order in 1307.

The papacy also found Templar banking useful. Houses of the Order were depositories for important documents, treasures or relics, and funds. After the schism of 1167, the popes turned to the Templars to help finance activities.<sup>50</sup> The expertise of the Order led to Templar *cibicularii* administering to papal banking from 1163 onwards, including the tabulation of revenues and financing of loans.<sup>51</sup> The importance of this relationship is best

<sup>45</sup>Partner, *The Knights Templar and their Myth*, 11.

<sup>46</sup>No. 335, *The Rule of the Templars*, 94.

<sup>47</sup>Howarth, *The Knights Templar*, 240-1.

<sup>48</sup>*Ibid.*, 241.

<sup>49</sup>Barber, *The New Knighthood*, 67.

<sup>50</sup>*Ibid.*, 277-8.

<sup>51</sup>*Ibid.*, 278.

illustrated by the fact that Templar *embiculatorii* were left alone during the Orders persecution and expulsion.<sup>52</sup>

The Templar financial institutions continued to grow throughout the Order's existence. By the middle of the thirteenth century, they numbered the growing merchant class among their clientele. These merchants were more concerned with the Templars as financiers, than with their now obsolete claim as "poor knights of Christ."<sup>53</sup> Banking had become a necessary adjunct to the exercise of power in Europe, and the Templars led the way. Many still cherished the values associated with the old system of gift exchange, however, and scorned profit as ignoble. The Order's success in finance was vital to their support of the continuing Crusade in the East, yet it also sowed the seeds of their eventual destruction by weakening their old, knightly virtues.

The financial network assumed such an important role in Europe, it is not surprising that Templars became trusted advisors to the greatest lords. The aforementioned relationships with the papacy offer an ecclesiastical example. King Louis VII of France not only looked to the Templars for financial aid during his Crusade, they were his military advisors in the Holy Land as well. They also advised Richard the Lion Heart during the Third Crusade, and acted as his honor guard.<sup>54</sup> He even traveled disguised as a Templar on his way back to England (but was recognized in Austria).<sup>55</sup> In London, the King's Council often met at the Temple. It was here the Templar Master attempted to reconcile Henry II and Thomas Becket.<sup>56</sup> William Marshall, Earl of Pembroke was close friend to the Master of England, Aimery de Sainte-Maure, and assumed the Templar mantle before his death.<sup>57</sup> The Templars profited by such relationships, which helped to further strengthen all aspects of their network. But the Brothers came to discover that the favor of kings and popes was

<sup>52</sup>Malcolm Barber, *The Trial of the Templars* (Cambridge, 1978), 72.

<sup>53</sup>Nicholson, *Templars, Hospitallers, and Teutonic Knights*, 75.

<sup>54</sup>Howarth, *The Knights Templar*, 174-7.

<sup>55</sup>*Ibid.*, 177-8.

<sup>56</sup>*Ibid.*, 241.

<sup>57</sup>Duby, *William Marshall*, 14-5.

a fickle and dangerous business, when Philip IV of France turned on them and Clement V subsequently abandoned them.

Despite its efficiency, the Templar network in its heyday had both problems and critics. Dignitaries were sometimes accused of being greedy or corrupt, of exploiting their privileges. Local clergy often complained that Templars intruded on their territory, offering discount burials and other holy services.<sup>58</sup> Some Welshmen complained that Templars let too many burgesses into their fraternal order, thus exempting them from local taxes.<sup>59</sup> The realities of banking also presented problems. Jean Sire de Joinville, chronicler of St. Louis threatened a Templar treasurer with an axe to receive cash for a loan promised to his lord.<sup>60</sup> It seems the Master had died in combat, and the Marshal and Commander citing a statute requiring the Masters consent on such transactions, were reluctant to act. The temptation presented by large sums of ready coin must have weighed heavily even on the most pious brothers. The notion of knights dirtying their hands with money aroused hostility, and Europeans found many aspects of banking un-Christian or amoral. They were not ready for all the implications of a profit economy.<sup>61</sup> Templars were often represented as too greedy, too rich, and too proud; in reality they had adapted too quickly to changing economic conditions.

How successful was the Templar network, this great medieval corporation? The Brothers in Acre never lacked equipment and recruits, despite some devastating losses over the years. They built "at least 870 castles, preceptories, and subsidiary houses" and took care of pensioners throughout Europe.<sup>62</sup> They were wealthy enough to buy the island of Cyprus from King Richard (although were unable to hold on to it).<sup>63</sup> A final, if ironic example of the effectiveness of the network occurred after the Templar's demise. The French crown ordered the Hospitallers, who inherited most Templar properties and wealth to pay a sum

<sup>58</sup>Partner, *The Knights Templar and their Myth*, 12.

<sup>59</sup>Rees, *A History of the Order*, 50.

<sup>60</sup>Jean Sire de Joinville, *The History of St. Louis*, translated by Joan Evans (London, 1938), 113-4.

<sup>61</sup>Little, *Religious Poverty*, 35-46.

<sup>62</sup>Barber, *The Trial of the Templars*, 1-2.

<sup>63</sup>Howarth, *The Knights Templar*, 173.

of 310,000 *livres tournois* from 1313 to 1318.<sup>64</sup> Over the course of about 200 years, the Templar network consolidated its holdings to exploit supply and demand while taking advantage of distinct privileges. It provided shipping and even built its own fleet and it developed and harnessed an advanced array of banking institutions, and provided advice and guidance to the first two estates.

### The Men of the Network

Who were the men who created and facilitated this vast network? They certainly were not the same sort of illiterate, crude and undoubtedly fanatical men who went off to fight in the East. Yet they contributed to this perception themselves, describing themselves as "simple and ignorant" right up to the time of their suppression.<sup>65</sup> Templars in the West were often older, established in their region, and skilled at particular functions. Their talents might include literacy, financial knowledge, agricultural expertise, or seamanship. An intriguing dichotomy developed between the fierce warrior-monks who travelled to Acre and the brethren supplying them in Europe.

Hugh de Payens, first Master of the Temple, presents an interesting portrait of the effective administrator. Although the first years of the Order were spent in relative poverty and obscurity, the Master had a plan. His ties to Count Hugh of Champagne as a former vassal, and Bernard of Clairvaux helped to guarantee his ambitions for the Temple. Hugh's initial campaigns in the West around the time of the council of Troyes illustrate a good understanding of the realities of establishing an Order such as the Templars. He appears to have been well-versed in secular and ecclesiastical politics; he was acutely aware of many of the criticisms of the knightly class, and seemed to understand some of the prevailing economic trends. It is perhaps a stretch to state that Hugh and his colleagues completely understood the transition from gift to profit economy, but they were quite aware of certain changes.

<sup>64</sup>Barber, *The Trial of the Templars*, 231-2.

<sup>65</sup>Partner, *The Knights Templar and their Myth*, 15.

In conception and structure the Templars responded well to the new realities of Crusading Europe. Hugh de Payens had predicted at the onset that, given Church approval, the nobility would enthusiastically support the Templars. He proved to be right and the Order profited from the still potent gift economy, but Hugh also understood the inherent dangers. Several statutes within the original Templar Rule prohibited the personal exchange of gifts, for example.<sup>66</sup> Hugh's vision and prudent leadership set the precedent for effective administration of Templar preceptories in the West.

The rapidly growing network was closely tied to the lay knighthood.<sup>67</sup> The Templars undoubtedly offered avenues of upward social mobility to small landowning knights. As its prestige quickly mounted, the Order accorded talented lesser knights new paths to power and influence. In Europe there was often little distinction between the knights proper, who took monastic vows, and fraternities of 'married brothers', who helped administer estates.<sup>68</sup> These men could continue in a similar lifestyle, while enjoying the benefits of the Order. Sergeants or brothers in service could occupy multiple positions in the network. In England, where the Order was chiefly concerned with agriculture, they were smiths, tanners, shepherds, gardeners, and cowherds.<sup>69</sup> Such members are comparable to the *conversi*--working lay brothers of the Cistercian monasteries. In the Mediterranean, the mariner Roger of Flor, designated a sergeant by the Order, captained a Templar ship for years.<sup>70</sup> The rest of the fleet was probably commanded by similar men. The *evitularii* who assisted the papacy undoubtedly trained in monasteries. As time passed, the Order thus came to engage in diverse and complex activities, to attract members from a variety of social backgrounds.

At its upper echelons, the Order displayed an impressive knack for acquiring land and engaging in effective commerce. It is unfortunate that there are not more detailed records of the men

<sup>66</sup>Nas, 44, 82, 85, 128, *The Rule of the Templars*, 30, 40, 51.

<sup>67</sup>Nicholson, *Templars, Hospitallers, and Tentonic Knights*, 56-9.

<sup>68</sup>Barber, *The Trial of the Templars*, 261.

<sup>69</sup>Howarth, *The Knights Templar*, 235.

<sup>70</sup>Barber, *The Trial of the Templars*, 240-1.



who enacted these policies. We know about the Grand Masters, who were sometimes illiterate and usually concerned with military operations in Acre. We know something of particular Masters, such as Aimery of England, as well.

The loss of Acre in 1291, the last Christian port of Outremer, signified a new and anxious moment in Templar history. Their *raison d'être* was compromised at a time when the crusading ideal itself had become corrupted. During the Thirteenth Century, kings and popes had used crusades to achieve political and even personal ends. Perhaps the foremost of these was the Albigensian Crusade, in which the barons of Northern France plundered the barons of the South, ostensibly to combat heresy. In this climate, the Templars, now a wealthy, well-armed, independent institution, with a presence throughout Europe, aroused suspicion and jealousy. Were they really dangerous to Europe's rulers? Scholars debate this point and come to different conclusions. Many argue that the Templars were relatively weak militarily by this time, but did commanded vast economic power. Perhaps they could have carved out their own state somewhere, given the time and motivation. But Jacques de Molay, the last Grand Master, was still concerned with mounting a return expedition to the Holy Land when the Order was suddenly suppressed.<sup>71</sup>

In 1307, Philip IV of France charged the Templars with a sinister array of crimes, including heresy, worship of idols and demons, and sodomy. With the reluctant assent of the papacy the King arrested every Templar he could find. Torture was used to extort confessions, and the Grand Master, proclaiming his innocence was burned at the stake. The initial reaction to this throughout Europe was shock and disbelief. Various kings, princes, and dukes were happy to devour the remains of Templar holdings, however, once guilty verdicts were followed by Pope Clement V's agreement to ban the Order and distribute its assets.

Perhaps the most intriguing question concerns the true aims and goals of the Order. Did some Knights of the Temple indeed lose faith in the Crusade, and become cynical about their

mission? Considerable evidence shows that their activities, initially, were centered with supplying and financing an ongoing crusading effort Outremer. But by the thirteenth century, their world was changing. Jealous enemies whispered these new, wealthy knights were the military arm of a mysterious esoteric Order called the *Priarre de Sion*, with sinister plans involving the Holy Land and the rightful kings of France.<sup>72</sup> Although such claims remain suspect and unproven, the rumors weakened support for the Order at a time when the Crusades all seemed to fail. Philip IV's need for money coupled with Templar wealth made them a tempting target.

The Order of the Temple was conceived with an impressive understanding of politics, economics, and religion. As it evolved, it grew into a vast medieval corporation capable of profiting while sustaining an expensive war effort in a distant land. The administrators of the Templar economic network were able to benefit from the lingering aspects of the older gift economy, while adapting and contributing to the growing profit economy. By the beginning of the Fourteenth Century, with the Holy Lands lost, the great and mighty Order of the Temple was suddenly exposed in a glaring, unfriendly, and dangerous light. They had lost Outremer, but continued to generate large profits. A powerful institution of "warrior-monks" whose greatest accomplishment was financial gain, was too startling a paradox to survive in medieval Europe.

<sup>71</sup>Partner, *The Knights Templar and their Myth*, 37-8.

<sup>72</sup>Michael Baigent et al., *Holy Blood, Holy Grail* (New York, 1982).

## Pastors And Pestilence: Martin Luther's Views on the Church, Christians and the Black Death

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In the late twentieth century, it is difficult or impossible to comprehend fully the intense horror and consuming fear that must have accompanied outbreaks of the bubonic plague in Europe. Nothing in today's world compares with the threat this contagion posed in the Middle Ages and the early modern era. With no particular warning or explanation, the black death swept in successive waves across the continent from the mid-fourteenth century until well into the 1700s. Most historians agree the plague came to Europe from East Asia aboard trading ships. But no matter its origin, the plague left behind ghastly destruction. Entire cities were paralyzed by epidemics. Some villages disappeared altogether. In the end, between one-third and one-half of Europe's population died from this relentless killer.

The very worst of the plague's many outbreaks occurred in the 1340s, but the disease continued to resurface in the sixteenth century, while Martin Luther and the Reformation sought to change many of the Christian church's fundamental teachings. Certainly few events in this period would so likely provoke religious questions as a bout with the plague. The plague touched Luther's life most closely when it struck Wittenberg in August 1527. He mentioned the disease regularly in his sermons and other writings, particularly in discussions of *Genesis*.

The traumatic experience of an eruption of plague took a deep emotional toll on the lives of believers, shaping—and no doubt shaking—their moral and religious outlooks, as well as their

superstitions. Appearance of the plague confronted Europeans with sudden, inexplicable death. The mere suggestion of a plague infection, not surprisingly, could send a village into near hysteria.

This study will argue, through Luther's own words, that he believed one's response to the plague was an important demonstration of Christian compassion. An outbreak of plague marked a time of heightened responsibilities for community and church leaders. Luther knew the black death called on Christians to show their love and faith as few other events could.

There is a wealth of academic literature on the bubonic plague in the Middle Ages, exploring in-depth the disease and its history. Medical details are of little importance to this paper, but we should first briefly place the plague's significance in historical perspective. To most Europeans, the plague represented more than an occasional natural disaster. The disease was a part of Europe's late medieval and early Renaissance culture, as reflected in the period's art, literature, worship and folk customs. An ubiquitous threat when the plague struck, it touched every part of one's life.<sup>1</sup>

Mortality rates for plague outbreaks ranged from 30 to 90 percent or even higher.<sup>2</sup> At least as frightening as the disease's sheer deadliness was its unpredictability. The plague could sweep into a city or village overnight and kill its first round of victims in less than a day. It might remain for months or vanish as quickly as it appeared. The plague could spread by the briefest touch, and yet some people who cared for victims were constantly exposed but never infected. Furthermore, infection with the plague was not always a death sentence. Some strains of infection could be beaten.

But most who were unfortunate enough to catch the black death died from it. Theories abounded as to what brought the plague and how to defend oneself against its deadly work. Some were pseudo-scientific, others pure superstition by modern-day

<sup>1</sup>Gustav K. Wieneke and Helmut T. Lehmann, eds., *The Collected Works of Martin Luther* (Philadelphia, 1955), vol. 43, 115-8. Cited hereafter as *Luther's Works*.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid. See also Philip Ziegler, *The Black Death* (New York, 1969), 25-8; Robert S. Gottfried, *The Black Death: Natural and Human Disaster in Medieval Europe* (New York, 1983), 7-8.

standards. But the best way to escape the plague was to flee from it by leaving the afflicted area quickly.

Luther knew this, and his fullest commentaries on the disease are found in the essay "Whether One May Flee From a Deadly Plague," written in 1527.<sup>3</sup> The fourteen-page pamphlet was reprinted in nineteen subsequent editions and enjoyed wide readership, especially when plague threatened. Luther's composition of the booklet served a dual purpose: to comfort followers who lived with the pestilence and to discuss Christians' moral obligations if their communities should become infested.

The black death struck Wittenberg on August 2, 1527. Concerned for the safety of faculty and students, Elector John ordered professors and others to leave for Jena. Luther was not persuaded by the Elector's request or the appeals of his friends. He decided to stay to minister to the sick and those who could not leave. Luther also helped the city council and lectured to a small group of students who, for unknown reasons, remained. By August 19, eighteen people had died, including several who were close to Luther's family. The wife of the mayor died nearly in Luther's arms. Many of Luther's friends lost loved ones, and others moved far away to escape the plague. Luther's son John, then a toddler, likely suffered from the plague in September and recovered. Luther's daughter Elizabeth, born in December, died in less than eight months, probably weakened by her mother's exposure to the black death while pregnant.<sup>4</sup>

Luther's behavior during these months of plague, along with his thoughtful treatise on fleeing the disease, offer compelling evidence of his dedication to God and his understanding of a Christian's responsibilities to his brethren. Some scholars note that in this period, which marked the tenth anniversary of the posting of the *Niney-Five Theses*, Luther composed the now-famous hymn "A Mighty Fortress is Our God." The song may have been based on Luther's own experience in Wittenberg.<sup>5</sup>

"Whether one may flee" was a response to questions raised by Johann Hess, a Reformation leader in Silesia, where the plague

also appeared in August 1527. Hess had asked Luther whether Christians could flee from the plague with a clear conscience. Luther was further prompted to write after hearing how a Dominican in Leipzig had mocked the way residents of Wittenberg ran from the peril. The pamphlet blended Christian charity and common sense.

Above all, Luther appealed to pastors not to abandon their flocks. All good Christians should resist giving into panic, but pastors carry a higher obligation. The pastor, Luther wrote, is not merely a hired teacher but a committed shepherd whose help is essential when the plague infects a region:

Those who are engaged in a spiritual ministry such as preachers and pastors must likewise remain steadfast before the peril of death. We have a plain command from Christ, "A good shepherd lays down his life for the sheep but the hireling sees the wolf coming and flees." [John 10:11]. For when people are dying, they most need a spiritual ministry which strengthens and comforts their consciences by word and sacrament and in faith overcomes death.<sup>6</sup>

Still, Luther recognized that if enough religious leaders stayed to take care of sick Christians, additional preachers need not expose themselves to danger. "I do not consider such conduct sinful because spiritual services are provided for and because they would have been ready and willing to stay if it had been necessary."<sup>7</sup>

A similar moral code bound civic officials. Secular authorities must stay to see that law and order are preserved in prevention of "fires, murders, riots and every imaginable disaster.... On the other hand, if in great weakness they flee but provide capable substitutes...all that would be proper." Servants should not leave their masters, and parents may not abandon their children. No one should leave without first checking on the well-being of those who cannot move.

<sup>3</sup>Luther's Works, vol. 43, 115-38.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid; Luther's Works vol. 48, 173; Luther's Works vol. 49, 203.

<sup>5</sup>Luther's Works, vol. 35, 281. See also note number 26 in Luther's Works vol. 48, 175.

<sup>6</sup>Luther's Works, vol. 43, 121.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.



Luther recognized that the human instinct for self-preservation overrides most other concerns in crises such as the plague.

If someone is weak and fearful, let him flee in God's name as long as he does not neglect his duty toward his neighbor but has made adequate provision for others to provide nursing care. To flee from death and save one's life is a natural tendency, implanted by God.<sup>8</sup>

But, he wrote, an outbreak of the black death is no different from any other threat. According to Scripture, God sent four scourges: famine, sword, wild beasts, and pestilence. The Bible teaches that in each of the first three cases, devoted believers may save themselves only after they have seen to the care of others, just as Abraham, Jacob and David did themselves. Luther expected that some Christians would doubt whether the plague could be compared to scourges described in the Bible. Biblical figures, after all, never faced the black death. "Death is death, no matter how it occurs," Luther insisted. Regardless of whether the threat is persecution or plague, Christians are bound by God's law first to meet obligations to their fellow men. Only afterwards may they think of their own escape. Those who panic and ignore this holy directive will be judged harshly in the eyes of God "Christ, therefore, will condemn them as murderers on the Last Day when he will say, 'I was sick and you did not visit me [Matt. 25:43].'"<sup>9</sup>

Luther thought that God sent the plague, either as a punishment, a demonstration of his power or as an exercise to test man's faith and love. Or perhaps the illness could have represented all three simultaneously. God sent the plague as "a fatherly game," Luther said, "for the purpose of melting and purging." Although God appears to be angry, he is not. The anger is "simulated." Natural disasters are sent "that you may be led to a knowledge of your sin.... Indeed, we must fall most horribly, in order that we may recognize our wretchedness and weakness."<sup>10</sup>

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., 122-3.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., 126.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., vol. 7, 231, 254, 228.

The devil entered the picture because his evil sought to create panic and selfishness among people in communities afflicted with the plague. Luther told pious Christians to defy the Prince of Darkness in times of plague by showing more compassion, more courage, not less.<sup>11</sup> Interestingly, Luther years later suggested fear as a main cause of the plague. In October 1539, more than a decade after the Wittenberg outbreak, Luther helped bury several friends who died of plague in Nuremberg. In a lecture he told listeners that the panic-stricken should flee without shame from the threat of plague because "fear itself is the chief cause of this calamity," although he did not elaborate.<sup>12</sup>

Luther shared the opinion of his contemporaries who believed that the black death "spread among the people by evil spirits who poison the air or exhale a pestifential breath which puts a deadly poison into the flesh."<sup>13</sup> However, he seemed to believe that God would impart a measure of divine immunity to those Christians who nursed plague victims. "It is proved by experience that those who nurse the sick with love, devotion, and sincerity are generally protected. Though they are poisoned, they are not harmed." Luther added a warning that "a person who attends a patient because of greed, or with the expectation of an inheritance or some personal advantage in such services, should not be surprised if eventually he is infected, disfigured, or even dies."<sup>14</sup>

Luther advised against going too far the other direction, disregarding minor precautions that might prevent one from becoming ill. Apparently, some Europeans tried to demonstrate superior faith by rejecting medicines and making no effort to avoid places and persons infected with plague. They were "much too rash and reckless," Luther said. "This is not trusting God but tempting him. God has created medicines and provided us with intelligence to guard and take good care of the body so that we can live in good health." In the same way, anyone who carelessly acquired the plague and infected others was considered a murderer, as was the person who, having apparently recovered

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., 127.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., vol. 4, 91, note 1.

<sup>13</sup>*Luther's Works*, vol. 43, 127. See also vol. 42, 91.

<sup>14</sup>*Luther's Works*, vol. 43, 129.

from plague, passed the disease to others before he was completely free of the germs.<sup>15</sup>

Luther saved his harshest condemnation for people with the black death who kept their infection secret either in the belief that they would rid themselves of the sickness by contaminating others or were simply "incredibly vicious." He suggested that such "deliberate murderers" promptly be sent to the hangman.

Luther suggested that communities seek ways to isolate victims of plague, just as God in the Old Testament ordered lepers to be banished from the city. Isolation is better for everyone. The ill may still be cared for, and the infection will not spread. "Our plague here in Wittenberg has been caused by nothing but filth. The air, thank God, is still clean and pure, but some few have been contaminated because of the laziness or recklessness of some."<sup>16</sup>

Luther thought moving cemeteries outside the city might stem the spread of the black death. Many popular beliefs about the dead held that poison vapors and mists rise out of graves. Luther suggested graveyards be moved for the common health of cities and because burial grounds should be sacred, hallowed places, not small plots in alleys or outside marketplaces. "A cemetery rightfully ought to be a fine quiet place, removed from all localities, to which one can go and reverently meditate upon death, the Last Judgement, the resurrection, and say one's prayers."<sup>17</sup>

Luther added a few words on how to prepare for death to the end of his essay "Whether One May Flee From a Deadly Plague." He reminded readers that the best way to prepare for the end of life was through regular worship and taking the sacrament. But when the plague struck a family, Christians should call for a pastor before the victim became delirious or unconscious. If a pastor arrived too late, he could not counsel the sick person or administer communion because the patient would not understand. Chaplains would not "teach them the gospel at the last minute and administer the sacrament to them as they were accustomed to it under the papacy when nobody asked whether they believed or

<sup>15</sup>Ibid, 131-2.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid, 132-4.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid, 136-7.

understood the gospel but just stuffed the sacrament down their throats as if into a bread bag."<sup>18</sup>

Philip Ziegler, a scholar of the black death in the late medieval period, argues that the plague helped create doubt and skepticism about Catholic authorities. Christians were struck by several phenomena. First, they saw the Church treated the plague as a punishment sent from God. Yet village priests died at least as often as commoners when the disease surfaced. This graphically demonstrated that the clergy's supposedly close relationship with God did not provide escape from his pestilence. Second, evidence suggests that some priests would not serve in plague-stricken areas without exceptionally high salaries. Such behavior raised obvious questions about the Church's commitment to its flock and the priests' materialism. Add to this a few notorious stories of priests abandoning their infected communities and one sees why the Church's credibility was so damaged.<sup>19</sup>

Ironically, ample data indicates that the Church suffered greater human losses from the black death than almost any other social institution. High mortality rates among the clergy may have cut the number of priests almost in half. The plague took a disproportionately high number of the most dedicated men of God. Rushing to fill the gap, the Church ignored its own standards and appointed many unsuitable candidates to the priesthood. Thus, Ziegler writes, in the years after the worst of the plague, when European society should have pulled back together, the church was miserably unprepared to deal with protest movements or revolts. Ziegler and G.G. Coulton both argue that the plague, though it did not lead inexorably to the Reformation, contributed to the weakening of the Catholic church.<sup>20</sup> Thus it seems reasonable to believe that the plague, even before Luther's time, had already played a significant role in laying the groundwork for the Reformation.

And yet, throughout the early sixteenth century, reformers such as Luther and Zwingli (himself almost killed by the plague) had to respond to the same problems with the persistent disease.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid, 136-7.

<sup>19</sup>Ziegler, *The Black Death*, 260-1.

<sup>20</sup>G.G. Coulton, *The Black Death* (New York, 1930), 74.

Their battles with the black death shaped their religious outlooks and personal life-and-death experiences. Luther's writings on the black death suggest that he understood the plague to be both a spiritual and a personal test of character. Although the source or purpose of the disease remained a mystery, committed Christians had several clear directives: preserve order, tend to the sick and avoid spreading the contagion. Amid the terror of a plague outbreak, Luther urged his followers to display courage, common sense, and compassion.

## Darwinian Racism

Doug Overmyer

*Doug Overmyer wrote this source analysis as a senior at Eastern Illinois for Historical Sources and Techniques (His 2509) under Professor Casey Machula during Spring 1996. He is currently a graduate student in the Master of Arts in History program.*

In 1856, Charles Darwin revolutionized the biological sciences with his monumental *Origin of Species*, in which he described the evolution of species as a product of natural selection. He argued convincingly that various species engage in a vast struggle for existence in the battlefield of Nature. As species contested over scarce resources, Darwin insisted, the stronger species survived and the weaker perished. In essence, Nature selects certain varieties as *unfit* to carry on, while allowing others to survive. These latter varieties would then adapt to their ever-changing surroundings and the competition would continue. By this process, animals *progress*, or evolve, from inferior to superior species.

Through his later work, specifically *The Descent of Man*, he applied his theory of Natural Selection to humans. Thenceforth, a struggle raged in public circles after his theory became widely known. Some accepted his new interpretation of old data, while others rejected it. In the latter quarter of the nineteenth century and the beginning decades of the twentieth, many politicians in industrialized nations came to accept Darwin's theory, and began formulating laws to apply this scientific theory to society in general. This extrapolation of scientific thought to social thought was nothing new: the American Declaration of Independence and Constitution applied Enlightenment thought of the eighteenth century (some of which derived from the Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth) to the American public domain. However, applying Darwin's new scientific thought to social policy had drastic consequences. These *Social Darwinists*, overwhelmingly white Europeans, believed their own race was the superior of any race among humanity. Dinesh D'Souza has rightly argued that this line of thought culminated with the idea of "might makes



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right" and to "oppose it was to stigmatize yourself a religious fanatic or an ignominus."<sup>21</sup> He also notes that many writers today "make a strenuous effort to distance Darwin from racism, [citing] his record as an opponent of slavery, and blame the racism that subsequently took his name on the unscientific 'social Darwinism' which is generally branded as a distortion of the theory of evolution."<sup>22</sup> This paper analyzes Darwin's own writings to show he endorsed both racism and social Darwinism.

Darwinism is inherently racist; and furthermore, Charles Darwin himself spawned the racist slant in this social movement which bears his name. Indeed, the works of Darwin are blatantly racist, both on the international and the domestic level. Charles Darwin, of course, did not invent racism. In fact, the idea of social Darwinism found its roots in certain Enlightenment ideals. Charles Darwin, especially in *The Descent of Man*, merely offered racists his scientific stamp of approval.<sup>3</sup>

Social Darwinists can use the works of Darwin himself to justify imperialism. Consider briefly his theory of natural selection and its application to humankind. Throughout *The Origin of Species*, Darwin suggests that humankind is not a part of Nature, that the rules which normally apply in parts of Nature untouched by humanity do not apply to humans and human development.<sup>4</sup> However, in *The Descent of Man*, he applies his theory of natural selection to human society. The different races of man, he wrote, are "sub-species" in humanity.<sup>5</sup> One of these sub-species, or races, will eventually prove to be supreme and will subjugate the others. In a Marxist-like cycle, he predicted that different races of man would clash and struggle for the scarce resources found in Nature to survive; after the struggle, the

<sup>1</sup>Dinesh D'Souza, *The End of Racism* (New York, 1995), 132.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, 128.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, 131. For the purpose of this study, racism will be considered the opinion that one group of individuals which share similar physical characteristics, social norms, and society is supreme to another group of individuals with different criteria.

<sup>4</sup>His chapters separate natural selection from man-inspired artificial selection. If man were a part of nature, according to Darwin, then no distinction between these, artificial and natural, would be necessary.

<sup>5</sup>Charles Darwin, *The Origin of Species and Descent of Man* (New York, 1971), 537.

defeated race would whither into extinction, while the superior race would advance into the next struggle.<sup>6</sup> He wrote "when civilized nations [i.e. white Europeans] come into contact with barbaric (nations) the struggle is short"<sup>7</sup> and after the "struggle," the defeated "barbaric" race "will surely decrease in number ...sooner or later (leading) to extinction; the end ...being promptly determined by the inroads (of) the conquering (race)."<sup>8</sup> Extinction of the conquered, he wrote in *Origin of Species*, was essential for the progress of the superior animal in the struggle. To further illustrate, he wrote that "extinction follows chiefly from competition of ...race versus race."<sup>9</sup> If a certain race could not adapt to the new conditions imposed on it by the conquering race, it would necessarily be exterminated, and Darwin concluded that "civilized races can certainly resist changes of all kinds far better than savages."<sup>10</sup>

Darwin further believed these inferior races "of men resemble domesticated animals" and even compared the lowest savages to the highest ape.<sup>11</sup> He claimed that

the reduced size of the jaws from lessened use ...with increased size of the brain from greater intellectual activity ...and increased body stature ...have together produced a considerable effect on their [civilized men] general appearance when compared with savages.<sup>12</sup>

Furthermore, he cites evidence that the brain of the "Bushman race ...[is] considerably less complicated and more symmetrical than in the European brain."<sup>13</sup> Since Darwin believed that "endurance and success on Earth ...could be attributed to the ability of races to adapt themselves to the threats and challenges

<sup>6</sup>As paraphrased by Nicolas Berdyaev, *The Russian Revolution* (Ann Arbor, 1931; reprinted Toronto, 1966), 21. Berdyaev goes into more detail linking the importance between Marxism and Darwinism in his work.

<sup>7</sup>Darwin, *Origin*, 543.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*, 530.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*, 542.

<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.*, 549.

<sup>11</sup>*Ibid.*, 414, 445.

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*, 555.

<sup>13</sup>*Ibid.*, 559.

of the natural environment,"<sup>14</sup> and, according to Peter Bowler, citing more evidence that "whites have a larger cranium capacity than other races,"<sup>15</sup> he felt confident in insisting that eventually, civilized people would exterminate the world of the inferior races of man. Here, Darwin clearly sounds the imperialistic trumpet blasted by every colony-hungry European and North American power.

Of course Charles Darwin did not pioneer this scientifically sanctioned racism alone. Thomas H. Huxley, an avid supporter of Darwinism, wrote that "no rational man cognizant of the facts, believes the average Negro is the equal, still less the superior of the average white man."<sup>16</sup> In addition, Ernst Heinrich Philip August Haeckel, who became known as "Darwin's Bulldog on the continent" introduced a form of social Darwinism to Germany which eventually became a principle ideology in Germany's vision of racism, imperialism, and nationalism.<sup>17</sup> Finally, Darwinists everywhere claimed according to some commentators, that "some races had fallen so far behind...they could never catch up with the triumphant whites,"<sup>18</sup> and "as the resources of the world became scarce...the stronger animals would prevail and the weaker would die out,"<sup>19</sup> therefore implying the justness of the extermination of those latter weaklings.

Darwin and his supporters easily took these general scientific "facts" and derived social policies not only to exterminate other races, but to further enhance their own. Indeed, social Darwinists were scientifically justified, for if the weak in their own race were allowed to survive, the race would deteriorate in quality and some other race would consequently pass it. For instance, J. B. Hayscraft wrote that

<sup>14</sup>D'Souza, *End of Racism*, 129.

<sup>15</sup>Peter J. Bowler, *Biology and Social Thought: 1850-1914* (Berkeley, 1993), 70.

<sup>16</sup>Thomas Huxley, "Emancipation -Black and White," chap. in *Science and Education* (New York, 1901), 64-7.

<sup>17</sup>Daniel Gasman, *The Scientific Origins of National Socialism: Social Darwinism in Ernst Haeckel and the German Monist League* (New York, 1921), xvi, xvii, cited in Russell Grigg, "Ernst Haeckel: Evangelist for evolution and apostle of deceit," *Creation: ex nihilo* 18 (March-May 1996): 33-6.

<sup>18</sup>Bowler, *Biology and Social Thought*, 69.

<sup>19</sup>D'Souza, *End of Racism*, 130.

racial change, improvement, or deterioration, is brought about... by what is termed selection, that is, by the death or non-productiveness of certain individuals of a race whereby others alone remain. If this remnant is organically superior, the next generation inheriting only from them will be themselves superior; [and] racial improvement is brought about.<sup>20</sup>

Naturally, those of a race who are weak should die off quickly; hence keeping the next generation from inheriting the former's weaknesses.

To allow the biologically weak to survive in modern society poses a threat to that society. Indeed, Darwin despaired at mankind's own charity to the weak and downtrodden:

we civilized men do our utmost to check the process of elimination: we build asylums for the imbecile, the maimed, the sick, we institute poor [welfare] laws; and our medical men exert their utmost skill to save the life of every one to the last moment...[all] highly injurious to the race of man.<sup>21</sup>

Unfortunately, Darwin wrote, that all of this aid "we feel impelled to give to the helpless is mainly an incidental result of the instinct of sympathy."<sup>22</sup> In contrast, the social Darwinist believes, diseases such as "tuberculosis is the friend of the race, for it attacks no healthy man or woman, but only the feeble."<sup>23</sup> Because, the Darwinist cannot let the feeble survive if the race is to advance, he commends also leprosy, typhoid fever, measles, syphilis, hemophilia, diabetes, and cancer, for these kill off the weak, leaving only the strong to survive.<sup>24</sup> Today, the Darwinist would not help the HIV carrier, for "it is probable that, as a race, we shall thereby suffer, for the banishment of the disease will enable the feeble members of the community to live and

<sup>20</sup>John Berry Hayscraft, *Darwinism and Race Progress* (London, 1895), 17.

<sup>21</sup>Darwin, *Origin*, 501.

<sup>22</sup>*Ibid.*, 501-2.

<sup>23</sup>Hayscraft, *Darwinism*, 57.

<sup>24</sup>*Ibid.*, 58.



...contribute to the progeny of the future."<sup>25</sup> Furthermore, the social Darwinist praises the "popular and widespread feeling against the marriage of those with a distinct family history of insanity,"<sup>26</sup> which in his period included those with mental retardation, depression, and those with physical disabilities such as a hearing impairment. These inferior people are not to be allowed to reproduce, lest those defective characteristics be preserved in the race regardless of the "incidental result of the instinct of sympathy," which is "highly injurious to the race of man."<sup>27</sup> However, biological defects alone do not constitute what may result in the decline of a race.

Indeed, proper morality in a society is also selected by nature to survive with superior race as Darwin poses this example:

a savage will risk his own life to save that of a member of the same community, but will be wholly indifferent about a stranger ...[while] many a civilized man, or even boy, who never before risked his life for another, but full of courage and sympathy, has disregarded the instinct of self-preservation, and plunged at once into a torrent to save a drowning man, though a stranger.<sup>28</sup>

Hence, those societies with supreme morals will subjugate those societies with poor morals. Furthermore, immoral traits in a superior society will be eliminated: "a timid man ...[whose] instinct of self-preservation might be so strong," may be unable to bring himself to "run any such risk [which may impair his life], perhaps not even for his own child." Thus, the race fortunately loses his weak characteristics if the child dies.<sup>29</sup>

According to Darwinist thinking, a race should strive to multiply from those which are fitter (i.e. physically, mentally, and morally stronger) and exterminate the unfit, or at least limit their abilities to propagate. Among "the intellectually superior and

<sup>25</sup>*Ibid.*, 51.

<sup>26</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>27</sup>This issue is still one of controversy today. Do those with mental retardation forfeit the right to have children simply because they have a congenital defect? The Darwinist would say, "Yes!"

<sup>28</sup>Darwin, *Origin*, 481-2.

<sup>29</sup>*Ibid.* 482.

...the inferior, there can be little doubt that the former would succeed best in all occupations, and rear a greater number of children."<sup>30</sup> Furthermore, the intellectually superior person, who is more successful, achieves wealth, and "bequeaths it to his children, so that the children of the rich have an advantage over the poor in the race for success."<sup>31</sup> However, occasionally great wealth "tends to convert men into useless drones, but their number is never large; and some degree of elimination here occurs, for we daily see rich men, who happen to be fools or profligate, squandering away their wealth."<sup>32</sup> Therefore, the wealthy, having the useful morals and skills to succeed, are overall much more suited to contribute to the continued existence of the race: since the poor are therefore the weaker and not suited to contribute to that race's progeny, they are immoral and hence unfit. This line of reasoning is the basis for much of social Darwinist thought.

The poor, nonetheless, attempt to overwhelm society with offspring to that society's detriment. Darwin complains that the

poor and reckless ...almost invariably marry early, whilst the careful and frugal, who are generally otherwise virtuous, marry late in life, so that they may be able to support themselves and their children in comfort. Those who marry early ...produce many more children.... Thus the reckless, degraded, and often vicious members of society tend to increase at a quicker rate than the provident and generally virtuous members.<sup>33</sup>

Darwin, ever the objective English scientist, cites evidence that the

careless, squalid, unambitious Irishman multiplies like rabbits: the frugal, foreseeing, self-respecting, ambitious Scot, stern in his morality, spiritual in his faith, sagacious and disciplined in his intelligence, passes his best years

<sup>30</sup>*Ibid.*, 503.

<sup>31</sup>*Ibid.*, 502.

<sup>32</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>33</sup>*Ibid.*

in struggle and in celibacy, marries late, and leaves few behind him.<sup>34</sup>

Indeed, says Darwin passionately, "In the eternal 'struggle for existence,' it would be the inferior and less favored race that had prevailed—and prevailed by virtue not of its good qualities but of its faults."<sup>35</sup> Luckily, Darwin concludes, there are "some checks to this downward tendency" of poor children overwhelming society.<sup>36</sup>

Indeed, Nature is not so blind as to let immorality stain its superior races, and circumstances ensure the survival and advancement of these cultures. While, Darwin notes, "the poorest classes crowd into towns," the consequent "death-rate is higher in towns than in rural districts."<sup>37</sup> Furthermore, even if some of the rich live in towns, "no doubt more than twice the number of births would be requisite to keep up the number of the very poor inhabitants in the towns," or in other words, more poor, unhealthy children die than rich children.<sup>38</sup> Nature imposes yet another check on the growth of the poor and immoral (in the eyes of all governing Natural Selection) by the high mortality rate of those who are poor and wasteful: immoral people will not take the time to achieve success; only immoral people marry young, and hence remain poor. Darwin insists that women who marry under twenty have twice the chance of dying in any given year as "the same number of the unmarried. The mortality, also, of husbands under twenty is 'excessively high.'"<sup>39</sup> However, if a man, rich or poor, never marries, then he is certainly a waste to Nature since his qualities do not have a chance to be passed on. Darwinist thought claims he is immoral and Nature will eliminate him. Also, insists Darwin, men weak of heart and spirit have little chance of finding a mate.<sup>40</sup> Nature insures they will remain unmarried to eliminate his destructive characteristics. He is

<sup>34</sup>Ibid.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., 505.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., 506. Darwin is quoting a sociologist here.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid. Darwin also deals at length with this topic under the heading Sexual Selection, *ibid.*, starting on 567-94, and 867-894.

doomed to die a young death. Indeed, Darwin quotes a sociologist that, "[b]achelorhood is more destructive to life than the most unwholesome trades."<sup>41</sup> Consequently since, "marriage in itself is the main cause of prolonged life.... We may, therefore, infer that sound and good men who out of prudence remain for a time unmarried, do not suffer a high rate of mortality."<sup>42</sup> To conclude, Nature favors those who wait for a time to acquire success before marrying, and then blesses these ever so wise people with long life. Meanwhile, Nature eliminates the weak and imprudent who marry early, while poor, and breed like rodents, to the detriment of society.

Therefore, Darwin concludes that any action outside of nature to protect the poor, such as welfare laws, is "wrongly directed."<sup>43</sup> Most of the rich are so by virtue of being the most moral in a society, and any laws restricting them also seems misdirected.

Social Darwinists, however, assume that perhaps Nature may not be effective enough in its efforts in eliminating the poor and weak from a race; and consequently, many of these scientists and philosophers, armed with *The Origin of Species and Descent of Man*, began developing dangerous social theories to help it. To further enhance the superior race, social Darwinists decided to do away with all inferiors: those weaklings of their own race and all other inferior races. According to Sir Francis Galton who coined the term, the science of eugenics, which deals with exterminating the unwanted mental or physical qualities in a race to "protect" future generations and had its roots in racism.<sup>44</sup> The Breeder's Association, a Darwinist group founded at the turn of the century, wanted to sterilize the lower tenth (determined by their own definition) of the American people from generation to generation in order to have done away with the unfit by 1980. Indeed, "Margaret Sanger, the founder of Planned Parenthood, coined the slogan, "More children from the fit, less from the unfit."<sup>45</sup> She further described African-Americans and East-European immigrants to the United States as "a menace to civilization" and

<sup>41</sup>*Ibid.*, 506.

<sup>42</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>43</sup>*Ibid.*, 501.

<sup>44</sup>D'Sauza, *End of Racism*, 257.

<sup>45</sup>*Ibid.*, 118.

## Patrick Pearse and the Triumph of Failure

Matthew E. Thrun

Matthew Thrun completed his B.A. in History in Spring 1997 and will be working on his J.D. at Loyola University School of Law. This essay was written for an Advanced Composition class for English Professor Richard Sylvia during Spring 1996.

Only Cuchulainn, the Hound of Ulster, remained, fatally wounded, his side and stomach gaping with wounds. He bound himself with his sword-belt to a pillar-stone, *Carrig-an-Compan*, so that he might die standing, facing his enemies. And so he did, with drawn sword in hand, a raven perched on his shoulder, the rays of the setting sun bright on his bronze helmet, a terror even in death to his enemies.<sup>1</sup>

Patrick Pearse's idealistic ways were set when he founded St. Enda's College in 1908 and emblazoned a quote of Cuchulainn's upon a wall so that all his students would see it. "I care not though I were to live but one day and one night, if only my fame and my deeds live after me." This was Patrick Pearse speaking through Cuchulainn; he too saw himself as fighting an unbeatable foe and he also knew that one day he would be killed in this fight. It was with this mind set and with this Irish hero in his thoughts that Pearse set out on that fateful Monday in 1916 to lead the Easter Rising, an Irish revolt against British occupation. Pearse dreamed of being a hero to his country and wanted his deeds to live on after him.

Patrick (Padraic) Pearse was born on November 10, 1879, on Great Brunswick Street, now Pearse Street, in Dublin. His father was James Pearse, a English sculptor. Politically, James was a proponent of Home Rule, a proposed through which Ireland would remain a part of the British Empire but with self-government. His fathers one literary work was a pamphlet entitled *England's duty to Ireland as it appears to an*

"human weeds."<sup>46</sup> She believed the best way to kill weeds is to kill their roots, while admitting that Planned Parenthood does "not want word to get out that we want to exterminate the Negro population."<sup>47</sup> Clearly, according to the social Darwinist, "the struggle of race with race (culminates in) the survival of the physically and mentally fitter race."<sup>48</sup>

Clearly Darwin was a racist, as *The Origin of Species* and *The Descent of Man* show, and believed in the superiority of his race over those he called "savages." His works are full of references belittling "inferior" races and inferior people in his own race, and he approved of their subjugation and extinction. These references and beliefs were more than enough for his followers to feed upon, and the parasitic disease of social Darwinism spread like the cancer they strove to protect. In the name of progress, people were conquered and subjugated, and schemes were spewed forth to preserve and advance their own "superior" race. Clearly, the theory of evolution needs to be reexamined. Irrefutably, scientifically endorsed racism is founded upon Charles Darwin.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid., 275.

<sup>1</sup>Desmond Williams, *The Irish Struggle 1912-1926* (London, 1967), 1.



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<sup>1</sup>Deamond Williams, *The Irish Struggle 1912-1936* (London, 1967), 1.

*Englishman*, his thesis being: "you ought not force a mode of government upon an unwilling people. And you cannot forever do so, whether you ought to or not."<sup>2</sup> Patrick's mother was Margaret Brady. She was 20 when she married the 37-year-old Pearse, who was marrying for the second time. Little is known about her except that she was from the county of Meath and that she would sing to Patrick in Irish and tell him Gaelic stories. The Irish and British parentage provided the mixed background common to Irish patriots.

Patrick Pearse was educated by the Christian Brothers and received his B.A. in 1901, then entered the Law practice as a barrister. This profession was not to his liking, and he made very few appearances as counsel. His only case of any importance was one he tried in 1905. He represented a man who was being fined for writing his name on his cart in "illegible" script, that is to say, in the Irish language, Gaelic. His defense was described by the presiding judge as "very ingenious, interesting, and from a literary point of view, instructive."<sup>3</sup> Nonetheless, he lost the case and never tried another. He later referred to the law as the most ignoble of all professions. Instead, Pearse found his calling in education.

St. Enda's College, an experimental bilingual secondary school in Rathmines, was founded by Pearse in 1908. The language and sports of the school were all conducted in Irish, and many analysts have described Pearse's style as ahead of his time. He later described his philosophy on education in a 1912 essay:

What the teacher should bring to his pupils is not a set of ready-made opinions, or a stock of cut-and-dry information, but an inspiration and an example; and his main qualification should be, not such an overmastering will as shall impose itself at all hazards upon all weaker wills that come under its influence, but rather so infectious an enthusiasm as shall enkindle new enthusiasm.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>2</sup>F. X. Martin, *Leaders and Men of the Easter Rising Dublin 1916* (Ithaca, 1967), 152.

<sup>3</sup>George Dangerfield, *The Damnable Question: A Study in Anglo-Irish Relations* (Boston, 1976), 138.

<sup>4</sup>Martin, *Leaders and Men*, 154.

pearse's teaching philosophy described a man who wanted to inspire and enlighten his students. He wanted to be remembered as an inspiration and an example to the youth of the country.

Once when Pearse was told by a father, "My son is good at nothing but playing a tin whistle," and asked, "What am I to do with him?" Pearse replied, "Buy a tin whistle for him."<sup>5</sup> His attitude challenged the established educational norms and as a result, many members of the educational establishment looked down upon St. Enda's. But, these progressive ideas contained a view that nationalism had a place in the classroom. Pearse felt that an Irish nationalistic tradition must be taught to schoolchildren. This is the time where Pearse's nationalism began to develop. Pearse was fascinated with the idea of inspiring his students with Irish songs and stories. He longed to imbue the stories of Irish heroes into the hearts and minds of his students and thus help arouse nationalistic sentiment. He saw no incompatibility between the roles of educator and propagandist.

Pearse had exhibited strong nationalistic beliefs in his youth and as soon as he was sixteen, he joined the Gaelic League, a social club devoted to greater independence for Ireland. However, in 1913, he began to find the non-political aspect of the work tiresome. He began to look to the Irish Republican Brotherhood (I.R.B.), a more radical group, for guidance. During this time, Pearse was making a name for himself as a charismatic orator who could lead people. It was due to this reputation that he was invited to make the annual speech at the grave of Ireland's first official martyr, Wolfe Tone. This speech cemented Pearse's reputation as a highly-skilled orator who had the power to inspire and it was the main reason Pearse was invited to join the I.R.B.

Before Pearse was invited to join the I.R.B., it came under the control of a generation of younger men, allowing Pearse to have a stronger voice in the direction in which the group was heading. The man who made this possible was Tom Clarke, who in 1913 was 56 years old. He possessed "a young man's enthusiasm tempered by an iron discipline."<sup>6</sup> He represented the older generation, men who otherwise would have dismissed the young upstarts. But with his support, the new generation gained

<sup>5</sup>Dangerfield, *Damnable Question*, 139.

<sup>6</sup>Martin, *Leaders and Men*, 101.

widespread support. Pearse impressed Clarke and he was granted membership in the I.R.B. At the same time, Pearse was also granted membership into another radical Irish group, the Irish Volunteers. Before Pearse joined these groups he knew of their overt purpose: to challenge conscription and partition. But at this time, Pearse discovered that both groups had a covert purpose: to mount a rising before the war ended. He reacted with strong enthusiasm; he now saw an opportunity to fulfil his dream.

Pearse rose rapidly to positions of prominence in both organizations. He was a principal orator and he served on the planning committees for both organizations. In May 1915, he was appointed to a three-man committee established by the Supreme Council of the I.R.B. to create a plan for a military insurrection. For the rest of this year Pearse planned and organized this rising. He traveled throughout Ireland delivering speeches and attempting to gain support. Although he traveled much his main support was found in Dublin.

On April 24, 1916, Pearse's chance to fulfill his destiny arrived. Easter Monday, just before noon, a group of about 150 men lined up in ranks in Dublin. They were an odd assortment of men; they carried a mixture of rifles, shotguns, and handguns. The few people on the street gave little notice to the group. Various small groups had been marching around Dublin playing "soldier" recently.<sup>7</sup> Something was very different this Monday; however, for when the men reached the General Post Office (GPO) in downtown Dublin, a command was issued: "The GPO - Charge!"

The men quickly took control of the building, removed the Union Jack, and replaced it with a Green, White, and Orange Tricolor Flag. This was the first time that this flag, the current flag of the Irish Republic, had flown over Dublin. Around the city, small groups of rebels attacked British positions and attempted to take control of parts of the city. But, before the rising had begun, two major setbacks had occurred: one, the sinking of the *Axel*, a German ship carrying arms to Ireland, and two, Eoin MacNeill, the leader of the Irish Volunteers, ordered that all Volunteer movements for the whole Easter weekend be called off. MacNeill traveled around Ireland on April 23rd and convinced most of the

<sup>7</sup>Richard Killeen, *The Easter Rising* (New York, 1995), 5.

rural populace that the rising was off. The leaders of the rising in Dublin, however, were determined. They had some arms, although fewer than they would have wished, and fewer men than they would have wanted. They knew that MacNeill's order would keep most Volunteers at home, but they expected enough people to make a show.

The British responded early Tuesday morning. General W.H.M. Lowe and 5,000 British soldiers arrived and began to set up a cordon around the rebel positions. By now it was clear that MacNeill's order was having two devastating effects. First, the number of people turning out to fight was low and secondly, the I.R.B. and the Irish Volunteers were not rising across the country. Dublin was on her own.

Wednesday included some of the most intense fighting of the Rising. General Lowe did not have much respect for the rebels and believed they would break easily if attacked. The British first assaulted the Mendicity Institution, a building occupied by twenty to twenty-five rebels, most near twenty years of age. The British attempted several frontal assaults but each one failed. Finally, after the building had been attacked for several hours, it was surrounded and the remainder of the force surrendered. By the time they had surrendered, the rebels had inflicted over one hundred casualties of the British force.<sup>8</sup> At Kingston, the British had landed another contingent of troops. As they attempted to cross the Mount Street Bridge over the Liffey River, they were ambushed by forces of the Irish Volunteers. The fight began at noon and went on until late in the evening. During the battle, the British lost 200 men while the rebels lost only twelve.<sup>9</sup>

A man who shared Pearse's vision of nationalism was The O'Rahilly. His baptismal name was Michael Joseph O'Rahilly, but he took the title of a Gaelic Clan Chief, hence his name was "The O'Rahilly." He supported the actions of Eoin MacNeill and traveled over the countryside telling people not to rebel. However, when he returned to Dublin, he saw that part of the rising was going forward. He knew that without the support of the countryside, it was doomed from the start, yet he felt that in

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*, 23.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*, 24.



all honor, he should join it.<sup>10</sup> He fought with gallantry and was particularly concerned to see that no harm came to the British soldiers taken prisoners. He died with the utmost courage while leading a breakout from the burning GPO.

On Thursday, April 27, the tide began to seriously turn against the rebels. A full Brigade of Artillery had arrived and it was pounding the City of Dublin relentlessly. The rebels began a general withdrawal to positions near the General Post Office. On Friday, the G.P.O. itself was under heavy attack. The roof caught fire at 4 p.m. and the rebels were forced to abandon it. As the GPO burned, the last major fighting of the Rising was taking place on North King Street. Rebels had prepared defensive positions and a barricade to block this vital thoroughfare. General Lowe, the British commander, had a cautious plan worked out to flush the Irish out. However, earlier that day, General Sir John Maxwell, who had very little respect for the rebels and believed they would easily be routed, ordered a frontal attack on the position. The battle raged from 6 p.m. Friday until morning Saturday. By some tragic coincidence, the British troops that were attacking were the same that had been mauled at the Mount Street Bridge on Wednesday and after several bloody and fruitless attempts to take the positions, some of the soldiers began to crack. They broke into some of the surrounding homes and began to attack unarmed civilians. By the time they were done, fifteen innocent men had been murdered.<sup>11</sup> On Saturday morning, the nationalists decided to surrender. At 2:30 p.m. Pearse took off his sword and handed it to General Maxwell. The leaders were court-martialed and fifteen of them were sentenced to die. Patrick Pearse was the first man to be executed.

One aspect of Pearse's personality that must be examined is that he was prepared to assume a role in this rising that practically guaranteed his execution. The reason can be understood only through an examination of his writings before the rising. He concluded that his generation had lost their right to be free because they were decadent and servile. He felt the only way they could be rejuvenated was through a blood sacrifice. Pearse once wrote, "May it not be said with entire truth that the reason

<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.*, 34.

<sup>11</sup>*Ibid.*, 36.

why Ireland is not free is that Ireland has not deserved to be free?"<sup>12</sup> He was convinced that the right to freedom could only be won through the use of arms; he promoted open rebellion and seemed unbothered by the bloodshed that was sure to follow. He wrote in December 1915, "bloodshed is a cleansing and sanctifying thing, and the nation that regards it as a final horror has lost its manhood."<sup>13</sup>

The Rising has been described as the "Triumph of Failure." The executions made martyrs of the leaders and their deaths revived the spirit of Irish separatism, which eventually led to independence in 1922. The Rising also changed the debate for Irish Independence. Before the majority of Irish supported Home Rule (a national Parliament in charge of domestic affairs) or at most a gradual independence. After this rebellion people began to look at independence through force as a real possibility. For every hour the rebels had held out more Irish were being convinced that a full scale rebellion was possible. Pearse was obsessed with the idea of a bloody Rising that would serve as the catalyst for a larger revolution. He saw the violence as not only a political but also a spiritual and moral force.<sup>14</sup> He foresaw that the Rising was doomed to fail and this did not bother him. While he was imprisoned in Arbour Hill Barracks after the Rising, he wrote to his mother: "We are ready to die and we shall die cheerfully and proudly. Personally, I do not hope or hope to even desire to live."<sup>15</sup> Pearse saw in Cuchulainn the man he wanted to be; he hoped to be martyred and remembered as an executed patriot. Also in the letter to his mother he wrote, "Our deeds last week are the most splendid in Ireland's history. People will say hard things about us now, but we shall be remembered by posterity and blessed by unborn generations."<sup>16</sup> He did not care about his life; all that mattered to him was that his name and deeds lived on after him.

<sup>12</sup>Martin, *Leaders and Men*, 160.

<sup>13</sup>*Ibid.*, 161.

<sup>14</sup>Sean Farrell Moran, "Patrick Pearse and the European Revolt against Reason," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 50 (October-December 1989): 627.

<sup>15</sup>Leon Broin, *Dublin Castle and the 1916 Rising* (New York, 1971), 129.

<sup>16</sup>*Ibid.*, 128.

## The Treaty of Versailles in the Senate

Gregory Ayd

*Greg Ayd is a junior in history and wrote an analysis of a passage from a standard history textbook as an assignment for Historical Sources and Techniques (His 2500) under Professor Christopher Waldrep. A version of this essay won the university-wide Social Science Writing Award for 1996-1997.*

The United States Senate has debated many important topics, but one of the most legendary battles was the fight over the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles. Associated with this debate was not only the treaty, but also Woodrow Wilson's dream of a League of Nations. In a discussion about the debate's lasting fame, author Herbert Margulies wrote that "the story of the League's rejection has entered folklore and become almost mythological, with President Woodrow Wilson and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge the larger-than-life protagonists."<sup>1</sup> The ramifications of the Senate's defeat of the treaty were both immediate and far-reaching. Instead of becoming heavily involved in European affairs, the United States shied away from a prominent position in European politics.

At the time of the debate, prominent voices of public opinion held Lodge responsible for the treaty's defeat. After the Senate rejected the treaty for the second time in the spring of 1920, a *New York Times* editorial stated that "Mr. Lodge might at any time have secured ratification with reservations sufficient for every reasonable purpose..., and upon him, as the leader of the Republican majority, the actual responsibility [for the treaty's rejection] falls and will rest."<sup>2</sup> Since that time, however, historians have reevaluated the roles played by both Lodge and Wilson. Current history textbooks reflect this change. In the standard textbook *Nation of Nations*, the authors charge both

<sup>1</sup>Herbert F. Margulies, *The Mild Reservationists and the League of Nations Controversy in the Senate* (Columbia, 1989), ix.

<sup>2</sup>*New York Times*, 20 March 1920.

Lodge and Wilson with some responsibility for the defeat of the treaty.<sup>3</sup> Lodge loved the Republican party more than world peace and certainly did not want the Democrats to win votes by taking credit for the treaty.<sup>4</sup> The authors consider this to be one of the main reasons for Lodge's opposition to the treaty. As for Wilson, they write that "temperamentally the president could not abide compromise."<sup>4</sup> This failure to reach a compromise with Lodge and the Republicans, despite several opportunities to do so, eventually led to the defeat of the treaty. Ultimately, *Nation of Nations* credits the Democrats in the Senate with killing the treaty, stating that "loyal Democrats had been forced to deliver the killing blow."<sup>5</sup>

At first glance, it appears that the Treaty of Versailles, and with it the League of Nations, should have been easily ratified. While the argument in the Senate might appear to have been between pro-treaty, pro-League internationalists led by President Wilson and anti-treaty, anti-League isolationists under the leadership of Lodge, this was not the case at all. Although they had very different ideas as to the role which the United States should assume in what Wilson called the "new world order," both Lodge and Wilson subscribed to internationalist doctrines. Lodge believed Wilson had gone too far towards complete internationalism by allowing the League of Nations to assume powers which should only be claimed by the Congress, but he was not opposed to the concept of a league of nations. As Professor David Fromkin writes, it misleads to suggest that the issue was isolationism versus internationalism. For most senators, the issue was whether they shared President Wilson's particular brand of internationalist vision or held one of several rival internationalist visions.<sup>6</sup>

Of course, two-thirds of the Senate was required to approve the treaty in order for it to take force. While this number is more than a simple majority, it was certainly within the reach of Wilson

<sup>3</sup>James West Davidson and others, *Nation of Nations: A Narrative History of the American Republic, Volume II: Since 1865*, 2d ed. (New York, 1994), 502.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, 503.

<sup>6</sup>David Fromkin, "Rival Internationalism: Lodge, Wilson, and the Two Roosevelts," *World Policy Journal* 13 (Summer 1996): 78.

and his supporters. Within the Senate, between 75 and 80 percent of the senators favored joining the League. The American public was just as favorable in joining of the League, with perhaps as many as 80 percent of the people in agreement. Yet Americans chose to make the ratification vote a referendum on whether the United States should pursue Wilson's League, or a milder league proposed by Lodge and the Republicans. This milder league would delegate less authority to the League of Nations and leave more control over foreign affairs in the hands of Congress. Lodge's decision shaped the debate from the beginning.

Other factors also affected the tone of the debate. Even before the treaty had been completely finalized, Senate Republicans felt that Wilson had ignored their opinions and views on how the League of Nations should be constituted. When choosing a Republican to be a member of the peace delegation which went to Paris to write the treaty, Wilson chose not to pick a member of the Senate. Instead he chose Henry White, who was not a strong Republican, and did not even live in the United States.<sup>7</sup> This displeased the Senate Republicans, and it was only the first of several political blunders which Wilson would make to irritate them. These very same senators would cast the crucial votes which decided the fate of the treaty, a treaty which they had very little input in writing. Since the Republicans had gained control of the Senate in the Congressional elections of 1918, they would be a very important factor in the treaty fight. Although holding only a slim forty-nine to forty-seven majority, Republican votes would be necessary to ratify the treaty.

After returning to the United States from his initial negotiating trip to Europe, several members of the Senate informed Wilson that some changes would be necessary in order for the treaty to be approved by the Senate. Several senators suggested, in fact, that the proposal for the League of Nations should be separated from the rest of the treaty and dealt with as a separate entity. By doing this, the treaty would be assured of easy ratification, and any changes to the Covenant of the League which the Senate deemed necessary could be made without scuttling the entire peace treaty. The President, however, chose not only to disregard these suggestions, but to defy them openly.

<sup>7</sup>Margulies, *Mild Reservationists*, 8.

In a speech in New York prior to his return to Europe to finalize the treaty, Wilson bragged that "when that treaty comes back, gentlemen on this side will find the covenant not only in it, but so many threads of the treaty tied to the covenant that you cannot dissect the covenant from the treaty without destroying the whole vital structure."<sup>8</sup> In the end, that is precisely what happened, and the treaty was destroyed.

Wilson's unwillingness to allow the Senate to play even a small part in the writing of the treaty resulted in much bitterness, especially on the Republican side of the aisle; however, disappointment with Wilson's handling of the situation was not confined only to Republicans. Thomas J. Walsh was a loyal Democratic senator from Montana; nevertheless, he felt that "the President has handled the thing most maladroitly and has evidenced a disposition to exclude the Senate from any real, active participation in the making of the treaty."<sup>9</sup>

Wilson's actions during this time created considerable animosity between himself and the leading Republican senators. This animosity, in addition to the partisanship naturally present between the two political parties, virtually assured that Republicans would subject the Treaty of Versailles to more scrutiny than might otherwise be directed toward a similar treaty under different circumstances. These events set the stage for the heated battle which would occur in the Senate.

President Wilson did not present the treaty to the Senate until July 10, 1919, when he asked the Senate for its approval, as prescribed in the Constitution. The senators expected Wilson to present a defense of the treaty, with particular attention being given to the Covenant. Wilson, however, already considered the Republicans to be hopelessly against the treaty. While he did discuss the League during the address, he never referred to the specific issues opponents of the league had criticized. He instead delivered a speech in which he dwelled on "lofty generalities,"<sup>10</sup> as the *Chicago Tribune* disgustedly reported. The President seemed to be unwilling to respond to Republican complaints. The *New York Times* wrote that "from the outset he [Wilson]

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>10</sup>*Chicago Tribune*, 11 July 1919.



seemed to sense the hostility on the Republican side of the Chamber and to feel the virtual futility of an appeal to them.<sup>11</sup>

Wilson implored the senators to realize that the time had come for a world organization such as the League of Nations to be formed. He made an impassioned plea for adoption of the League:

They [statesmen] saw it [the League] as the main object of the peace, as the only thing that could complete it or make it worth while. They saw it as the hope of the world, and that hope they did not dare to disappoint. Shall we or any other free people hesitate to accept this great duty? Dare we reject it and break the heart of the world?<sup>12</sup>

While Wilson presented to the Senate an eloquent case for a league of one sort or another, he did not show clearly why this particular League of Nations proposal was better than other proposals that the Senate would consider.

Wilson's failure to respond directly to his senatorial critics fueled the opposition. According to the *Chicago Tribune*, a strongly Republican newspaper and a great antagonist of Wilson, "senators, generally, had supposed Mr. Wilson would endeavor to demolish the opposition by explaining the mysteries of the covenant." The article continued: "When Mr. Wilson touched upon none of these concrete objections, but continued to dwell on the beauties of self-sacrifice, national unselfishness, and the new order of internationalism, interest on the floor began to wane."<sup>13</sup> The senators were in no mood for idealistic rhetoric; they wanted to hear a cold, factual account of the treaty's provisions. Henry Fountain Ashurst, a Democratic senator from Arizona, summed up the situation acutely when he wrote in his diary that "his [Wilson's] audience wanted raw meat, he fed them cold turnips."<sup>14</sup> Wilson's speech changed few, if any, votes in the Senate.

<sup>11</sup>New York Times, 11 July 1919.

<sup>12</sup>Arthur S. Link, ed., *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson* (Princeton, 1991), 61:434.

<sup>13</sup>*Chicago Tribune*, 11 July 1919.

<sup>14</sup>Link, ed., *Papers of Wilson*, 61:445-6.

The treaty went first to the Foreign Relations Committee, where senators debated it for two months. As chairman of this committee, Lodge controlled the entire process. He assumed the difficult task of attempting to adopt some strategy which could garner the votes of two-thirds of a seriously divided Senate. While less than two-thirds of the Senate would have been sufficient to kill Wilson's treaty, this did not satisfy Lodge. He wanted the Senate to ratify a Republican version to be sent to the President, forcing Wilson either to sign a Republican treaty or to be directly responsible for rejecting the treaty himself. Lodge considered two possible approaches. The committee could either offer amendments or reservations. While the distinction between these two policies was sometimes confused even by the participants in the debate, the difference proved very important. An amendment added to the treaty during ratification required renegotiation. This meant that all parties to the treaty would have to formally agree to the change by signing the treaty again. A reservation, on the other hand, did not change the actual text of the treaty, allowing the other signatories to agree to it "without formal acknowledgment" of the alteration.<sup>15</sup>

The Senate, by this time, had broken into several fairly well-defined factions. A small, but unwavering group of senators were against the League in any form. Known as irrecconcilables, this group could be counted on to vote against the treaty with or without amendments or reservations. Composed of fourteen Republicans and two Democrats, this group did not play an influential role in the debate. Their minds were already made up, and nothing could change their stance. The remainder of the Republicans favored ratification, but harbored reservations of one type or another.<sup>16</sup> Mild reservationists favored interpretive amendments or reservations, which would only more clearly define what had originally been intended by the writers of the treaty. Strong reservationists, led by Lodge, wanted to define certain parts of the treaty more clearly, but not necessarily with the same meaning which had been intended by the framers of the treaty. The strong reservationists outnumbered the mild

<sup>15</sup>Robert H. Ferrell, *Woodrow Wilson and World War I, 1917-1921* (New York, 1985), 176.

<sup>16</sup>Although this group is now called reservationists, some of these senators also favored amendments at the time.

reservationists, but treaty supporters needed to win both groups to ratify the treaty.<sup>17</sup>

All of the Senate Democrats supported the Wilsonian position of no reservations or amendments, with the exception of two irreconcilables. In several cases, Democrats gave the support only out of party loyalty. Senator Gilbert Hitchcock led the Democrats. Not actually the minority leader, he filled in for Senator Thomas Martin, suffering from a terminal illness. This change in leadership hurt the Democrats, not by injuring party unity, but by curtailing their ability to devise a policy to woo Republican support. Hitchcock's lack of experience as minority leader limited his influence among both Democrats and Republicans. About twenty Republican votes would be needed in order to provide a two-thirds majority when combined with loyal Democrats. Compromise would probably be necessary, but despite his attempts, Hitchcock failed to convince Wilson that this was so.<sup>18</sup>

One of the major stumbling blocks for ratification was Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which said:

The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.<sup>19</sup>

This article expressed Wilson's view of collective security. It authorized league members to respond to any attack against another member nation. Reservationists thought that this article gave too much power to the League and took away the Congressional right to declare war. President Wilson, however,

<sup>17</sup>Magulies, *Mild Reservationists*, ix-x.

<sup>18</sup>Kendrick A. Clements, *The Presidency of Woodrow Wilson*, American Presidency Series (Lawrence, 1992), 191.

<sup>19</sup>"Treaty of Peace with Germany (Treaty of Versailles)," 28 June 1919, *Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, 1776-1949*, vol. 2, 51.

considered Article 10 to be "the heart of the Covenant,"<sup>20</sup> because in his opinion, it embodied the major theme of the entire League. In a conference with members of the Foreign Relations Committee, Wilson stated that "Article 10 seems to me to constitute the very backbone of the whole covenant. Without it the league would be hardly more than an influential debating society."<sup>21</sup> Since Wilson saw this article as one of the basic tenets upon which the League was founded, he did not want any reservations attached to it.

In the Foreign Relations Committee, Republican senators introduced different amendments and reservations to be discussed. The committee approved several amendments, sending them to the full Senate for debate. The committee also adopted four reservations which came to become known as the Lodge reservations. These reservations became the basis for several different sets of reservations subsequently proposed by Republicans for inclusion in the resolution of ratification. The first of the Lodge Reservations protected the United States' "unconditional right to withdraw from the league." The second reservation stipulated that the United States would not assume any obligations under Article 10, or any other article, except with Congressional approval. Lodge's third reservation affirmed the United States' right to determine "what questions are within its domestic jurisdiction," and therefore outside of the League's jurisdiction. The fourth reservation removed the Monroe Doctrine from the League's domain. This left the United States free to enforce the Monroe Doctrine as she saw fit, without obtaining approval from the League.<sup>22</sup>

In the full Senate, voting began on the Foreign Relations Committee's amendments. As expected, the Democrats stuck together and generally voted against the amendments. On the Republican side though, there was no such unanimity. The strong reservationists voted in favor of some amendments, but against others. Nine of the mild reservationists voted against all of the amendments, and as a result of this, all of the amendments were rejected. While this might have seemed to be good news for

<sup>20</sup>Link, ed., *Papers of Wilson*, 63:452.

<sup>21</sup>*Ibid.*, 62:343.

<sup>22</sup>*Congressional Record*, 66th Cong., 1st sess. (1919), 7271.

Wilson and the Democrats, a closer look at the vote totals revealed that it really was not. The combination of loyal Democrats and mild reservationists was enough to provide the simple majority necessary to defeat amendments to the treaty, but it was well short of the two-thirds necessary to approve the treaty. Over one-third of the senators, more than enough to kill the treaty, voted for almost every amendment. This should have indicated to Wilson and the Democratic leadership that accommodating the strong reservationists would be a necessity if the treaty was to have a good chance of being approved.<sup>25</sup>

Wilson's next move demonstrated his idealism in action. Instead of looking for compromise at this point, he chose to take his case for the League of Nations directly to the people. On August 25, Wilson decided to deliver his message to the people through the Middle West and West. Prior to leaving for the tour, Wilson sent a secret memorandum to Senator Hitchcock, dated September 3 and titled "Suggestion." In this memorandum, Wilson outlined in his own words four reservations dealing with the same topics as the Lodge reservations. Wilson apparently intended the reservations to be proposed by Hitchcock, but not until Wilson himself gave him the order. If and when Wilson gave Hitchcock permission to propose the reservations, he was not to admit that they had actually been composed by the President.<sup>26</sup>

If Hitchcock had proposed the reservations at this point, a compromise might have been reached. Wilson, however, wanted to win ratification on his own terms. Consequently, he departed on his speaking tour on the same day that he gave the memorandum to Hitchcock. The potential reservations would have to wait until Wilson gave Hitchcock permission to propose them, which would likely be upon Wilson's return from his trip. By that time, though, the situation would be drastically different.

Wilson had wanted to launch his campaign as early as July 20, but at that time his advisers opposed the trip. Wilson hoped to demonstrate during the tour that the public at large favored the treaty, but his advisers pointed out that the Senate was fairly

insulated from any pressure which could be applied by public opinion.<sup>25</sup> The Seventeenth Amendment had just been ratified in 1913, so the populace lacked experience with electing senators directly. By late August, however, Wilson felt that an appeal to the people was the only option left that could turn the tide against reservations, so accordingly, the President left Washington by train on September 3. By the middle of September, the public was becoming very responsive at every stop, and the speeches drew large crowds. After a speech at Pueblo, Colorado on September 25, however, Wilson showed signs of an impending stroke. According to Dr. Cary Grayson, Wilson's personal physician saw this and informed the President that the remainder of the trip must be canceled. And Wilson grudgingly consented and returned to Washington.<sup>26</sup>

On October 2, only a few days after returning from the western trip, Wilson suffered a major stroke that paralyzed the left side of his body. The long-term political effects of this medical problem were almost as damaging. At the time, those individuals who were very close to the President employed a great deal of deception so that the American people would not find out how greatly the stroke had impaired Wilson's ability to hold the office. Irwin Hood Hoover was Head Usher of the White House during Wilson's entire term of office and was devoted to Wilson, but in his memoirs he writes that "never was a conspiracy so pointedly and so artistically formed."<sup>27</sup> A news report dated 10:00 p.m. October 3 stated that "the President's illness is diagnosed as 'nervous exhaustion,' but the danger is that the present attack...may develop into nervous prostration."<sup>28</sup> The fact that Wilson had suffered a stroke was not announced to the public.

According to Dr. Bert Park, a medical doctor who has studied Wilson's case considerably, "that Wilson was disabled for at least the first month of his illness in the constitutional sense, such that he was unable to carry out the duties of the office, the documents

<sup>25</sup>Clements, *Presidency of Wilson*, 192-3.

<sup>26</sup>*Ibid.*, 63:518.

<sup>27</sup>*Ibid.*, 63:634.

<sup>28</sup>*Ibid.*, 63:545.

<sup>25</sup>Lloyd E. Ambrosius, *Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition: The Treaty Fight in Perspective* (New York, 1987), 198.

<sup>26</sup>Woodrow Wilson, "Suggestion," *Papers of Wilson*, Link, ed. 62:621.



...make clear."<sup>29</sup> Irwin Hoover was a bit more descriptive when he wrote that "this original [sic] stroke or whatever it was simply put the President out of business, mentally & physically for at least a month."<sup>30</sup> Even when recovery finally did begin to become evident, it was painfully obvious to anyone who had known him prior to the stroke that Wilson was not the man he had once been. Hoover wrote that "there was no comparison with the President that went to Paris and before. He could not talk plain, mumbled more than he articulated, was helpless and looked awful."<sup>31</sup> Wilson would never fully recover from the trauma which he suffered during the stroke.

The relationship between Wilson's illness and the treaty debate is of great importance, because at a critical time during which some compromises might have been made, Wilson, the leader of the pro-treaty delegation, could not give any direction to Hitchcock in the Senate. Even after he regained enough strength to begin taking a limited interest in political affairs again, the long-term effects of his stroke still took their toll. Although it was not known in Wilson's day, strokes also have an effect on an individual's psychological well-being. These effects include disorders of emotion, impaired impulse control, and defective judgment. Furthermore, a stroke victim's underlying personality traits are greatly magnified and become plainly obvious. For Wilson, these traits included intransigence. Usually hidden by Wilson's sense of proper and prudent behavior, it came to the forefront after his stroke and became evident in his actions pertaining to the treaty.<sup>32</sup>

While Wilson's recovery continued slowly, action continued in the Senate. On November 6, Lodge introduced fourteen reservations which he hoped to attach to the treaty prior to ratification. Some of these were similar to the original four Lodge reservations which the Foreign Relations Committee had proposed, but there were several additional reservations as well. The list of reservations stated: that the United States would not enforce sanctions without the consent of Congress; that only the

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., 63:644.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., 63:636.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., 64:523.

US would decide if it had fulfilled its obligations to the League if it withdrew; that mandates would only be accepted with Congressional approval; that only the US would determine what qualified as a "domestic" issue; that no issues pertaining to the Monroe Doctrine would be submitted to the League; that arms-limitation agreements would be binding only if they were given Congressional approval; and that the covenant of the League must be amended to equalize the voting power of the US and Great Britain in combination with its dominions. There were other reservations included, but these were the most important ones.

Senator Hitchcock realized the situation looked bleak. On November 13, Hitchcock wrote to Wilson so that he might be kept abreast of the latest developments. He informed Wilson that the Republicans were solid in their support of the Lodge reservations, and that the Democrats offered substitute reservations, similar to those suggested by Wilson prior to his speaking trip. These substitute reservations drew the support of all but three or four Democrats. Hitchcock also spelled out the Democrat's plan for voting on resolutions of ratification. They intended to offer a resolution of unqualified ratification to rival Lodge's resolution of ratification with reservations, knowing full well that their resolution would be defeated. They would then offer interpretive reservations in place of the Lodge Reservations, again expecting defeat. The purpose of this was to "make the democratic record clear."<sup>33</sup>

Hitchcock proposed to Wilson that the Democrats vote against the resolution of ratification containing the Lodge reservations when it came to a vote. This would assure its failure. There was, however, another possibility. Hitchcock wrote: "This plan is subject to modification, however, in case when the time arrives we shall determine, or the President shall advise us to vote for the Lodge resolution."<sup>34</sup> With this statement, Hitchcock intended to give Wilson an opportunity to change his stance on reservations, since the treaty would apparently not pass without the Lodge reservations attached. Hitchcock followed up this correspondence to Wilson with a personal visit on November

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., 64:29.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid.

17. Hitchcock hoped that the spirit of compromise which Wilson had displayed briefly, prior to his ill-fated western trip, would again be manifested in Wilson's behavior.<sup>35</sup>

Upon asking the President if he had anything to suggest about the Lodge resolution, Hitchcock soon discovered that any disposition which Wilson might have had toward compromise had been destroyed. The President responded "I consider it a nullification of the Treaty and utterly impossible." Senator Hitchcock then noted that the Senate had made some changes to Article 10 of the League covenant, and proceeded to describe the changes. Wilson was not impressed, and stated: "That cuts the very heart out of the Treaty; I could not stand for those changes for a moment because it would humiliate the United States before all of the allied countries." Wilson's bitterness toward the Republicans was clear when he told Hitchcock that "I will get their [Republicans] political scalps when the truth is known to the people.... Mind you, Senator, I have no hostility towards these gentlemen but an utter contempt."<sup>36</sup>

Hitchcock wanted to make certain compromises with the Republicans, but Wilson was set against it. The President considered everything except interpretive reservations, which did not change the substance of the treaty, as being too compromising. After his conference with President Wilson, Hitchcock spoke to the press about his discussion with the chief executive. He informed them that "President Wilson will pocket the treaty if the Lodge program of reservations is carried out in the ratifying resolution."<sup>37</sup> In other words, even if the Lodge resolution passed with a veto-proof two-thirds majority in the Senate, Wilson would refuse to complete the ratification process. This action would send the treaty back to the Senate at the beginning of the next session to start the entire process over again.

By November 19, the Senate was finally ready to vote on the different resolutions of ratification. Before any votes were cast, however, there was one final bit of political wrangling. Before the vote took place, Senator Hitchcock circulated among the

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., 64:43.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., 64:48.

Democrats in the Senate a letter from President Wilson discussing the Lodge resolution in which he wrote: "In my opinion, the resolution in that form does not provide for ratification but, rather, for the nullification of the treaty. I sincerely hope that the friends and supporters of the treaty will vote against the Lodge resolution of ratification." Senator Lodge, sensing a chance to make Wilson look foolish for urging the Senate to vote against a resolution ratifying his own treaty, read the letter to the entire Senate. Finally, debate was closed, and the voting began.<sup>38</sup>

The senators first voted on the resolution of ratification with the Lodge reservations attached. This resolution received thirty-nine votes in favor of ratification and fifty-five votes against ratification. A motion was made to reconsider, so the same resolution came up for a second vote. This time the measure was defeated forty-one to fifty. Consequently, the Lodge resolution went down to defeat. Then, as planned by Hitchcock and the Democrats, the Senate voted on a resolution of ratification with no reservations at all. The resolution received thirty-eight votes in favor of ratification, versus fifty-three votes against ratification. Similar margins decided all three votes. None of them came close to the necessary two-thirds majority. The Treaty of Versailles was dead, at least in this session of Congress.<sup>39</sup>

When the next session of Congress began in January of 1920, Wilson again sent the treaty to the Senate for ratification. Unfortunately for the supporters of the treaty, he had not altered his stance in the least since the previous Senate's actions. In the President's traditional Jackson Day message to Democrats, he stood by his earlier position; namely, that interpretive reservations were acceptable, but nothing else. He wrote, "We cannot rewrite this treaty. We must take it without changes which alter its meaning, or leave it."<sup>40</sup> Only compromise could have saved the treaty in the Senate, but Wilson left no room for maneuvering. The treaty came up for another vote on March 19. The resolution of ratification including the Lodge reservations

<sup>38</sup>Congressional Record, 66th Cong., 1st sess. (1919), 8768.

<sup>39</sup>New York Times, 20 November 1919.

<sup>40</sup>Link, ed., *Papers of Wilson*, 64:258.

was defeated, with forty-nine senators voting in favor of the resolution and thirty-five voting against it. Despite the fact that twenty-one Democrats broke ranks to join with Republican supporters of the Lodge resolution, it fell seven votes short of being approved by two-thirds of the Senate.<sup>41</sup>

This second defeat ended Woodrow Wilson's dream of American participation in the League of Nations, but ultimately, Wilson himself was responsible for leading the Democrats to an ignominious defeat. By refusing every attempt at compromise, Wilson ignored the political realities of the situation. Even several members of his own party believed that some reservations were necessary, but Wilson stubbornly clung to the idea that the treaty could somehow be approved without reservations. He repeatedly refused to accept opportunities to reach some sort of agreement with his adversaries, and even with Senator Hitchcock, his own party's leader in the Senate. By asking Democrats to reject his own treaty, Wilson left them with no good alternatives. They could either vote for the treaty and humiliate the President, or vote against the treaty and kill it. In the final analysis, nearly half of the Senate Democrats did vote against Wilson's wishes, but this was not enough to save the treaty. For these reasons, the Democrats were responsible for defeating the Treaty of Versailles. This ended an unfortunate chapter in the storied history of Congressional debates.

## The Life of Mary J. Booth

*Brandie E. Banks*

*Brandie Banks, an Eastern Illinois undergraduate, wrote this biography for Historical Sources and Techniques (His 2500) under Professor Christopher Waldrep as a regular weekly assignment requiring use of the University Archives at Booth Library in Fall 1996.*

**M**ary Josephine Booth, librarian at Eastern Illinois State College from 1904-1945, was instrumental in the acquisition of the current library facility in use today. Had it not been for Booth's persistence and dedication to her profession, the building of Booth library would have been delayed considerably. Mary Booth was a truly remarkable woman whom everyone respected and admired for her commitment to the University. She fought for funding of a new library because she believed it would be an integral part of the University. Only by Booth's insistence was the need for a new library assessed by the Illinois State Legislature. By tracing Mary Booth's history, one can see more clearly her motivation.

Booth lived from 1876 to 1965. Booth was born in Beloit, Wisconsin, to John and Minerva (Leonard) Booth. She graduated from Beloit High School in 1893, attended Beloit College, and then the University of Illinois Library School where she graduated in 1904. She immediately was hired by President Livingston C. Lord and started work that fall at Eastern Illinois State College. Booth was the third librarian at Eastern where she stayed until she retired in 1945, except for a brief but important interlude when she served as a Red Cross relief worker during the First World War.<sup>1</sup> Booth was state treasurer and later President of the Illinois Library Association, as well as a member of the Daughters of the American Revolution, Women's Overseas Service League, and the American Association of University Women.

<sup>41</sup>New York Times, 20 March 1920.

<sup>1</sup>Mary J. Booth, 1804-1945, Mary J. Booth Collection, University Archives, Booth Library, Eastern Illinois University, Charleston, Illinois.



was defeated, with forty-nine senators voting in favor of the resolution and thirty-five voting against it. Despite the fact that twenty-one Democrats broke ranks to join with Republican supporters of the Lodge resolution, it fell seven votes short of being approved by two-thirds of the Senate.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Mary J. Booth, 1804-1945, Mary J. Booth Collection, University Archives, Booth Library, Eastern Illinois University, Charleston, Illinois.

During her tenure at Eastern, Booth made many contributions. Her work meant so much to her that often she would sacrifice her own health for the job. In a correspondence from the secretary of the Illinois State Historical Library, Jessie Weber states: "I heard from some of the library ladies that your health had not been good and I was very sorry to hear it, but I must confess that I was not much surprised, for you know that I had told you when we were in Mackinaw together that you were working too hard and using up too much nervous energy."<sup>2</sup> This letter proves that Booth was extremely devoted to the University and to her profession.

Booth was also very active with the Red Cross. She became involved by serving as the head of the Red Cross relief work when a cyclone hit Mattoon and Charleston in 1916. After this incident, when the call for workers for the First World War sprang up, Booth jumped at the chance. She was the only faculty member at Eastern to served overseas. Booth volunteered in the fall of 1917 and arrived in France on November 27. She served as a Red Cross Canteen worker in the aviation training center at Isoudum until May 1918. Her library experience caused her to be transferred to the American Library Association for the remainder of her stay. She was posted to do military camp library work in Paris, Chaumont, and Gievres, France, and also in Coblenz, Germany. Booth classified the library at General Pershing's headquarters and was in charge of the library in the Festhalle, Coblenz. Booth returned to the United States on July 17, 1919, and to Eastern that Fall.<sup>3</sup> Booth later commented on the national effort to send books overseas in a speech to the Daughters of the American Revolution:

From one of my letters: One hundred and eighty-nine cases of books came into the library this last week, and we have all but about forty unpacked and sorted. Many cases have been packed and sent out. I know they will be

<sup>2</sup>Jessie Palmer Weber, Springfield, Illinois, to Mary J. Booth, Charleston, Illinois, 17 October 1911, Mary J. Booth Collection, University Archives, Booth Library, Eastern Illinois University, Charleston Illinois.

<sup>3</sup>Charles H. Coleman, *Eastern Illinois State College: Fifty Years of Public Service* (Springfield, IL, 1950), 171.

appreciated, for the boys like good American books and these are that kind.<sup>4</sup>

Booth worked very hard to provide books for the troops. She summed up her volunteer experience: "[e]arly in July we reached New York and the experiences overseas became a memory; happy in part, sad in part, mingled with a feeling of thankfulness that I had been permitted to be over there."<sup>5</sup> Perhaps Booth's librarian experience in the war prompted her later in her career to realize the need for a new library at Eastern. The library symbolized a necessary part of the school just as it had been a necessary part of the soldier's lives which gave them hope.

Booth's contributions to the University are another example of how dedicated she was in promoting learning amongst the students. Booth published many of her own works including records of books in her library, geography material indexes (*Journal of Geography*), and her *Index to Material on Picture Study* (an index to children's books). She sent library information booklets out to other universities and correspondence from Phineas L. Winsor of the University of Illinois Library School shows that Mary Booth often sent her publications to other schools without charge.<sup>6</sup> Booth's work was truly her passion.

Mary Booth also contracted to work outside the University compiling indexes for other organizations and for the Index office, a national library categorizing organization. Booth spent a month organizing the library at the Southwestern Louisiana Institute in Lafayette, Louisiana, which increased from 4,000 to 10,000 books to gain membership to the Southern Association of Colleges.<sup>7</sup> During several summers, Booth worked as a volunteer without pay at the New York Public Library. Booth gained valuable experience and knowledge of the variety of books available. There is much correspondence of Booth requesting library materials, sending books back to their original schools, and discussing the Dewey Decimal system. Her correspondence

<sup>4</sup>Mary J. Booth, "Books Over There," speech to the Daughters of the American Revolution, 8 February 1936, Mary J. Booth Collection.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup>Coleman, *Fifty Years of Service*, 359; Phineas L. Winsor, Urbana, Illinois, to Mary J. Booth, Charleston, Illinois, 14 April 1925, Mary J. Booth Collection.

<sup>7</sup>*Minsterdam Evening Recorder* (New York), 19 April 1923.

shows Booth was in high demand. She was asked to compile a bibliography of poems written about Abe Lincoln for the centennial of Lincoln's birth in 1908.<sup>8</sup> Booth was, in fact, so well known in the library community that she felt confident enough to apply for the editorship at the H.W. Windsor company, a prestigious publishing house in New York.

Among all these examples of Booth's persistence, the biggest accomplishment in her life was the building of the Mary J. Booth Library on Eastern's campus. From 1900 to 1948, the library at Eastern Illinois State College increased from 2,500 books to over 67,000 books. The library was located in Old Main and sprawled over six classrooms before the new library was built. Books were stored in the "tower" which made them highly inaccessible. Reading space was also inadequate as the student population rose year after year. In 1933, limited space and a growing student body caused the stacks to be closed to students.<sup>9</sup> In the 1930 *Warbler* yearbook, Miss Booth outlined the type of building that was needed.<sup>10</sup> Finally, after much insistence on the matter of the new library, the Illinois General Assembly appropriated \$2,010,092 for the building and another \$80,000 to furnish it in October 1947.<sup>11</sup> The library building, named after Booth, was the first major building erected at Eastern since 1940. An article in the Illinois State Register said about Booth: "She has the distinction of being one of the first living woman academic leaders in Illinois for whom a college building was named."<sup>12</sup> This was quite an accomplishment for a woman at that time.

Mary Booth received an honorary Doctor of Literature degree from Beloit College on June 5 of the same year as the grand opening of the new library. When Booth died on January 2, 1965 at the age of 88, the local newspaper produced a lengthy tribute.<sup>13</sup> Mary Booth's early contributions to the University and her persistence and dedication were the inspiration for and prompted construction of the much needed library facility in use today.

<sup>8</sup>Illinois State Historical Library, Springfield, Illinois to Mary J. Booth, Charleston, Illinois, 5 December 1908, Mary J. Booth Collection.

<sup>9</sup>Coleman, *Fifty Years of Service*, 279.

<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.*, 281.

<sup>11</sup>*Ibid.*, 277.

<sup>12</sup>*Illinois State Register* (Springfield), 22 May 1950.

<sup>13</sup>*Charleston Courier News*, 2 January 1965.

## The U-2 Incident

Amanda Standerfer

*Amanda Standerfer is a graduate student in history at Eastern Illinois University and has held the Illinois Regional Archives Depository Internship at Booth Library. This essay was written for a seminar in Diplomatic History with Professor Mark White. It was co-winner of the Hamand Graduate Writing Award for 1997.*

In November 1954, John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and several other advisors approached President Dwight D. Eisenhower about proceeding with a program for a special high-performance aircraft possibly to be used for reconnaissance. They wanted to produce about thirty planes for around \$35 million. Lockheed had developed, under tight security, a light-weight plane called the U-2, which could maintain altitudes over 60,000 feet for a long period of time. Eisenhower later said that "any leak of information either at home or abroad could compel abandonment of the entire idea of such a reconnaissance plane."<sup>1</sup> The name U-2 or a utility plane, cloaked its reconnaissance capabilities. Since the government could not deny the existence of the plane, it was said to be used for gathering climate information around the world. The President approved the plan because of the need for intelligence information about the Soviet Union, and, consequently flights began in 1956. Pilots from the Air Force, including Francis Gary Powers, were chosen based on their experience and rigorously trained.

On 1 May 1960, Powers's plane crashed near Sverdlovsk, nearly 1,500 miles into the heart of Russia, sparking a possible international crisis. The President was informed when it was certain that the plane was missing. The President was also told that the possibility that the pilot lived was slim to none. He had been "assured that if a plane were to go down it would be

<sup>1</sup>Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961* (New York, 1965), 544.



shows Booth was in high demand. She was asked to compile a bibliography of poems written about Abe Lincoln for the centennial of Lincoln's birth in 1908.<sup>8</sup> Booth was, in fact, so well known in the library community that she felt confident enough to apply for the editorship at the H.W. Windsor company, a prestigious publishing house in New York.

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<sup>1</sup>Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1955-1961* (New York, 1965), 544.

destroyed either in the air or on impact, that proof of espionage would be lacking.<sup>16</sup>

On May 3 NASA issued a statement saying that a U-2 research plane flying over Turkey on a Air Weather Service mission had gone down in the Lake Van, Turkey area on Sunday, May 1. NASA was told to issue this statement, and really did not know about the U-2 program or what had happened on May 1. The Soviets did not issue a statement until May 5, boasting that they had shot down a United States reconnaissance plane. At this point, the President, upon the recommendation of his advisors, decided to continue to maintain the cover story suggesting that the pilot had difficulty with his oxygen equipment and may have strayed into Soviet air space, and that this was the plane that Khrushchev announced had been shot down. They felt it was important to issue a statement in response to Khrushchev in order to maintain the "credibility" of the "explanation."<sup>17</sup>

Then, on May 6, Khrushchev announced that the pilot, Francis Gary Powers, was "alive and kicking." A State Department statement acknowledged the need for "intelligence-collecting activities," but more or less still clung to the false cover story. The next morning, the President, again upon the advice of his aides, issued a statement "admitting the essential truth of the Soviet allegations," and accepting full responsibility.<sup>18</sup>

At the Paris Summit on May 16, Khrushchev demanded an apology, an end to all U-2 flights, and punishment of the responsible parties. Eisenhower had already said that the flights would be ended, but he would not apologize. He did not feel it was necessary to "permanently tie the hands of the United States government for the single purpose of saving a conference."<sup>19</sup> Khrushchev refused to believe that the President was behind the flights, and wanted someone, Dulles or Nixon preferably, punished for sending the U-2 over Soviet airspace. Khrushchev was also dissatisfied with Eisenhower's word that the flights would not be resumed. De Gaulle, Macmillan, and Eisenhower made several attempts to get Khrushchev to come to the meetings,

<sup>16</sup>*Ibid.*, 547.

<sup>17</sup>*Ibid.*, 549.

<sup>18</sup>*Ibid.*, 550.

<sup>19</sup>*Ibid.*, 554.

but he continued to insist that Eisenhower apologize. The Summit concluded before it ever really started.

The U-2 episode poses several important questions: first, was the decision to start the U-2 program the best way to overcome the problems created by the secrecy of the Soviet Union? Second, was a flight over the Soviet Union so close to the Paris Summit necessary? Third, was the initial cover-up the best way to deal with the incident? And fourth, could something have been done to save the Paris Summit? To establish a case, this paper will make use of Eisenhower's memoirs and papers, but will also consider Khrushchev's, Powers's, and the media's role in the U-2 incident.

—I—

Was the decision to start the U-2 program the best alternative to cracking the secrecy of the Soviet Union? President Eisenhower hesitated to have American pilots fly over Soviet territory. He knew he had to respond to Soviet secrecy. Border pilots and spy balloons had been used in the past with little success. Of course, the Americans also had spies in the Soviet Union. Yet, information from these spies took a long time to reach the United States, and involved great risks. Eisenhower and his advisors saw the need to develop some other way to extract information from the Soviet Union. The President was extremely "intelligence-minded," so the idea of the U-2 appealed to him even though he had serious doubts.<sup>6</sup> Eisenhower's advisors noted that the Soviets spied from their satellite, and that technically there were no international laws against sending planes over other countries. Besides, the advisors said, the Soviets would take advantage of this technology if they had it. The President approved the program, but there was always the matter of continuing the flights, and the President's advisors were quick with reasons why the U-2 had the best reconnaissance capabilities.

Eisenhower felt that a viable alternative to the overflights was a satellite. The Soviets had their own satellite which could take pictures of the United States. In 1959, about three years after the

<sup>6</sup>Michael R. Beschloss, *Mandate*, (New York, 1986), 363.

beginning of the overflights, Eisenhower suggested in a meeting that the U-2 overflights should be curbed and more advanced technology developed to replace them. One of his advisors "pointed out that the new equipment will not be available for eighteen months to two years."<sup>77</sup> Thus, the President believed that U-2 overflights were his only option for probably the next two years. Eisenhower also said that he was hesitant to authorize more flights because nothing would make him "declare war more quickly than violation of our air space by Soviet aircraft."<sup>78</sup> It was for those reasons that the President was against an extensive U-2 program. Reconnaissance satellites would not violate anyone's airspace, so Eisenhower felt that "the satellite represents the greatest future in this reconnaissance area."<sup>79</sup> Even though Eisenhower expressed this opinion, his advisors kept insisting on the importance of carrying out U-2 missions immediately. Eisenhower's advisors took the role of salesmen. To keep business going, they had to convince their boss that it was the best course of action. The President could develop all the satellites that he wanted, as long as he kept approving the U-2 flights.

The President was also hesitant to use the U-2 during the continuing Berlin crisis. Eisenhower said that "it would be most unwise to have world tensions exacerbated by our pursuit of a program of extensive reconnaissance flights over the territory of the Soviet Union."<sup>80</sup> The President had clear concerns about how the U-2 would effect international relations in the event of a mishap. Why was this not a major concern to his advisors? Again, they seem only to be interested in keeping the program and the information provided alive. In another meeting the President worried "over the terrible propaganda impact that would be occasioned if a reconnaissance plane were to fail."<sup>81</sup>

<sup>77</sup>Memorandum For the Record, 12 February 1959, in Glenn W. LaFantasie, et al., eds., *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)*, Vol. X, Part 1, *Eastern Europe Region, Soviet Union; Cyprus* (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1993), 261.

<sup>78</sup>*Ibid.*, 261.

<sup>79</sup>*Ibid.*, 262.

<sup>80</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>81</sup>Memorandum of Conference with President Eisenhower, 7 April 1959, in FRUS, X, 1, 265.

His advisors responded by telling the President of the important sites that might have long-range missile capabilities. Once again, the advisors pushed the President's concerns aside.

The President also considered the Soviet perception of the U-2 program. The Soviets had detected the overflights very early on in the program, and knew about each one even though they could do nothing about them. Each time the Americans sent a U-2 over Soviet territory it led the Soviet leaders to be "more inclined to distrust the Americans."<sup>82</sup> The Soviets felt that the Americans surely knew the kinds of problems they were causing by sending the U-2's over the Soviet Union, but "Soviet secrecy was so great that the President, State Department and CIA could not precisely gauge the impact of the flights on internal Kremlin politics."<sup>83</sup>

When laboring over the decision of whether to authorize more flights, he said that the United States was "getting to the point where we must decide if we are trying to prepare to fight a war, or to prevent one."<sup>84</sup> In this case, the President decided to go ahead with this flight since his advisors provided him with an "unanimous recommendation." The advisors once again had powerful influence over the President's better judgement.

Although several of these examples did not deal specifically with the very beginnings of the U-2 program, they were important factors when considering the continuance of the program. In each case the President's advisors played an important role in the decision making process.

## —II—

Was a flight over the Soviet Union so close to the Paris Summit necessary? The United States and the Soviet Union had been enjoying what had been dubbed the "Spirit of Camp David." In 1959, Khrushchev had visited the United States and had made some serious progress in negotiating with President Eisenhower. It was during this visit that Khrushchev agreed to a Summit to be held the following spring in Paris to be attended by the Soviet

<sup>82</sup>Beschloss, *Mayday*, 365.

<sup>83</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>84</sup>Memorandum of Conference with President Eisenhower, in FRUS, X, 1, 307.



Union, the United States, France, and Great Britain. Both Eisenhower and Khrushchev had been looking forward to further negotiations in Paris. The "Spirit of Camp David" ended with the downing of the U-2 on 1 May 1960, just before the Summit opened.

U-2 missions had been canceled when Eisenhower felt the international situation too tense. He had previously considered "whether the intelligence which we receive from this source is worth the exacerbation of international tension that results."<sup>15</sup> For example, the President had canceled flights when there was problems with the Suez Canal and Berlin because he was afraid that the flights would chill the Cold War.

Another example of this policy of canceling flights when the international situation was tense was a meeting between the President and his advisors on 7 April 1959. He had scheduled the meeting to tell them that he was not going to approve certain overflights. Eisenhower gave several reasons for this decision:

first, we now have the power to destroy the Soviets without need for detailed targeting; second, as the world is going now, there seems no hope for the future unless we can make some progress in negotiation; third, we cannot in the present circumstances afford the revulsion of world opinion against the United States that might occur—the U.S. being the only nation that could conduct this activity; and fourth, we are putting several hundred million dollars into programs for more advanced capabilities.<sup>16</sup>

Overall, the President felt that the U-2 program could potentially be a political problem worldwide.

And yet he reversed his decision and authorized the May flights. Secretary of State Herter, Secretary of Defense Gates, CIA Director Dulles, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Twining "all argued that the flights were important; information on a first Soviet ICBM and other targets might be impossible to get until

<sup>15</sup>Beschloss, *Mayday*, 366.

<sup>16</sup>Memorandum of Conference with President Eisenhower, 7 April 1959, in FRUS, X, 1, 264.

months after May 1960."<sup>17</sup> The advisors pointed to "technical factors" for the timing of the flight such as the angle of the sun's rays and the weather.<sup>18</sup> They pointed out that the intelligence information the flights provided was invaluable, and without this information the military would have to be put on alert since the United States would have to be ready for a surprise attack at all times, something which the U-2 flights could warn against. Besides, one advisor asserted, "the intelligence objective in his view outweighs the danger of getting trapped."<sup>19</sup> The President even felt confident "with a record of many successful flights behind us," and perhaps because of the success of other missions they had become careless in proposing future flights.<sup>20</sup> Besides, Eisenhower felt no reason to go against his advisors who were so confident in the program. But his advisors failed to mention the U-2 flight over Japan that had crash landed in September of 1959. There were also problems with other planes in Japan, one of which, number 360, was transferred to Turkey just in time for Powers's May 1 flight.<sup>21</sup>

This proves historian Michael Beschloss's argument that there was a "fatal weakness in the system Eisenhower had created to manage the U-2 program." Eisenhower had taken the main role in assessing the importance of each flight and the possible consequences in the event of a mishap. Almost all of Eisenhower's advisors "had a stake in pressing for flights." In almost all cases, Eisenhower was the only one to discuss the down side to each flight, with his advisors assuring him that he had nothing to worry about. The advisors feared that if the President and Khrushchev come to some sort of agreement at Paris that Eisenhower "might not approve a flight into the Soviet Union again, causing an intelligence blackout until spy satellites were in full operation." Thus, the President's advisors had other

<sup>17</sup>Beschloss, *Mayday*, 370.

<sup>18</sup>Memorandum of Discussion at the 445th Meeting of the National Security Council, 24 May 1960, in FRUS, X, 1, 525.

<sup>19</sup>Memorandum of Conference with President Eisenhower, 8 July 1959, in FRUS, X, 1, 306.

<sup>20</sup>Eisenhower, *White House Years*, 547.

<sup>21</sup>Francis Gary Powers, *Operation Overflight: The U-2 Spy Pilot Tells His Story for the First Time*. (New York, 1970), 76.

priorities, namely saving their beloved U-2 program, and because of this their recommendations were not always sound.<sup>22</sup>

As for the timing of the U-2 flights in the spring of 1960, "the President said that there was no good time for failure."<sup>23</sup> This was a different attitude than the year before when the President questioned the timing of flights in relation to international events. Also, there had been a flight in April 1960, so another flight that spring seemed out of place.<sup>24</sup> The President's advisors were so enthusiastic about the flight that the President felt he had no choice but to agree. But Eisenhower had the final say, and he had refused to authorize flights in the past.

What if Eisenhower had consulted other advisors? Would the flights have been resumed? The President could have consulted several specialists in Soviet affairs, and they might have advised him that "resuming the U-2 flights in the spring of 1960 might send Moscow a hostile signal he did not mean." But the President could only consult the select few who had known of the program from the very beginning. The secrecy of the program might have been the problem when making the decision about the spring 1960 flights.<sup>25</sup> The Soviets had known about the flights for some time, and they had, as Nikita Khrushchev once put it, "protested its violations of our airspace, but each time the U.S. brushed our protest aside, saying none of their planes were overflying our territory."<sup>26</sup> The President took pride in the way he handled his foreign policy; his "institutional decision-making, understanding his rivals' point of view and relating tactics to strategy," but these policies "failed him in his decision to resume the U-2 flights."<sup>27</sup>

### —III—

Was the initial cover-up the best way to deal with the incident? The President said that the "big error we made was, of

<sup>22</sup>Beschloss, *Mayday*, 370.

<sup>23</sup>Memorandum of Conference with President Eisenhower, 8 July 1959, FRUS, X, 1, 523.

<sup>24</sup>Beschloss, *Mayday*, 370.

<sup>25</sup>*Ibid.*, 372.

<sup>26</sup>Nikita Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament* (Boston, 1974), 444.

<sup>27</sup>Beschloss, *Mayday*, 372.

course, in the issuance of a premature and erroneous cover story." Allowing himself to be persuaded on this issue was his "principal personal regret—except for the U-2 failure itself—regarding the whole affair."<sup>28</sup> The President had voiced his opinion that he did not want to issue the immediate cover story.

Eisenhower's advisors had told him, however, over and over that if a plane went down the United States had nothing to worry about because the Soviets would not admit that it had happened. Khrushchev might be "unwilling to admit that United States planes had been for years penetrating deep into his territory," and "suppress the facts."<sup>29</sup> The President's advisors assured him that it would embarrass the Soviets far too much to reveal that a plane had gone down.

Eisenhower had also been told that the plane would be destroyed if it went down, and the destructive charge would eliminate proof of espionage. Based on these two assumptions from his advisors, Eisenhower agreed to issue the NASA statement without knowing of any reaction from within the Soviet Union. His advisors had been wrong on both accounts, though, because on May 5 Khrushchev announced that they had downed a plane over Soviet territory. The President's advisors wanted to issue an immediate statement, but the President himself "voiced serious doubts." His suggestion was to "remain silent until we knew what Khrushchev's follow-up was to be."<sup>30</sup> His aides argued that they must make an immediate statement so that the initial cover story did not lose credibility. It was upon this unanimous recommendation of his advisors that Eisenhower agreed to issue the next cover story. This once again proves the influence that the President's advisors had on dictating policy.

Eisenhower was astonished when Khrushchev announced on May 6 that the pilot was alive. Eisenhower had "no system to show him the full range of options and contingencies," and because of this he had "hastily approved the false cover story" that caused so many problems.<sup>31</sup> The President and his advisors now had no choice but to admit to engaging in espionage

<sup>28</sup>Eisenhower, *White House Years*, 558.

<sup>29</sup>*Ibid.*, 547.

<sup>30</sup>Eisenhower, *White House Years*, 549.

<sup>31</sup>Beschloss, *Mayday*, 372.

than his close advisors and he chose to ignore it. Thompson's telegram should have been the red flag when considering what move to make, but it was not. This mistake was by far the most critical in the whole affair.

Even after Khrushchev had revealed that the pilot was alive, the advisors decided that it would not be best to involve the President in the program directly. The statement gave a more truthful version than the previous two statements, but only said that the "pilot had 'probably' invaded Soviet airspace but that the flight had not been authorized by Washington."<sup>35</sup> This statement shocked Powers since he waited in his plane for nearly thirty minutes for "approval from the White House."<sup>36</sup> By not admitting that Eisenhower had control over the flight "ignited the international scare that some American officer could start a war without the President's knowledge."<sup>37</sup> Now Eisenhower had put himself in the position where he had to accept responsibility for the flight.

This fiasco with the cover stories led the American people and press to be increasingly distrustful of their government. Some Americans were proud that their country could handle such a secret operation for so long without being discovered, but others feared that this might start a war.<sup>38</sup> Eisenhower made a prime-time speech on television several days after the truth came out in order to inform the American people about the U-2 program and talk about the events of the previous days. What if the American people had been told about the program back when it started? Certainly the Soviets had known about it for almost that long, and if they already knew about it then there was no reason why the American people could not have known about it as well. If this had been the case, if the Eisenhower administration had been truthful from the very beginning, then the false cover story would not have been needed. The people knew that the U-2 was used for gathering weather information, and being good Cold Warriors, they might have overwhelmingly approved of the flights over Russia. The American people would have been disappointed that

<sup>35</sup>Beschloss, *Maiden*, 373.

<sup>36</sup>Powers, *Operation*, 78.

<sup>37</sup>Beschloss, *Maiden*, 373.

<sup>38</sup>Eisenhower, *White House Years*, 550.

activities and reveal the essential truth. Had the original cover story not been issued, the President and his advisors could have dealt with the situation in a much more informed manner.

The fatal weakness in the process for which the U-2 program was managed comes out again when dealing with the cover story. The President suffered "from the exclusive, ad hoc procedure he had fashioned to run the U-2 program."<sup>32</sup> If the President had been able to consult with advisors other than those who were so close to the U-2 program, such as an expert on the Soviet Union, he might have acted differently in the days immediately following the downing of the plane. The secrecy of the program would not allow Eisenhower to consult outside sources, though, so he was forced to act upon the unanimous recommendations of his advisors even if that meant ignoring his own instincts. Powers was astonished when shown the cover story in a United States newspaper. He was held in a Soviet prison and being questioned rigorously. He said that he had been given no formal training on what to do if captured, or any information on what kind of a cover story would be issued. Eisenhower's advisors said that Powers had been "told to reveal whatever he himself knew, including the fact that he worked for the CIA."<sup>33</sup>

The President could have "cut his losses and told the world the truth" after the initial NASA statement and before Khrushchev announced that the pilot was alive. This would have restored his credibility, and he had reason to believe that this was the right thing to do. On May 5, after the NASA statement and after Khrushchev had announced that a plane had been downed over Soviet territory, the President received a telegram from the United States Ambassador in Moscow, Llewellyn E. Thompson. Thompson had overheard Deputy Foreign Minister Jacob Malik tell someone at a function that night that "they were still questioning the pilot who had parachuted to safety."<sup>34</sup> Here the President had evidence that there was a possibility the pilot was alive, and yet he still agreed to continue with the cover story. Eisenhower had the chance to take advice from a source other

<sup>32</sup>Ibid.

<sup>33</sup>Memorandum of Conference with President Eisenhower, 8 July 1959, FRUS, X, 1, 525.

<sup>34</sup>Quoted from telegram 2715 from Ambassador Thompson to Department of State, 5 May 1960, in Editorial Note, FRUS, X, 1, 511.



territory; third, the possibility that the Soviet military hierarchy was unhappy over the demobilization measures recently announced by Khrushchev and has consequently insisted that Khrushchev take a strong stand in the plane case; and fourth, a possible desire to embarrass the President at the outset of the Summit Conference.<sup>41</sup>

Economic difficulties, opposition to Khrushchev's policy of relaxation, and a political power struggle were also influences on the Soviets at this time.

Khrushchev himself did not feel these factors influenced his decisions in Paris. He hoped that there would be an agreement reached at Paris up to the time the U-2 was downed. Khrushchev said that he decided on the plane Paris there could be no agreement at the Summit because the "Americans had deliberately tried to place a time bomb under the meeting," and hence the conference "was doomed before it began."<sup>42</sup> Khrushchev points to the role of Eisenhower's advisors. Khrushchev notes that the President wanted to apologize, but that one of his advisors said no "in such a way, with such a grimace on his face, that he left no room for argument on the issue."<sup>43</sup> Khrushchev even said that the President "let himself be pushed around by his Secretaries of State, first Dulles and now Herter."<sup>44</sup>

The British and the French supported the United States at Paris and were even somewhat disgusted at the way Khrushchev handled events. Both delegations, though, admitting the U-2 flight was ill-timed, noted that President Eisenhower admitted that he had made a mistake. Charles de Gaulle informed the Soviets on May 16, that, considering that the U-2 was shot down on May 1, they had time to make amends with the United States or they should have "let it be known that he [Khrushchev] would not be coming to the conference."<sup>45</sup> Both the British and the French agreed that the Soviets needed to come to terms with what

<sup>41</sup>Memorandum of the Discussion at the 444th Meeting of the National Security Council, 9 May 1960, in FRUS, X, 1, 518.

<sup>42</sup>Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, 451.

<sup>43</sup>*Ibid.*, 454.

<sup>44</sup>*Ibid.*, 455.

<sup>45</sup>Charles de Gaulle, *Memoirs of Hope: Renewal and Endeavor* (New York, 1970), 251.

the plane had been shot down, but at least they would have known that their government had been honest with them.

#### —IV—

Could something have been done to save the Paris Summit? Khrushchev had gone to Paris early hoping that Eisenhower would do the same so they could talk privately. Eisenhower did not come until the day before the meetings were supposed to start, and by that time Khrushchev had decided to make three demands: the U.S. must publicly apologize, promise never to send flights over the Soviet Union again, and punish those responsible. Eisenhower had already stopped the flights, but refused to apologize.

Eisenhower wondered why Khrushchev had not said anything about the flights at Camp David the year before when relations were good. What Khrushchev did say was that he was cutting back his own espionage against the United States, and he presumed that when the flights stopped for a time after the Camp David meetings that the Americans had curtailed their espionage as well. So when the flights were resumed in the spring of 1960, Khrushchev thought this was a sign that relations were turning for the worse. Khrushchev now felt that Americans were "following a two-faced policy" since they were so friendly at Camp David but were now sending more U-2's over Russia.<sup>35</sup>

Khrushchev might have been exploiting the U-2 affair for his own reasons. In a telegram, Ambassador Thompson said that "Khrushchev is having some internal difficulties and this incident affords him a convenient diversion."<sup>36</sup> Eisenhower's advisors mention several reasons why Khrushchev would want to exploit the incident:

first, deep conviction, which appears common among Soviet leaders, that secrecy is a major asset of the USSR; second, anxiety with respect to any violation of Soviet

<sup>35</sup>Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, 511.

<sup>36</sup>Telegram from the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State, 7 May 1960, in FRUS, X, 1, 515.

had happened. After all, espionage was not unique to the United States, so in that sense the Soviets had nothing to complain about.

The American public reacted badly to the events in Paris. After the President returned from Paris, he went on a tour of the Pacific, and found the overseas reaction to his recent foreign policy was also negative. Thus, Eisenhower left office on a sour note. Had he not been so distrustful of public opinion, he could have prevented the events in May 1960 from heightening the Cold War. Eisenhower did not want the American public's hope for peace at Paris to influence his decisions there so greatly that he would have appeared "to have been taken in by the Russians." This was a flaw of his "hidden-hand leadership." Without involving the public, his foreign policy seemed weak. Eisenhower could have prevented this perception by having the backing of American public opinion integrated in his policy.<sup>46</sup>

Eisenhower's decision-making process before and after the U-2 incident was not entirely effective. There are a number of examples that show his advisors' opinions taking precedence. Not only is this not the best way to make decisions about any policy, it certainly is not the best way to make decisions about a vital security and diplomatic issue. The President himself seemed to have the right idea about what should have been done: develop other methods of information gathering, curb flights during critical international periods, wait for a response from the Soviets before issuing a false cover story, and apologize to the Soviets to save the Paris Summit. His advisors frowned upon these ideas, and tossed them aside. The role of the American public was also marginalized, but this was the President's fault for not trusting in the people he was leading. This U-2 incident was a turning point in the way the American people and media viewed the President of the United States. Americans were increasingly distrustful of presidents, starting with the false U-2 story and continuing with events like Watergate and Vietnam.

Eisenhower only regret that the false cover story had been issued, but as far as the U-2 program was concerned he did not think that he would make any decisions differently, "given the

<sup>46</sup>Beschloss, *Mayday*, 375.

same set of facts as they confronted us at the time."<sup>47</sup> The information gathered from the flights had proved invaluable. Eisenhower, looking back, thought that the Paris Summit probably would have been a failure even if it had not been for the U-2 because nothing would have been accomplished except bringing the world "further disillusionment."<sup>48</sup> Besides, Khrushchev had known about the flights for some time and only now had made a fuss about them. This led Eisenhower to believe that Khrushchev was only using this as an excuse to wreck the Summit because he had other issues pressing at home.<sup>49</sup>

Overall, it was the President who had the final say in the course of events. He may have been influenced by his advisors, but he still could have halted events. The problem was that he did not. He let his advisors influence his final decision, and his excuse was that since they agreed unanimously that he would go along with it. This decision showed bad judgement on Eisenhower's part. If Eisenhower had the backbone to stand up for what he thought was right, then the U-2 incident might not have been "a supreme humiliation for Eisenhower."<sup>50</sup>

<sup>47</sup>Eisenhower, *White House Years*, 558.

<sup>48</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>49</sup>*Ibid.*, 559.

<sup>50</sup>Craig Allen, *Eisenhower and the Mass Media: Peace, Prosperity, and Prime-Time TV* (Chapel Hill, 1993), 172.

## The Growth of American Conservatism

Derrick Helmbacher

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—I—

With the capture of control of the United States Congress, Republicans made history in 1994. For the first time in more than forty years the Republicans had control of both houses of Congress. The new Republican Congress had a decisively conservative flavor, with attacks on the liberal social programs and calls for limiting federal power over the states. But the conservatism that climbed into Congressional leadership did not always possess such influence. In fact, there was a time when conservatism was thought to be intellectually dead, or at least catatonic. Between 1946 and 1996 American conservatism rose from a beleaguered remnant to the halls of Congress and widespread popularity. The rise of this conservatism can be laid at the feet of the changes in American society that have taken place in the last fifty years and on the heads of a liberalism that failed to respond adequately to the conflicts and complexities created by these social and economic changes.

Arriving at a definition of conservatism is not an easy task; for the word means many different things to different people. In many books and articles, conservatives and others have tried to define the term and themselves. Definitions varied. Peter Witonski, in his "Introduction to the Wisdom of Conservatives," agreed that conservatism did not have a fixed meaning, but added to the confusion by insisting that conservatism was not an ideology but instead a "style of thinking."<sup>1</sup> George Nash

presented the simplest definition. He identified post-World War Two conservatism "as resistance to certain forces perceived to be leftist, revolutionary, and profoundly subversive of what conservatives at the time deemed worth cherishing, defending, and perhaps dying for."<sup>2</sup>

Although American conservatism shared many similarities and ideas with European conservatism, the two were not the same. In *Conservatism in America*, historian Clinton Rossiter stated that there were three general differences between American and European conservatism. The former was clearly more optimistic about the nature of man, the uses of reason, the possibilities of progress, and the prospects of democracy. Also, American conservatism was clearly more materialistic because much more of it is based on economics instead of ethics or politics. Finally, the kind of conservatism extant in the United States was clearly more individualistic because it relied less on the primacy of society and the state.<sup>3</sup>

Nash described the state of conservatism in 1945 as such: "In 1945 no articulate, coordinated, self-consciously conservative intellectual force existed in the United States... In 1945 'conservatism' was not a popular word in America, and its spokesmen were without much influence in their native land."<sup>4</sup> There were several reasons for the weakness of conservatism during this time period. The chief reason was that there was no clear body of conservative doctrine. Its detractors saw conservatism as almost exclusively a reaction against Roosevelt and the New Deal.<sup>5</sup> These were the very programs and leaders which were seen as victorious over the Depression and the Second World War. During the Depression and the war, the federal government increased its role in the economy and society so that by 1945 the reactions and cries of conservatism seemed out of place and out of step with the times to the majority of Americans.

<sup>1</sup>George H. Nash, *The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America Since 1945* (New York, 1976), xii.

<sup>2</sup>Clinton Rossiter, *Conservatism in America: The Thoughtless Persuasion*, 2d ed. (New York, 1962), 201.

<sup>3</sup>Nash, *Conservative Intellectual Movement*, xii-vx.

<sup>4</sup>E.J. Dionne, Jr., *Why Americans Hate Politics* (New York, 1991), 153.



If conservatism was in such low regard and seemingly very unpopular, what happened in the course of fifty years to resurrect the movement? Despite the bleak outlook in 1945, there were people who committed themselves to rallying the conservative cause, but they were isolated and lacked an intellectual voice in society. It is ironic that one of the first voices to speak out for the conservative cause in America was Friedrich von Hayek, an Austrian professor who had immigrated to Britain in the 1930's and was an early antifascist. In his 1944 book *The Road to Serfdom*, Hayek argued that "the rise of fascism and Nazism was not a reaction against the socialist trends of the preceding period but a necessary outcome of those tendencies."<sup>6</sup> This connection between Nazism and socialism was important because it gave American conservatives a clear response to the charge that fascism and Nazism had been brought into power by the frightened business class. The book allowed the conservative movement to escape from the charge that it had much in common with fascism and Nazism, and the book gave a strong philosophical basis for their support of the war.<sup>7</sup>

*The Road to Serfdom* became very popular in the United States. Hayek's thesis for the book was simple: "[p]lanning leads to dictatorship," and "the direction of economic activity" would inevitably necessitate the "suppression of freedom."<sup>8</sup> The book became a controversial bestseller in America. It offered the conservatives a vibrant new weapon to attack the New Deal and the planning structures of the war effort. Liberals strongly opposed the book since it attacked the very successes and triumphs which they had achieved in the previous twelve years.

Hayek's book fit into the first of three categories of conservatism established by Nash: "libertarian" or "free-market" conservatism. This branch was mainly concerned with limiting the role of the state in the economy and society. These conservatives were especially concerned with the growth of

<sup>6</sup>Quoted in Nash, *Conservative Intellectual Movement*, 6.

<sup>7</sup>Dianne, *Why Americans Hate Politics*, 152-3.

<sup>8</sup>Nash, *Conservative Intellectual Movement*, 5.

power in the executive branch and the growth of statism, which they connected to socialism and communism. Though Hayek himself did not agree with the total free-market or the pure laissez-faire idea, his book gave much intellectual force to the beliefs of the libertarian branch of conservatism. Other examples of early libertarian writers were Hayek's mentors, Ludwig von Mises and Albert Jay Nock, whose best known book was *Our Enemy, the State*. Libertarian and individualistic thought was also spread through journals such as *The Freeman* and *Analysis* and by organizations such as the Foundation for Economic Education and the Intercollegiate Society of Individualists.

The revival of conservatism did not limit itself to the individualists and libertarians. The postwar period also witnessed the growth of two other branches: traditionalism and anti-Communism. The "new conservative" or traditional branch of conservatism looked back at the destruction and desolation caused by the war and questioned the modern society. Richard Weaver and Russel Kirk were two early proponents of this form of conservatism. Both looked into history to explain the problems of man. Kirk argued that America did indeed have a conservative tradition and that it defined the American experience. Kirk enhanced the philosophy of non-American Edmund Burke, but also traced conservatism through figures such as John Randolph, John Adams, John C. Calhoun, and Henry Adams. Both Weaver and Kirk argued that there were fundamental, unchangeable truths or principles in the world. They saw modernism and ethical relativism as dangers to civilization and were even uncomfortable with democracy and totally free markets. The traditionalists emphasized values, community, and self-discipline over profits, pure individualism, and consumerism. Many viewed capitalism as a possible threat to the community.

The third school of conservative thought—anti-Communism—was mainly made up of people who had in early years been influenced by or involved in leftist organizations and had come to repudiate these early beliefs and associations. The anti-Communists favored an interventionist type of foreign policy and spoke about rolling back the gains made by Communism. These conservatives attacked Harry Truman's containment policy as costly and cowardly. Their crusading spirit came from ex-

communists, who supplied much energy and zeal and helped the Right to acquire a fervent mass following for the first time in years.<sup>9</sup>

The differences among the three schools were obvious to both liberals and conservatives, and in the 1950s a movement started to bring the three together. This movement searched for a unifying journal that would be able to spread the conservative message to new converts and establish a sense of unity or community among the three schools of conservatism. For a while, many hoped that *The Freeman* could be the unifying voice of conservatism but when it was sold and the editorship turned over to Frank Chodorov, a near anarchist, the call for a new journal increased.

Into this vacuum moved William F. Buckley, Jr., who founded the *National Review* in 1955. The *National Review* was weekly and aimed at a wide audience. Buckley saw the purpose of this new journal as not only to renew the attack against the Left but to consolidate the Right. Although the editorial board was made up a wide range of conservative thinkers, the new journal was stridently anti-Communist. The new journal allowed for the discussion of ideas while emphasizing the unity of the movement. Since the journal was the only weekly avowed conservative magazine for a long time to come, it became indispensable to the Right. Without such a similar journal, there would not have been a cohesive intellectual force on the Right in the 1960s and 1970s.<sup>10</sup>

Not only did the *National Review* promote conservative unity, it also acted as a tester of orthodoxy. Through its criticism of arch individualist Peter Viereck, Ayn Rand, and the radical libertarians, the journal tried to establish a coherent vision of conservatism. The fusionist consensus built by the *National Review* proved durable and lasted through to the 1990s.<sup>11</sup>

If the 1950s, however, began the molding of new conservative thought, it did not appear to be the beginning of new conservatism practice. In 1947, historian Arthur Schlesinger called for a new politics of freedom in his book *The Vital Center*. Schlesinger stressed his belief in liberalism and Keynesian economics. A liberal consensus seemed secure. Even when Republicans were elected to high public offices, the New Deal and welfare state policies did not under go significant revision. The Eisenhower presidency, too, did not prove a chance to implement the Right's ideas and beliefs. Although Eisenhower was economically conservative, he did not agree with social conservatism. The Right started to realize that it needed to gain more influence in the Republican party before its views could gain more widespread political support. Yet, America was undergoing a dramatic transformation. The very success of the welfare state and liberalism planted the seeds of a counter-attack. Mainstream Liberalism would be gravely weakened under concerted attacks from both the Left and the Right.

The 1960s saw the growth of the conservative movement in both the intellectual world and the political. Retrospectively, the 1940s and 1950s could be seen as a time of rebuilding and preparation for the changes that would shake America's belief in liberalism. The administrations of President Kennedy and President Johnson raised hopes in the general population that poverty, racism, and chronic unemployment would disappear through liberal legislation and Supreme Court decisions. Some groups were not satisfied with the progress of government action and resorted to street protests and even violent confrontations.

The 1960s were a time of great political and social change but that change caused a backlash by those who did not agree with the way they saw American society to be progressing. This backlash also caught up large numbers of less affluent, or working class whites, who felt that their interests had been forgotten by the elitism of liberalism. This, combined with the increased power of middle-class intellectuals and reformers in the

<sup>9</sup>Nash, *Conservative Intellectual Movement*, 129.

<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.*, 153.

<sup>11</sup>Dionne, *Hate Politics*, 166.

Democratic Party, caused the New Deal liberal coalition to start to fracture.<sup>12</sup>

The fracturing of the liberal coalition became noticeable in the 1964 Presidential elections. Although Barry Goldwater lost in a landslide, the election served notice that there was a growing number of conservative voters in both the Republican and Democratic Parties. Future Republican presidential candidates started to see this realignment and to use conservative messages and themes to draw the support of these voters. The conservative Republicans realized the potential power of these voters and the campaigns of Nixon, Reagan, and Bush were successful in courting social conservative working-class and lower-middle class vote.<sup>13</sup> Through this process the conservative voices gained a wider audience and increased their credibility.

The great changes that took place in the 1960s also caused some liberals of the day to react. It was a movement made up of liberals "who had been mugged by reality."<sup>14</sup> These people were concerned with what they saw as ideological rigidity in liberal programs. The belief that liberalism no longer knew what it was talking about became a central theme for the neoconservative movement. Neoconservatives also perceived liberals as soft on Communism.

Several erstwhile liberals became very critical of liberal programs. The writers and journalists of the movement became increasingly skeptical of the liberal view of rationally analyzed social problems with quasi-scientific solutions. The neoconservatives doubted that imperfect and unpredictable man could be organized socially on the basis of 'scientific' knowledge alone.<sup>15</sup> Their criticisms of the liberal programs were more accepted by the mainstream press, which saw them as credible since they were seen as urbane intellectuals and not penny-punching businessmen or racists.<sup>16</sup>

As the neoconservative movement progressed, it became increasingly conservative. The attacks on liberal programs were

<sup>12</sup>Dionne, *Hate Politics*, 51, 80-3.

<sup>13</sup>*Ibid.*, 180-91.

<sup>14</sup>Irving Kristol, "Neoconservative Guru to America's New Order," *McClean's* 94 (January, 1981): 9.

<sup>15</sup>Dionne, *Hate Politics*, 60.

<sup>16</sup>*Ibid.*, 61.

extended until just about every government program was called into question. The neoconservatives did not just criticize. One of the main strengths of the movement and one of its great contributions to American conservatism, was its ability to set up foundations, journals, and think tanks. These institutions helped to formulate positive counter proposals to liberal programs. Instead of just criticism, the neoconservatives were able to offer alternatives to the liberal programs. The neoconservatives wanted to reverse the agenda of government, turn the government away from grand schemes, and reform America by relying upon the private sector, market mechanisms, and traditional institutions such as the family and local community.

Another group of Americans who became active in the process of political and social thought due to the changes taking place in the 1960s, was the religious conservatives. Prior to the 1962 Supreme Court decision against school prayer and the Court's subsequent rulings on abortion and pornography, most on the religious right did not actively participate in the political, intellectual, and social discussions of America. In fact, fundamentalists prided themselves on being apolitical if not anti-political. The growing permissiveness of society and the mass media concerned the religious conservatives. These concerns caused the religious right to reexamine their separatism; in the late 1970s right-wing evangelicals organized themselves to defend the Judeo-Christian tradition and the cultural values that they believed in and which they felt to be under attack.<sup>17</sup> Organizations such as the Moral Majority and the Christian Coalition sprang up to advocate and voice the concerns of the religious conservatives. These organizations were successful in motivating and mobilizing large blocks of religious conservatives in support of the conservative cause.

Despite the variances and differences within the conservative movement, many were able to find common ground and bring the movement together. The anti-Communists found common cause with the religious conservatives who were concerned about the atehism of communism. The traditionalists and the religious conservatives had common grounds in their beliefs and in eternal truths and principles. Without the groundwork of the 1940s and

<sup>17</sup>Dunn, *Conservative Tradition*, 8-10.



The conservative movement was ultimately successful because it was able to offer alternatives to the liberal programs and policies which had increasingly been criticized and called into question. This ability to offer an alternative to liberalism enabled conservatism to attract new and diverse groups to its ranks.

Whether the conservative revival will see continued growth is a question that has yet to be adequately answered. The 1996 elections saw a conservative Republican majority return to the halls of Congress; but their numbers are fewer and President Clinton was reelected. But perhaps the reelection of President Clinton bodes well for American conservatism. The President did pledge support for a balanced budget and signed into law the welfare reform bill, both of which were widely supported. Perhaps America is not as conservative as the conservatives wish to think it is, and the reaction to some of the 1994 Congress's actions on the environment and Medicare are examples of this; support for welfare repeal, however, and other reforms of the welfare state suggest that America has moved perceptibly to the Right.

1950s, there may not have been a conservatism to turn to when the 1960s caused a great reaction in many people.

But the conservative revival must not be seen as just a reaction to the 1960s. Because of *Commentary*, *National Review*, and Russell Kirk's *Modern Age*, along with other conservative journals, the conservative movement was able to offer alternatives to the policies and beliefs of liberalism. As conservatives became more adept at formulating and presenting these alternatives to the American people, they became more readily accepted. This process was greatly helped by the emergence of the neoconservatives, whose criticisms of the liberal programs and policies were accepted as much more credible by the mainstream media. The neoconservatives also significantly helped the conservative cause by establishing foundations and other groups that were able to positively present conservative policies for governmental and social reform. Thus, modern conservatism was able to offer full alternatives to the people and voters who turned away from modern liberalism in the second half of this century.

People turned away from modern liberalism for many different reasons. Blue collar and less affluent whites turned away from liberalism because of what they perceived as an abandonment of their interests by modern liberalism and the Democratic Party. The radical Left also turned away from liberalism because of their concern over the lack of social progress. Some of these radicals, interestingly enough would later start to identify with the libertarian school of conservatism. Maybe some of the success of conservatism was due to the very fact that it contained so many divergent and different aims and beliefs. If Wiltonski was right and conservatism was not an ideology that would also help explain its rise. The conservative movement was open to various beliefs and people. The same people who voted for F.D.R in the 1930s could feel at home with conservatism in the 1980s and 1990s because it allowed them to keep and express their traditional social and cultural beliefs. Modern conservatism was open to the ideas of the neoconservatives and the religious conservatives. Though conservatism was not open to everyone, it did allow in groups that had become alienated and disenchanting with modern liberalism.

museums and academic history is comparatively weaker, and the American ideas of public history have not forged as strong a bond.<sup>3</sup>

Local history has a long respectable past. In the United States, as in other national traditions, the past has been fascinating and often sacred to its citizens. This led to the establishment of many local historical societies charged with saving both the material culture and documentary heritage of the community's history. Historical societies are as old as the United States. Some of the first historical societies, such as the Massachusetts and New York Historical Societies, were founded soon after this country was established. They initially sought to save materials from the people involved with the Revolution.<sup>4</sup> These states were formed on the basis of colonial boundaries and forming societies on the basis of states seemed reasonable. The inclination for Americans to divide themselves into regions is deeply embedded in the colonial past and the tendency for historians to create societies based on the different regions is a natural one.<sup>5</sup> It was only logical for early historical studies in the United States to center on localities. In its early incarnations, local histories and historical societies were handled by "patrician historians," interested in preserving the past of the elite, to honor the venerable pioneers, and to teach the younger generation the great feats that their ancestors had performed before they were lost to the past.<sup>6</sup> After the Civil War, as W.B. Hesseltine notes, the United States national government was stronger, which influenced studies in politics, culture, economics and history to be national in their focus.<sup>7</sup> Odes to local founders and hearty pioneers continued, but a national conception of history began to emerge in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.

<sup>3</sup>C. Wesley Johnson Jr., "An American Impression of Public History in Europe," *History Today* 34 (Fall 1984), 87-97.

<sup>4</sup>American Association for State and Local History. *Local History. National Heritage: Reflections on the History of the AASLH* (Nashville, 1991).

<sup>5</sup>See David Russo, *Keepers of our Past: Local Historical Writing in the United States, 1820s-1930s* (New York, 1988), 10-1.

<sup>6</sup>Jensen Merrill, ed., *Regionalism in America* (Madison, 1952), 3-20.

<sup>7</sup>Carol Kammen, *On Doing Local History: Reflections of What Local Historians Do, Why, and What It Means* (Nashville, 1986), 14-7.

<sup>8</sup>Merrill, *Regionalism in America*, 143.

## Locally Speaking: United States and English Local History Compared

Jennifer Van Haften

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Local history has been an anomaly—a stepchild—in the academic discipline of history. In the European and American historical traditions of the nineteenth century, history was written to highlight important people and events in the dominant nation-states of the western hemisphere within a national framework. A paradigm shift occurred in historical profession in the 1950s and 1960s that emphasized study of the general population or specific groups at various periods of history, i.e., social history. The shift underscored the potentially valuable use of local history as case studies of national trends. Local history began to take on a broader meaning.

The public history movement of the last twenty years has given further impetus to the study of local history. While in Europe public history, or applied history as Europeans are apt to call it, is exclusively equated with the formation of public policy, the United States views public history as that which is applied for the use of the public.<sup>1</sup> American historians see the advent of public history as the link between local and academic history, giving both greater use and validation by the general population at large. Public history is also the arena in which museum and historical agency professionals ply their craft and serve as a link between local history, historical methodology, and public audiences.<sup>2</sup> In Great Britain, the link between local history,

<sup>1</sup>Anthony Sutcliffe, "Gleanings and Echoes of Public History in Western Europe: Before and After the Rotterdam Conference," *The Public Historian*, 6 (Fall 1984): 8, 13.

<sup>2</sup>John Alexander Williams, "Public History and Local History: An Introduction," *The Public Historian* 5 (Fall 1983): 13-4.

agriculture, topics that often were left untouched by academic historians before the 1960s.<sup>12</sup>

Despite its apparent popularity with the public at large in the United States, local history has had a difficult struggle to become a part of professional history. This was because the people who were heading local societies and writing county histories were often not trained academic historians. It made their work seem suspect. Indeed often there were good reasons for these low opinions. However, there were many avocational historians who contributed distinguished works. They analyzed their locales as case studies for trends in national events. They were already performing the work that Kammen was promoting.

W.G. Hoskins took an integrated approach to the subject in *Local History in England*. Like Kammen, Hoskins notes that people interested in doing local history cherished and were interested in their own local community. Hoskins instructs his readers that a local historian needs to have a good general knowledge of English history to be able to put the local history in perspective, a sentiment shared by Kammen. He is also concerned that local historians seem to concentrate only on documents and suggests the use of fieldwork to add depth.<sup>13</sup> Cultural geography, or cultural history broadly defined, is a hallmark of Hoskins school of English local history.

Since the second edition of Hoskins' book, several articles in British historical journals have revisited local history. As in the United States, local history enjoyed a rebirth beginning with Hoskins first edition of his book in 1959, which continued into the 1960s and 1970s as academic historians began to delve into the "new" social history. Local history provided more details about the deep structure of communities and "common" occurrences, as opposed to the national overview of politics and economics. There was a parallel resurgence in the use of local history in local schools. Several authors believed that local history, including visits to museums, can be used as a way to move away from the traditional textbook histories and towards a multi-cultural approach. As in the U.S.A., Great Britain has been struggling with its own debate about the use of history in schools

<sup>12</sup>Kammen, *The Pursuit of Local History*, 27-8, 38.

<sup>13</sup>Hoskins, *Local History in England*, 6, 8, 123.

Historians in Great Britain also followed the historiographical tradition of focusing on prominent people and events in their early national histories. W.G. Hoskins, a prominent pioneer in bringing local history to academia in England, noted that parish noblemen were some of the first historians to write local histories in England, appearing as early as the late fifteenth century. These types of writers concentrated on the people and the activities that occurred in the manor instead of the village. Although there were many such histories written, by the nineteenth century, historians in academic departments were concentrating on national social and economic issues, which rose out of the cultural nationalism that prevailed in the Western world during the nineteenth century.<sup>8</sup> Carol Kammen, an American local historian and author, has noted that the history of the early writings on local history in England and the United States are similar. She believed it is because the upper classes had the time to write histories with that related stories of the successful and wealthy people like themselves.<sup>9</sup>

The nature of local history seems to be a difficult subject for many authors to define. The most comprehensive definitions have been put forth by Carol Kammen for the United States and W.G. Hoskins for England. In *The Pursuit of Local History: Readings on Theory and Practice*, Kammen charges authors of American local history to focus on the ordinary people of a specific community. She also stresses that local historians should not work in a vacuum and need to be aware of broad historical perspectives.<sup>10</sup> She is adamant that material culture is an important part of writing good local history, and that a local audience is often the primary target for local histories.<sup>11</sup> Previous local histories in the United States were motivated by an attachment to the local community and a curiosity to trace the history of the area in which the historian lived. The subjects of local history have included education, poor relief, religion, and

<sup>8</sup>W.G. Hoskins, *Local History in England* 2d ed. (London, 1972), 17-26.

<sup>9</sup>Kammen, *On Doing Local History*, 17.

<sup>10</sup>Carol Kammen ed., *The Pursuit of Local History: Readings on Theory and Practice* (Walnut Creek, Cal, 1996), 15-6.

<sup>11</sup>David Russo, "Some Impressions of the Non Academic Local Historians and Their Writing," in *The Pursuit of Local History*, ed. Kammen, 38. See also *Ibid.*, 27-8.



professional academic historians do not fully recognize this organization's contributions to historical knowledge.

In England local historians and museum professionals continue work separate from those doing history in universities. The rift in England seems to be greater, because there is very little dialogue between the two in professional journals, whereas the United States has active discussion on the role of museum professionals and other public historians in both academia and the general public.<sup>17</sup> Historians in both countries see a rift between the many facets of history and there is a great clamor for cooperation between all branches of history, whether professional, amateur, student, professor, historians and laymen.<sup>18</sup>

In the United States, museum professionals are still often labeled amateurs as well, even though academia has created training programs promoting better historical methods and expertise in running historical agencies, and techniques for presenting history to the public.<sup>19</sup> In Great Britain, the gap still remains wide. The few museum studies programs offered in England are often separated from history departments and placed in the realm of art history, as museums professionals are often thought of as people who work in art galleries. Again, the University of Leicester is a leader in museum studies programs that emphasize history in museums, and that relates museum work to the broader discipline of history.

Local history and academic history are struggling to find common ground in the United States and Great Britain. Both Kaminen and Hoskins charge local historians in their respective countries to follow academic standards, even if they have never had formal training. Local history continues to have a poor reputation in some quarters, because the earlier histories were often based upon legends and were biased as to what they

<sup>17</sup>Richard Cavendish, "British Association for Local History," *History Today* 41 (September 1991): 62-3; Dennis Mills, "Local History on the Council Agenda," *History Today* 43 (December 1993): 10-2.

<sup>18</sup>Judith Wellman, "Local Historians and Their Activities," in *The Pursuit of Local History*, ed. Kaminen, 46-50.

<sup>19</sup>Myron A. Marty, "The Place of Local History in the training of Public Historians," *The Public Historian* 5 (Fall 1983): 77-87; Peter J. Beck, "Forward with History: Studying the Past for Careers in the Future," *The Public Historian* 6 (Fall 1984): 40-64.

and the question of instilling national patriotism through history. Some that an introduction to town elders and their knowledge of its history would give children a sense of pride and place.<sup>14</sup>

Part of the problem in the defining local history and its value to the general public and the historical profession comes from the difficulty of pinpointing who exactly can be or is a local historian. The struggle is similar in the United States and England. Both Hoskins and Kaminen, and other writers on local history, conceded that some local history was written by amateurs untrained in historical methods and writing for their own gratification, which produced histories that were inaccurate, non-analytical, and often lacked documentary and bibliographical references.<sup>15</sup> At the same time, they recognized that there were local historians writing at a scholarly level. The books they have written are models for local historians to emulate.

Tensions have sometimes developed between local historians who are sentimentally tied to the community and outside academics using histories of localities removed from their own experience as case studies. In the United States, historians such as Herbert G. Gutman in *Work, Culture, and Society*, have worked within the realm of local history to flesh out their theses. England has created a Chair of Local History at the University of Leicester. But local history is still separated from the general study of history. In the United States and England, local history is also considered the realm of most museum professionals, although Hoskins does not include museum staff in local history.<sup>16</sup> Local museums could benefit from the advice on local history given in Kaminen's works. Museum professionals and local historians in the United States come together in the American Association for State and Local History, but often

<sup>14</sup>Damen Gregory, "Threads of Lancashire History," *History Today* 39 (October 1989): 4-5; "Editorial," *History Today* 39 (October 1989): 2.

<sup>15</sup>Kaminen *The Pursuit of Local History*, 24-6, 38-9; Kaminen, *On Doing Local History*, 14-33; Hoskins, *Local History in England*, 27.

<sup>16</sup>Gregory, "Threads," 4-5; Williams, "Public History," 14; Harvey Green, "The Role of Research in Public Historical Agencies," *The Public Historian* 5 (Fall 1983): 71-6; Mark Rawwisch, Sandra Metzler-Smith, and Kathleen Kane, "Toot, Hug, or Die," *History News* (August 1982): 8. Also see Hoskins, *Local History in England*, *passim*.

included and excluded. The reputation also follows museum professionals, even after many of them are being trained in universities. Many historians, academic and otherwise, find value in the use of local history in academic studies and in publishing it for the public. Increasingly historians, academic and otherwise, have called for all to work together rather than to criticize each other from separate camps. Because this is echoed so many times on both sides of the Atlantic, it is surprising that so little has been done to bridge that gap. England and the United States could learn much from each other by developing an exchange between local historical organizations, since the problems associated with local history are often quite similar.<sup>20</sup> A fuller recognition of the museum profession in local historical studies in England, could, for example, create new alliances and collaboration serving all who work in the field.

## Reviews

### Iconoclasm: A Historiographical Essay

Lois A. Dickenson

*Lois Dickenson is a graduate student at Eastern Illinois. This review essay was written for a graduate seminar on the Renaissance and Reformation for Professor Joy Kummerling during Fall 1996. It examines the historiography of iconoclasm across Reformation Europe.*

Historians have long acknowledged that the rejection of the validity of image worship, often followed by outbursts of iconoclasm, was the hallmark of the Protestant Reformation in many communities. Interpretations of the changes in the popular perception of religious images differ widely. Some historians have noted an abrupt, rapid, and widespread change in image perception, while others argue that it occurred slowly and reluctantly on the part of the common population. The basis for iconoclastic acts has also been debated. Was iconoclasm a natural product of Protestant theology, or was it an expression of local/regional socio-economic or political factors? Alternatively, was iconoclasm an expression of ritualistic symbolism traditional among the general population?

This essay reviews the scholarly debate on these questions. Because of the multi-faceted dimensions of the problem of images and iconoclasm during the Reformation, the theses and arguments examined herein are drawn from several schools of historical thought—art history, social history, intellectual history—with the belief that these differing approaches contribute unique insights. Likewise, the broad geographic range of iconoclastic events has prompted the inclusion of arguments based on incidents scattered from France to Russia. The variance in local background provides not only a basis for examining similarities and differences in the arguments concerning the basis for iconoclasm, but also provides an opportunity to examine the

<sup>20</sup>Cavendish, "British Association," 62-3; Larry E. Tise, "State and Local History: A Future from the Past," *The Public Historian* 1 (Summer 1979): 14-

included and excluded. The reputation also follows museum professionals, even after many of them are being trained in universities. Many historians, academic and otherwise, find value in the use of local history in academic studies and in publishing it for the public. Increasingly historians, academic and otherwise, have called for all to work together rather than to criticize each other from separate camps. Because this is echoed so many times on both sides of the Atlantic, it is surprising that so little has been done to bridge that gap. England and the United States could learn much from each other by developing an exchange between local historical organizations, since the problems associated with local history are often quite similar.<sup>20</sup> A fuller recognition of the museum profession in local historical studies in England, could, for example, create new alliances and collaboration serving all who work in the field.

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<sup>20</sup>Cavendish, "British Association," 62-3; Larry E. Tise, "State and Local History: A Future from the Past," *The Public Historian* 1 (Summer 1979): 14-



significance that the reformers placed on the image question.<sup>3</sup> The survival of devotional pictures for the home and the combination of images with text in *Merkbild* (Pictorial Reminders) demonstrates that Protestants continued to value the educational function of images.<sup>4</sup>

While acknowledging the validity of the communicative value of religious images, scholarly arguments based in other historical schools indicate the shortcomings of such a broad-based conclusion. Lee Wandel argues, from a sociological point of view, that far from worshipping religious images as idols, the general population understood the meditative and metaphorical functions of images in the churches. Images were not mistaken for the deity, but provided religious metaphors, analogies and evocations for the worshiper to use in developing a personal and private concept of God.<sup>5</sup>

Precisely because the conceptualization of images "remained personal," Wandel argues, the modern term "cult of the image" is a misnomer for the relationship between an image and the viewer. This term is based not on the perceptions of images (for which Wandel says no evidence has been presented) but on studies of behavior during worship, derived from medieval descriptions.<sup>6</sup> This view must be contrasted with the more traditional interpretation of the cult of images embraced by Eamon Duffy, who presents the cult of images as a vital and active part of lay worship, with an internal structure and rationale, and specific mystic functions.<sup>7</sup> Duffy's work offers an unusual point of departure for a Reformation historian, in that he rejects the common perception of widespread dissatisfaction with late medieval Catholicism, viewing the Reformation not as a fulfillment of religious longings, but as a violent disruption of a diverse and vigorous religion.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., 112.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., 119.

<sup>5</sup>Lee Palmer Wandel, *Foracious Idols and Violent Hands: Iconoclasm in Reformation Zurich, Strasbourg and Basel* (Cambridge, 1995), 40-1.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., 51.

<sup>7</sup>Eamon Duffy, *The Stripping of the Altars: Traditional Religion in England 1400-1580* (New Haven, 1992), 169-70.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., 4.

debate on the effectiveness of iconoclasm as a tool in the expansion of Protestantism in Europe.

Iconoclasm is the most visually compelling aspect of the relationship between Protestantism and the visual arts, but the complex problem of religious imagery is a thread which runs continuously throughout the Reformation period, not a snippet which surfaces for brief violent moments. Ernst Ullman has examined this relationship from the standpoint of an art historian. He argues that the relationship between art and the Reformation is based on the conception of art as a communication tool, both used and influenced by Protestantism.<sup>1</sup> Besides the unarguable utility of the woodcuts to the Protestant cause, Ullman also argues that fine art served an educational role in spreading the precursory ideas of the Reformation. By examining the symbolism and subjects of paintings by Albrecht Durer, Lukas Cranach and other painters, Ullman demonstrates a rising sense of individualization and dissatisfaction in society prior to the Reformation and argues that the Protestant ideals of the Christian's direct relationship with God was present in pre-Reformation society.<sup>2</sup> Ullman's argument rests upon the point that fine paintings were a major tool in educating the common people—a point which is debatable, since Ullman offers no evidence of widespread exposure to such works among the general population (this obviously does not apply to the medium of the woodcut or pamphlet). It seems equally valid to presume that fine painting played a reactive rather than proactive role in pre-Reformation society, reflecting thoughts and beliefs present in the elite circles with which the artists interacted, rather than attempting to inculcate the general population with new beliefs.

In Ullman's argument, while iconoclasm struck at the liturgical base and material wealth of the Catholic Church, its significance lay in its communicative function. The true danger and value of religious images lay in their ability to communicate ideology and beliefs for both Catholics and Protestants. The level and duration of iconoclastic activity indicated the degree of

<sup>1</sup>Ernst Ullman, "Reformation and Iconoclasm," *Journal of Popular Culture* 18 (Winter 1984): 102.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., 105.

It is also a misconception to attempt to unify the views of the major figures of the Reformation on the question of images. Carlos Eire specifically addresses this issue, saying that although iconoclasm was the most visible characteristic of Protestant attacks on medieval piety, it did not reflect a consensus of opinion among reformers on theological doctrine or actual reforming policy.<sup>9</sup> Similarly, Sergiusz Michalski argues that it is an error to assume that the major reformers were intimately familiar with the work of one another. This common assumption tends, Michalski says, to falsely unify certain doctrinal aspects and activities among the reformers. Michalski instead argues that the theology of the Reformation cannot be realistically perceived as linear in development; that all the major non-Lutheran reformers may have reached similar conclusions on the image question, but that their reasoning proceeded from different beginning points.<sup>10</sup> For most reformers (Luther included, but excluding Calvin) the question of images was something addressed only under the pressure of events and was of secondary importance to the more central need to reform the liturgy.<sup>11</sup> Calvin's ministry occurred primarily after Protestantism had been established in Geneva, and so his carefully rationalized theology had a unique place for iconoclasm, although the issue is never directly addressed. Instead, the condemnation of images is contained in the Calvinist rejection of intermediaries in the essentially static relationship between God and mankind.<sup>12</sup>

Iconoclasm was, at least in some sense, the practical application of the theological debate on images among the reformers. Phyllis Mack suggests that iconoclasm was a universal phenomena of the Reformation.<sup>13</sup> Eire defines it as the expression of the social and political dimensions of Reformed

ideology/theology on the part of the laity.<sup>14</sup> Other scholars suggest that political, economic or sociological factors were the prominent factors which shaped iconoclastic incidents. Michalski provides the broadest base for interpretation with his thesis that iconoclasm was not monocausal in origin, nor derived from any single theological source. Because of this multidimensional form, it manifested differing aspects in different places according to local conditions and culture. Michalski interprets iconoclasm primarily as a projection of crowd psychology, which in turn, depends on factors such as the quality of Protestant leadership, the amount of local resistance to reform, and local political conditions.<sup>15</sup>

Although this thesis is broadly sociological in outlook, Michalski accepts the validity of the influence of theological, political, and economic factors in iconoclastic outbursts. Indeed in some iconoclastic incidents in Eastern Europe, he acknowledges such factors are predominant. In incidents where iconoclasm was imposed on an unwilling population from above (for example, the Czech King Frederick V) political factors are the prominent triggers. Likewise, in iconoclastic incidents where quasi-ritualistic elements are prominent, theological and cultural factors may be dominant (as expressed by Robert Scribner).<sup>16</sup>

Cultural and political factors, according to Michalski, played a significant role in the failure of Protestantism to establish itself in areas dominated by Eastern Orthodoxy. Although contact between Greek Orthodoxy and Protestantism was slight, significant iconoclastic incidents occurred in the Baltic and Polish Commonwealth-areas under the influence of Russian Orthodoxy. Here, iconoclastic acts tended to identify Protestants with internal heresies within Russian Orthodoxy and with the Byzantine iconoclastic controversy of the eighth century, which was a seminal event for the shaping of the Russian Orthodox religion.<sup>17</sup> The unique political amalgamation of the Russian monarchy and the Russian Orthodox Church also tended to discourage Protestantism; however, the decisive factor may simply have been

<sup>9</sup>Carlos M.N. Eire, *War Against the Idols: The Reformation of Worship from Erasmus to Calvin* (Cambridge, 1986), 55.

<sup>10</sup>Sergiusz Michalski, *The Reformation and the Visual Arts: The Protestant Image Question in Western and Eastern Europe* (London, 1993), 43.

<sup>11</sup>*Ibid.*, 37, 59.

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*, 59.

<sup>13</sup>Phyllis Mack, "The Wordyear: Reformed Preaching and Iconoclasm in the Netherlands," in *Religion and the People 800-1700*, ed. James Obelkevich (Chapel Hill, 1979), 192.

<sup>14</sup>Eire, *War Against the Idols*, 6.

<sup>15</sup>Michalski, *Reformation*, 79.

<sup>16</sup>*Ibid.*, 83-5, 93-6.

<sup>17</sup>*Ibid.*, 100.

the extreme cultural difference in religious perceptions between an iconoclastic Protestantism and an extremely iconclastic Orthodoxy.<sup>18</sup>

Michalski sees iconoclasm as a kind of "point of no return" for the breaking with the old faith. This point varies with location and can mark the beginning of the physically active phase of the Reformation. Iconoclasm is thus subject to the dialectics of revolutionary process, marking the move of the Reformation to a more radical stage, a discharge of social tension, or a mechanism to channel the actions of radical elements into specific areas.<sup>19</sup>

Michalski's thesis is very broadly based, but other historians have considered iconoclasm from a more definite orientation. Ullman, as has been discussed, approached iconoclasm as a art historian. The other authors considered herein, fall into one of the broadly defined categories of socio-political, socio-economic, or socio-ritualistic. It seems appropriate, therefore, to compare their arguments within these groupings.

Wandel presents a thesis which falls predominately within the socio-ritualistic category. Wandel's work is based on the premise that iconoclasm was a kind of synergetic action, lead neither wholly by "the people" nor by theologians, but the result of a resonance between the clergy's theological changes and the people's cultural heritage.<sup>20</sup> Iconoclasm reflected a symbiotic partnership between the reformation leadership and the activity of the common Christian. In studying iconoclastic incidents in Zurich, Strasbourg and Basel, Wandel determined that the decisive factor in these acts was not the theological interpretation of the meaning of images, but the traditional popular associations the images carried in the minds of the laity. So, while the reformed ministry may have acted as the initial focus to raise tensions in these cities, ultimately, it was the people who chose iconoclastic targets, according to their own mental associations. In Zurich, where the reformation focus was on the establishment of a Christian economy, the iconoclastic focus was upon images that consumed material resources. In Strasbourg, the reformation

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., 152.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., 79-80.

<sup>20</sup>Wandel, *Coractions Idols*, 24.

focus on the invalidity of Catholic rites turned the iconoclasts to focus on the geographic centers of such rites—the altars. In Wandel's view, iconoclastic acts were ultimately important not only because they destroyed the traditional referents of religion, ensuring a reformed practice, but also because they ensured that the popular view of how a Christian should worship and should organize his civic and personal life would receive equal importance with the idealized views of such matters in the minds of the clergy.<sup>21</sup>

Robert Scribner also interprets iconoclasm as a socio-ritualistic phenomena. Scribner's thesis is that the entirety of the Reformation can be perceived as a ritual process. Protestants were attempting, through iconoclastic acts, to tear down old social rituals and establish new ones based on Evangelical tenets. Iconoclasm was essentially ritualistic in nature, either by association with ritualistic occasions, subverting or parodying established ritual or becoming antiritualistic in the act of disturbing established ceremonies and rites.<sup>22</sup> Scribner also introduces the relationship between iconoclasm and Carnival as complementary forms of popular communication. Both are stylized forms of behavior which occur in a "set aside" time and place and provide symbolic models of social relationships.<sup>23</sup>

Because iconoclasm represents the establishment of new rituals in society, Scribner maintains that they must be evaluated in terms of the old ritualistic order they are meant to replace or subvert. In societies, rituals are meant to unify communities; iconoclasm was a ritualistic inversion of this purpose—it was intended to be socially decisive.<sup>24</sup> Similarly, iconoclastic acts often took on aspects of other civic or folk rituals. Thus, an iconoclastic action involving an image may take on a ritualistic pattern similar to a social rite of passage, the dispensation of civic justice, or community purification rites.<sup>25</sup>

In both Wandel and Scribner the key to iconoclastic acts lies in the public perception of the social use of religious images.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., 194-6.

<sup>22</sup>Robert W. Scribner, "Ritual and Reformation," in *The German People and the Reformation*, ed. R. Po-Chia Hsia (Ithaca, 1988), 122-3.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., 125.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., 130.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., 135.



Although theologians play a role in Wandel's synergy, the ritualistic choice of targets and forms of action in both Wandel and Scribner lies with the common man. Important also is the intended social purpose both authors describe: the reordering of society to be the goal of iconoclasts.

John Maarbjerg's thesis is essentially socio-economic. In his study of two incidents of iconoclasm in the Thurgau, Maarbjerg concludes that social tensions were an integral part of iconoclastic acts, and that, in the Thurgau, the source of these tensions was the deeply ambiguous perceptions of the rural peasantry toward the social, political and economic power of the Catholic Church.<sup>26</sup> Maarbjerg theorizes that increasing population pressure, the marginalization of farms as viable economic units, and the increasing restrictions of traditional small-holders' rights to access pastures and woodlands, combined with the rural awareness of nearby urban unrest, served to heighten social and economic tension in rural areas. These economic and social factors were also occurring at a time when the rural peasantry was attempting to free itself from the last bonds of serfdom in the form of feudal rents and dues. Since the Church was the largest feudal landlord in this area, the disparity between the socio-political and economic aims of the peasantry and the Church were bound to increase. As the economic status of the rural peasantry declined, the egalitarian nature of the Zurich social model and the Zwinglian concept of redistributing the wealth of the Church to the poor was particularly attractive.<sup>27</sup> This socio-economic instability is probably enough to explain the attacks on church lands, but the initial removal of images by village officials may perhaps also be traced to this instability, if the assumption is made that the restless peasantry was also challenging the leadership of the literate peasant elite.<sup>28</sup> Iconoclasm by the village officials would then be interpreted as an effort to regain the support of the peasantry.

The ambivalence of the population toward religious images plays a particularly prominent role in Maarbjerg's argument. The

<sup>26</sup> John P. Maarbjerg, "Iconoclasm in the Thurgau: Two Related Incidents in the Summer of 1524," *Sixteenth Century Journal* 24 (Fall 1993): 579.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 587.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*

eneration of images was a practice deeply ingrained in the popular culture and unlikely to change quickly. So it is probable that images retained some of their perceived symbolic power to access the divine. However, in the situation of social and economic tension that developed in the Thurgau, images also came to be regarded as the products of and symbols for the resented feudal regime as maintained by the Church. Protestantism offered an alternative Christian culture free of feudal social and economic structures which was more attractive to the aspirations of the elite peasantry. Maarbjerg argues that this ambivalent attitude toward religious images explains the general passivity toward, or support of, iconoclastic acts in the Thurgau.<sup>29</sup>

The socio-political interpretation of iconoclastic phenomena presents an opportunity to examine the problems encountered by the Reformation in different political systems in its spread throughout Europe. Each of the scholars presented in this section has based his research in a different country. Eire examines the political nature of the Reform in Geneva. Natalie Zemon Davis examines the violent nature of the French Reformation. Phyllis Mack presents a stark contrast to Davis in her examination of the orderly iconoclastic Wouderyear of the Netherlands. Finally, Duffy examines the phenomena of a Reformation imposed from above in Tudor England.

Eire contends that iconoclasm in the Genevan reformation was the crowd's tool to publicly test and disprove the legality of the Roman Catholic cultus.<sup>30</sup> In Eire's view, iconoclasm was a tactic encouraged by the Protestant reformers to put pressure on a city council reluctant to enact the Reformation. By destroying the images, the Reformers presented the council with a *fait accompli*, and thus succeeded through an act of rebellion.<sup>31</sup> Iconoclasm becomes a revolutionary tactic in Eire's thesis, directed against accepted social myths. Iconoclasm may take one of several forms, legal or illegal, individual or collective, orderly or riotous, but in any of these forms the revolutionary intent is apparent: the overturning of the status quo. Iconoclasm, despite

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 551.

<sup>30</sup> Eire, *War Against the Idols*, 107.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 147.

its religious content, is in essence a political act that involves public participation, often for the purpose of usurping governmental authority.<sup>32</sup> But Eire also makes it clear that iconoclasm must be dependent on ideology: "Vandalism is wanton destruction; iconoclasm is the destruction of religious objects for ideological reasons."<sup>33</sup>

Davis's work on the French Reformation examines the question of the social meaning inherent in religious rioting. Drawing on previous work done on crowd analysis for economic and political riots in the sixteenth century, Davis's thesis asks if the strong links between violence, economic issues and class conflict established in bread and tax riots are also inherent in the religious rioting of the French Reformation. If no such class conflict can be detected in religious rioting, how then can the historian interpret the social meaning of religious violence?<sup>34</sup> Davis's analysis of the composition of the crowd during religious rioting establishes that class conflict was not a major factor in religious riots, since all economic and social classes participated, and the crowd leadership was usually made up of a mixture of classes. In order to discern the true nature of religious rioting, Davis examines the goals of the rioters, their targets, the kinds of actions they undertook, and the occasions which prompted iconoclastic actions.

Davis's theory on the behavior of religious rioters hinges on the interpretation of their actions as mimicking the actions of legitimate political and religious authority. The crowds took on these roles when they perceived a failure on the part of the legitimate authorities to undertake their duties. Thus, when the crowd perceived that the clergy (either Catholic or Reformed) had failed to challenge and test false doctrine, the crowd took on the clerical role by testing false doctrine through iconoclastic acts.<sup>35</sup> It was at this point that the ritualistic aspects of iconoclasm theorized by Robert Scribner came into play. The cleansing of the community of "pollution" (by either side, Catholic or

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., 155-6.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., 159.

<sup>34</sup>Natalie Zemon Davis, "The Rites of Violence," in *Society and Culture in Early Modern France*, (Stanford, 1965), 155.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., 156.

Protestant) was a major concern of the rioters, since moral/religious pollution was seen a provocation to God to visit mankind with natural disasters.<sup>36</sup> The crowd also usurped the magistrate's function to punish idolaters and the wicked. Since both the Protestants and Catholics saw the other side as pollutants, idolaters and adherents to a false faith, the French religious riots could be precipitated by either side with equal justification. The crowds also drew a type of legitimacy for their actions from the common magisterial practice of "deputizing" segments of the population for legal for religious purposes, such as chasing criminals or baptizing babies. When the magistrates "deputized," they often chose organized groups, such as confraternities. It was precisely these types of organized groups which often formed the nucleus of a rioting crowd.<sup>37</sup>

Davis's analysis of the occasion of religious riot agrees closely with the findings of Scribner, in that they seem tied to the celebration of religious rituals and sacred places. Thus, religious processions were always a likely target for iconoclastic rioting. Likewise, the two scholars agree that the rioters drew on a common popular repertory of beliefs and perceptions to make their actions ritually comprehensible. Like Scribner, Davis also finds that the underlying theme of religious rioting was a concern with the societal order, either re-establishing it to traditional Catholic model or redefining it to the Evangelical model. Where Davis differs from Scribner, and what makes her thesis socio-political in orientation is the quasi-legitimacy of the crowd in taking over the magisterial function in enforcing moral/civic law.

In sharp contrast to the violence of the French Reformation, the Reformation in the Netherlands had the defining characteristic of limited popular participation in a short, relatively non-violent, orderly, and regionally successive iconoclastic movement. Mack, in examining the Wonderyear, presents the thesis that iconoclasm in the Netherlands was of such short duration and so orderly because, due to political factors, it was not an expression of mass sentiment. Without further consideration, this thesis would indicate a lack of support for the Reformation. But Mack

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., 159.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., 168.

concludes that the most important aspect of the Dutch Reformation was hedge preaching, which she characterizes as a relatively conservative phenomena, a socializing experience and one that reinforced social stability.<sup>38</sup> The idea of social stability is crucial to Mack's thesis; in her analysis the relative conservatism of the Dutch Reformation movement was a response to a mass perception of the breakdown of political authority, due to physical absence of the monarch, the ineffectiveness of the regent, and the withdrawal of the local nobility from political life.<sup>39</sup> In this scenario, both Catholic and Protestants valued the aura of legitimacy over the ritualistic expressions of rejection of their opponents. This prevented a polarization of society; instead society fragmented into numerous groups with confused goals and loyalties, and thus were paralyzed from taking violent action.<sup>40</sup>

Since hedge preaching was the major expression of the Dutch Reformation, the Calvinist ministers were the natural heirs to fill the void of higher authority. Circumstances surrounding their presence in the Netherlands, however, conspired to make this group also relatively conservative. First, trained ministers in the Netherlands were somewhat of a rarity, and what ministers there were had been trained in differing cities and under differing circumstances, and reflected the multi-cultural and multilingual heritage of the Netherlands. The role of the lay pastors in the development of the hedge preaching was therefore crucial. This group, made up of locally popular speakers, had the opportunity to turn the crowds to violence, but, as a group, they seemed to identify with the goals of the trained ministry in seeking legitimacy above destruction.<sup>41</sup> This concern for legitimate authority was also an effort on the part of the ministry to distance themselves from the radical actions of the extreme left wing of the Reformation.

In Mack's analysis, then, the underlying theme of the Dutch Reformation was the search for social and political stability that the general population perceived had been surrendered by the

<sup>38</sup>Mack, "The Wonderyear," 196, 211.

<sup>39</sup>*Ibid.*, 203.

<sup>40</sup>*Ibid.*, 206.

<sup>41</sup>*Ibid.*, 209-1.

government and the nobility. The emphasis the Reformed clergy put on their own legitimacy as social leaders allowed them to fill this perceived void. The ritualistic need to remove the symbols of the old regime became less important than the search for authority, and in any case, society was so fragmented than the mass organization of such an effort was impossible. Mack also poses the interesting idea that the iconoclasm which occurred in the Netherlands, orderly though it was, essentially ruined the delicate social balance of the hedge preaching, since it was directly counterproductive to the function of community stabilization and legitimacy.<sup>42</sup>

In contrast to this portrayal of the Reformation filling a political void, Duffy argues that in Tudor England, the Reformation was imposed from above by legitimate political authorities. Duffy's thesis, as discussed earlier, posits existence of a vigorous and healthy Catholicism in the sixteenth century, which the general population gave up reluctantly and only under extreme pressure from the Tudor government. In his scenario, a small group of evangelical Protestants in positions of governmental authority were able, through manipulation of the monarchy and the legalization of iconoclastic and punitive acts, to impose the Reformation upon the English population. In Duffy's estimation their success at doing this was sporadic at best, due to local resistance, but the Reformation succeeded primarily through attrition, allowing enough time to pass for a generation educated in Protestantism to take control of the society.

In Duffy's argument the local resistance to Protestantism plus the lack of ideological commitment of Henry VIII to all the basic tenets of the new faith shaped the English Reformation to a local focus, making it necessary to fight to introduce Protestantism diocese by diocese.<sup>43</sup> The commitment to Protestantism on the part of the government was accomplished in the face of wavering monarchical support by the policy of placing Protestant clerics in diocesan and parish offices whenever possible, thus building a cadre of loyal clericals in positions of power.<sup>44</sup> These radical

<sup>42</sup>*Ibid.*, 216.

<sup>43</sup>Duffy, *The Stripping of the Altars*, 413.

<sup>44</sup>*Ibid.*, 433.



Protestant clerics often found themselves at odds with their conservative parishes.

Within the structure of the English Reformation, iconoclasm takes on a unique role. Since Duffy dismisses the idea of a popular mass movement fueling iconoclastic acts, iconoclasm can be interpreted here as a tool of the legitimate government to force its will on the population. Duffy illustrates this point by noting that the legal attacks were directed toward the clearest expressions of popular religious practice—processionals, pilgrimages, and the veneration of images.<sup>45</sup> This interpretation of iconoclasm differs sharply from the popular ritualistic interpretation given by Scribner, Davis, and Wandel. In Duffy's estimation, the actions of the population, in hiding images, in resisting the Abrogation of Holy Days, and the introduction of the 1549 Prayer Book, are proof that the hold of traditional religion on the general population remained strong throughout the early Tudor era.<sup>46</sup> In this type of legalistically powered reform, compliance with the law cannot, in Duffy's opinion, be equated to popular acceptance or approval.<sup>47</sup>

Iconoclasm was the heart of the Edwardian reforms, but Duffy maintains that the prompt removal of images cannot be used as evidence for the general acceptance of Protestantism, since community attachment to images varied, and the removal and sale of religious items was an accepted practice among Catholic dioceses with a cash-flow problem.<sup>48</sup> Evidence of the superficiality of the acceptance of Protestantism in the parishes is the prompt return of many of the removed items to the churches in the reign of Mary.<sup>49</sup>

All of these authors acknowledge the complexity of iconoclastic phenomena. Several of these scholars have attempted a localized analysis of iconoclastic incidents. The work of Phyllis Mack, Natalie Davis, Richard Scribner and Lee Wandel provide valuable insights to crowd composition, motivation, and behavior. Eamon Duffy and Sergiusz Michalski

<sup>45</sup>*Ibid.*, 452.

<sup>46</sup>*Ibid.* 393, 466.

<sup>47</sup>*Ibid.*, 462.

<sup>48</sup>*Ibid.* 481-2.

<sup>49</sup>*Ibid.*, 491.

111

have attempted to link the iconoclastic phenomena to broader political and cultural phenomena. In the final analysis, iconoclasm is a phenomena that cannot be easily classified or defined; it is dependent on a complex interplay of economic, political, religious, social, and psychological factors. The dominance of any of these factors in giving particular shape to an iconoclastic act is largely dependent on local/regional conditions and tensions. It was the peculiarities of communities which gave shape and symbolic meaning to their iconoclasm.

## Gendering Franklin And Eleanor: a Review

Barbara Burke

*M.A. in History student Barbara Burke wrote this review for Professor Lynne Curry's Historiography of Women and Gender History Seminar in Spring 1997.*

No Ordinary Time, by Doris Kearns Goodwin, is a biography of Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt, which looks at this incredible husband and wife team from their early lives, through a disease and an affair which almost ruined their lives, to eventually how they managed to rebuild their relationship on the most unusual terms. How the Roosevelt's redefined their relationship was paralleled by the effects of the war on the American home front and how the country tried to redefine itself in the war's aftermath. This review shows the role gender played in Goodwin's analysis of the lives of Franklin and Eleanor and compared her findings with those of other historians looking at gender roles.

As Doris Kearns Goodwin frequently points out in her book, Eleanor Roosevelt was not the traditional wife of her times. In fact, she let her husband's secretary, Marguerite "Missy" LeHand, handle that position freeing her to pursue her own goals. While Missy played the part of FDR's hostess at parties and kept the president company, Eleanor traveled and visited the American people. Eleanor felt rather out of place as hostess to her husband's cocktail hour, or filling the social duties of a woman of her class. She preferred to keep busy doing work that was meaningful to her rather than play a merely social role. However, Eleanor did believe in her right to be the mistress of the White House and did not like it if others imposed upon her position.<sup>1</sup>

Since Franklin's fight with polio left him paralyzed, Eleanor became instrumental in her husband's political life. Due to his paralysis, Franklin could not move freely around the country as he would like, so he sent the first lady in his place to act as his eyes and ears. Even before his election to the office of the

<sup>1</sup>Doris Kearns Goodwin, *No Ordinary Time* (New York, 1994), 82, 300. All parenthetical page references are to *Ibid.*

president, Eleanor was important. A year after FDR contracted polio, his wife maintained a busy schedule of appointments and political meetings in her husband's name so that he would not be forgotten. He taught her to inspect state institutions while he was governor, looking for human elements, so that he could better understand the people. Someone else probably could have filled this position, but Franklin chose Eleanor.

During FDR's presidency, she continued in her role as inspector and advisor. Her opinions carried a lot of weight with her husband and she used this position to urge Franklin to fight for civil rights, fair labor practices, and the mobilization of women in the military. Frequently, she pushed her husband to the breaking point and fights ensued. Through it all, Franklin let Eleanor speak her mind and tried not to control her. Franklin even allowed Eleanor to influence policy. Trude Pratt Lash gave the first lady credit for the ideas behind her husband's four freedoms, which included the civil rights for which Eleanor had long fought. Perhaps, her greatest contribution to her husband's presidency was her appearance at the party convention for FDR's third nomination. Eleanor did not want to make a speech, since a first lady had never spoken at a convention before. Yet her speech helped to ensure the nomination.

Although she broke some traditional roles, Eleanor for the most part stayed in her sphere. America became Eleanor's house and it's people her children, both of which she had to watch over like a good wife and mother. Her inspections primarily dealt with the sick, the poor, the working class, and children. She was dedicated to abolishing child labor, improving labor laws for women, and establishing minimum wages.

When the war came, Eleanor's main concern was still domestic affairs. A trip to the Pacific illustrated her role and image in the mind of the American people. One soldier who met Eleanor saw her not as a diplomat for the White House but as "an American mother" (464). Eleanor's own words reveal how she tried to conform to traditional ideas of womanhood: "the function of a woman is to ease things along; smooth them over."

Another interesting aspect of Eleanor's life was her relationship with her female friends. As a worker for the League of Women Voters, Eleanor came into contact with other politically oriented women, with some of whom she developed

close relationships. Several of the women Mrs. Roosevelt befriended, according to Goodwin, were lesbians. Goodwin suggests that she was jealous of these women's close, caring relationships. One woman in particular, Lorena Hickok (Hick), developed a special relationship with the First Lady and even fell in love with her. The two women wrote many letters about their love and their longing to see one another when apart. The relationship later faded as the first lady became increasingly active in politics.

Goodwin addresses Eleanor's romance in terms of her Victorian background and refers to Carroll Smith Rosenberg's study. Rosenberg in "The Female World of Love and Ritual: Relations Between Women in Nineteenth Century America," studied correspondence of women of that era in an attempt to examine female relations in the proper cultural and social context. Many of the letters Rosenberg presented show similar declarations of love and the need to be together. According to Rosenberg, this type of desire was not indicative of homosexuality as much as emotional ties between women. Rosenberg writes, "these female friendships served a number of emotional functions. Within this secure and empathetic world women could share sorrows, anxieties, and joys, confident that other women had experienced similar emotions."<sup>2</sup> Despite the fact that Hick fell in love with Eleanor, Goodwin appears to agree with Rosenberg that, for Eleanor, this relationship filled an emotional need that coming from a Victorian upbringing, only another woman could have fulfilled.

Even though Eleanor's success was contingent on her husband, she was accomplished in her own right. A Gallup poll taken in 1940 revealed a 67% approval rating (higher than her husband's), with most of the American people accepting her work as a part of the national life. This rating eventually dropped as the First Lady continued to fight for the rights of blacks and labor. *The Nation* honored her at a banquet for her work in civil rights and for the poor, one speaker referred to her as an institution. She was among the highest paid lecturers in the country and in 1940, before her husband was nominated for a

<sup>2</sup>Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, "The Female World of Love and Ritual," *Signs* 1 (1975): 63.

third term, she received a five year extension on her newspaper column. Goodwin suggests that such success coming from a woman of Mrs. Roosevelt's position and era was rare. While she does show that other women, such as Eleanor's friend Hick, had a career and were respected, no other women held quite a position of authority and popularity as Eleanor Roosevelt.

Eleanor Roosevelt became the archetype for American women during the war era. Like many women circumstances pushed her out of the house and into the public sphere. Many women took jobs in factories. At the beginning of the war, the government and other institutions discouraged women who entered the work force, such as the Catholic Church, for they were viewed a threat to the American home and traditional family values. When the war took it's toll on the male labor force, however, women were called in as substitutes. At the end of the war women would be expected to return home.

However, as the author points out, there was resistance for a change of status at the end of the war. Goodwin found that many women welcomed their new jobs and responsibilities, with 79% of women saying that they enjoyed working more than staying at home. Eleanor was the model of the change in women's roles at this time. Like many women she was happy out in the work force and did not care to leave. As Goodwin points out "The agitation the sixty-year-old Eleanor felt in not knowing what to do was echoed in the hearts of millions of American women for whom the war had been a major turning point, creating new expectations, new adjustments, new problems" (555).

Eleanor even worked at the cost of her marriage. In 1942 FDR implored his wife to stay at home more, act as his hostess, and accompany him on trips. "But over the past decade, " as Goodwin observes, "the experience of becoming a political force in her own right had brought with it a profoundly different sense of self-of independence, competence, and confidence. If joining her husband now meant giving up the life she had built for herself, it seemed a great deal to ask" (372).

There were women who felt differently. For example Eleanor's daughter Anne loved her new job and responsibilities for awhile, but after a time she encouraged her husband to come home for she could no longer handle the problems without him. This seems more in line with Drew Gilpin Faust's findings in



Eleanor did something unusual by going outside her traditional sphere and entering into politics, Franklin's life in politics was perfectly natural. Franklin Roosevelt was presented by Goodwin as a strong leader, who was forced to deal with the problems of the United States and the world. He had to constantly balance public opinion with his policy. Goodwin often referred to the president's inability to have deep personal relationships.

FDR, along with his friend Winston Churchill, took a certain amount of pleasure in mobilizing and waging war. Upon seeing Churchill's map room, Roosevelt ordered one made for himself. He took pride in seeing the growth of the military and reviewing the troops. Upon visiting the men in Africa, Goodwin reports "the sight of so many young Americans in good health and high spirits was a tonic for the soul" (405). Eleanor described the President and the Prime Minister making war plans like two boys playing soldier. Such idealized male views of war are also found in *The Great Adventure* by Michael C.C. Adams. In his piece Adams writes how men traditionally found joy and cleansing in war, not to mention the fact that war was viewed as an honorable way to die. Furthermore, men in the trenches, much like Roosevelt and Churchill in the map room, found male companionship during war.<sup>6</sup> According to Goodwin, Roosevelt also held this romanticized view of war.

Because the President faced the troubles of the nation and the war all day long, it was important for him to come home and relax. Eleanor could not be the type of companion Franklin found in Missy. Missy looked up at Franklin with adoring eyes, she repeatedly listened to his stories, hosted his parties, and made his life more comfortable: a traditional wifely role. In fact, Missy was referred to as FDR's other wife. Home was to be the place where Franklin could escape the outside world, and throughout his life he found women to make this place for him.

Although Franklin Roosevelt contracted polio at a young age, he remained active in sports. He tried hard at an early age to excel in school and advance his position in society. While his father taught him "how to row and sail, and skate and sled" his mother focused more on his moral teaching, taking him with her while she visited the sick and the poor (75-80). In "The habit of

<sup>6</sup>Michael C.C. Adams, *The Great Adventure* (Bloomington, 1990).

*Mothers of Invention*. In this book Faust looks at wealthy southern women in the Civil War and how they dealt with the changes that the war had on gender roles. These women grew up in a world of protection and privilege unable to deal with the new roles and responsibilities the war brought. At times, the women broke gender roles by verbally assaulting enemy soldiers, by playing the spy, or by wearing men's clothes, yet they always retreated behind their gender.<sup>3</sup> Faust claims that the women question "the desirability of female independence or emancipation."<sup>4</sup> But she points out, much like Goodwin, that circumstances had changed and not everything could go back to the way it was.

As stated above, Goodwin also addressed the hesitancy of allowing women into traditional male roles such as the work force. A woman's main function was to see to their homes and the raising of their children. Goodwin wrote of people's concerns about the breakdown of family values if women entered the work force. These same issues are addressed in Christine Stansell's article "Women, Children, and the Uses of the Streets: Class and Gender Conflict in New York City, 1850-1860." Due to the number of women working, children ran loose on the streets. Some youths turned towards picking up bottles and garbage for money, others to selling themselves on the streets. Stansell finds that New York's middle class was very upset at the presence of such children on the streets and tried to reaffirm their domestic ideals upon the working class. They encouraged women to create a good home environment, which included keeping a clean home and watching over their children.<sup>5</sup> Goodwin found that even in the 1940's the same ideals hold true. As the war came ended women's journals and movies encouraged females to leave their jobs and return to their place as caretakers of the hearth.

While Eleanor's break from traditional female roles is implied throughout the book, Franklin's masculinity is hardly mentioned. This appears to be a silent statement that while

<sup>3</sup>Drew Gilpin Faust, *Mothers of Invention* (Chapel Hill, 1996), 196-248.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, 256.

<sup>5</sup>Christine Stansell, "Women, Children, and the Uses of the Streets: Class and Gender Conflict in New York City, 1850-1860," in *Unequal Sisters: A Multicultural Reader in U.S. Women's History*, ed. Ellen Carol Dubois and Vicki L. Ruiz (New York, 1990), 92-108.

victory: the American military and the cult of manliness," Donald J. Mrozek examines three different masculine models. Mrozek points out how fathers tend to emphasize the Masculine Achiever, an idea based on a strong, active, aggressive male stereotype, while mothers tend to emphasize the Christian Gentleman an idea based on right actions, compassion and restraint. Roosevelt's parents appeared to fit this pattern.

Franklin himself seems to fit into the third category, the Masculine Primitive model, in which a man strives to achieve the strength of body and personality of the Masculine Achiever but relies on his primitive instincts for survival. Although Donald Mrozek studies middle-class boys, Franklin seems to fit in since he was competitive in college and at sports. Mrozek states that "competition and physical challenge were important tests of manhood."<sup>7</sup> Goodwin often shows Franklin's fight with polio as an important challenge which changed his life, for he was able to conquer it and continue.

Even though FDR contracted polio long before he ran for president, most people did not know that the leader of the world's most powerful country was crippled. He was proof that being crippled did not make one less of a man. This compare to the findings in Sonya Michel's "Danger On The Home Front: Motherhood, Sexuality, and Disabled Veterans in American Postwar Films." In three of the movies examined by Michel, disabilities suffered from the war, especially amputations were viewed as emasculating, for a man was expected to be the provider and protector. If he were crippled he would be unable to fulfill this role. Furthermore, the man then became dependent on his wife or girlfriend.

FDR was an example of how a man with a major disability could overcome and go on to succeed in the world of politics, a traditional male sphere. Michel also finds in her study that in two of the post-World War II films the women of the injured veterans "were not only to surrender their jobs, but also to subordinate their own dreams, ambitions, and desires to those of the

<sup>7</sup>Donald J. Mrozek, "The habit of victory: the American military and the cult of manliness," in *Manliness and Morality: Middle-Class Masculinity in Britain and America, 1860-1940*, ed. J.A. Mangan and James Wolven (Manchester, 1987): 220-35.

veterans."<sup>8</sup> This did not apply to the relationship between Franklin and Eleanor. Eleanor's power was increased after her husband's paralysis, and furthermore Franklin encouraged it by teaching her how to become an inspector and sending her out in his name. Eleanor doesn't subordinate herself to her husband just because he was in a wheelchair.

Goodwin understands gender better from a woman's point of view. She covers Eleanor's personal growth and break from traditional gender roles in great detail. She compares Eleanor's experience to that of American women as a whole during the war. She clearly showed that women enjoyed their new found freedoms and many refused to give them up at the end of the war, much like the first lady herself. On the other hand, Goodwin is rather vague when it comes to men and their gender roles. Her silence on such issues is a strong statement. Men were made for war, it was their job to play politics and fight on the front lines. However, she misses two important aspects. How did men feel about the roles they were assigned? Moreover, how does the ordinary man feel about the world of gender turned upside down? *No Ordinary Time* is an appropriate title for this book, and Goodwin writes more than just an ordinary biography. She does an excellent job of paralleling the lives of Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt to this remarkable time in American history. Just as the relationship between this husband and wife would undergo major changes during a time of crisis, so would the American home front. Neither would ever be the same.

<sup>8</sup>Sonya Michel, "Danger on the Home Front: Motherhood, Sexuality and Disabled Veterans in American Postwar Films," in *Gendering War Talk* (Princeton, 1993), 261.