بِسْمِ اللّٰهِ الرَّحْمٰنِ الرَّحِيمِ

The Vatican, Anti-Semitism, and the Holocaust

BY EVA PFANZELTER

In Spring 1975, Historian Judah L. Graubart wrote: "There are few issues in the historiography of the Holocaust that are colored by more emotion and based on less knowledge than the Vatican's response to the *final solution to the Jewish question*."[1] At the time of Pope Pius XII's death in 1958 the Jewish newspaper *L'Arche* published a bitter essay about *Les Silences de Pie XII* which accused Pius XII of anti-Semitism. In 1963, Rolf Hochhuth, a German writer, published *The Deputy*, a play which indicted the whole Catholic Church of pro-fascist attitudes. The essay and the play, both written prior to the publication of most of the relevant documents, marked the beginning of an era of accusations against the Holy See and initiated a fierce historical controversy. In reaction to the storm of attack on Pius XII in the 1960s, Pope Paul VI authorized the publication of the papers of the Secretariat of State of Pope Pius XII. The papers were edited by a group of Jesuit historians of different nationalities and intended to exonerate Pius XII. The first volume was published in 1965, the last in 1988.[2] The following years were characterized by furious and polarized debate. Defenders of the Vatican emphasized the Pope's, the Vatican's and the episcopacy's readiness to help individual Jews in finding hiding places or in escaping from German-occupied territories. The critics of the Holy See, accusing Catholic Church officials of "by-standing," attacked the Vatican, and especially Pope Pius XII, for not having *officially* condemned the National Socialist policies toward the Jews in Germany and the occupied countries. Further release of documents did not silence the critics of Pius XII. Finally, in Fall, 1988, the bishops of West Germany, East Germany, and Austria decided to issue an eighteen page long "word of the bishops concerning the relationship between Christians and Jews." In this memorandum the bishops admitted the church's failure and fault during the Nazi regime and expressed their regret.[3]

In discussing Vatican diplomacy during the Holocaust we must

[1]John F. Morley, *Vatican Diplomacy and the Jews During the Holocaust 1939-1943* (New York: Ktav Publishing House), 1980, 1.

[2]Robert A. Graham, *Pius XII's Defense of Jews and Others: 1944-1945* (Milwaukee: Catholic League for Religious & Civil Rights) 1954, 7.

[3]Rolf Steininger, "Katholische Kirche und NS-Judenpolitik," in *Zeitschrift für Katholische Theologie* (Innsbruck: Theologische Fakultät Innsbruck) 1992, 179.

remember that the first priority of the Vatican had to be survival of the institution itself over a vast and heterogeneous area in time of total war. Moreover, Vatican diplomacy was characterized by distinctive levels. On the highest level was the Pope himself. The nuncios acted on the lowest level within the Vatican. They received instruction from the Vatican's Secretariat of State and more specifically from the Secretary of State in the 1930s, Cardinal Luigi Maglione. Below the level of the Vatican itself, most of the Vatican's official policies had to be supported and guided by the representatives of the Church in the invaded countries and in Germany.[4] Finally, the Vatican's traditional approach of maintaining official neutrality in international disputes faced unprecedented challenge by the Nazi regime.

The primary field of interest here must certainly be the German episcopacy and their connections with the Vatican and the Vatican diplomats. Before 1933 the German Catholic Church had severely condemned National Socialism especially for its anti-religious and anti-moral teachings. Yet, after Hitler's rise to power and especially after the conclusion of the Concordat between Berlin and Rome in July 1933, this changed very quickly. Some historians argue that the Concordat provided the Nazi regime with a legitimate basis which persisted throughout the next twelve years and which persuaded many faithful Christians in Germany that, after all, Hitler's regime was not amoral and anti-religious. Other historians have argued that the Concordat represented not a reconciliation between Nazi Germany and the Catholic Church but the first stage in a long-lasting struggle for independence by the Church from Nazi "coordination." During these years the German Episcopacy divided into two camps. The anti-Nazi group was led by Konrad von Preysing, Bishop of Eichstätt and later of Berlin. He insisted that it was the Church's duty to warn the Catholics of the dangers for religion and morals that the Nazi ideology had inherent.[5] On the other side stood the chairman of the Fulda Bishop's Conference, Adolf Cardinal Bertram of Breslau, the Bishops Wilhelm Berning of Osnabrück and Heinrich Wienken, who from 1937 onwards was the leader of the Fulda Bishop's Conference, and the Apostolic Nuncio in Berlin, Cesare Orsenigo.[6] The Hitler Regime was not willing to allow the Church any freedom outside religious affairs. The Church, on the other side, tried to defend both religious press and religious organizations from the intervention of the state. Historian Ludwig Volk argues that the main effort of the National Socialists was to contain Church activities within Church buildings and to prevent any interference of religious institutions in national affairs.[7] As long

[4] Fred E. Katz, "Old Wounds and New Lessons," in Society, March/April 1983, 27.

[5] Staininger, "Katholische Kirche," 167.

[6] Rolf Hochhuth, The Deputy (New York: Grove Press), 1964, 13.

[7] Dieter Albrecht (ed.), Katholische Kirche und Nationalsozialismus, Ausgewählte Aufsätze von Ludwig Volk (Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag), 1987, 83.

as Pius XI was alive, the Concordat represented nothing more than a modus vivendi between the German state and the Vatican. Throughout the 1930s Pius XI fought to preserve the Church's influence and to protect its institutions from Nazi persecution.

Vatican diplomatic action during the Nazi regime took two forms. On the one hand, bishops, Cardinals and the Holy See intervened in individuals, including many Jews, through private protests directed at the German government. They constantly helped baptized Jews and continuously interfered with state officials when the latter tried to implement racial laws. On the other hand, the Vatican also conducted an official and public diplomacy. Here two periods of time have to be distinguished. Diplomacy underwent considerable change when Pope Pius XI died in 1939 and Eugenio Cardinal Pacelli was elected and became Pius XII. He then constantly challenged the Nazis through both personal intervention and open criticism. He had considerably contributed to the deterioration of the relations between the Vatican and Berlin and was not afraid of a public confrontation with the Nazi regime. When Eugenio Pacelli became pope the situation changed very rapidly. The new pope's major interest was to remain neutral and to work for peace. To achieve this aim he refrained from condemning any nation and relied on diplomatic discussions to solve the problems of the time. However, Pius XII's retreat from an aggressive policy and silence regarding growing Nazi persecutions has, at the time and since, often been interpreted as a policy of "by-standing", or tacit approval.

Yet, during Pius XII's candidature, the Church continued to help many individuals evade German persecution. Among others, the Apostolic Nuncio in Berlin, Cesare Orsenigo helped individual Jews. During the war years he also made repeated inquiries about other victims of German atrocities. He made frequent pleas for clemency on behalf of individuals who had been condemned to death by Nazi authorities, although most of the time the German authorities remained uncompromising and his attempts were fruitless.[8]

The main effort of the Catholic church, however, was to intervene for Christian Jews converted to Catholicism. The Vatican considered these Christian non-Aryans as full members of the Church and attempted to save them from Nazi persecution. Some interventions of the Vatican for these baptized Jews were successful. After a request by the representatives of the German Catholic hierarchy, Vatican diplomacy succeeded on June 20, 1939 in obtaining 3,000 immigration visas for German Catholic Jews to settle in Brazil. Historian John Morley stresses that the Brazil project shows that the Vatican's interest in the early years of the war was directed exclusively towards Christian Jews. The Church justified its intervention for these Jews by stating that the baptized Jews rightly concerned the Church and

[8] Morley, Vatican Diplomacy, 120,126.

December 29, 1942, the Holy See received a copy of the joint declaration of Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union condemning the persecution of the Jews.[14]

Moreover, there were many who pleaded with the Holy Father force-fully and openly to criticize German atrocities. The Polish president wrote a letter to the Vatican. American Catholics presented their alien-ation with the Church in Rome through their official voice, Francis Cardi-nal Spellmann. Eugéne Cardinal Tisserant already in 1940 begged Pius XII to issue an Encyclical about the "individual duty to obey the impera-tives of conscience."[15] On March 19, 1941, Pius XII replied to a letter sent to him by Bishop Preysing of Berlin, in which Preysing had reported and pleaded as follows:

> Your Holiness has certainly been informed about the situa-tion of the Jews in Germany and in its adjacent countries. ... I would like to mention that both Catholics and Protestants have asked me if the Holy See could do something about this matter. [like] make an appeal in favor of those unhappy people.

Pope Pius XII's reply did not address this plea. It simply ended with the words: "We recommend all your requests and anxieties to the kind protection of Holy Joseph and the compassionate love of Our Savior."[16] The Vatican refused officially to condemn Nazi atrocities towards the Jews in Germany and the occupied countries. In the words of Monsignor Charles Rodonski, a priest from the Warthegau, in this case silence was interpreted as giving consent.[17]

Historians have indeed pointed out that as soon as Pius XII succeed-ed in Rome the public conflict between the Vatican and the Third Reich disappeared. Following his election in March, 1939, Pius XII sent his warm greetings to Hitler without even mentioning the German occupa-tion of Prague. The German response was forthcoming: as early as May, 1939, the Nazi press became noticeably less critical of the Holy See, although the Nazi government remained suspicious as Pius XII began his candidature trying first to preserve, and later to restore, peace and medi-ate between the powers involved in the war.[18]

Shortly after the beginning of the war, England and France asked the Pope to condemn Germany as an aggressor against Poland. But Pius XII refused. The Germans understood this as a sign that he wanted to avoid direct intervention in international conflicts, which was tradi-tional policy in Vatican diplomacy, and that he also feared that such an intervention would damage the situation of the Catholics in Germany.

14 Morley, Vatican Diplomacy, 115-119.
15 Lipstadt, "Bystanders," 24.
16 Burkhart Schneider (ed.), Die Briefe Pius XII. an die deutschen Bischöfe, 1939-1944 (Mainz: Mathias-Grünewald-Verlag, 1966), 134.
17 Donald J. Dietrich, "Historical Judgments and Eternal Verities," in Society, March/April 1983, 33.
18 Kont, "A Tale," 605.

that these Jews were cut off from Jewish relief organizations.[9]

In addition to negotiating on behalf of individual Jews, the Holy See also tried to undermine racist legislation in different countries. Racist legislation, especially the prohibition of intermarriage between Jews and Christians, stood in complete opposition to the Church's moral teachings. However, the reaction of the German episcopacy to the establishment of the so-called Nuremberg Laws, the German racial laws, of September 15, 1935, was divided. Some clergymen, as for example Bishop Hudal, the head of the German Church in Rome, welcomed the laws as a necessary measure of self-defense of the German people against the "influx of for-eign elements." Others, like Waldemar Gurian, a German Catholic in exile, condemned the racial laws as violations of natural law and the moral teachings of the Christian faith.[10] Many historians cite the follow-ing as an articulation of the Church's overall standpoint on racist legisla-ture. At the beginning of August 1941 the French ambassador to the Holy See, Léon Bérard wrote a letter to Marshal Pétain, who had asked him about the Church's opinion on the French anti-Jewish legislation. In it he stated that the Church was basically against racism but that it did not repudiate every action taken by different countries against the Jews. Bérard mentioned that there were certain gradations and distinctions that the Church made. Furthermore he reported that the Vatican had only expressed its desire that no additional laws concerning marriage should be added and that "the precepts of justice and charity be taken into account in the application of the law."[11]

As mentioned, the Church's priorities shifted somewhat when Pius XII was elected in 1939. Dieter Albrecht's document-collection shows that during Pius XII's reign the Holy See was increasingly concerned with the situation of the Church in Germany and later in the German-occupied territories.[12] At the same time, in the view of historian Walter Laqueur, it probably was the Vatican who first in Europe learned of the Final Solution.[13] Already in the summer of 1941 the nuncio in Bucharest sent a report describing the killing of the Jews in the East. A similar report came from Poland in October 1941. In 1942, after Action Reinhart (the final roundup of Jews) began, the memoranda poured in from all sides: the nuncio of Switzerland sent a memorandum of the World Jewish Congress to Rome. Reports came to the Vatican from Slo-vakia, Belgium, Berlin and Poland. Colonel Kurt Gerstein, a German sol-dier, reported about what he saw in the death camps at Belzec and Tre-blinka—the document would later enter history as the "Gerstein Report" and would later become the main topic in Rolf Hochhuth's The Deputy. On

9 Morley, Vatican Diplomacy, 18-21.
10 Lewy, Catholic Church, 281.
11 Morley, Vatican Diplomacy, 51-52.
12 Albrecht, Notenwechsel.
13 Lipstadt, "Bystanders," 22.

Nevertheless when the encyclical *Summi Pontificatus* was issued on October 27, 1939, Nazi officials forbade its publication and diffusion within Germany. The encyclical indirectly expressed the Pope's sympathy for the invaded Polish nation, where Christian charitable relief work had been suppressed, priests had been imprisoned, and Church property had been seized. From the perspective of the Nazi government the encyclical damaged Germany's reputation in the eyes of the world.[19] In the same manner the official voice of the Vatican refused to condemn or accuse any nation throughout the entire duration of the war. Only once, in 1944 did the Holy See intervene for the civil victims of German atrocity.[20]

pen criticism was problematic not only for the Pope and the officials presiding in Rome. The decision to act or not to act on a public level was often influenced by the representatives of the Church hierarchy in the occupied countries and Germany itself. For the episcopacy in Germany it was particularly difficult to decide whether it was better for a priest to be a patriotic German who should lead his community towards the greater ideal of the German nation, or protest against Nazi policy and thus risk becoming an outcast of society and losing all influence, or even worse, being arrested by the Nazis. Indeed, most Cardinals and Bishops attempted to play a role as mediators. Very rarely did they protest either to German officials or from the pulpit.

At the beginning of World War II it became even more difficult for the church leaders in Germany to remain neutral. Apparently, overwhelming patriotism allowed them to forget even the attacks Hitler made on the Church in Germany. Already in 1937 the Fulda Bishops' Conference had praised the patriotic actions of the clerics in World War I. The author of a work praising the Catholic priests' involvement in that war added that this was the right time to honor the patriotism of the Church because it was now that "the German people, through their leaders, have again become a nation." In September, 1939, a Fulda Pastoral letter issued by the Bishops of the Fulda Conference exhorted:

In this decisive hour we encourage and admonish our Catholic soldiers, in obedience to the Führer, to do their duty and to be ready to sacrifice their whole person. We appeal to the faithful to join in ardent prayers that God's providence may lead this war to blessed success and peace for fatherland and people.[21]

In October, 1941, the deportation of the Jews began and the Church soon realized how seriously the Nazis implemented their ideology. However, as Michael Cardinal Faulhaber expressed it, many clergymen thought that the German officials would pay no attention to interference of the

[19]Rhodes, *Vatican*, 237.
See also the different notes concerning the reaction of German officials to the Encyclical, in Albrecht, *Notenwechsel*, 1969.
[20]Albrecht, *Notenwechsel*, 1969, 197.
[21]Guenter Lewy, *The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany* (New York, Toronto: McGraw-Hill), 1964, 225.

Church and that therefore it was futile even to try. Cardinal Bertram's opinion was that the deportation of the Jews was the execution of a principle of ideology which could not be stopped and that the bishops should "in the meantime be concerned about other, ecclesiastically more important, and further-reaching matters."[22] Moreover, within Germany the admiration for the Führer after his first victories did not stop at the church-doors. After the defeat of France, Archbishop Schulte of Cologne and Bishop Bornewasser of Trier issued a proclamation sending special thanks to heaven for the victory of the German army.[23] Cardinal Bertram of Breslau who in 1930 had said that the "National Socialist movement is no longer purely political. It teaches a misshapen philosophy which must be combated with all firmness,"[24] in April, 1940 congratulated Adolph Hitler on his birthday, pronouncing that the words should be seen "in connection with the passionate prayers, which the German Catholics send to heaven on the altars on April 20 for the people, the army, and the fatherland, for the State and the Führer." Bertram congratulated Hitler in the name of the German episcopacy without having the consent of the German bishops. The result was fierce protests by the German bishops which threatened further to divide the German Catholic hierarchy. Despite this, Cardinal Bertram apparently thought it was his duty to congratulate Hitler on his birthday every from then on until 1944.[25]

nly once, between 1943 and 1945, did Cardinal Bertram protest the systematic murder of the Jews. He protested not openly but in a private letter to Heinrich Himmler and the *Reichssicherheitshauptamt*. This letter, for the first and only time, not only mentioned the non-Aryan Catholics but also the deported non-Aryans (Jews). In this letter Bertram spoke of the inhuman conditions under which the "prisoners" had to live in the concentration camps all over Germany and urged that, considering the reputation of the German name at home and abroad, the situation in the camps should be examined and where necessary changed. However, Hitler himself never received this letter and it was neither published nor openly spread throughout Germany.[26]

The voices that did speak out publicly were scarce and hardly ever successful. However, in one famous instance a Catholic Bishop did suc-

[22]Steininger, "Katholische Kirche," 175.
[23]Lewy, *Catholic Church*, 228.
[24]Rhodes, *Vatican*, 166.
[25]Steininger, "Katholische Kirche," 174, 177-178.
In the end the situation became nearly macabre. When Bertram received the news about Hitler's suicide in the evening of May 1 or in the morning of May 2, 1945 he personally instructed all parishes in the archdiocese to "celebrate a festive Requiem in remembrance of the Führer and of all those members of the German Wehrmacht who died in the fight for the German fatherland." Remarkable about this is, as historian Scholder insists, that a Requiem according to Catholic Church law can only be celebrated for religious members and only for very important matters concerning an official affair of the church. In Steininger, "Katholische Kirche," 178.
[26]Steininger, "Katholische Kirche," 177.

ceed in effecting a reversal of Nazi policy. In August, 1941, the Bishop of Münster, Count von Galen, in a sermon in the church of Lambert condemned the killing of the sick, disabled, and old. Subsequently the whole German episcopacy protested so fiercely that Hitler still in August,1941, actually ordered the cessation of the murder of innocent "unproductive life." In a letter to Bishop von Galen, Pope Pius XII expressed his approval the bishop's actions, and added that the sermons were "proof of how much can still be achieved through open and manly behavior within the Third Reich."[27] Before that, though, the Bishops had protested unsuccessfully against the Nazi treatment of the disabled internally for over a year. Von Galen's sermon outraged the people and thus forced the suspension of the terror against the disabled.[28] However, it took Pius XII several months before he himself spoke out against the killing of the deformed, the insane, and the incurable. In July, 1943, in the encyclical *Mystici Corporis* he condemned the killing of innocent life.[29]

In 1942 the Vatican did become more critical of German policies. As a result, in a telegram on October 21, 1942, Joachim von Ribbentrop, German Minister of Foreign Affairs, ordered that confrontation with the Vatican had to be avoided, and that the Holy See should be informed that, since July 30, 1941, no Church property had been confiscated, and that anti-religious press propaganda had been forbidden. Despite these disclosures, on Christmas eve the Pope spoke out against the persecution of innocent people. But in his only allusion to the Jews in this Christmas radio address, Pius XII still remained incomprehensibly vague, expressing his concern about "the hundreds of thousands who, through no fault of their own, and solely because of their nation or race, have been condemned to death or progressive extinction." In the speech, the words "Jews" or "Germany" were not mentioned. Pius XII also refused to speak out against Nazi aggression any further. The reason for this might be found in an exchange of letters that followed the radio address between von Ribbentrop and Diego von Bergen, the German Ambassador to the Vatican. Von Ribbentrop had instructed von Bergen to inform Pius XII that Germany did not appreciate the Pope's renunciation of his neutral standpoint and that he should keep in mind that Germany did not "lack physical means of retaliation." Von Bergen responded that Pius XII was "firmly convinced that the majority [of the German Catholics] will remain true to their Faith. And that the German Catholic clergy will screw up its courage, prepared for the greatest sacrifices."[30] Yet, Pius XII's further actions did not reflect a firm belief in German Catholicism. He did not touch the Jewish question again. By not supporting the deported Jews, John Morley admits, the Church did not only forgo the

[27]Steininger, "Katholische Kirche," 166.
[28]Albrecht, Katholische Kirche, 98.
[29]Morley, Vatican Diplomacy, 196-201.
[30]Rhodes, Vatican, 271-274.

possibility of saving lives, which might have been in vain in any case, but it also failed to "give witness to the humanitarian commitment which [they] proudly claimed as the hallmark of Vatican diplomacy."[31]

The Church rightly feared open attack on Catholics within Germany. Albrecht von Kessel, a staff member of Ernst von Weizsäcker, later confirmed that this fear was not unsubstantiated.[32] Vatican reaction to accusations of "by-standing" was defensive. On April 30, 1943, Pius XII replied to a letter of Konrad von Preysing, Bishop of Berlin. The Pope underlined that the Vatican had to remain silent "ad maiora mala vitanda"[33] and he defended the Vatican policy towards the Jews as follows:

The Holy See for both the Catholic non-Aryans and for the Jews has charitably done everything that was within its economic and moral power. The executive authorities of our relief organizations needed a maximum of patience and self-sacrifice to meet the requirements — or one rather has to say — to meet the demands of the help-seekers and to gain control over emerging diplomatic problems. We do not even want to mention the high amounts of money in American currency that we made available for overseas emigrants; we gave them [the high amounts of money] with pleasure, because these people needed them; we helped in return for rewards by God, and were well advised not to expect earthly gratitude. ... As far as the actions taken against non-Aryans in German-influenced territories are concerned we already put in a word in our Christmas message. It was short but was well understood. We do not have to stress that our paternal love and paternal anxiety is intensely concerned with non-Aryan and half-Aryan Christians... The situation right now does not allow us to give them more effective help than our prayers. However, we are determined, depending on whether the circumstances allow it or not, to again raise our voices for them.[34]

In short, Pius XII was afraid. As Mr. Tittmann, the American Chargé d'Affaires at the Vatican in September, 1942, reported to the State Department, official statements could worsen the situation of the Catholics in Germany.[35] The German Bishops' Conference announced as well that not only would an official statement be ineffective, it would jeopardize what still could be done to help the Jews on a personal basis. Even well known opponents of the National Socialists, like Bishop Preysing, decided not to intervene because they feared that the Church would lose its last ability to offer refuge and help. Furthermore, as historian Ludwig Volk argues, while the euthanasia of the disabled and sick was an "open" secret, which was deeply deplored and criticized among the people, the knowledge of Jewish extermination was very limited. Therefore an official statement against the killing of the Jews would not have

[31]Morley, Vatican Diplomacy, 196-201.
[32]Lipstadt, "Bystanders," 26.
[33]to prevent major evils. Schneider, Briefe, 240.
[34]Schneider, Briefe, 241-242.
[35]Rhodes, Vatican, 347.

received as much public support as the euthanasia protest did.[36] In the words of historian Guenter Lewy "the bishops knew that here [with the killing of the disabled] they had the public behind them. When Hitler proceeded to 'The Final Solution of the Jewish Question,' no such sentiments showed themselves, and the episcopate therefore hesitated to risk a clash with the regime."[37]

From 1939 to 1945 the Vatican focused on two main issues. As mentioned, Pius XII was concerned with achieving peace throughout Europe and therefore refrained from abandoning neutrality and ceasing to serve as mediator. Beyond this, however, the first priority of both Pius XI and Pius XII was always to accumulate all their forces to oppose Bolshevism's influence in Western Europe. For the Vatican, Communism was more than just an ideological system which preached militant atheism; communism was another religion, with the same strength that Islam had had in previous centuries. Pius XI's encyclical *Divini Redemptoris*, issued on March 19, 1937, and directed against atheistic Communism, expressed much of the feelings the Church nourished against the system.[38]

Therefore, as historian Anthony Rhodes argues, when Germany attacked the Soviet Union in June, 1941, for many Catholics the war became something like a crusade.[39] Although Pius XII at this point decided not to condemn Communism any further, his standpoint was clear. Communism was the Church's first enemy, and Germany could help to defeat this enemy. Historian Saul Friedländer already in 1966 pointed out that the Holy See saw in the Nazi regime the savior of Europe from Bolshevism, no matter what form the Nazi regime took. Friedländer concluded that Pius XII feared the Bolshevization of Europe and hoped that Hitler's Germany would be able to stop the advance of the Soviet Union toward the West.[40]

Interestingly, the Church never spoke openly of the war against Russia as a religious crusade. For Nazi Germany this silence of the Holy Father in 1941 was a clear sign: if the Pope raised his voice against the evils of Communism he undoubtedly would also have to raise his voice against the "anti-clerical measures and anti-Christian tendencies in Germany." Paradoxically, his silence signaled that he approved the German invasion of Russia and was satisfied with the Germans' attempt to fight against evil Communism. To maintain the appearance of "neutrality," he could not state this openly. In a speech on June 29, 1941, Pius XII said:

Certainly in the midst of surrounding darkness and storm, signs of light appear which lift up our hearts with great and holy

36 Albrecht, *Katholische Kirche*, 111.
37 Lewy, *Catholic Church*, 257.
38 Terence P. McLaughlin, *The Church and the Reconstruction of the Modern World: The Social Encyclicals of Pius XI* (New York: Image Books), 1957, 368-369.
39 Rhodes, *Vatican*, 256.
40 Friedländer, *Pius XII*, 236.

expectations—these are those magnanimous acts of valour which now defend the foundations of Christian culture, as well as the confident hope of victory.[41]

Pius XII's fear of Communism was greater than of anything else. Historian Peter Kent explains that Pius XII's hatred of Bolshevism began in April, 1919, when the future Pope personally faced the Bolshevik invasion of the Munich nunciature. But, unlike Pius XI, who never missed an opportunity to condemn Bolshevism and Nazi Germany at the same time, Pius XII, who during his long stay in Germany had already been pro-German in the 1930's, did not continue Pius XI's anti-Nazi campaign.[42]

In addition to anti-Bolshevism there is yet another, almost equally strong traditional component of Vatican policy that might help to explain Vatican silence on the Holocaust. Historians have repeatedly accused the church of anti-Semitism and have argued it that was the reason why church officials did not stand up for the descendants of Abraham. Indeed, while the Church had criticized the Nazi glorification of race and blood and attacked the Nazi's criticism of the Old Testament, most of the Church officials said practically nothing about the acts of violence against the Jews. As mentioned earlier, when the Holy See and the episcopacy did address the problem, they never attacked Germany directly and did not name the Jews specifically as *the* example of a people predestined to violent extinction through the Nazi regime; the clergy mostly referred to "foreign races." Anti-Judaism was indeed known to be not uncommon among church officials and the Holy See's refusal to speak up for the Jews let the bitter feeling arise that church officials supported Hitler's campaign not only against Communists but also against the Jews. The Vatican's silence provokes the question: did the Church view Hitler's fight as a possibility to finally solve two of her "problems" — Judaism and Communism?

Historian Guenter Lewy argues that the "attitude of the Roman Catholic Church toward National Socialist anti-Semitism must be seen in the context of the still partially unresolved 2,000-year-old conflict between Church and Synagogue." Lewy admits that the differences between the Church's traditional anti-Judaism and the Nazi's anti-Semitism were big. However, it was to a large degree the Christian hostility to the "witness people" throughout previous centuries that had created the climate which allowed such unprecedented violence against the Jews. Some Christian clergymen also assisted in spreading the growth of the new anti-Semitism in the nineteenth century. Moreover, when the Catholic Church came in conflict with the National Socialists prior to 1933 the Nazi's anti-Semitism was not a point of discord. On the contrary, as pointed out, some clergymen were also known for their radical anti-Semitism. In 1923 Curate Josef Roth wrote:

41 Rhodes, *Vatican*, 257-258.
42 Kent, "A Tale," 589.

If in the course of proceeding against the Jews as a race some good and harmless Jews, with whom immorality because of inheritance is latent, will have to suffer together with the guilty ones, this is not a violation of Christian love of one's neighbor as long as the Church recognizes also the moral justification of war, for example, where many more 'innocents' than 'guilty' have to suffer.[43]

Still in 1933 the *Encyclopedia for Theology and Church* explained that the Jews had a "demoralizing influence on religiosity and national character."[44] From here it was a small step to Father Senn's, a veteran National Socialist priest's, outcry in 1934 that Hitler was "the tool of God, called upon to overcome Judaism."[45]

Indeed, historians do well know that many Vatican diplomats also did nourish at least anti-Zionist feelings and expressed them during these critical years. The Vatican's Secretary of State, Luigi Maglione himself, and one of his principal assistants Monsignor Domenico Tardini also expressed anti-Zionism on several occasions. Anti-Zionism is not equal to anti-Semitism. Yet, expressing anti-Zionist feelings while at the same time the Holocaust was working with full speed, seems at the least rather improper.[46] It is not irrelevant that diplomatic relations between the Vatican and Israel have been taken up only recently.

In conclusion, the record of the Vatican and the Catholic Church as a whole during World War II in regard to the Holocaust is profoundly mixed. Although Vatican activity during the Holocaust admittedly saved few Jews from Nazi persecution, some representatives of the Church did raise their voices and show their solidarity with the suffering of individual Jews. For this reason, historians should not unconditionally attack the Vatican or the Church as a whole.[47] Yet, many historians and analysts agree that what was missing was open criticism of Nazi policy.[48] Historian Rolf Steininger argues: "The Catholic Church was mainly concerned with her own matters. She did not think of the Jews but she was rather concerned with the unity of the organization. Nobody wanted a Church struggle with the Third Reich."[49] And John Morley regrets:

The greater tragedy, therefore, is not the death of thousands of innocent people, but that the diplomats of the Vatican, which claimed such a unique and spiritual status for their diplomacy, concurred by their silence. This was a concurrence which the Germans had come to expect and, in the most daring move of all,

43 Lewy, *Catholic Church*, 269-272.
44 Lewy, *Catholic Church*, 279.
45 Lewy, *Catholic Church*, 279.
46 Morley, *Vatican Diplomacy*, 207.
47 Morley, *Vatican Diplomacy*, 2-6.
48 Steininger, "Katholische Kirche," 169.
49 Steininger, "Katholische Kirche," 172.

prove would also be forthcoming in Rome.[50]

Moreover, as Rolf Hochhuth points out, the Holy Father did not condemn Hitler even when it was already clear that Germany would lose the war and while the daily killing at Auschwitz was reaching its zenith. Hochhuth continues that "the papal legations were in fact the only authorities Hitler continued to respect following the unwelcome entry of the United States into the war."[51] And indeed, a papal protest could have reached the ears of millions of Catholics who, no matter what the Führer's teachings were, might still have heeded the man that they believed, after all, to be God's deputy on earth.[52]

Historians sometimes point out that the Vatican's by-standing was not a unique phenomenon in the history of the Holocaust. Hardly any other institution or government condemned Nazi atrocities or attempted to help the Jews. Anti-Judaism was part of people's mentalities in many nations throughout the world; by-standing was common reaction when confronted with the Holocaust. Yet, record of the Holy See remains particularly troubling, not least because of the moral authority claimed by the Church. Additionally problematic for those seeking to explain or excuse the record of the Church is the fact that historians have found evidence that the Holy See after May 1945 supported the escape of Nazi criminals to countries mostly in South America. Vatican expert Robert A. Graham explains that the disorder of the aftermath of World War II made it almost impossible for Christian personnel involved in the relocation of displaced persons to identify war criminals. Furthermore, he maintains, refugee workers "were not equipped to recognize criminals of any kind."[53] However, this hardly discredit the evidence that other historians bring forward. Historian Ernst Klee writes that "in the aftermath of World War II Rome was the most popular place of pilgrimage for fugitive Nazis. In the Eternal City they found hiding-places and fake papers which helped them to escape to foreign countries." With the help of a German priest Adolf Eichman, the organizer of the *Final Solution* escaped to Argentina. Other prominent Nazi fugitives helped by members of the Church were "SS-Standardtenführer" Walter Rauff, Auschwitz-doctor Josef Mengele, Franz Stangl, commander of the extermination-camps Sobibor and Treblinka, and his deputy Friedrich Warzok, leader of the concentration-camp Lemberg-Janowka. Also Dr. Kurth Christmann, leader of the "SS-Special-Commission 10a", Dr. Gerhard Bohne, former organizer of the Nazi-Euthanasia, and Werner Baumbach, most success-

50 Morley, *Vatican Diplomacy*, 194.
51 Rolf Hochhuth, "The Vatican and the Jews," in *Society*, March/April 1983, 5-6.
52 Lipstadt, "Bystanders," 21.
53 Vincent A. Lapomarda, "Some Reflections on Catholics and the Holocaust," in *America*, Dec. 27, 1986, 425.

ﷺﷻﷲ

The Dreyfus Affair and the Influence of the International Press

BY AMY LINDEMAN

The late nineteenth century became a significant turning point in France and around the world. French society was shifting from one era to another.[1] France claimed to be establishing democracy and its related institutions. However, many of its "traditional institutions," such as the church and the army, were pursuing a return to "traditional France." As a result, discrepancies arose between those in favor of a liberal democracy and those seeking tradition. Thus, the two emerged with two differing systems of values. In addition, France became xenophobic.[2] These conditions set the scene for a controversial crisis in France known as the Dreyfus Affair. Through the influence of the media, what began as a battle against the institutions of traditional France, military espionage and anti-Semitism became an issue of the institutions of traditional France.

The Dreyfus Affair began on October 15, 1894, when the army falsely arrested Captain Alfred Dreyfus for conveying military secrets to Germany. In September, General Mercier, the Minister of War, was informed that a note, known as the *bordereau*, had been discovered in the office of General Schwartzkoppen, a German ambassador to France. The document revealed that someone of high command in the French army was leaking information. General Du Paty de Clam discovered that Dreyfus' handwriting resembled that found on the *bordereau*. Dreyfus' peers found him guilty almost immediately. Not only was his handwriting similar to that on the *bordereau*, but many did not like Dreyfus, and higher officials had given him a poor evaluation in 1893.[3] More importantly though, Alfred Dreyfus was a Jew from Alsace. The fact that Dreyfus originated from Alsace raised suspicion. Alsace, which lay on the border between Germany and France, often changed hands between the two countries. Therefore, many questioned his patriotism to France.[4] Growing anti-Semitism in France contributed immensely to Alfred Dreyfus' conviction.

Hatred of Jews in France became a more pressing issue in 1870 during the Franco-German War. Algerian natives began a revolt within their country at this time. France decided to take measures to strengthen their influ-

[1]Jeffrey Mehlman, *L'Affaire*, trans. Jean-Denis Bredin (New York: George Braziller, 1986), 537.
[2]Frederick Busi, "A Bibliographical Overview of the Dreyfus Affair," in *Jewish Social Studies* XL (1978), 39.
[3]Mehlman, 63.
[4]Ibid, 533.

---

ful bomber-pilot of Hitler's Germany escaped through Rome.[54] Pope Pius XII himself intervened for the Governor of Wartheland, Arthur Greiser, whose murder commandos were accused of having killed over 300,000 Jews, Poles, and mentally ill in the extermination camp Chelmno. Pius XII filed a plea for clemency in favor of Arthur Greiser to the Polish Government.[55]

On March 16, 1994, the *Chicago Tribune* announced that a trial against Paul Tourier, former intelligence aide to Klaus Barbie, head of the Gestapo and "Butcher of Lyon," was about to reopen in Paris. After the war Tourier had been condemned to death twice but he "succeeded in avoiding arrest by taking refuge with his family and among sympathetic Catholic organizations, at one time hiding in the Vatican." After the French Christian philosopher Gabriel Marcel filed a plea for clemency, Tourier was pardoned in 1971, but outraged Jews and Resistance groups forced him into hiding anew, "again aided by right-wing Catholics." Finally he was arrested in 1989 in a monastery in Nice and in 1992 a French court ruled that Tourier's alleged personal ordering of the execution of seven Jews did not constitute a crime against humanity. A national uproar compelled review of the decision. Tourier now is waiting for the trial, hoping to prove that he "merely" acted on the orders of Nazi superiors.[56]

Eva Pfanzelter hails from South Tyrol, Italy. On April 16, her paper, "The Vatican, Anti-Semitism, and the Holocaust," won runner-up prize in the graduate category at the Phi Alpha Theta Lower Illinois Regional Conference at Greenville College. It also received the EIU History Department's Lavern M. Hamand Writing Award for best graduate paper of 1993-94. Ms. Pfanzelter holds an advanced degree in history from the University of Innsbruck. She is currently pursuing her M.A. in history at Eastern.

[54]Ernst Klee, *Persilscheine und falsche Pässe. Wie die Kirchen den Nazis halfen.* (Frankfurt: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag), 1991, 25.
[55]Klee, *Persilscheine*, 57.
[56]Sharon Waxman, "War Crimes Case Puts France on Trial. Nazi Collaborator's Day in Court may End '50 Years of Amnesia,'" in *Chicago Tribune*, March 16, 1994, 1, 11.

The Dreyfus Affair and the Influence of the International Press

BY AMY LINDEMAN

The late nineteenth century became a significant turning point in France and around the world. French society was shifting from one era to another.[1] France claimed to be establishing democracy and its related institutions. However, many of its "traditional institutions," such as the church and the army, were pursuing a return to "traditional France." As a result, discrepancies arose between those in favor of a liberal democracy and those seeking tradition. Thus, the two emerged with two differing systems of values. In addition, France became xenophobic.[2] These conditions set the scene for a controversial crisis in France known as the Dreyfus Affair. Through the influence of the media, what began as an issue of military espionage and anti-Semitism became a battle against the institutions of traditional France.

The Dreyfus Affair began on October 15, 1894, when the army falsely arrested Captain Alfred Dreyfus for conveying military secrets to Germany. In September, General Mercier, the Minister of War, was informed that a note, known as the *bordereau*, had been discovered in the office of General Schwartzkoppen, a German ambassador to France. The document revealed that someone of high command in the French army was leaking information. General Du Paty de Clam discovered that Dreyfus' handwriting resembled that found on the *bordereau*. Dreyfus' peers found him guilty almost immediately. Not only was his handwriting similar to that on the *bordereau*, but many did not like Dreyfus, and higher officials had given him a poor evaluation in 1893.[3] More importantly though, Alfred Dreyfus was a Jew from Alsace. The fact that Dreyfus originated from Alsace raised suspicion. Alsace, which lay on the border between Germany and France, often changed hands between the two countries. Therefore, many questioned his patriotism to France.[4] Growing anti-Semitism in France contributed immensely to Alfred Dreyfus' conviction.

Hatred of Jews in France became a more pressing issue in 1870 during the Franco-German War. Algerian natives began a revolt within their country at this time. France decided to take measures to strengthen their influ-

[1] Jeffrey Mehlman, *L'Affaire*, trans. Jean-Denis Bredin (New York: George Braziller, 1986), 537.
[2] Frederick Busi, "A Bibliographical Overview of the Dreyfus Affair," in *Jewish Social Studies XL* (1978), 39.
[3] Mehlman, 53.
[4] Ibid., 533.

ful bomber-pilot of Hitler's Germany escaped through Rome.[54] Pope Pius XII himself intervened for the Governor of Wartheland, Arthur Greiser, whose murder commandos were accused of having killed over 300,000 Jews, Poles, and mentally ill in the extermination camp Chelmno. Pius XII filed a plea for clemency in favor of Arthur Greiser to the Polish Government.[55]

On March 16, 1994, the *Chicago Tribune* announced that a trial against Paul Touvier, former intelligence aide to Klaus Barbie, head of the Gestapo and "Butcher of Lyon," was about to reopen in Paris. After the war Touvier had been condemned to death twice but he "succeeded in avoiding arrest by taking refuge with his family and among sympathetic Catholic organizations, at one time hiding in the Vatican." After the French Christian philosopher Gabriel Marcel filed a plea for clemency, Touvier was pardoned in 1971, but outraged Jews and Resistance groups forced him into hiding anew, "again aided by right-wing Catholics." Finally he was arrested in 1989 in a monastery in Nice and in 1992 a French court ruled that Touvier's alleged personal ordering of the execution of seven Jews did not constitute a crime against humanity. A national uproar compelled review of the decision. Touvier now is waiting for the trial, hoping to prove that he "merely" acted on the orders of Nazi superiors.[56]

Eva Pfanzelter hails from South Tyrol, Italy. On April 18, her paper, "The Vatican, Anti-Semitism, and the Holocaust," won runner-up prize in the graduate category at the Phi Alpha Theta Lower Illinois Regional Conference at Greenville College. It also received the EIU History Department's Lavern M. Hamand Writing Award for best graduate paper of 1993-94. Ms. Pfanzelter holds an advanced degree in history from the University of Innsbruck. She is currently pursuing her M.A. in history at Eastern.

[54] Ernst Klee, *Persilscheine und falsche Pässe. Wie die Kirchen den Nazis halfen* (Frankfurt: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag), 1991, 25.
[55] Klee, *Persilscheine*, 67.
[56] Sharon Waxman, "War Crimes Case Puts France on Trial Next Collaborator's Day in Court may End '50 Years of Amnesia," in *Chicago Tribune*, March 16, 1994, 1, 11

ence in Algeria by enfranchising the Jews in that area. However, they did not include other foreigners living in Algeria. This policy created a strong anti-semitic feeling in Algeria. Author Edouard Drumont quickly spread a similar feeling throughout France. Drumont published works inspired by gossip that conveyed the idea that Jews in France were attempting, by secret use of the power of their wealth (which they acquired from the rise of Jews with the corruption in the government. Drumont also credited Jews with the corruption in the government and exploitation in the work sector.[5] Anti-Semitism also grew in the 1880s as a result of the "Jewish Invasion" in France, wherein Jews fled to France from Russia, Germany, and Hungary to escape persecution.[6] Prosecutors continued to use these anti-semitic views against Alfred Dreyfus throughout the case.

As the case against Captain Dreyfus continued, the military refused to explain to their prisoner the basis for his retention and interrogation.[7] they set the trial for December 19, 1894. Meanwhile, the Section of Statistics secretly fabricated a dossier against Dreyfus. At this time the army held a position in France of prestige and integrity. Many believed that the case would undermine the nation's trust in its army. Therefore, they found it necessary to do everything possible to ensure a conviction.[8] Just following the trial, while the military judges deliberated, General Du Paty de Clam took it upon himself to send an envelope to the judges that contained fabricated evidence against Dreyfus. Thus, the court-martial unanimously found Dreyfus guilty. The judges sentenced him to perpetual exile on Devil's Island and to military degradation.[9] Throughout the case, officers presented faulty evidence to ensure the conviction of Captain Dreyfus. However, this evidence also presented a turning point in the case that would result in a pardon.

I n 1896, shortly after the French government made General Picquart head of the Intelligence Bureau, the Dreyfus case took a new direction.

Two years after Dreyfus' guilty verdict, Picquart found fragments of a telegram, the "petit bleu," that proved Dreyfus' innocence. A French infantry officer named Esterhazy was actually the traitor.[10] The present Minister of War and higher officials did not want to see another Dreyfus Affair, so they demanded Picquart to ignore his findings.[11] As one French officer declared, "I am convinced of Dreyfus' innocence, but if his verdict were up to me, I would convict him again for the honor of the army."[12] That is exactly what happened. Alfred Dreyfus' brother, Mathieu, and his supporters, known as the "Dreyfusards," managed to secure a retrial. The army held the trial in

[5]"The Dreyfus Scandal," in Current History 9 (1899), 510.
[6]Mahlman, 26.
[7]Ibid, 71.
[8]Ibid, 534.
[9]Ibid, 96.
[10]Ibid, 143.
[11]Ibid, 157.
[12]Ibid, 536.

September 1899, and once again the reputation of the army took precedence over an innocent man's freedom. The court convicted Dreyfus a second time.[13] Fortunately, this was not the end for Dreyfus. René Waldeck-Rousseau, the Premier of France during the second trial, believed in Dreyfus' innocence. He also wanted to preserve national unity while bringing the army under control. He therefore requested a pardon. The judges of the court-martial also showed discontent with their past decision.[14] They saw a pardon not only as a response to an unjust verdict, but also as a way to suppress the violent uprisings that had troubled France since the second verdict's announcement. On September 19, 1899, they granted Dreyfus a pardon. But he and his supporters were not satisfied. As a result, the Dreyfusards split when many believed that Dreyfus should have sacrificed himself for their cause and not have accepted the pardon.[15] For five years Dreyfus worked at getting a reversal of the verdict of Rennes, the courts' second declaration of guilt. In July 1906, the court voted to set aside the judgement of Rennes, and it proclaimed Captain Dreyfus' innocence. After twelve long years, the affair finally came to an end.[15]

T he role of the press proved significant throughout the affair. In the beginning, the press promoted anti-Semitism. In 1894, all the French newspapers expressed similar themes of hatred of the Jews and love for the nation and the army.[17] The press exercised a major influence on the political life of a nation.[18] One might conclude that the entire turbulence was both caused and resolved by the power of the press. Libre Parole swung public opinion against Dreyfus. When General Mercier first learned of the bordereau, the press hounded him and pressured him into declaring that he knew for certain of Dreyfus' guilt.[19] Had Mercier not felt pressured, the whole affair might not have existed. In the same manner, Emile Zola's "J'accuse" clearly convinced the public of Dreyfus' innocence and the need for a retrial.[20] The press not only kept the public informed, but also encouraged their involvement in national politics, thus highly politicizing the nation.

The Dreyfus Affair furthered the decline of many of France's "traditional institutions," such as the army and the church. However, the affair strengthened the new Republic, and in the process may also have prevented the rise of democratic socialism in France.[21] In the election of 1899, the Government Republicans, who supported the new regime and would also

[13]Ibid, 422.
[14]Ibid, 430.
[15]Ibid, 449.
[16]Ibid, 476.
[17]Ibid, 78.
[18]Ibid, 517.
[19]"Is a Dreyfus Case Possible in America?" in Independent 61, 167.
[20]Bust, 35.
[21]Edward M. Earle, Modern France: Problems of the Third and Fourth Republics (New York: Russell and Russell, 1964), 198.

America.[30] Although America was not plagued with political bouts between the church and state or the army and government, it did suffer from a similar form of racial prejudice. Many believed that under certain circumstances this hatred could develop into a disastrous situation similar to the Dreyfus Affair.[31]

The Dreyfus Affair that troubled France for more than a decade served as a warning to nations around the world who suffered from a disease similar to the anti-Semitism then plaguing France. The affair enhanced the role of the press in national politics, which is still prevalent today. It also witnessed many changes in France's internal politics with the decline of the church and the army. The nation split, but was then reunited under the republic, which in turn would be strengthened by the whole affair.

Amy Lindeman is a junior social science major. Ms. Lindeman wrote her essay on the Dreyfus case as a sophomore in the History Department's 3005 survey course on European history from 1815 to the present. She is also pursuing a minor in Spanish, and plans to teach high school. Recently, Ms. Lindeman was inducted into the Phi Alpha Theta history honors organization.

30"Is a Dreyfus Case Possible in America?," 166.
31Ibid, 167.

---

become Dreyfusards, defeated the reactionaries.[22] The government Republicans promoted the overthrow of traditional institutions. One of their goals became to secularize education in France. As one might expect, the church strongly opposed the plan. the army joined the church in its opposition as it distrusted such democratic ideas.[23] The Catholic Church enlisted anti-Semitism to encourage the hatred of foreigners and members of Parlement since both disturbed the "traditional balance."[24] The Catholics also used the Dreyfus Affair to undermine the present government. Political forces within the church accused Dreyfusards of plotting to divide and disarm France.[25] This accusation resembled the one that Edouard Drumont had used against Jews.

The Dreyfus Affair also had an impact on foreign nations. In 1898, the League for the Defense of the Rights of Man and Citizen organized to promote a retrial which they believed would prove Dreyfus' innocence. The syndicate carried the League's message throughout France. It used numerous British and foreign newspapers to present evidence of Esterhazy's guilt.[26] The British wanted to promote justice in France and did so through the press. During Captain Dreyfus' first conviction, the French press and the public were convinced of Dreyfus' guilt. They dwelled upon only those acts that seemed connected with the treason. This, however, did not convince many foreigners. In January 1895, Lucie Dreyfus, Alfred's wife, published a story about her husband's degradation in the French newspaper *Le Figaro*. The French populace, however, believed that Dreyfus "got what he deserved." Many English and Americans viewed the story as a last attempt for appeal from an innocent man.[27] The English continued to view the affair as the personal tragedy of Alfred Dreyfus. They found the politics, scandals, and controversy surrounding the affair to be chaotic and confusing. As justice appeared to be the most important issue of the affair to the English, France declared order as its major issue of concern.[28]

Americans also became involved in the affair because of the press. Alfred Dreyfus greatly appreciated the support he found in the *New York Times*. A Parisian journalist found Walter Littlefield's article in the *Times* to be the most "intelligent" works of its time. Littlefield's article helped to gain not only French support, but also American sympathies for the cause.[29] The Dreyfus Affair interested Americans for a different reason then the English. They feared a similar situation could erupt in

22Ibid, 33.
23Ibid, 35.
24Mehlman, 519.
25Ibid, 347.
26Joseph O. Baylen, "Dreyfusards and the Foreign Press: The Syndicate and the Daily News February-March 1898," in French Historical Studies 7 (1971), 338.
27Alfred Dreyfus, Lettres d'un Innocent, trans. L.G. Moreau (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1899), viii.
28"End of the Affair," in Living Age 32 (1906), 441.
29Editorial, "Dreyfus in Switzerland," in New York Times, August 23, 1906, 5.

The Impact of the Battle of Britain

The Nazis Tried to Break England's Spirit,
but Instead Sacrificed Their Own Aura of Invincibility

BY JEFF WELGE

From 10 July to 31 October 1940, a battle raged in the skies over England that had a profound impact on the outcome of the Second World War. The Battle of Britain probably represented the closest the Allied Powers ever came to defeat, and it happened relatively early in the war. Historians have speculated how the outcome of the war might have been different had the British resistance collapsed. To reach such conclusions, it is necessary to reconsider modern perceptions of the battle's significance with regard to the attitudes of contemporary people. Because the Battle of Britain was so important to the story of the whole European theater, reactions of the Americans and Germans are as relevant as those of the British. The confusion resulting from misinformation and propaganda during the wartime can be of greater importance than the actual fact.

After the First World War, the British allowed their air strength to diminish. Prime Minister David Lloyd George had dismantled much of the Royal Air Force following the Armistice. Senior military officials who felt that air power was the wave of the future and should be given as much attention as the maintenance of sea power cautioned against this loss of air supremacy. Nevertheless, Britain reduced the RAF from an operational strength of 188 squadrons to 25 in a mere eighteen months. During the 1920s, the RAF systematically scaled back in an attempt to reduce costs.[1]

Fortunately for the British, they recognized the German threat in the 1930s in time to fortify the air force or the Battle of Britain most certainly would have been a short and disastrous episode.

Although it is difficult to ascertain precisely when the reconstruction of the German Air Force began, surely Hitler initiated the process shortly after taking power in 1933. In March 1935, Germany revealed the existence of its air force, the *Luftwaffe*. By the next year, Great Britain had begun to suspect Hitler and his *Luftwaffe* to be a threat. The rebuilding of the RAF began.[2]

The Battle of Britain was not only significant for the sheer military importance of possessing the British Isles. Of course, this is its primary significance, and at the time of the battle, it was the only factor that really

[1] Richard Hough and Denis Richards, *The Battle of Britain* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co. 1989), 17-18.
[2] Ibid, 31.

mattered. From a historical perspective, though, several precedents were set which would reoccur throughout the war. This was the first attack against civilians during the Second World War. Despite the claim by the German High Command that the bombings in and around London were retaliatory and directed at "war-essential objectives,"[3] Hitler believed indiscriminate bombings would weaken British morale. This represented a new direction in war and redefined the concept of total war. The objective now went beyond defeating the enemy in combat, to the point of attempting to break his spirit.

The Battle of Britain demonstrated the effectiveness of science over brute strength, a theme repeated throughout the war. Despite the *Luftwaffe*'s overwhelming power as compared to the Royal Air Force, the British drastically reduced this advantage by its use of a new technology, radar. The *Luftwaffe*, however, had a great deal of information about their targets. Therefore, the Nazis knew that the radar stations existed. But, they underestimated the efficiency of this tool.[4]

The winning of the Battle of Britain sent a message to other nations that Nazi Germany was not invincible. The very fact that this was Hitler's first defeat, and marked the end of the German advance, was significant. It lent support in America to Roosevelt's appeal to aid the Allies. A *New York Times* article from August 1940 stated that the American believed Germany's aggressions with regard to Great Britain were over Africa.[5] The American press as late as the Battle of Britain still viewed the German threat strictly as a European affair. This same article, however, contained an excerpt from a German communiqué indicating that the war could take many years and might ultimately involve the United States. Though many today believe that a German victory in the Battle of Britain would have quickly brought the war to an end, the Germans clearly intended to continue offensives regardless of the outcome. A more accurate assessment would be that the battle encouraged the formation of the Allied Powers to halt German aggressions.

The role of the press proved crucial in shaping contemporary attitudes. Despite all obstacles, the British presses would not be silenced. *The Times* of London continued to work during the bombings. Though smaller and less frequent than before, this paper reassured Londoners that it was still on the job. One member of *The Times* staff said that "what the reader gets for his two cents is something no German or Italian could buy at any price."

[3] *New York Times*, 21 September 1940, p. 1.
[4] Hough and Richards, 50-1.
[5] *New York Times*, 19 August 1940, p. 2.

turned its attention toward Russia.[9]

In the end, the Battle of Britain claimed the lives of 13,000 British men, women and children, and seriously injured 20,000 others. Nazi Germany never admitted to the consequences of its failure to break Great Britain. The battle was swept aside in Germany as a relatively insignificant campaign. The Nazis never offered an explanation of why the operation ceased when it did, although the British military command believed that casualties among German pilots had been outstripping the pace at which new pilots could be trained. Historians Richard Hough and Dennis Richards suggest that indeed this might have been the downfall of the assault.[10]

While the issue of why the attack failed is debatable, there can be no questioning the significance of this failure. The Battle of Britain solidified Allied resistance to stand up against Nazi onslaught. It also marks, to a considerable degree, the end of the war's early phase of mobility. Soon after this event, the entry of the United States and the development of numerous additional theaters of operation marked the beginning of the true world conflict. The Battle of Britain showed the entire world that Germany could be contained. It also foretold that the war would be a long and painful ordeal.

Jeff Weige, a former history major, wrote his essay on the Battle of Britain as a student enrolled in the History Department's 3005 survey course on European history from 1815 to the present.

[9]Hough and Richards, 197, 302-304.
[10]Hough and Richards, 305.

---

untrue. One captured pilot, who believed that an invasion had successfully taken place, insisted that his British hosts take him to Nazi headquarters.[6] Through leaks from the German military to newspapers in Great Britain and the United States, the average Allied citizen was far better informed on Nazi operations than the average German.

While the indiscriminate bombing of London's residential districts certainly cannot be justified, the British retaliated similarly. Newspaper accounts throughout the course of the battle indicate that the RAF maintained a steady schedule of bombing missions over Germany. Daily reports from Berlin described the horrors of British bombings of German residential districts.[7] It may be assumed that although an isolationist element remained in the United States, by the time of the Battle of Britain public opinion in the U.S. had already swung too far toward the Allies for such reports to arouse very much sympathy. Yet considering how little the average German knew about the war, it was no surprise that the citizens of Berlin saw the British as every bit as brutal as the British saw the Nazis. For this reason, it is necessary to recognize that the atrocities were not one-sided.

H itler's planned invasion of Great Britain never occurred because he underestimated British technology. But more importantly, he failed to recognize British resolve. This added to the British advantage of fighting a defensive battle against an outside aggressor. *The Times* reported with pride that the RAF "is giving out as much punishment to them as they are giving to us." British squadrons often challenged *Luftwaffe* flyers over the English Channel.

As the battle dragged on, the ferocity exhibited by the Germans in the early weeks faded. This suggests that they had anticipated an easy victory in the air that would lead to a land invasion. On 20 September, the Air and Home Security Ministries released a statement that the German attacks had become smaller and less effective.[8] At the same time, *The Times* described British morale as improving, and that there were "fewer evidences of fatigue and fear than after the opening days" of the attack. Had the German High Command recognized this, the assault may have ended far sooner. In their eyes, the British were "dead but would not lie down."

Consequently, the bombardment continued at fluctuating levels of intensity until November, largely due to the unpredictable weather. It was clear to both sides that the most powerful onslaught would commence when Hitler felt the time was right for an invasion by land. Due to refusal of the British to succumb to air bombardments, a land invasion never occurred. On 29 October, the Royal Air Force dealt the *Luftwaffe* a significant defeat over the English Channel. Germany continued indiscriminate bombing for several months afterward, but for the most part the *Luftwaffe*

[6]*New York Times*, 22 September 1940, p. 2.
[7]*New York Times*, various editions from August-September 1940.
[8]*New York Times*, 20 September 1940, p. 1

The Articulate Prophet:
Thomas Carlyle on Oliver Cromwell and Revolutionary Heroism

BY MARK G. SCHMELTZER

The memory of the seventeenth-century "Puritan" Revolution lingers like a pall over modern English historiography. The name of its principle actor, Oliver Cromwell, still lies cloaked in a curious admixture of controversy, confusion, fear, ignominy, sympathy and admiration. At times throughout the three-and-a-third centuries since the Restoration, the Lord Protector has been called to stand before the bar of derisive scholarship on charges of hypocrisy, duplicity, fanaticism, ambition and megalomania. At other times he has been praised by statesmen and historians for the long-term consequences of his actions. Most accounts stress the significance of political, economic, social or constitutional changes in this tumultucus chapter in English history.[1]

The Victorian literary hero Thomas Carlyle, however, rejected the use of eighteenth-century rational formulas which have either vilified Cromwell or have trivialised the man and his cause. He regarded both types of analyses as mired in the black falsehood of skeptical and "unheroic" ages. Carlyle believed that the age of "Enlightenment" actually rendered the age of the Puritans obscure and unintelligible for all ever since. His defense of Cromwell and castigation of modern intellectuals was consistent with and inextricably tied to his philosophy of history, revolution and the role of the great man who did their bidding. Carlyle sought to demonstrate that through the patient reading of the unrefined utterances and writings of a sincere and dedicated country gentleman, the divine light of a great age would finally pierce the thick, impenetrable fog of modern scholarship.

Much about Carlyle's philosophy flowed with the strong historiographical currents of the nineteenth century. Critics often view his exaltation of power as a part of the theoretical continuity which fed into twentieth-century totalitarianism.[2] His views and methods have been compared to those of the German historicists. Some analysts term his hero-worship vitalism, and many view him as a forerunner to Friedrich Nietzsche.[3] Yet, much

---

[1] Christopher Hill, *God's Englishman: Oliver Cromwell and the English Revolution* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1970), chap. 10 passim.

[2] Peter Geyl, *Debates With Historians* (Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1958), 57.

[3] Eric Russell Bentley, *A Century of Hero-Worship* (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1944), 32.

about Carlyle is unique. His decorated literary style is highly personal and his criticisms of his predecessors and contemporaries must be taken into account by subsequent scholars on Cromwell and the English revolution. Indeed, Carlyle staked his claim in the historiography of the English Revolution. And his work remains among the most memorable.

According to Carlyle, the misdeeds of dilettante scholars, whom he grouped under the collective appellation of "English Dryasdust," rendered the seventeenth-century unintelligible to the contemporary mind.[4] Previous historians had not cared enough to sort, edit and index the "tons and square miles" of documents, records and pamphlets of the English Revolution. Instead, Carlyle believed, historians had produced useless heaps of political and philosophical histories in the vain pursuit of personal notoriety and praise. The sum total of all of Dryasdust's "shot-rubbish" was darkness and confusion: "Here properly lies the grand unintelligibility of the Seventeenth-Century for us. From this source has proceeded our maltreatment of it, our miseditings, miswritings, and all the other 'avalanche of Human Stupidity,' wherewith,...we have allowed it to be overwhelmed!"[5]

By collecting and editing the decaying manuscripts of Cromwell's letters and speeches, Carlyle sought to resuscitate the heroic age of Puritanism. Carlyle proposed that the proper editing of Cromwell's utterances could make the truth of the Puritan cause visible again. Carlyle was convinced that if the modern reader looked deeply into the heart of the period, through Cromwell's writings, he or she would understand it as an "actual flesh and blood fact; with color in its cheeks, with awful august heroic thoughts in its heart, and at last with steel sword in its hand!"[6] This was essential in asserting the greatness of the English people. Previous civilizations, like that of the Greeks, recorded their legacies in their grand epics, such as Homer's *Iliad*. England, on the other hand, had so far produced only state papers and philosophical histories, leaving nothing for eternity but chaos and confusion: "As if we had done no brave thing at all on this Earth; as if not Men but Nightmares had written of our History!"[7] To remedy this, Carlyle intended to leave behind an English epic. Since he considered the Puritan revolt the greatest, most fundamental epoch in English civilization, with Cromwell as its soul, he sought to create a "Cromwelliad."[8] In order to comprehend why and how he attempted to create such an epic, an understanding of Carlyle's theory of history is essential.

Much of Carlyle's historical philosophy stemmed from what has been called the "new spirit" in historiography during the nineteenth century.

---

[4] Thomas Carlyle, *Oliver Cromwell's Letters and Speeches* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1870; orig. pub. 1845, vol 1, chap. 1, passim.

[5] Ibid., p. 6.

[6] Ibid., 75-6.

[7] Ibid., 8.

[8] Ibid., 7.13.

such Ideals do realize themselves; and grow, wondrously, from amid the incongruous ever-fluctuating chaos of the Actual: this is what World-History, if it teach anything, has to teach us.[15]

Once an action is done, according to Carlyle, it is "done always; cast forth into endless Time," wherein it struggled to grow in the infinite realm of all other actions.

> Or indeed, what is this Infinite of Things itself, which men name Universe, but an Action, a sum-total of Actions and Activities? The living ready-made sum-total of these three,—which Calculation cannot add, cannot bring on its tablets; yet the sum, we say, is written visible: All that has been done, All that is doing, All that will be done! Understand it well, the Thing thou beholdest, that Thing is an Action, the product and expression of exerted force: the All of things is an infinite conjugation of the verb To do.[16]

Carlyle emphasized, therefore, change and action in history. He saw the practical expressions of these as revolution and biography. The first represented his belief in the inequality of various ages. Eighteenth-century thought held that since history was the expression of universal order, the internal condition of man has always been the same in all eras.[17] Carlyle, on the other hand, believed that some ages were vital and heroic while others were unheroic and shallow. In fact, the majority of generations acted not upon the impulse of divine truth, but rather by "heresays, traditionary cants, black and white surplices, and inane confusions."[18] Accordingly, these were such ages which, gladly, fade permanently from the memory of mankind, and crumble into "dust, as inorganic manure. Why should any memory of them continue?" He stressed the inevitability of their oblivion, and that even Dryasdust would one day cease to blather about them, since no one would care to listen.[19]

What accounted for the death of decadent ages and the subsequent reappearance of truth? How did change occur? Carlyle accounted for this in his theory of revolution. Carlyle's version of the dialectic in history, that familiar Hegelian metaphysical mechanism, described brief moments in history wherein God's truth reined in the hearts of men for a while. But then these eventually became buried under the thickets and brush of falsehood: "And what if a whole Nation fall into that? In such case, I answer, infallibly they will return out of it!"[20] When this era born of lies could no longer sustain itself, a new era of truth and justice would arise to shatter the decrepit institutions. Since history is the sum total of human action, revolutions occur in generations which can no longer subsist

[15] Thomas Carlyle, *The French Revolution* (New York: The Modern Library, no date given for this edition), orig. pub. 1837, 9-10.
[16] Ibid., 311.
[17] Carlyle, *Oliver Cromwell*, vol.1, 78-80.
[18] Ibid., 79.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Carlyle, *French Revolution*, 44-5.

This was the Romantic rejection of the linear description of history. According to Philip Rosenberg, in *The Seventh Hero*, pre-Hegelian history provided an adequate explanation of the way in which change occurs within a framework of permanence. Thus came the dictum that history was "philosophy teaching by examples," the rejection of which stood at the beginning of Carlyle's historical insight. The nineteenth-century Romantics, according to Rosenberg, accounted for the appearance of ceaseless change and questioned the possibility of permanence. The technological, social and political revolutions of the late eighteenth century, Rosenberg stated, made evident the existence of continual change. Therefore, "the metaphor of linear succession is no longer appropriate, for what now puzzles the student of history is not how new historical orders arise from time to time but how the old order can exist from day to day."9

Carlyle believed, as did the German Romantics, that history was a continual process of mutation over time. Rosenberg stated that the Hegelian revolution in historiography was founded upon a new vision of "the weblike complexity of the historical process," and that Carlyle joined in by 1830 when he too turned away from sequence and causality as history.10 Carlyle came to believe that "Truly, if History is Philosophy teaching by Experience, the writer fitted to compose History is hitherto an unknown man."11 The human experience was as incomplete as any man's ability to understand it. History happened not as men could observe it, that is in succession; rather actions happened simultaneously, in groups: "every single event is the offspring not of one, but of all other events, prior or contemporaneous, and will in its turn combine with all others to give birth to new: It is an ever-living, ever-working Chaos of Being, wherein shape after shape bodies itself forth from innumerable elements."12 Therefore, deductive philosophy, with its attendant "cause-and-effect speculators,"13 proved incapable of truly discovering historical reality.

Carlyle did indeed feel that history was our supreme teacher. However, the lessons it yielded came not from our deduction from the universal to the particular, but rather in the way ideals were realized in the continuous unfolding of history, in the constant flux of becoming ("*das ewige Werden*"),14 In his most famous work, *The French Revolution*, he clearly stated his organic view of history:

> Concerning which we may not again say, that in the huge mass of Evil, as it rolls and swells, there is ever some Good working imprisoned; working towards deliverance and triumph? How

9 Philip Rosenberg, *The Seventh Hero: Thomas Carlyle and the Theory of Radical Activism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), 65-6.
10 Ibid., 65-7.
11 Thomas Carlyle, "On History", from *The Varieties of History*, Fritz Stern, ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), 95.
12 Ibid., 94-95.
13 Ibid., 97.
14 Bentley, *A Century of Hero-Worship*, 37, 61.

on hollow "Semblance and Sham."[21] Revolutions were acts of divine creativity that shattered vapid institutions and social orders: "In the turbulent times life triumphs over all schemes of thought that in quiescent periods fossilize the products of bygone creativity."[22] In *The French Revolution*, Carlyle argued that the age of Louis XVI was such an age. He described how the obsolete order in France was swept away and a new era was ushered in. This held true for all ages, even his own.[23]

Carlyle took the notion of revolution out of the political sphere and placed it into the context of a divine plan. *The French Revolution and Oliver Cromwell's Letters and Speeches* were categorical denials of political/constitutional interpretations of the great upheavals in history. Carlyle's historical method sought to bring the historical to life, and to demonstrate the true inward condition of man. Dryasdust, with his mechanistic view of the universe, and his analyses of the political events which *he* judged worthy of record, had obscured the truly meaningful forces in men's lives: "Laws themselves, political Constitutions, are not our Life, but only the house wherein our life is led; nay, they are but the bare walls of the house...Well may we say that of our History the more important part is lost without recovery."[24] For this reason he repudiated Enlightenment political theorists and the heretical followers of "the Gospel according to Jean Jacques."[25]

The new order which was created by the "creative anarchy" of the people would then lapse into stagnation and complacency, only to be overthrown again one day.[26] Carlyle saw the portents of revolution in his own day, and denied the ability of gradual reforms to resist the inevitable. What he observed as the condition of pre-revolutionary France, he saw as the condition of England: "...there is a stillness, not of unobstructed growth, but of passive inertness, the symptom of imminent downfall."[27]

The second fundamental component of Carlyle's historical philosophy, which was intimately tied to the nature of revolution, was his concept of the hero. Since the universe was the sum total of human action, then the essence of Universal History consisted entirely of "innumerable biographies."[23] Therefore the political historian, who "dwells with disproportionate fondness in Senate-houses, in Battle-fields, nay even in King's Antechambers," failed to grasp any of the depth of universal history: "far away from such scenes, the mighty tide of Thought and Action was still rolling on its wondrous course, in gloom and brightness; and in a thousand

21Carlyle, *Heroes*, 237.
22Breisach, *Historiography*, 252-3.
23Carlyle, *French Revolution*, 30.
24Carlyle, *Heroes*, 83-4.
25Ibid.
26Ibid.
27Carlyle, *French Revolution*, 24.
28Carlyle, *Heroes*, 93.

remote valleys, a whole world of Existence."[29] Carlyle believed that the unconscious will of the multitude of individuals was represented and carried out by a select, chosen few. These he called the "Great Men," the prophets, the Heroes in History.[30]

Carlyle claimed, like many of his Romantic counterparts, that God, (or in more Hegelian terms, the absolute Spirit or divine Idea) was revealed in history through action. But in the final analysis, he did not have faith that the masses could realize and ascend to the highest goals of life. Certainly they served as revolutionary fodder. But they could be an ungainly mass of wasted potential without gifted, predestined leadership. So then, of all the innumerable biographies which supposedly revealed the essence of life, the ones that mattered the most were those of the great men:

For, as I take it, Universal History, the history of what man has accomplished in this world, is at bottom the History of the Great Men who have worked here. They were the leaders of men, these great ones...in a wide sense the creators, of whatsoever the general mass of men contrived to do or to attain; all things that we see standing accomplished in the world are properly...the practical realization and embodiment of Thoughts that dwelt in the Great Men sent into the world: the soul of the whole worlds history... were the history of these.[31]

Unfortunately, the history of the world was replete with quacks and sham kings. Any man who claimed the right to rule over another may have indeed prospered for a day, but he was essentially a forgery.[32] Then, in accordance with the divine plan, a prophet would be "sent from the Infinite Unknown with tidings to us."[33] Carlyle vehemently asserted that people must be able to recognize the great man at the moment of his arrival. Otherwise, he would come to them in vain: "Not a Hero only is needed, but a world fit for him; a world not of Valets."[34] Once accepted, the great man, or "Hero," would expose the fraudulent rule of the unworthy king at the moment of revolutionary conflagration.[35]

The single most important criterion of the hero was his sincerity, which only other sincere people could recognize. The hero would not proclaim himself a prophet; in fact, he would not even be aware of his divinity. But his words and deeds would flow from an inherent sincerity, and be "Direct from the inner fact of things."[36] The great man in revolution was the "missionary of order" and the enemy of falsehood.[37] The hero was the

29Carlyle, "On History," 97.
30Breisach, *Historiography*, 254-55.
31Carlyle, *Heroes*, 1.
32Ibid, 188.
33Ibid, 45.
34Ibid, 215.
35Ibid, 44-5.
36Ibid, 45.
37Ibid, 203.

true leader by divine right in that he was the ablest, wisest and strong-est.[38] For Carlyle, then, laws, suffrages and constitutions were empty promises. It was rather the acknowledged hero who ruled with heavenly sanction: "Woe to him that claims obedience when it is not due; who to him who refuses it when it is!"[39]

Unfortunately, for Carlyle, the age of Skepticism and formulism had left modern man in doubt over the heroic deeds of better days. The hero himself was attacked, and his contemporaries asked if the hero was an historical reality. Was the hero, and indeed hero-worship even desirable? He admonished the skeptical reader, who still clung to "the Rights of Man," and "liberty and equality." Carlyle noted that there were only two alternatives of government: "We shall either learn to know a Hero, a true Governor and Captain, somewhat better, when we see him; or else go on to be forever governed by the Unheroic;—had we ballot-boxes clattering at every street-corner, there would be no remedy in these."[40]

Carlyle constructed and fueled his visions of historical purpose and development, as well as his hero-worship, with his deep religious convictions. These also inspired his energetic hostility toward the Enlightenment cult of reason. But Carlyle did not gather his religious assurances from traditional dogmas and creeds. Instead, he credited divine intervention in the affairs of this world to the great, God-sent hero. Consequently, he advocated the submissive, prostrate veneration of God's handymen. Religion, for him, was built upon hero-worship, as the hero was the human form of the Godliest qualities: "Is that not the germ of Christianity itself?"[41]

Peter Geyl stated that while much of Carlyle's rebellion remained typical of the nineteenth century, much of it also stemmed from his personal alienation from his time and from his Calvinist faith. Carlyle viewed himself as an outcast in an effete and superficial society dedicated to rationality and democracy. It was upon this same model, that of an outsider who wielded exclusive insights to the heavens, that Carlyle developed his great man.[42]

Carlyle's history, which we may call his religion, sought to reinvigorate the Christian ethos from the ashes of defunct and vacant creeds. He geared his vibrant historical rhetoric toward proving what he firmly believed was the truth of Christianity. He sought to reform and rejuvenate the Calvinist distinction between the Elect and the Damned. Hence, not all generations were close to God, and at different historical moments, He sent great men to lead the masses out of the darkness. To Carlyle, this was the business of Cromwell and the Puritans; this was the meaning of the seventeenth century.[43]

38 Ibid., 216-7.
39 Ibid., 199.
40 Ibid., 217.
41 Ibid., 11.
42 Geyl, *Debates with Historians*, 48-51.
43 Carlyle, *Oliver Cromwell*, vol.1, 75-77.

Carlyle felt that the recorded, but as yet unorganized utterances of the great Puritan leaders yielded a clear insight into their divine mission.[44] The truth of these documents, he believed was self-evident, if not for the two centuries of scholastic "owl-droppings" which had suppressed them.[45]

Despite Carlyle's claims, however, Cromwell's own words must not have been sufficiently autonomous. Instead, Carlyle told most of the story in *The Letters and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell*. The modern reader finds the "truth" of the seventeenth century, not so much revealed, as filtered through the biographer's historical understanding. At every stop, Carlyle interjected his own rewording and "elucidations" of Cromwell's words. This casts some doubt upon the divine truth allegedly contained therein.

If Carlyle felt the need to come to the rescue of his hero's reputation, it was because of the endless attack to which the Lord Protector had been subjected. For Carlyle, the less heretical of these was that it was not Cromwell's strong will which carried the moment, but rather the reverse. To these historians it was the exigencies of the time which not only produced the need for a man like Cromwell, but also produced him. This seemed nonsense to Carlyle since many ages had despaired for a hero, and yet one could not be found. Instead, a divine power timed the hero's appearance, whereas so called leaders or kings who ruled in the hero's absence, that is in dark ages, ruled by deception and fraud.

In light of this idea, the second common charge against Cromwell was the more reprehensible for Carlyle. This was the belief that Cromwell, too, ruled among the sham-kings of the world. In his denial of heroic possibility, Dryasdust saw only self-serving ambition, hypocrisy and duplicity in Cromwell's actions, particularly in his ultimate assumption of virtual kingship of England, Scotland, and Ireland. Alas, blind pedants who recognized not the hero when he stood before him! Who were these, thought Carlyle, to question Cromwell's sincerity, while they themselves left nothing to this world but volumes of lies and worthless paper.[46] He stated that it was the eighteenth-century skeptics who could not recognize the inner genius of Cromwell. Thus they scorned him for "turning all that noble Struggle for constitutional Liberty into a sorry farce played for his own benefit." Carlyle regarded this view of Cromwell as typical of the age of science and reason. Such critics could not know a hero, and valued instead "regulated respectable Formulas,...a style of speech and conduct which has got to seem 'respectable,' which can gain the suffrages of an enlightened skeptical Eighteenth-century!"[47] Instead, it was Cromwell's heroic "silence," his "belief without words," which was significant in his writings and speeches: "how noble it is in comparison to eloquent words without heroic insight!"[48]

44 Ibid., chaps. I and V, passim.
45 Carlyle, *Oliver Cromwell*, vol.2, 55.
46 Ibid., vol.1, chap.1, passim.
47 Carlyle, *Heroes*, 206.
48 Carlyle, *Cromwell*, vol. 1, 74.

According to Carlyle, Cromwell's very confusion of speech had everything to do with his sincerity and the authenticity of his heroism. He believed that Cromwell's unrefined and unhewn words revealed a state of mind which was more concerned with the highest concerns. The inner mind which was more attuned to God's wishes than to political squabblings. This is why modern pedants irritated Carlyle when they stressed the constitutional significance of the seventeenth-century revolution.[49]

While Carlyle granted that there were "grand social improvements" born of the Puritan efforts, he felt that these were merely their happy consequences.[50] Surely such a religious view of history scoffed at the notion that great epochs born of revolution were brought about for the "Liberty to tax one's self."[51] It was not for such things that men surrendered their lives:

> The purse is any Highwayman's who might meet me with a loaded pistol; but the Self is mine and God my Maker's; it is not yours, and I will resist you to the death, and revolt against you.....Really, it seems to me the one reason which could justify revolting, this of the Puritans. It has been the soul of all just revolts among men.[52]

Carlyle's status as the defender of Oliver Cromwell and advocate for a rebirth of Puritanism is significant. He admitted that Cromwell appeared rough and ineloquent, in speech and in manner: "Poor Cromwell,—Great Cromwell! The inarticulate Prophet; Prophet who could not speak."[53] But Carlyle was interested, or so he claimed, in presenting this hero in his natural and true light. He said that the job which fell upon him was to portray Cromwell in the same way as the artist who painted him. That was, not to hide Cromwell's warts and rugged features, but rather to "wash the natural face clean." He used this analogy to explain that his purpose in editing the letters and speeches was to erase the soot and dubious scholarship, which over the years had tarnished the Protector's real significance.[54]

nd what of Cromwell's career in general? Carlyle believed his most pressing duty was to refute the rumors that Cromwell had planned all along, through the careful manipulation of factions and overall treachery, to assume exclusive hold on political power in England.[55] Instead, he argued that Cromwell, again owing to the sincerity of such a hero, had always been more content to plow the fields at Cambridgeshire and to live a humble life following the scriptures. He was content to do so until old age. But his thoughts were always occupied by otherworldly concerns. It was rather, for Carlyle, a matter of inevitability that Cromwell

49 Carlyle, Heroes, 231-2.
50 Carlyle, Cromwell, vol.1, 77.
51 Carlyle, Heroes, 210.
52 Ibid, 210.
53 Ibid, 217.
54 Carlyle, Cromwell, vol.2, 106.
55 Carlyle, Heroes, 221.

should one day become the sole authority in all England. To Carlyle, the obligation to seek one's place was nothing less than the "meaning of life" and the noblest pursuit for a man.[56] Carlyle argued that, in the end, Cromwell had no choice. It was the "heavy burden of Providence" which he bore throughout his dealings with an uncompromising king, and a series of ineffectual Parliaments.[57] His successes, won not for himself, but for the true liberty of the people, were honest and he ceded proper credit to the God who made them possible.[58] As proof, Carlyle repeatedly referred to Cromwell's personal unhappiness, his hypochondria, and his expressed desire to be released from the duties of public life.[59] Carlyle described Cromwell's life's work as what the German Romantic poet Novalis called "Selbstödtung, a killing of Self...the beginning of all morality"[60] Why, asked Carlyle, would Cromwell suffer in this way for the trappings of dignified kingship? Carlyle viewed the times as the most perilous for all of England, and even more so for Cromwell's position: "Perhaps no more perilous place that I Know clearly of, was ever deliberately accepted by a man." His explanation was that he did it for the same reasons which guided all of his actions—there was no other choice for the safety of England. There was no "able-man" left to guide them through the frightful times.[61] There was too much danger of the return of sham-kingship, threatened by hostile alliances and cowardly overtures of compromise. Cromwell, according to Carlyle, had only military rule left to stem resurgent royalism and to secure for England the title of "Queen of Protestant Christianity."[62] His hope for the settlement of peace in England after the victory at Worcester, he told Parliament, was disappointed by the designs of certain factions in Parliament.[63] Before the public, Cromwell accepted the title of Protector after the failure of a resolution within Parliament.[64] In the same speech he told the assembly, "Of that God is witness...I called not myself to this place!"[65] Thus, Carlyle concluded, it was not ambition but heroic duty, and upon the orders of God that Cromwell became ruler of England, Scotland, and Ireland. His actions embodied the best of the entire Puritan mission to bring the rule of the Bible into practice on Earth. His will was, according to Carlyle's view of the heroic in history, the unconscious will of the people of England and the guarantor of their rights and liberties.[66]

Carlyle noted that there were numerous revolts throughout English history that faded into appropriate obscurity. The Puritan revolution, on

56 Ibid, 225.
57 Ibid, 236.
58 Ibid, 212-3.
59 Carlyle, Oliver Cromwell, vol. 2, 111.
60 Ibid, 100.
61 Ibid, 70.
62 Carlyle, Heroes, 235.
63 Carlyle, Oliver Cromwell, vol. 2, 111.
64 Ibid, 114-15.
65 Ibid, 110.
66 Ibid, 50.

the other hand, seemed part of a larger historical struggle which comprised "the true history of the World,—the war of Belief against Unbelief"[57] It was the opening act in this divine drama, wherein devout Puritanism faced off with "dignified Ceremonialism," (i.e. Laudianism and idolatry in general) for the first time.[68] The whole history of the seventeenth century in England and throughout Europe he described in terms of this very struggle. In England, the "armed appeal of Puritanism to the Invisible God of Heaven against many very visible Devils, on Earth and Elsewhere, was, so to speak, beginning."[69]

Carlyle's strident stance against the legions of the Pope and related evils fueled his vitriolic musings regarding the rebellion in Ireland. Indeed, the criminal actions of the Puritan Army in Ireland would be difficult to justify. But here, too, Carlyle championed his hero against what he viewed as slanderous biographies. The massacre at Drogheda and the victory in Ireland, for Carlyle, represented another act of divine justice, wherein Cromwell, "like the Hammer of Thor," settled the Irish question once and for all, as it pleased God to have it done. The letters in Carlyle's edition which described this "terrible surgery," he noted, must have seemed reprehensible to those loyal to "Rousseau Sentimentalism" and "Universal Pardon and Benevolence." Carlyle's perennial enemies notwithstanding, the Army's assault was led by an understanding and reverence of God's laws. Thus, such "punishments" were terrible but necessary to defeat rampant idolatry. It was only later, less Godly generations who through their philosophical pretentions, engaged in the "indiscriminate Mashing-up of Good and Evil." Carlyle lashed out against those who thought that "a land of Sanguinary Quacks can be healed by sprinkling it with rose-water....Oliver Cromwell did believe in God's judgement; and did not believe in the rose-water plan of Surgery,—which, in fact, is this Editor's case too!"[70]

Carlyle felt that the rebellion in his native Scotland had also been doomed to fail, yet not for the same inherent flaws that cursed the Irish. Instead, his assessment followed the pattern of his hero philosophy. The Scots were the first to begin the revolution which was to establish God's law in this world. Unfortunately, they were handicapped because God sent down no one to lead them. If He had, thought Carlyle, if Cromwell had been born there, with a unified nation behind him, then surely Protestantism and the "divine Hebrew Gospel" would have reigned supreme throughout the Earth.[71] But, as Cromwell recounted in a speech to his first Parliament, enemies in Parliament inflamed passions in order to stall the work of God in both Ireland and Scotland. With internal dissension and

[67]Carlyle, Heroes, 204.
[68]Carlyle, Cromwell, vol 1, 37.
[69]Ibid., 38-40.
[70]Ibid., 374-77, passim.
[71]Ibid., 433.

war abroad, Cromwell could claim divine sanction for his actions toward securing the peace of the nation.[72]

Regardless, Cromwell ultimately failed, and the Stuart line of kings, a genealogy of quacks according to Carlyle, was restored. For his efforts, Carlyle's dismembered corpse was unearthed and hung in chains. Carlyle did not believe that the Lord Protector sought merely to secure his own place in history, but rather to do its work obediently:

Did he not, in spite of all, accomplish much for us? We walk smoothly over his great rough heroic life; step-over his body sunk in the ditch there. We need not spurn it, as we step on it!—Let the Hero rest. It was not to men's judgment that he appealed; nor have men judged him very well.[73]

Almost two centuries later, Thomas Carlyle lamented over the absence of a modern hero-king, while indicating the various signals of a hastily approaching revolution. Certainly, he was disappointed in this too, as he appeared to be about many aspects of his life and times. Much could still be said in criticism of his philosophy. According to Peter Geyl, Carlyle unwittingly supplied ammunition to the totalitarian monsters of the twentieth century with his assault upon the positive values of Western society.[74] Considering the history of thought in the nineteenth-century, Carlyle was not alone to blame.

Geyl states that there was indeed truth and beauty to be found in Carlyle's works, particularly in his language and his emphasis on the spiritual side of life. However, throughout his career, Carlyle's work increasingly degenerated into a more "vehement glorification of power, racial pride, cult of instinct, and revilement of reason."[75] These are the strains which for many bear the most significance. Geyl also states that Carlyle's work was notable for the way in which he conveyed the inner details of history and made it come alive as did few others.[76] He used graceful expression to speak on behalf of those old heroes who really, despite his insistence to the contrary, could not do so themselves.

Also significant is the fundamental contradiction that ran throughout his view of the Hero. Carlyle spoke at length about the inevitability of all the historical process, and that revolution invariably shatters all of the dark times. It was as if to say that there is progress in history, and that ultimately it must be positive. But, as already shown, sometimes dark ages were rendered obsolete by even darker ones; revolutions did not always work on behalf of the Godly. Furthermore, if the triumphant appearance of the hero was a foregone conclusion, why then did Carlyle continually place the onus upon lesser men to prepare a place for him? Why must society, as

[72]Carlyle, Oliver Cromwell, vol 2, 95-98.
[73]Carlyle, Heroes, 207.
[74]Geyl, Debates with Historians, 52-54.
[75]Ibid., 54.
[76]Ibid., 65.

he suggested, be geared toward enabling the great man to rule, if it was chaos and falsehood which invites him?[77] In the end, Carlyle gave no assurances that anyone could ever identify the heroic, and make the crucial distinction between a leader's divine right, and rule by brute force. Frankly, without the safety nets of rational, universal principles, power simply becomes arbitrary and absolute.

Geyl also mentions Carlyle's significance as a prophet, or in any case, "an abettor of upheaval."[78] Carlyle apparently foresaw the crisis of capitalism and democracy, as it later had to contend with the irrational forces of nationalism and the like. Sadly, he was a "poor prophet,"[79] who sought comfort in the Godliness of the past, if only to escape from the despicable present.

Mark Schmeltzer, a graduate student in history, composed his paper on Thomas Carlyle for a graduate seminar on revolutions. He has been on the Historia staff since its inception in 1991. This issue represents his final year working on the journal.

[77] Carlyle, Heroes, lects. I, II, and VI, passim.
[78] Geyl, Debates with Historians, 53.
[79] Ibid.

Charles Darwin and *The Origin of Species*: Resistance, Acceptance, and Recent Challenges

By Jeff Waldhoff

The publication of Charles Darwin's *The Origin of Species* (1859) would stand as one of the most significant events of the modern era if it had only affected traditional views of biology. It asserted not just the ideas of evolution, but described in detail how that evolution happened. Darwin pioneered new areas in ecology by showing the intimate relationships among individuals, groups, different organisms, and their climates. However, Darwin's work transcended his specific field of expertise to become a force in social thought and philosophy not just for the elite intellectual, but also for the common person. In this respect, Darwin stands above all great minds of the past 150 years. Even Einstein's ingenious insights into the nature of light, energy, and matter, which explained nuclear fission and revolutionized human history, did not have as immediate impact on the common person as did Darwin's work.

Although Darwin's arguments were powerful and well documented, it has only been in the past fifty years or so that the majority of scientists have accepted them as valid. Darwin not only revolutionized interpretations of biology, but invented a new philosophy of science, which so profoundly challenged scientific thought in nineteenth-century Europe that it took a long time to win converts. This paper will focus solely on the effect of Darwin's work on the natural sciences, which one will see was tremendous. And it will also show how viewpoints on Darwinian theory have changed, why, and what new discoveries have been added to Darwin's theories.

Darwin described the process of natural selection in *The Origin of Species:*

> ...if variations useful to any organic being's welfare, assuredly individuals thus characterised [sic] will have the best chance of being preserved in the struggle for life; and from the strong principle of inheritance, they will tend to produce offspring similarly characterised. This principle of preservation, I have called, for the sake of brevity, Natural Selection. It leads to the improvement of each creature...[1]

These variations arise out of the genetic variability that is inherent in each organism. Although natural selection was important to his evolutionary theory, it is not the only part. He also went on to explain the importance of sexual selection, whereby the males of a species struggle with each other for

[1] Charles Darwin, *The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection*, with a foreward by J.W. Burrow, editor. (London: Penguin Books, 1968) 169-170.

he suggested, be geared toward enabling the great man to rule, if it was chaos and falsehood which invites him?[77] In the end, Carlyle gave no assurances that anyone could ever identify the heroic, and make the crucial distinction between a leader's divine right, and rule by brute force. Frankly, without the safety nets of rational, universal principles, power simply becomes arbitrary and absolute.

Geyl also mentions Carlyle's significance as a prophet, or in any case, "an abettor of upheaval."[78] Carlyle apparently foresaw the crisis of capitalism and democracy, as it later had to contend with the irrational forces of nationalism and the like. Sadly, he was a "poor prophet,"[79] who sought comfort in the Godliness of the past, if only to escape from the despicable present.

Mark Schmelzer, a graduate student in history, composed his paper on Thomas Carlyle for a graduate seminar on revolutions. He has been on the Historia staff since its inception in 1991. This issue represents his final year working on the journal.

77 Carlyle, Heroes, lects. I, II, and VI, passim.
78 Geyl, Debates with Historians, 53.
79 Ibid.

Charles Darwin and *The Origin of Species*: Resistance, Acceptance, and Recent Challenges

BY JEFF WALDHOFF

The publication of Charles Darwin's *The Origin of Species* (1859) would stand as one of the most significant events of the modern era if it had only affected traditional views of biology. It asserted not just the ideas of evolution, but described in detail how that evolution happened. Darwin pioneered new areas in ecology by showing the intimate relationships among individuals, groups, different organisms, and their climates. However, Darwin's work transcended his specific field of expertise to become a force in social thought and philosophy not just for the elite intellectual, but also for the common person. In this respect, Darwin stands above all great minds of the past 150 years. Even Einstein's ingenious insights into the nature of light, energy, and matter, which explained nuclear fission and revolutionized human history, did not have as immediate impact on the common person as did Darwin's work.

Although Darwin's arguments were powerful and well documented, it has only been in the past fifty years or so that the majority of scientists have accepted them as valid. Darwin not only revolutionized interpretations of biology, but invented a new philosophy of science, which so profoundly challenged scientific thought in nineteenth-century Europe that it took a long time to win converts. This paper will focus solely on the effect of Darwin's work on the natural sciences, which one will see was tremendous. And it will also show how viewpoints on Darwinian theory have changed, why, and what new discoveries have been added to Darwin's theories.

Darwin described the process of natural selection in *The Origin of Species*:

...if variations useful to any organic being's welfare, assuredly individuals thus characterised [sic] will have the best chance of being preserved in the struggle for life; and from the strong principle of inheritance, they will tend to produce offspring similarly characterised. This principle of preservation, I have called, for the sake of brevity, Natural Selection. It leads to the improvement of each creature...[1]

These variations arise out of the genetic variability that is inherent in each organism. Although natural selection was important to his evolutionary theory, it is not the only part. He also went on to explain the importance of sexual selection, whereby the males of a species struggle with each other for

1 Charles Darwin, *The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection*, with a foreward by J.W. Burrow, editor. (London: Penguin Books, 1968) 168-170.

the opportunity to mate with the most desirable females. Additionally, he examined how climate affects natural selection, and how these mechanisms explain the way in which the extinction of a species could occur. Much of the rest of the book attempted to demonstrate this process. In his first draft, Darwin did not make value judgments or refer to the "advancement" of a species. He only observed adaptations that occurred which aided organisms in their particular environment. The power of Darwin's argument "is that one simple mechanism can account both for the fact that descendants do not resemble ancestors, and for the fact that many creatures seem to be exquisitely well adapted to their lifestyles."[2]

Contrary to popular belief, the greatest initial resistance to Darwin's writings came not from the clergy, but from other scientists, who recognized (as Darwin did) that important parts of his theory were intuitive, and not based on available knowledge. As stated in *The Times'* review of *Origin of Species*:

> The majority of...competent persons have up to the present time maintained two positions,...that every species is...fixed and incapable of modification; the second, that every species was originally produced by a distinct creative act.[3]

Part of this criticism owed to a lack of geologic knowledge, and another was the lack of understanding of the mechanics of genetics. Darwin was one of the first to acknowledge the holes in his theory, and devoted an entire chapter to exploring them, which he prefaced with this paragraph.

> Long before having arrived at this part of my work, a crowd of difficulties will have occurred to the reader. Some of them are so grave that to this day I can never reflect on them without being staggered.; but, to the best of my judgment, the greater number are only apparent, and those that are real are not, I think, fatal to my theory.[4]

The first substantive arguments against Darwin's ideas addressed the amount of time it would have taken for the mechanism of selection to act. If species of organisms were the result of an evolutionary process, rather than of spontaneous, simultaneous generation from a higher power, it would have taken millions of years. However, there was very little evidence pointing to how old the Earth really was in 1859. Most people ascribed to the Biblical account that the earth was approximately 6000 years old.[5] Also, if such selection had taken place, where was the physical evidence of such gradual adaptations? Georges Cuvier, the nineteenth-century French anatomist, pointed out that the depictions of animals in the tombs of the ancient Egyptians extraordinarily resembled those in the 1800s.[6] However, Darwin and others had doubts about the geologic record.

2 "The Missing Links of Evolution," *The Economist*, 23 May 1987, 86-87.
3 Review of *Origin of Species*, by Charles Darwin, in *The Times of London*, 26 December 1859, 8.
4 Darwin, *Species*, 30-31.
5 Ibid., 20.
6 Ibid., 30.

In his *Red Notebook*, which contained notes about his voyage upon the *Beagle* and its 40,000-mile circumnavigation of the globe, Darwin began to ponder about the true age of the Earth. Upon seeing the cliffs and highlands in South America and understanding the creeping slowness of nature's work, Darwin wondered how such magnificently huge rifts formed if the Earth were so relatively young.

> There are some arguments which strike the mind with force. —the exact yearly rise of the great rivers prove better than any meteorlogical [sic] table the precise periods over immense areas...The grand cliffs of a thousand feet in height, of the solid lavas—proportionally high to age...If men could raise such a bulwark to the ocean, who would ever suppose that its age was limited.[7]

Also, contemporary scientists did not understand genetics. Many believed that the union of two organisms resulted in offspring that was a balance of features of the two. How could new physical structures develop if organisms mated within their own species?

Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Darwin's theories met ideological opposition. Natural theology, which cited the wonders of nature as proof of the existence of God still dominated contemporary scientific thought. Natural theology saw how perfectly animals adapted to their respective climates, and saw a divine explanation. What source of wisdom but God could place polar bears at the North Pole and chimpanzees in the jungle, instead of vice-versa? Any challenge to this interpretation of the laws of nature seemed to be a challenge to the very existence of God.

Another common intellectual framework was essentialist, or typological thinking. In nineteenth-century Europe, biologists used this method. Essentialist thinking defined objects by their invariability. For example, triangles could have different angles and sides of different lengths, but the invariable qualities of always having three angles adding to 180 degrees and three sides was what defined a shape as a triangle. Darwin believed species were not "classes but variable populations composed of uniquely different individuals."[8] Variation was a necessary part of Darwin's theories, but to an essentialist, "the idea was the only thing that was real, and variation simply meant an 'error' or 'accident'."[9]

Finally, teleological, or finalistic, views of the world also predominated. These interpreted all developments as being directed towards a specific goal, that is, progress and development.[10] Many tried to interpret Darwin's views on evolution and selection as culminating in man. The *Origin of*

7 Charles Darwin, *The Red Notebook of Charles Darwin*, ed. Sandra Herbert in *The Bulletin of the British Museum (Natural History)* (London: 24 April 1980), 59-60.
8 Darwin, *Species*, 31-32.
9 Ernst Mayr, "the Ideological Resistance to Darwin's theory of Natural Selection," the *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society Held at Philadelphia for Promoting Useful Knowledge* 135 (1991): 126-133.
10 Ibid., 129.

Species certainly implied (and Darwin's *Descent of Man* stated explicitly) that the human animal was affected by natural selection and evolution. However, he never wrote that man was the high point of all evolution. "Improvement" became only an ability to survive. This does not make one organism better than another in any metaphysical sense, but rather only better at surviving.

In short, Darwin's theories challenged the existing scientific mind. It would take a massive intellectual shift before his ideas could become accepted. This shift took the combined forces of many different fields. Eventually, other fields of science began to communicate and share information that provided evidence supporting Darwinian theory.

A group of English geologists known as the uniformitarians began to question the geologic record. Uniformitarians felt that it did not take rapid and dramatic natural disasters to create mountains, river beds, and valleys, but rather that the gradual processes of nature could accomplish this. The most relevant aspect of the uniformitarian theory to Darwin's work was that the Earth was actually millions of years old.[11] In the twentieth century, a great deal of information about the nature of atomic structure became available. Pierre and Marie Curie discovered radiation and radioactive isotopes. This lead to the discovery of a radioactive carbon isotope, Carbon-14, which could be used to date living matter. Carbon-14 had a radioactive half-life of just over 5,000 years. Using this information to examine plant matter revealed approximately how long ago a plant died. Anthropologists discovered fossilized remains to be not just a few thousand years old, but rather hundreds of thousands, or even millions of years old.

Also, at the turn of the twentieth century, anthropologists made some startling discoveries in East Africa. They discovered fossilized remains of animals that were similar in shape and appearance to contemporary animals, but with several markedly different structures. The famous discovery of *Australopithecus* provided some evidence that even man may have had ancient relatives. In sites dating back thirteen million years, diggers unearthed remains of advanced, bipedal ape-like creatures. The more direct (yet still distant) relative to *Homo Sapiens* dated back to around three million years ago, and the comparison of skulls from epoch to epoch seemed to indicate a modification of brain size.[12]

Furthermore, a greater knowledge of genetics became available. Mendel's work with the genetic mixing of peas became popular in the 1930s. This demonstrated how parents passed traits to offspring, and showed the existence of dominant and recessive genes which could explain variations and mutations that occur in offspring that were not visible to parents. When James Watson and Francis Crick made their ground-breaking discovery of the double helix shape of DNA, science became aware of just how much an

11 Charles Hamrum, ed., *Darwin's Legacy* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1983), 31-33.
12 Harum, *Legacy*, 32.

organism could vary from minute changes in amino acid structures.

Darwin's acknowledgment of the discrepancies in his theories showed that he was not dogmatic in his beliefs, and this lent to their strength and flexibility. Second, the sheer weight of scientific observation and documentation presented in Darwin's work was incredible. This made his evidence hard to deny. He documented graduated differences in species of birds, insects, lizards, fish, bacteria, and plants in a multitude of settings. Most scientists felt that only *experimentation* could provide proof of a theory. Darwin helped bring the tool of observation to a new level of credibility. Also, as mentioned before, Darwin challenged the process of studying organisms as individual entities separate from each other. He emphasized the importance of systems and thinking of nature in terms of the relations of organisms to each other and to their external environment.

Ideologically, many parts of Darwin's new philosophy of science and thought challenged traditional ideas. Darwin rejected the ideas of determinism, which stated that if all current facts were known, all future events could be predicted. Darwin felt that variations were infinite, and that chance played a heavy role in these variations, at least on a genetic level. In this way, Darwin's challenge to determinism preceded a similar pronouncement in physics by nearly fifty years—Heisenburg's Uncertainty Principle.[13] Finally, the simplicity and power of Darwin's ideas made them hard to deny.

Any intellectual revolution of such power must take a long time to settle into the minds of scientists. Indeed, although social Darwinists applied Darwin's ideas to business and human action in the late nineteenth century, biologists generally rejected many of Darwin's ideas. Because of Darwin's enhanced level of intuition, it took scientists in other areas until the 1930s, '40s, and '50s to provide the tools that verified Darwin's ideas. These ideas were shared, new tools were applied, and by the 1960s, most of Darwin's ideas had become accepted as truth.

Although biologists accepted the general idea of evolution, new theories challenged and modified Darwin's process of natural selection. Ironically, these challenges have come from the very areas that helped prove the validity of Darwin's ideas: geology, anthropology, and genetics.

The first theory was called punctuated-equilibrium theory, which, briefly, stated that evolution occurs in fits and starts. Dr. Stephen Gould, a Harvard biologist, based this theory on fossilized remains. He believed that recent fossilized evidence demonstrated that species remained unchanged for millions of years. Then, in a fit of change, they evolve suddenly. Organisms with adaptations which were advantageous then invaded areas where the parent species exists. Thus, gradual adaptations did not occur, but instead long periods of stability were broken by rapid change and invasion.[14] This did not fundamentally reject Darwinism, but did challenge

13 Mayr, "Resistance," 128.
14 *Economist*, "Missing Links," 33.

Protector or Monarch: Images of Kingship 1656-1657

By Seth D. Rodgers

O n 30 January, 1649, a decade of civil conflict ended in England with the execution of Charles I.[1] The war, according to the victors, was fought to end the tyrannical power of kings and to establish "a commonwealth and free state."[2] Yet eight years later, the Parliamentarian government founded by anti-monarchial forces offered the crown to the Lord Protector, Oliver Cromwell.[3] Despite the efforts of Parliament and the Army, the idea of Kingship had not been eliminated by the years of fighting. While there were practical reasons for offering the crown to Cromwell, there was also a cultural underpinning to the offer. The English people had an attachment to the crown that the revolution could not eradicate, an attachment that exhibited itself in the writings and attitudes of the time. While the Commonwealth and Protectorate had abolished the monarchy in name, a positive image of Kingship still existed in post-revolution England. This paper will argue the idea of Kingship was inseparable from the idea of government in England during the 1650s.

The King, in seventeenth-century England, represented more than just the head of state.[4] Englishmen thought that the Monarchy "taught fundamental truths about human behavior and human value," and was the "center of the English structure of power—the center of politics, of culture, of law, and of religion."[5] The English saw the monarchy as vital to the social and political cultures of the 1600s and early 1700s. A mere fifty years after the Protectorate, Queen Anne would unify the nation through the "revival and exploitation of royal ritual and symbol.[6] Respect and reverence for Kingship had become so ingrained in English society that not even a regicide republic could eradicate its existence.

It is important to understand how entrenched these images of kingship had become in the thought of virtually every English person. The Parliamentarians had come to power by opposing the rule of Charles I, though, even in the 1640s, they claimed they had fought the revolution to protect

[1] Derek Hirst, *Authority and Conflict: England, 1603-1658* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), 287.
[2] Ibid, 292.
[3] *Mercurius Politicus*, 25 March to 2 April 1657.
[4] Cynthia Herrup, "Beyond Personality and Pomp: Recent Works on Early Modern Monarchies," *Journal of British Studies* Vol. 28 (April 1989): 175.
[5] Ibid.
[6] R. O. Bucholz, "Nothing but Ceremony': Queen Anne and the Limitations of Royal Ritual," *Journal of British Studies* Vol. 30 (July 1991): 288.

---

some of Darwin's ideas.

A nother more recent theory was the renewed belief in catastrophism. As the name suggests, this theory asserted that life forms stay the same until huge catastrophes kill off the dominant life forms, clearing the way for new organisms. Much evidence has become known that demonstrates how just such a catastrophe occurred sixty-five million years ago when a comet struck the Earth, massively changing the environment and killing off the dinosaurs.

A third challenge came from geneticists. As more was learned about genetic mechanisms, geneticists have discovered a lot of "junk" in DNA strands: long chains of amino acids that served no apparent function. Also, genes are unpredictable, disappearing from one generation and reappearing much later.[15] Thus, one possible explanation for trait continuity could be some process of natural selection at a molecular level. However, more evidence pointed to the theory proposed by Japanese biologist Dr. Motoo Kimura, that genes do not experience a "selection" process, but instead mutate in a neutral manner. Some mutations are beneficial, others are harmful, but most are neither. Strict Darwinians believed that no change is "silent." The "junk" in a DNA strand must be either helpful or harmful.[16] None of these ideas completely rejected Darwinian evolution. Instead, all of them attempted to modify the mechanisms described by Charles Darwin.

Darwin achieved a balance of genius and humility. He was not dogmatic or too rigid in his theories. He admitted their weaknesses, but backed up his assertions with as much information that he had at his disposal. Most importantly, he looked outside his particular area of expertise. In a stroke of intuitive genius, he invented a new intellectual framework. The most important and far reaching idea that can be gleaned from Darwin's work is that no area of thought operates in a vacuum separate from its sister disciplines. Physicists, biologists, anthropologists, and philosophers all have shaped the acceptance of Darwin's theories, and continue to do so today. No field of thought or study is so comprehensive that it can find all of its answers in itself. Scientists, philosophers, historians, and lay persons not involved in these intellectual professions must look outside their own experiences and disciplines to fully understand the world. This was Darwin's truest and most lasting legacy.

Jeff Waldhoff is a senior history major and a member of the Historia staff. Mr. Waldhoff's interest in scientific history can be traced to his physics minor. However, his other areas of study include political science, economics, and secondary education. Last spring, he was inducted into the Phi Alpha Theta history honors organization.

[15] Ibid, 87.
[16] Ibid.

ﺑﺴﻢ ﺍﻟﻠﻪ ﺍﻟﺮﺣﻤﻦ ﺍﻟﺮﺣﻴﻢ

Protector or Monarch: Images of Kingship 1656-1657

BY SETH D. RODGERS

O n 30 January, 1649, a decade of civil conflict ended in England with the execution of Charles I.[1] The war, according to the victors, was fought to end the tyrannical power of kings and to establish "a commonwealth and free state."[2] Yet eight years later, the Parliamentarian government founded by anti-monarchial forces offered the crown to the Lord Protector, Oliver Cromwell.[3] Despite the efforts of Parliament and the Army, the idea of Kingship had not been eliminated by the years of fighting. While there were practical reasons for offering the crown to Cromwell, there was also a cultural underpinning to the offer. The English people had an attachment to the crown that the revolution could not eradicate, an attachment that exhibited itself in the writings and attitudes of the time. While the Commonwealth and Protectorate had abolished the monarchy in name, a positive image of Kingship still existed in post-revolution England. This paper will argue the idea of Kingship was inseparable from the idea of government in England during the 1650s.

The King, in seventeenth-century England, represented more than just the head of state.[4] Englishmen thought that the Monarchy "taught fundamental truths about human behavior and human value," and was the "center of the English structure of power—the center of politics, of culture, of law, and of religion."[5] The English saw the monarchy as vital to the social and political cultures of the 1600s and early 1700s. A mere fifty years after the Protectorate, Queen Anne would unify the nation through the "revival and exploitation of royal ritual and symbol.[6] Respect and reverence for Kingship had become so ingrained in English society that not even a regicide republic could eradicate its existence.

It is important to understand how entrenched these images of kingship had become in the thought of virtually every English person. The Parliamentarians had come to power by opposing the rule of Charles I, though, even in the 1640s, they claimed they had fought the revolution to protect

[1]Derek Hirst, *Authority and Conflict: England, 1603-1658* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), 287.

[2]Ibid., 292.

[3]*Mercurius Politicus*, 26 March to 2 April 1657.

[4]Cynthia Herrup, "Beyond Personality and Pomp: Recent Works on Early Modern Monarchies," *Journal of British Studies* Vol. 28 (April 1989): 175.

[5]Ibid.

[6]R. O. Bucholz, "Nothing but Ceremony': Queen Anne and the Limitations of Royal Ritual," *Journal of British Studies* Vol. 30 (July 1991): 288.

---

some of Darwin's ideas.

A nother more recent theory was the renewed belief in catastrophism. As the name suggests, this theory asserted that life forms stay the same until huge catastrophes kill off the dominant life forms, clearing the way for new organisms. Much evidence has become known that demonstrates how just such a catastrophe occurred sixty-five million years ago when a comet struck the Earth, massively changing the environment and killing off the dinosaurs.

A third challenge came from geneticists. As more was learned about genetic mechanisms, geneticists have discovered a lot of "junk" in DNA strands: long chains of amino acids that served no apparent function. Also, genes are unpredictable, disappearing from one generation and reappearing much later.[15] Thus, one possible explanation for trait continuity could be some process of natural selection at a molecular level. However, more evidence pointed to the theory proposed by Japanese biologist Dr. Motoo Kimura that genes do not experience a "selection" process, but instead mutate in a neutral manner. Some mutations are beneficial, others are harmful, but most are neither. Strict Darwinians believed that no change is "silent." The "junk" in a DNA strand must be either helpful or harmful.[16] None of these ideas completely rejected Darwinian evolution. Instead, all of them attempted to modify the mechanisms described by Charles Darwin.

Darwin achieved a balance of genius and humility. He was not dogmatic or too rigid in his theories. He admitted their weaknesses, but backed up his assertions with as much information that he had at his disposal. Most importantly, he looked outside his particular area of expertise. In a stroke of intuitive genius, he invented a new intellectual framework. The most important and far reaching idea that can be gleaned from Darwin's work is that no area of thought operates in a vacuum separate from its sister disciplines. Physicists, biologists, anthropologists, and philosophers all have shaped the acceptance of Darwin's theories, and continue to do so today. No field of thought or study is so comprehensive that it can find all of its answers in itself. Scientists, philosophers, historians, and lay persons not involved in these intellectual professions must look outside their own experiences and disciplines to fully understand the world. This was Darwin's truest and most lasting legacy.

Jeff Waldhoff is a senior history major and a member of the Historia staff. Mr. Waldhoff's interest in scientific history can be traced to his physics minor. However, his other areas of study include political science, economics, and secondary education. Last spring, he was inducted into the Phi Alpha Theta history honors organization.

[15]Ibid., 87.
[16]Ibid.

"king and Parliament."[7] After the trial and execution of Charles I, any attempt to make such claim would have been met with ridicule. England now had only the House of Commons to run the government, and this body distanced itself from the monarchy. The Commons passed "an act prohibiting the proclaiming of any person to be king of England or Ireland, or the dominions thereof."[8] In 1656, it passed an act that was specifically for "renouncing and disannulling the pretended Title of Charles Stuart [Charles II]," an action that, in view of later actions taken by the Parliament, was not as redundant as it first appears.[9] The men who passed laws against Kings and dissolved the House of Lords were the same men who felt a return to the monarchy, on their terms, was in the best interest of the nation. The possibility of a Cromwellian monarchy did not sit well with the opponents of the Protectorate.

After the overthrow of the Stuarts, the main opposition to the Commonwealth came from the Royalists. There had been an informal Royalist underground in England beginning with the death of Charles I.[10] In March of 1656, Royalists organized and rebelled throughout the nation.[11] Riding under the royal colors, Cromwellian forces routed the rebels throughout the nation.[12] Assistance that could have saved the Royalists forces never came.[13] The plan for a country-wide rebellion had failed. But the rebellion did not fail because of anti-royalist sentiment; rather, lack of planning and inferior numbers of troops were more costly. The Southwest would return "suspected persons" to Parliament in the 1656 elections, demonstrating royalist support in this area.[14] The rebellion failed because the Royalists tried to overthrow Cromwell without allies and without mobilizing the whole of the Royalist body.[15]

T he reaction of Cromwell and his government to the March uprising suggested that the new rulers thought resistance to the Protectorate went deeper than a body of men desiring a return to Stuart rule. Following the rebellion, England was divided into eleven districts, each to be governed by a Major General.[16] This experiment in military rule seemed an extreme reaction since the Royalist defeat was an overwhelming one. Yet enough Royalists remained in England that the Protectorate could pay for the new arraignment by only taxing that base of old Stuart support.[17] Thus, a sizeable portion of the English population remained wedded to the monarchy.

[7]Hirst, 222.
[8]Mercurius Politicus, 24 November to 3 December 1653.
[9]Mercurius Politicus, 27 November to 4 December 1656.
[10]David Underdown, Royalist Conspiracy in England: 1649-1660 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960), 18.
[11]Ibid, 127.
[12]Ibid, 152.
[13]Ibid, 153.
[14]Underdown, Revel, 236.
[15]Underdown, Royalist, 155.
[16]Christopher Hill, God's Englishman (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), 175.
[17]Underdown, Royalist, 159.

Some of the publications of the time reflected this attachment. In 1656 a reprint of a work by Thomas Wilson showed favor to kingship. The Rule of Reason Containing the Arte of Logique was "Imprinted at London by Richard Grafton, Printer to the Kyngs."[18] The opening page of the book hailed the king as the "most excellent Prince and sovereigne Lord."[19] These words subverted the anti-monarchical stance of the nation. While the work was from the Pre-Stuart era, the reprinting, accompanied by the publishing information, suggested that a royalist market existed in England during the Protectorate.

But not only the Royalists concerned themselves with the idea of kingship; many religious books published during the kingship crisis of 1656-7 take a very different view of kingship than one would expect from publishers under a regicide republic. In A New Postil Containyng Sermons Upon All the Sonday Gospelles, a collection of sermons of English pastors, the image of kings was extremely positive. The sermons emphasized that secular kings should be "righteous."[20] Kings, good kings at least, were compared to Christ.[21] John Jewel's A Replie Unto M. Hardinges Answeare, a commentary on a Catholic text, frequently invoked the name of Augustus Caesar. Jewel commented that kings had the "special privlege" of whatever council they choose, not just the council provided by law.[22] The council seemed to refer to was Parliament—the body responsible for removing a king who sought council that they did not approve. The positive portrayal of monarchy during a regicide republic reflected a societal connection to kingship that existed in the people of England.

N ewspapers give us a limited, but important, public view of kingship. In 1656-7 only two newspapers existed: Mercurius Politicus and Publick Intelligencer.[23] Both government publications, their contents were almost identical. Both appeared weekly and relied on reports mailed from the localities and foreign nations. The title page of the Mercurius Politicus announced that it reported the news of the "three nations," not three kingdoms.[24] This statement blazoned the front page though bills to unite England, Scotland and Ireland in a commonwealth were not introduced until 1656, seven years after the revolution to abolish the three kingdoms.[25] The first mention of Oliver Cromwell being the "Lord Protector of the Commonwealth of England, Scotland, Ireland, &c.," in the Mercurius

[18]Thomas Wilson, The Rule of Reason Containing the Arte of Logique (London: 1655), title page.
[19]Ibid, 1
[20]J. Becon, A New Postil Containyng Sermons Upon All the Sonday Gospelles (1656), folio 3.
[21]Becon, folio 2.
[22]John Jewel, A Replie Unto M. Hardinges Answeare; by Perusinge Whereof the Discrete, and Diligent Reader May Easily See, the Weake, and Unstable Groundes of the Romaine Religion, Whiche of Late Hath Beene Accompted Catholique (London: 1656), 294.
[23]Hirst, 340.
[24]Mercurius Politicus, 29 October to 6 November 1656.
[25]Mercurius Politicus, 13 November to 20 November 1656.

Politicus came not until January of 1657.[26] Instead, since at least 1653, the papers referred to Cromwell as "his highness."[27] Occasionally they expanded the title, after the declaration of the Protectorate, to "his Highness, the Lord Protector," but more commonly they omitted the "Lord Protector."[28] Only after the refusal of kingship did the paper refer to Cromwell consistently as "His highness the Lord Protector."[29]

The Mercurius Politicus also showed varying attitudes about Charles I and Charles II. A report from Flanders calls Charles II "the Scottish King," ignoring the union between Scotland and England.[30] But advertisements showed differing attitudes about Charles I. One, an advertisement for the printed reports of the Court of Exchequer, calls Charles I "the late Prince Charles," denying the existence of his kingship, while another titled him the "late King Charles."[31] These advertisements in a government-run publication showed the difficulty in exhibiting a consistent government stance toward the Stuarts. If Charles II was the exiled king of Scotland, then this cast doubts upon the legitimacy of the union of England and Scotland, and by extension the legitimacy of the Protectorate itself. And if the government could not decide on how to refer to Charles I, then how could the populace reach a conclusion about the nature of the deposed line? The government in this situation failed to provide a consistent image of the ousted line, and continued the image of the King of England that it had tried to eliminate.

The advertisements in the newspaper also revealed a still deep-seated belief in the notion of social, and by implication political, hierarchy. The acceptance of the theory of divine right dominated the structure of the monarchy.[32] This hierarchical belief assumed that authority flowed from God to King, and then down through the social classes in a great chain of being. This idea was exhibited in the paper through notices of runaway servants and apprentices. Newspapers grouped these notices regarding servants with advertisements about runaway livestock. The lower classes ranked next to animals.[33] Professional services, gentlemen's announcements, and bookseller adverts, were placed together, coupling the high classes with business and knowledge.[34] The language in the advertisements pertaining to runaways also drew the lines in the class system. John Towers was said to have, while "distracted, went from his keeper," George Wood.[35] The use of "keeper" places Mr. Towers on a level less than Mr.

[26] Mercurius Politicus, 22 January to 29 January 1657.
[27] Mercurius Politicus, 24 November to 2 December 1653.
[28] Mercurius Politicus, 20 November to 27 November 1656.
[29] Mercurius Politicus, 7 May to 14 May 1657.
[30] Mercurius Politicus, 16 April to 23 April 1657.
[31] Mercurius Politicus, 5 February to 12 February 1657; 24 April to 1 May 1655.
[32] Hirst, 86.
[33] Mercurius Politicus, 2 April to 9 April 1657.
[34] Mercurius Politicus, 19 February to 26 February 1657.
[35] Mercurius Politicus, 29 October to 5 November 1656.

Wood, reducing him to the lost horses surrounding his name. Social order in Interregnum England remained based on a great chain of being at the head of which was the monarch, second only to God.

During 1656-7, the Protectorate would enter a crisis concerning kingship, a crisis that almost resulted in the crowning of Oliver Cromwell. The background to the crisis is worth retelling. In January 1656, government agents uncovered a plot to assassinate Cromwell. Miles Sindercombe, under the direction of the exiled Leveller Edward Saxby, was to make the attempt on the Protector's life.[36] The Levellers, who had argued for a Republic before the execution of the King, had entered a quasi-alliance with the Royalists.[37] The diametrically opposed groups felt that Cromwell was on the verge of taking the crown for himself.[38] Saxby wrote, "We wish we had rather endured thee (O Charles) than have been condemned to this mean tyrant."[39]

But the real difficulty for the Protectorate surrounding the assassination attempt came during the trial of Sindercombe. The judgement of the court, as reported by the Mercurius Politicus was

that by the Common Law to compass or imagine the death of the Chief Magistrate of the land, by what name soever he was called, whether Lord Protector or otherwise, is high-treason...and that the statutes of treason made 25 Ed 3 as to this, did onely declare what the Common Law was before the making of that statute, and was not introductive of a new law.[40]

The same people who executed the king in the name of the law admitted that their actions were also treasonous. At the time of his execution, Charles I was "the Chief Magistrate of the land." By referring to royal laws, they raised the question by whose authority did Parliament try the king in 1649. If the laws of past Kings provide the basis for the Protectorate's survival, then the anti-monarchical nature of the government was compromised. Thus, appeals to the Ancient Constitution did nothing to assure the position of the Commonwealth.

What happened was that the courts and Parliament selectively manipulated the Ancient Constitution. The Ancient Constitution, an unwritten body of laws and legal decisions that provided the basis for English Common Law, established the principle of a three headed government: Commons, Lords, and King.[41] In 1657 two-thirds of the Constitutional govern-

[36] Underdown, Royalist, 192.
[37] Ibid., 192.
[38] Edward Saxby, "Killing Noe Murder," in Divine Right and Democracy: An Anthology of Political Writing in Stuart England, ed. David Wootton (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1986), 383.
[39] Ibid., 385.
[40] Mercurius Politicus, 5 February to 12 February 1657.
[41] Philip Hunton, "A Treatise of Monarchy, Containing Two Parts: I. Concerning Monarchy in General, II. Concerning This Particular Monarchy. Wherein All the Maine Questions Occurrent in Both, are Stated, Disputed, and Determined....Done by an Earnest Desirer of His Countries Peace," in Divine Right and Democracy: An Anthology of Political Writing in Stuart England, ed. David Wootton (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1986), 201.

ment did not exist. The Commons had executed the King and dismissed the Lords. Parliament, despite working outside of the Constitution, found it necessary to refer back to it to justify their actions. Historian Charles Firth writes that the desire to return to the monarchy was indicative of the want of "the re-establishment of constitutional government, and therefore of the only form of constitutional government with which they were familiar."[42] Parliament tried to maintain an anti-monarchical stance while creating a new monarchy.[43]

Pressures existed from outside as well that pushed the Parliament to offer Cromwell the crown. A pamphlet titled "A Copy of a Letter written to an Officer of the Army by a True Commonwealth's Man and no Courtier, concerning the Right and Settlement of our present Government and Governors," argued that historical precedent and the need to abolish "factions, insurrections, and confusion," necessitated a return to royal rule.[44] The discussion of the issue began seriously in September of 1656.[45] Opposition came from officers in the army, but the rest of Parliament supported the motion.[46] With this alignment never shifting, the Parliament drafted *The Petition and Advice* that contained the offer of the crown.

Oliver had, in fact, taken on the role of the king in action if not name. On 3 March 1657, the paper reported that Cromwell conferred a knighthood on Alderman Dickenson of York, a very kingly duty.[47] He had also created a second house of Parliament with a "new aristocracy."[48] Cromwell had already assumed such duties as calling and dismissing Parliament and consenting to bills—functions performed in the past by kings. The speaker of the House of Commons had, in a speech on the failed assassination, compared Cromwell to "the best of Kings, David."[49] With the royal air that surrounded the court of Cromwell, the offer of Kingship on 31 March should not have come as a surprise. The speaker of the House of Commons

took occasion, for several reasons, to commend the title and office of a king, in this nation; As that a king first settled Christianity in this island; that it had long received end approved by our ancestors, who by experience found it to be consisting with their liberties; that it was a title best know to our laws, most agreeable to the Constitution, and to the temper of the people.[50]

---

42 Ibid.
43 Charles Firth, "Cromwell and the Crown," *The English Historical Review* LXVII (July 1902):430.
44 Ibid., 431.
45 Ibid., 433.
46 Ibid., 435.
47 *Mercurius Politicus*, 5 March to 12 March 1657.
48 Wilbur Cortez Abbott, ed., *The Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell*, Vol IV *The Protectorate: 1655-1658* (Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press, 1947; reprint, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 375.
49 *Mercurius Politicus*, 22 January to 29 January 1656.
50 *Mercurius Politicus*, 26 March to 2 April 1657.

This offer became yet another in a long line of attempts since 1653 to make Cromwell the king of England.[51] Cromwell had consistently rejected past offers, but met the 1657 offer with some thought.[52] In response to that offer, *Mercurius Politicus* reported "that before he [Cromwell] give a resolution, his intent was first to seek God, who had been his guide hitherto, to have an answer put into his heart."[53]

The arguments used for offering the crown to Cromwell are interesting because of their appeal to the more traditional duties of a king. The image of the king as the head of the Church of England was one of these traditional duties. Since the English Reformation, the king had been the head of the Anglican Church, but Cromwell believed in toleration for all Protestant sects.[54] To compare Cromwell to a head of the Church was to go against his tolerationist principles.[55] When the Parliament tried to institute a Presbyterian system on the churches of England, Cromwell reacted by dissolving Parliament.[56] While there was support in England for a state church, Cromwell could not back it because of his religious beliefs.[57] The government, thought Cromwell, should not "impose what religions they will on the consciences of men."[58]

The Speaker's reference to the relation between king and Constitution admitted the failure of the new government to adapt to the law of the land. And by saying that a king was more compatible with "the temper of the people," he acknowledged an underlying attachment of the people to the Crown. The Protectorate government was forced to accept the failure of their experiment in a kingless England. Wilbur Abbott writes, "all their [England's] history, all their traditions...all their political and legal concepts were bound up with kingship...it was an inconvenience not to have a monarchy."[59]

But what of Cromwell's thoughts on the crown? In a speech to Parliament on January 23, 1657, Cromwell says that "God hath bestowed upon you, (and you are in possession of it,) three nations," a statement in the greatest tradition of patriarchal divine right.[60] Cromwell continued,

We shall know, you and I, as the father of this family, how to dispose our mercies to God's glory, how to dispose our severity, how to distinguish betwixt obedient and rebellious children.[61]

England's Protector, not the King, was now the father of the nation. Sexby echoed this sentiment when he wrote with intended irony that Cromwell

---

51 Hill, 179.
52 *Mercurius Politicus*, 26 March to 2 April 1657.
53 Ibid.
54 Underdown, *Revel*, 289.
55 Hill, 77.
56 Ibid., 185.
57 Abbott, 375.
58 Qtd. in Hill, 186.
59 Abbott, 376.
60 Ibid., 389.
61 Ibid., 390.

was now "the true father of [our] country."[62] Divine right rested on the analogous relation of God-King-Father to Church-Country-Children. Cromwell in this speech invokes the argument used to justify the rule of kings.

When Parliament formally offered the crown to Cromwell, he said he needed "time to deliberate and consider what particular answer [he] may return," not the answer expected of a regicide.[63] On 3 April, in a meeting with members of Commons, he apparently refused the crown, saying, "I have not been able to find it in my duty to God and you to undertake this charge under that title."[64] But in the same statement, Cromwell said that, "if Parliament be so resolved [to necessitate my answer to be categorical] it will not be fit for me to use any inducements by you to alter their resolutions."[65] On one hand, Cromwell had rejected the offer of kingship, but on the other, he made it known that if it were the desire of Parliament to crown him, he would consent.

Parliament voted 77 to 65 to "adhere to the *Petition and Advice*."[66] The Crown was still available for Cromwell's taking. On April 11th, in a meeting on the issue of the offer, Sir Charles Wolsely argued that "this nation hath ever been a lover of Monarchy, and of Monarchy under the title of King."[67] Two days later, Cromwell stated that, "Kingship be not a title, but a name of office that runs through the law."[68] He continued, saying that he would "rather have any name from this Parliament, then any name without it," implying that the crown would be accepted.[69]

Still, Cromwell refused the crown on 8 May.[70] The final resolution to the crisis came on 19 May when Parliament decided to resubmit *The Petition and Advice* with the title of King changed to Lord Protector.[71] On 25 May, Oliver Cromwell consented to *The Petition*, with the change from King to Protector as the only alteration.[72] Cromwell had consented to a bill that made him king, not in name but in practice.[73]

There are limits to the image of kingship during the Protectorate, primarily Cromwell's refusal of the Crown. There were, however, enough royal trappings around the Protector to warrant comparison. During the kingship crisis, to Cromwell himself the problem was "a mere difference of names."[74] Either Cromwell believed his role was already a regal one or he

[62]Semby, 861.
[63]Abbott, 443.
[64]Ibid, 446.
[65]Ibid.
[66]Ibid, 447.
[67]Ibid, 460.
[68]Ibid, 468.
[69]Ibid, 468.
[70]Ibid, 510.
[71]*Mercurius Politicus*, 14 May to 21 May 1657.
[72]*Mercurius Politicus*, 21 May to 28 May 1657.
[73]Sir Richard Tangye, *The Two Protectors: Oliver and Richard Cromwell* (1899; reprint, Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1971), 200.
[74]Abbott, 459.

did not understand the comparison he was making. The Lord Protector was in a delicate situation during the crisis of kingship. Because of its power, Cromwell needed support for his policies and his legitimacy from the Army—that faction in the government most opposed to his accepting the Crown.[75] Acceptance of kingship would have placed the Army in opposition to the Protectorate, and might have possibly set off another round of civil war.

The change from the three Kingdoms to the three nations was another limit on the image of Kingship. While it was a difference in name, the impact of the words was powerful. The reference to the country denied kingship. Yet the denial was not complete. The *Mercurius Politicus* admitted that Charles II was "the Scottish King," thus implying that one of the three nations was still a Kingdom.[76] The need of Parliament to revoke the claim Charles II had claim to the English throne also showed the belief that the English throne remained open to claim.[77] If the nation were no longer a monarchy, there would have been no need, except for symbolic value, to disannul the Stuart claims.

On 26 June 1657, just one month after rejecting the offer of the crown, Parliament reinstalled Cromwell as Protector in a ceremony that rivaled a royal coronation.[78] He had refused the title of king, but the images of Kingship surrounded his rule. And the images were not just in government, they were entrenched in culture, law, and religion.[79] In three years, England returned to its monarchy.

The Protectorate abolished the Crown. But in the end, the traditions of English government triumphed. The patriarchal right that Cromwell invoked in his speech of 23 January 1657 was connected to the divine right of kings. The English people could not rid themselves of the notion of hierarchy, and the government reflected this. The reliance on the Ancient Constitution was another failure of the Protectorate to rid the nation of ideas of kingship. The law relied so heavily on the office of king, that failure to have a king, or a king-like figure, rendered government ineffective. Only through the regal nature of the Protectorate could the English government function.

Seth Rodgers is a senior history major. On April 16, his "Protector or Monarch: Images of Kingship 1656-1657" won runner-up prize in the undergraduate category of the Phi Alpha Theta Lower Illinois Regional Conference at Greenville College. In addition, his paper was named runner-up for the 1994 Eastern Illinois University Social Science Writing Award.

[75]Firth, 435.
[76]*Mercurius Politicus*, 16 April to 23 April 1657.
[77]*Mercurius Politicus*, 27 November to 4 December 1656.
[78]Tangye, 200.
[79]Herrup, 175.

The American Revolution: Intellectual or Social?

Edmund S. Morgan. *Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and America.* New York: W.W. Norton, 1988. Pp. 306.

Gordon S. Wood. *The Radicalism of the American Revolution.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992. Pp. 359.

Did America experience an intellectual or social revolution in the eighteenth century? That is the overall question that these two historians address in their works. Edmund S. Morgan's book examines the intellectual constructions of both the English and American constitutions respectively. Accordingly, he attempts to portray the formation of the U.S. Constitution as a radical transformation in the conception of government. Gordon Wood, on the other hand, while rejecting a constitutional revolution, seeks to explain the same period in terms of a social revolution, emphasizing an extreme transformation within American society. The crux of these two arguments comes down to an understanding of British politics and society. In the end, it is this historical foundation that weakens Morgan's argument while elevating Wood's research to new levels of erudition.

In his Bancroft-winning publication, Morgan reinvigorates the dying Whig interpretation of seventeenth-century English history by exploring the roots of the popular sovereignty movement. He believes that in the 1640s and 50s, England boldly attempted to replace the political fiction of divine right monarchy with the political fiction of popular sovereignty. It failed. As a result, the nation was forced to restore the monarchy and accept the supremacy of the king.

England's problem, according to Morgan, lay in its conception of governmental organization. It had two very simple classifications: ruler and ruled. The monarch, being the ruler (or the government), wielded sovereign power. The people, being the ruled (or the Parliament), were to attend to the monarch's needs while defending the liberties of Englishmen. This latter role led to the challenge of kingly prerogative, and, eventually, to civil war. With Charles I's execution, "the people" won. Parliament, embodying the people, now became the sovereign of the nation.

Then, Morgan argues, the problems arose. The role of the ruled was to check the actions of the ruler. If Parliament became the ruler, then what force would check it? Morgan points out that "the Levellers indeed had identified the central problem of popular sovereignty, the problem of setting limits to a government that derived its authority from a people for whom it claimed the sole right to speak" (70). How could the people (as the ruled) check the embodiment of the people (as the ruler)? Morgan concludes that they could not. For this reason, the Protectorate died and England restored its monarchy. Again in 1688, the English would fail to eliminate the monarchy and make the people the sovereign force in the nation.

According to Morgan, after the American War for Independence, the ex-colonists found themselves facing

the same issue. They knew that they wanted to make the people the supreme authority of the new nation, but they did not want any single political body to be absolute. In effect, they sought to separate the representatives from the people, and thus place representation inside the government.

They found their answer in the formation of the United States Constitution. According to John Locke, the people of a nation generally escape the state of nature by making two contracts: the first creates a society, and the second passes the sovereign authority of the people over to the government. In America, the Constitution became the written form of the social contract. Americans then faced the task of transferring the sovereignty of the people over to the government. This, however, they never did. Instead, the Americans used the Constitution as a way to limit the actions of their representatives in the government. Representatives no longer embodied the people. Rather, they represented them with limited power of attorney. The representatives now could be placed within the governmental structure along with the executive because of these limitations. As Morgan states: "...the Americans found a way that the British had rejected to balance the real majesty of the people against the personal majesty of their representatives" (233). In effect, these limitations had transformed the people into the ruler, and the government into the ruled.

Unfortunately, Morgan's choice of secondary research serves only to undermine his thesis, especially in his examination of seventeenth-century England. Indeed, much of his understanding of this particular issue comes from the severely beaten Whig school of thought. Recent revisionist research exposes the misconceptions of this more traditional school. Conrad Russel (*The Crisis of Parliaments*) and Mark Kishlansky (*Parliamentary Selections*) have shown, respectively, that Parliament was not fighting to replace divine right monarchy with popular government, nor was it their place to give consent (but rather assent) to the king's policies until well after the 1640s. Further studies by W.A. Speck (*Reluctant Revolutionaries*) disprove Morgan's understanding of the Glorious Revolution as the abandonment of "divine right and hereditary succession, to make clear the community's freedom of action by placing the crown in someone whose heredity did not entitle him to it" (109). Furthermore, what Morgan seems to forget is that after 1688, English government did indeed undergo a transformation. Before, the Whigs argued for the sovereignty of Parliament (embodying the people) while the Tories argued for the supremacy of the Crown. But with the institutionalization of Parliament, Whigs and Tories alike came to accept that real sovereignty resided in the Crown in Parliament. It appears that England had in fact learned how to divide sovereignty and limit government a century before the Americans. In effect, the Americans had merely copied the British form of government. They did not, as Morgan argues, turn the English Constitution inside out.

Perhaps social transformation better describes the American Revolution. Today, many historians believe that with the Constitution came the reestablishment of an older British model of society. Not Gordon Wood. In fact, his book explicitly attacks this argument. According to

Wood, "in destroying monarchy and establishing republics [the Americans] were changing their society as well as their governments, and they knew it" (6). The Revolution was not fought solely for political change, but also for social reconstruction. The Americans wanted to cast aside the chains of monarchy in all its various forms and to don the mantle of republicanism, with all its virtue and equality.

Wood examines the period from the middle of the eighteenth century through the beginning of the nineteenth (a different period than Morgan), and sees the primary conflict of the Revolution as between two differing views of society. The British lived within a monarchical society which, being strongly hierarchical, required intense obedience and deference. However, Wood argues, due to the American policy of salutary neglect, the American colonies, before 1763, developed in a slightly different manner. Republican ideals of the Enlightenment slowly infected society, challenging the existing structure. Indeed, these new conceptions of the individual, the family, and the state stood diametrically opposed to the monarchical ideals of hierarchy, inequality, kinship ties, patriarchy, patronage, and dependency. In effect, republican ideology lived within an incompatible monarchical structure.

In 1763, Britain toughened its colonial policy, using every means at its disposal. Wood stresses that in a monarchical society, as it existed in America, politics and society were intertwined: "Indeed, all government was regarded essentially as the enlisting and mobilizing of the power of private persons to carry out public ends" (82). Through the manipulation of the patronage system—without which a monarchy cannot maintain control—the British expected to enforce obedience to the wishes of the Crown. Unfortunately for them, the Enlightenment had undermined much of their control over the American populace. The ideals of benevolence and individualism had unravelled the vertical ties of society. In this manner, republicanism already had established a foothold in the colonies. When the British attempted to strengthen monarchical forces within the society to enforce their measures, the Americans abandoned their traditional social format, seeking to establish a fully operative republic. They looked to the future, not to the past, for their inspiration.

Once the king was defeated, Wood claims that almost overnight the structure of society underwent radical changes. For example, the flight of the loyalists occasioned the collapse of monarchical hierarchy. As Wood points out their significance was not in their numbers, but in "who they were. A disproportionate number of them were well-to-do gentry operating at the pinnacles of power and patronage" (176). This greatly affected the remaining colonists by freeing them from the bonds of dependence. Furthermore, shortly after the Revolution, the states abolished primogeniture by their numerous attacks on "the power of family and heredity privilege" (183). Equality—especially equality of opportunity—was no longer just an idea; it became practice. In fact, Wood argues, largely because of this liberated idea of equality, "suddenly it was as if the whole traditional structure, enfeebled and brittle to begin with, broke apart, and people and their energies were set loose in an unprecedented outburst" (232). This

idea of individual superiority became the driving force behind democracy.

But a force still survived to resist democracy: gentility. Where once the battle had been between patriots and courtiers, Wood contends, it had now become one of democrats versus aristocrats. Democracy led to the emergence of special interest in politics and many were adamant about their opposition to such a danger. According to Wood, some of those who assembled to create the Constitution (the Federalists) decided that virtuous politicking could only come from the select few—the "disinterested" gentlemen. These men dominated the framing of the Constitution, with the purpose of limiting the advance of democracy.

But, as the Anti-Federalists argued, democracy based on self-interest could not be stopped. The Federalists failed in their attempts to create a ruling class of virtuous gentlemen. Not only were these natural leaders few and far between, but the electorate voted for candidates who were in line with their interests. Wood shows how, in 1787, the Federalists won the battle, but lost the war. They discovered that the Revolution had unleashed uncontrollable and expansive democracy which culminated in the Jacksonian era—that highly democratic period of a rising middle class with its materialistic ambitions. Wood argues that the Revolution "had succeeded only too well" (368).

Perhaps the most questionable aspect of Wood's thesis is the speed with which the Revolution ushered in Jacksonian society. He represents the change as almost instantaneous, a phenomenon that is extremely hard to believe. Nevertheless, Wood has cogently synthesized both the traditional Whig and Progressive schools of thought on the causes and effects of the American Revolution. And the result is masterful.

In their respective works, both of these historians have exhibited great skill in analysis. For those who adhere to the Whig school of English History, Morgan does indeed make a compelling argument, enhanced wonderfully by his use of prose. He has taken an extremely complex idea and made it easily comprehensible. But Wood, though not as literary, seems to have a more sound historical foundation. His care in uncovering the underpinning assumptions of the revolutionary Americans is more thorough and more enlightening. In the end however, both of these scholars expertly weave an abundance of primary and secondary sources into highly impressive theses.

—*Vernon A. McGuffee*

Vernon A. McGuffee is a graduate student and is currently completing his thesis in English history. Mr. McGuffee has been on the Historia staff since its inception in 1991. He served as co-editor of the premier issue, as well as co-editor of this year's edition.

The Changing Perceptions of the Vietnam War

Andrew Martin. *Receptions of War: Vietnam in American Culture*. Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993. 170 pages.

America's attempts to understand the legacies of the Vietnam War have varied considerably in the past thirty years. The questions of what went wrong, what happened to America's ability and willingness to fight, and who is to blame have been themes in the analysis of the Vietnam war. According to Andrew Martin, author of *Receptions of War: Vietnam in American Culture*, the discussion about the war continues to miss the real questions about Vietnam: why was America there in the first place, and how has the legacy of the media's role during the war shaped contemporary American policy making? Martin delivers an interesting and thoroughly researched argument about how American perceptions of the war have changed with the intellectual and cultural changes from 1950 to 1991.

Martin begins by examining the social and cultural forces that helped propel America into the conflict. Martin first discusses how the "Vietnam Syndrome" still haunts the American media and American policy makers. This "Syndrome" describes the tendency of the American people and the United States Congress to be skeptical about the use of military intervention in the third world, and the need for leaders, especially the President to contrast interventions with Vietnam. Congressional and public resistance to intervention in Nicaragua (although advisors and money were certainly there) during the 1980s, is one example. Martin further explains how President George Bush and the media trumpeted the message that the war would "not be another Vietnam." Dozens of articles appeared in popular journals contrasting the climatic, geographical, and political differences between the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Other articles dealt with the advances in military technology and the difference in troops (who were highly motivated volunteers compared to the frightened draftees of the 1960s).

Martin then delves into the past to explain how cultural trends and the technology of mass media created the militarized and adversarial atmosphere that allowed Americans to enter Vietnam. Television in the 1950s espoused Cold War rhetoric subtly through entertainment programs and blatantly through its news coverage. According to Martin, the media simplified issues and painted a world of black and white: the battle of the good United States versus the evil Soviet Union. Ideological fundamentalism mixed with the legacy of an undefeated military to create the myth of an indestructible America on a holy mission to thwart godless communism.

A small number of individuals argued against American policy in South East Asia, but such works rarely found an audience. Novels like Graham Greene's *The Quiet American* (1955), portrayed American policy makers as politically naive and ignorant. Ignored at first, this work was recast in the contemporary image of American intervention. The book, *The Ugly American*, and a film, *The Quiet American*, turned the message of Greene's novel on its head. In these works, Americans in Southeast Asia were portrayed as brave, stalwart foes of communism and European defeatism. Works like this convinced Americans that Vietnam was another chance for the conquering of a primitive landscape, an extension of America's frontier thesis.

However, the 1960s saw massive cultural shifts that challenged these ideas about America. The war became "a whole cultural event that eventually drew into itself" during the 1960s. Martin traces the history of American Cultural studies to explain how intellectuals and the intellectual framework fit into the "Vietnam Continuum." Martin explains how the Cold War began to shape cultural criticisms. The close financial links between academia and the government added a bias to many important academic studies. Increasingly, American studies defined Americanism in the way the government wanted it to, that is, through anti-communism.

In the 1960s, the U.S. government demanded more scientific and technical information. Thus, the government required the use of intellectuals and technical experts who supplied this information. Both Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson brought many intellectuals and technical advisors into their cabinets. Soon, the government controlled the funds and the future of the intelligencia so closely that criticism of the culture and the government had nearly ceased among the more mature academicians. Only younger intellectuals, such as Susan Sontag, could become the critics of government policies. But eventually the American Mythology, constructed by American Studies, could not answer the calls for massive social change and equality that characterized the 1960s and early 1970s. This shattered the intellectual hegemony of Myth Symbolism.

Martin then examines how the print media treated the war. He examines writings and thought in two different areas: intellectual and popular culture. Among intellectuals, the debate over the Vietnam war was divisive. Many intellectuals supported government policies because of government control of research funding. Others, such as Walter Lippmann, became members of the New Left, in strong opposition to the war. Others slowly converted from one camp to the other. One example of a pro-war intellectual who eventually came to oppose it was Daniel Ellsberg. Ellsberg worked closely with Robert MacNamara in 1967 in defining Vietnam policies, but released the Pentagon Papers to *The New York Times* in 1971. The 1965 White House Festival of Arts served as a public forum for intellectuals in the artistic community to protest the war. Some boycotted the event; others displayed art works with obvious anti-war messages. President Johnson said, "Some of them [the artists] offend me by staying away and some of them insult me by coming."[1]

Popular novels and memoirs were more consistently anti-war and showed combat from a firsthand point of view, since many authors

[1]Andrew Martin, *Receptions of War: Vietnam in American Culture*, Oklahoma Project for Discourse and Theory Series (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), 68.

were veterans. Although very realistic and often praised by critics, works of this type published during the war did not sell very widely. David Halberstam's 1968 novel, *One Very Hot Day* was well-received by critics, but could not find a market in the warweary public. The book was a fictionalized account of the early (Kennedy) phase, and followed two characters, one American soldier and one Vietnamese soldier, as they come to the same conclusion: America cannot win the Vietnam War. However, when released in the 1980s, this book sold very well. Other later released novels and memoirs critical of the war also found wider audiences. A list of these novels includes *Dispatches* (1977), the domestic drama *In Country* (1985) and *Going After Cacciato* (1978). Memoirs included *Born on the Fourth of July* (1976) and *A Rumor of War* (1977). These books demonstrate the changes in the debate about the Vietnam War. They were more often about the sense of loss and anger felt by Vietnam veterans, and their families' attempts to deal with their changed sons.

Martin also examined another form of media. He asserts that "without a doubt, much of the contemporary understanding of Vietnam . . . owes a great deal to the mass circulation of cinematic reconstructions of the war."[2] He explains how popular culture's film narratives have changed with shifts in the cultural landscape. The pro-Vietnam film *The Green Berets* (1968) starring John Wayne was nothing more than a retelling of the classic cowboy story, with the Viet Cong replacing Apaches as convenient cannon fodder for superior American firepower.

However, the Western format which used vaguely hidden images of the Vietnam War criticized such a view. Heroes like Clint Eastwood in *The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly* displayed self-interested and less virtuous traits than their 1950s counterparts. Traditional hero and villain roles reversed. Films like *Little Big Man* (1970) showed the atrocities committed by the cavalry against Native Americans in the West, not unlike the My Lai massacre. Martin cites B-movies such as *Satan's Sadists* (1969) and *The Losers* (1971), with more widely released films like *Taxi Driver* (1976) and *Heroes* (1977) which show Vietnam veterans as broken shells of their former selves. Although the war itself did not appear on screen much during the 1970s, the men who fought the war did. And films portrayed them as dangerous, violent loners. Films during the 1970s that did show the war (*Coming Home* (1978), *The Deer Hunter* (1978) and *Apocalypse Now* (1979)) focused on the sense of loss and conflict — internal and external — among veterans.

After a temporary fade from the cinema, Vietnam reappeared in the more conservative Reagan era. The 1982 Sylvester Stallone blockbuster, *First Blood* combined a number of familiar film expressions within a new political framework. A counterculture figure straight out of the 1960s (long hair, backpack, wandering with no destination) turns out to be a disturbed Vietnam veteran—a former Green Beret, no less. After being mistreated and imprisoned, he exacts his deadly revenge on the authority figures who would not allow him to win the war: the police, the military, and the mayor. The end of the film features an enraged Rambo, who explains: "I did what I had to do to win. But somebody wouldn't let us win"[3] Other films also feature veterans (invariably Green Berets) finishing the war they were capable of, but denied, victory in. These titles include *Uncommon Valor* (1983), *First Blood Part II* (1985) *P.O.W.: The Escape* (1986) and the *Missing in Action* series (1984-1985).

The 1986 release of *Platoon* signalled a change in the perspective of Vietnam War films. Certainly more realistic and emotionally powerful, it showed no superhuman Green Berets fighting the war single-handedly. Instead, it shows the confusion and terror of battle from the eyes of the grunt. Other films with similar themes include *Full Metal Jacket* (1987), *Casualties of War* (1988), and television shows like CBS's *Tour of Duty*. These mass media presentations showed war to be a frightening and dangerous thing, not a glamorous and exciting adventure. However, they do not deal with the economic and political issues that explain why the United States invaded Southeast Asia in the first place. In this way, the films are critical of war in general, but ignore the important issues and policy decisions that brought the United States into the Vietnam War.

Finally, Martin examined how portrayals of the Vietnam experience have drifted even further from the subject of the war and have become a more familiar melodramatic method. Martin analyzes television series such as *China Beach* and *Tour of Duty*. In their last seasons, both of these series moved away from stories about the war and toward stories about relationships between characters. Martin explains that this had to do with both the pressures of the ratings war (in an attempt to "lighten up" and obtain more viewers) and of the real Gulf War, which created an atmosphere where the government pressured the media into showing more positive examples of America. Martin also applies a Freudian analysis of Vietnam films as searches for lost masculinity and oedipal identities, dealing more with companionship and fatherhood. Examples include the closeness of the "heads" in *Platoon* and *Full Metal Jacket*, a father's search for his lost son in *Uncommon Valor*, and the unity and self-sacrifice displayed in *Hamburger Hill* (1987).

M artin concludes with a very strong statement about the war. He believes that all the conflicting messages about the Vietnam War and the legacy it has left the United States have avoided the real issues about Vietnam. Martin believes that the new myth about Vietnam is that it was "a war between victims," with the United States suffering as much as anyone. He believes that the US should come to grips with the fact that it has basically destroyed a third-world country.

As Martin sees it, the second true legacy of the Vietnam war is the enhanced "power of the media to silence opposition"[4] and to manipulate public opinion into supporting government policies. Martin's example is the Gulf War. He quotes an observer of the Gulf War who says, "we didn't learn to end war with Vietnam, we learned how to manage it."[5]

[2]Ibid., 95.

[3]Ibid., 124.
[4]Ibid., 168.
[5]Ibid., 169.

54

He concludes that although the images and discussions of the Vietnam war have changed in the past three decades, they have all continued a trend of intellectual and cultural dishonesty about its legacy. The images are different, but the effects are chillingly similar to previous ideas about America's self-righteousness and indestructibility.

One of Martin's weaknesses is his reliance on Freudian analysis. The constant discussion of "symbolic castrations" and "oedipal desires" seems a bit trite. Fortunately, he does not rely too heavily on this analytic tool. Aside from this, the book was compelling and very clearly written. Martin's wide and varied bibliography only strengthens his arguments. Although numerous works concerning Vietnam in American culture have been written, Martin

demonstrates an encyclopedic knowledge of related literature and makes a new argument concerning the true legacy of Vietnam. He relied on works about film, literature, philosophy, historiography, history, and post-modernist feminist thought. He examined works ranging from popular books to the work of intellectuals, from B-movies to Oscar-winning performances, and from Westerns to documentaries. Martin presents a convincing argument that America needs to come to face the true Vietnam legacy: the legacy of the atrocities it committed against Vietnam, and the overwhelming power of the government and the media. Although much has been written on this subject, I recommend Andrew Martin's *Receptions of War* as a fresh insight into America's Vietnam legacy.

—*Jeff Waldhoff*